US Strategic Research Articles

The US Strategic Shifts Necessary For Stability in the Middle East

AbstractThe combination of the October 7 attacks and Israel's retaliation in the Gaza Strip has brought the Middle East closer than ever to all‐out war. While analysts focus on the long‐running enmity between Tel Aviv and Tehran, this article contends that the region can move toward stability only with changes in US policy, especially toward Iran. Ending 40 years of hostile relations would not only help reduce the likelihood of a prolonged Israel‐Iran war but also create the conditions necessary to resolve crises in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. The key is to revive the nuclear negotiations and move to a deal that can tamp down rivalries that threaten West Asian security. The author, who as an Iranian official participated in early rounds of nuclear talks in the early 2000s, analyzes the US‐Iran rivalry, recommends how to move toward a nuclear‐free region, and makes recommendations for shifts in American strategy.

A Typology Analysis of US Strategic Intervention to the Taiwan Question in the US–China Competition Era

A Typology Analysis of US Strategic Intervention to the Taiwan Question in the US–China Competition Era

CHALLENGES TO THE US ASIA PIVOT STRATEGY

The US introduced the Asia Pivot Strategy / Rebalance Asia policy in 2011 which was also known as Asia Pivot Strategy which focuses on the maintaining equilibrium in Asia particularly in Asia Pacific region. The main architect of the policy were the Hillary Clinton and Curt Campbell. The policy is designed to contain the China in the region, and in this policy they have designed to forge close links with the US allies in the region, and the role of India has been highlighted to be the key player in its policy. The Asia Pivot Strategy is accompanied by the US Strategic Guidance Programme of 2012 which focuses on the allies concerns regarding the US commitment in the region. The policy since its implementation has faced various challenges such as the difference among the US allies on the historical issues of Japan-South Korea relations as well as the concerns over the US commitments and their reservations on the Chinese military build-up and the assertive role it has posed in the South China Sea, as well as the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region under the Strings of Pearl, and the impact of the OBOR over the US Asia Pivot Strategy.

Understanding Barriers to Establishing Public JYNNEOS Mpox Vaccination Clinics in New Hampshire: Mpox vaccine clinic NH.

2022 - 2023 mpox outbreak necessitated rapid distribution of JYNNEOS vaccines from US Strategic National Stockpile to state and local public health agencies. New Hampshire's centralized public health structure required partnering with healthcare facilities to reach at-risk persons. Among the 67 organizations contacted to partner with, only 7 established public JYNNEOS vaccine clinics. The study objective was to identify barriers and resources needed for emergency public vaccination. In March 2023, mixed-method surveys were developed and sent to 20 non-participating organizations and 7 participating organizations ("vaccine-partners"). 35% (7/20) of non-participating organizations and 100% (7/7) vaccine-partners responded. Non-participating organizations (n = 5) identified lack of staffing (100%) and insufficient provider time or clinical resources (80%) as the most common barriers. Staffing needs reported by non-participating organizations included: administrative (100%); medical doctor or advanced practice practitioner (67%); and registered nurse, medical assistant, or licensed nursing assistant (67%). Vaccine partners reported similar staffing requirements. Estimated additional monthly funding needs were $3,750 for non-participating organizations and $1,680 for vaccine-partners. A minority of NH healthcare facilities established public JYNNEOS vaccination clinics. The primary barrier was insufficient staffing; additional resources and funding needs were modest. Success of the next emergency vaccination campaign depends on sustained advocacy, resources, and partnership.

Key performance indicators in extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO): protocol for a systematic review

IntroductionExtracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is an intervention used in critically ill patients with severe cardiopulmonary failure that is expensive and resource intensive and requires specialised care. There remains a significant...

1778. Same Story, Different Outbreak: Lessons from a Survey Study Investigating JYNNEOS Mpox Public Vaccination Clinic Establishment in New Hampshire

Abstract Background The 2022-2023 mpox outbreak necessitated rapid distribution of JYNNEOS vaccines from the US Strategic National Stockpile to protect at-risk persons. New Hampshire’s centralized public health structure requires partnership with healthcare facilities to administer vaccines during public health responses. We reached out to 67 organizations; only seven were able to establish a community JYNNEOS vaccine clinic. Methods To identify barriers and resources needed for emergency public vaccination, surveys were sent to seven participating and 20 non-participating organizations. Results Seven (100%) participating organizations (“vaccine-partners”) and seven (35%) non-participating organizations responded. Two out of seven non-participating respondents were non-clinical and lacked facilities and staff to conduct vaccination clinics. Of the remaining five non-participating respondents, all identified lack of staffing, provider time, and clinical resources as barriers to establishing community vaccination clinics. Vaccine-partners and non-participating organizations reported needing or utilizing the following staff positions to conduct public vaccination clinics: administrators (0.15-1.5 Full Time Equivalents [FTE]), physicians or advanced practice providers (0.2-1 FTE), registered nurses (0.17-1.5 FTE), medical/licensed nursing assistants (0.2-1 FTE), and communications outreach staff (0.5 FTE). In addition to staffing, additional funding needs estimated by all survey respondents averaged $2,057 per month (range $0-$7,500).Figure 1.Consort flow diagram. *Public mpox vaccination clinics were intended to be clinics open to the general public (i.e., open points of distribution, or PODS) serving both the organizations existing patient population, new patients, and referrals from other providers or public health for both post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) and pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) vaccination. Public mpox vaccination clinics were advertised on the NH DHHS website and in the media as a resource for all NH residents and providers. ** These clinics went through initial "onboarding" process to be able to receive and administer mpox vaccine, but they either didn't complete the process to be a public clinic, only served as a PEP provider as needed, or only chose to administer vaccine to their patient population which was allowed in select circumstances (e.g., with FQHCs) to increase equitable access.Figure 2.Barriers to establishing public mpox vaccine clinic Conclusion A minority of NH healthcare facilities elected to establish public JYNNEOS vaccination clinics. Insufficient staffing was the primary barrier. Additional resources and funding were minimal. The repeated need for public health vaccination clinics requires sustained advocacy, support, and partnership to ensure an efficient and effective emergency response for the next outbreak. Disclosures Benjamin P. Chan, MD, MPH, General Electric (GE): Stocks/Bonds

India–US Strategic Cooperation through the LEMOA Lens

Since Narendra Modi took office, India and the United States’ strategic ties have become stronger. It took almost 12 years to sign the ‘Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)’. The LEMOA offers a framework for governing the logistical assistance, supplies and services exchanged between the Indian and US forces on a reciprocal and reimbursable basis. Concerns in India’s strategic elite and political class over the endangerment of India’s strategic autonomy and compromising India’s sovereignty for a long time prevented the execution of this agreement. However, after the BJP government came to power in 2014, it negotiated this agreement with the United States. India has strategically moved closer to the United States by signing this agreement, which will have a lot of positive effects on the development of India’s strategic capabilities and the strengthening of Indian defence forces’ operational capabilities. It will also allow India to expand its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. This study analyses the LEMOA, its implications for India’s strategic autonomy, and its subsequent implications for expanding India’s strategic footprint in the region.

Examining US Strategic Interests in South Asia: A Decade-Long Study of Triangular Relations (US-Pakistan-India) in the Post-Cold War Era

This study is devoted primarily to the security priorities of the US towards South Asia in the post-Soviet decade of the 1990s. Indeed, the world witnessed the end of Cold war with the demise of Communist USSR. The United States, therefore, nourished more enthusiastically its inherent desire of a ‘New World Order’. For this purpose, South Asia again became a ‘land of desire’ for Washington to consolidate its preponderance in the strategically vital region of Asia. The research, therefore, delves into a decade long post-cold war security environment of South Asia by analyzing the US policies towards India and Pakistan. The study uses a qualitative methodology that includes a systematic review of existing literature and primary sources, including official documents and statements to identify the important factors that have influenced US strategic partnerships in South Asia and concludes that contemporary Indo-US strategic partnership has its roots since the end of cold war.

Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Varied Responses to US Strategic Competition

ABSTRACT America’s embracement of a competition posture against China has redefined their bilateral relationship and reordered the latter’s strategic environment. However, how China has responded to US strategic competition has been understudied. This study seeks to fill the gap by using structural realism to gauge China’s reactions. It argues that China’s periodic confrontations with the United States, such as the one over Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, do not define its strategy towards the United States. In fact, this strategy incorporates three components: binding, balancing, and competition. China continues to seek to bind further with the US to limit Washington’s ability to shift towards a full containment posture. As the same time, China has also been pursuing bolder or new balancing and competition measures to safeguard its security and influences. While binding represents China ‘hoping for the best’, balancing and competition show it is ‘preparing for the worst’. China’s balancing and competition measures have only further intensified the strategic rivalry with the US, even though Beijing prefers as much cooperation with Washington as possible.

Preparedness with a system integrating inventory, capacity, and capability for future pandemics and other disasters

The chaotic response of the US Strategic National Stockpile to COVID‐19 during 2020 highlighted the inadequacy of the inventory‐based approaches to disaster response. This paper examines the integration of stockpile inventory, backup capacity, and standby capability to meet the disaster‐related surge in demand in the future. We present a two‐period model of such an integrated system for consumable items with uncertain demand that follows a general probability distribution. Our model incorporates standby capability in period 1 that can be converted to additional capacity for use in period 2, with the conversion yield being deterministic or stochastic. Our main results are: (1) Adding capacity in addition to inventory is beneficial only when the capacity reservation‐related costs are relatively lower than the inventory‐related costs. In this case, adding capacity will decrease the inventory needed in both periods, the shortfall probability, and the total expected cost. (2) Adding capability in period 1 is cost‐effective only when the ratio of capability‐development cost to conversion yield is lower than the capacity reservation cost. In this case, investing in capability results in less inventory and less reserved capacity in period 2. (3) Higher uncertainty in capability conversion yield reduces the attraction of developing capability in period 1. Consequently, less capability would be developed in period 1, while more inventory and capacity would be needed in period 2 in the face of a higher shortfall probability.

From Globalisation “Friend” to Global “Foe”: The Evolution of the US Strategic Narrative on China’s Rise

From Globalisation “Friend” to Global “Foe”: The Evolution of the US Strategic Narrative on China’s Rise

China–US Strategic Competition and Indonesia’s Status Anxiety

Indonesia has been actively seeking to improve its status and has gradually developed a trinity of national–regional–world status, consisting of independent status, regional leadership status and middle power status. In the context of China–US strategic competition, Indonesia is more sensitive to the consolidation and pursuit of its status. In response, Indonesia not only inherits the traditional diplomatic policy of “rowing between two rocks” and refuses to take sides between China and the US, but also tries to lead the ASEAN countries to develop a “third way” in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper analyzes Indonesia’s perception of and response to China–US strategic competition from the perspective of status politics, arguing that status politics plays a key role as the underlying logic of Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy — maintaining close relations with both China and the United States at the material level can enhance Indonesia’s economic and military status, and maintaining autonomy at the social level can gain international recognition of its status.

Monkeypox and the safety of the blood supply.

Monkeypox and the safety of the blood supply.

Defining China–US Strategic Competition: Partisan Realignment and the Domestic Political Logic of Change in American Strategy toward China, 2009–2020

The Grand Strategy of the United States, including its strategy toward China, has always been the product of the interaction of geopolitics and domestic politics. After the Cold War, with the end of the bipolar structure of the international system and the increasing polarization of domestic politics in the United States, the impact of geopolitics on the formulation of the foreign policy of the United States has been weakened to some degree, while the spillover effect of domestic politics has weighed more heavily than before. This change could be explained in the way that while two opposing trends of Partisan Realignment began to emerge in the post-financial crisis era in the United States, the elites from both Democratic and Republican Parties had often focused on the preferences of their core political coalition as basis in foreign policy making, in order to further their own respective political interests. In regard to the American strategy toward China, with the deepening of the structural contradictions between China and the United States as well as changes in their respective external strategic choices, geopolitics became the primary logic in the formulation of American strategy toward China since 2009, thus the “strategic competition” has become the dominant mode of bilateral relations. In the view of Washington, China and the United States have formed a competitive relationship in the areas relating to the core interests of the United States, such as economy, security, values and the dominance of the existing international order. However, the questions of reality, such as how to compete with China and how to decide the priorities of their own core interests, are defined by demands of core political coalitions represented by the elites from both Democratic and Republican Parties in the context of a new round of Partisan Realignment. From Obama to Trump, different domestic political logics made the focus of American strategy toward China shifted from “institution–values” competition based on globalism to “economy–security” competition based on nationalism. Therefore, the changes in American domestic politics will present an important channel through which the orientation of American strategy toward China would be clearly observed in the future.

Can the US and OECD Strategic Petroleum Reserve Calm a Tight Market Exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine Conflict?

Can the US and OECD Strategic Petroleum Reserve Calm a Tight Market Exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine Conflict?

Foreign Aid, Development, and US Strategic Interests in the Cold War

Abstract Scholars have argued that during the Cold War, the United States gave aid to its allies to reward them for maintaining an anti-Communist foreign policy rather than to promote their economic development. This finding is mostly based on data starting in the 1970s and does not accurately characterize US grand strategy before the 1970s, when the United States used aid to promote development among its allies in order to strengthen them against Communism. Using original data collected from historical editions of USAID's “Greenbook,” this article identifies the amount of unconditional aid in the United States’ foreign-aid programs in the period 1955–1970. This type of aid was designed to be politically attractive rather than to be developmentally effective. This article also develops an original measure of aid recipients’ geopolitical alignment that draws on hand coding of 466 diplomatic documents. Using these data, this article finds that there was more unconditional aid in the United States’ aid programs to neutral and nonaligned countries than in the United States’ aid programs to its allies and security partners—a counterintuitive finding that shows how different the first half of the Cold War was from the second.1

Стратегия США в Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе и отношения с КНР

The aim of the research is to analyse the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region and its impact on relations with the PRC. This article examines the basic principles of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy set out in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, in the 2019 report “Indo-Pacific region. Readiness, partnership and assistance of the regional network”, the 2020 US Strategic Approach to China. The balance of forces and the development of relations between the US and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region are analysed. The originality of the research lies in the fact that the emerging competition between the two states for leading positions in the Indo-Pacific region can be seen in the proposed concept of China “One Belt, One Road” and in the US strategy of “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy”. As a result, it is determined that in recent years, there has been a significant increase in tension in the South China Sea due to the increase in military infrastructure in the disputed territories of the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. The Taiwan issue remains a controversial factor in the development of Sino-American relations.

China–US Strategic Competition and the Descent of a Porous Curtain

Abstract Since the onset of the Coronavirus Disease 2019(COVID-19) global pandemic, Sino–US strategic rivalry has dramatically heightened to a pitch where there is a mounting discussion over whether or not China and the United States have embarked on a “new Cold War.” There are three main views in this regard. The first is that China and the United States have indeed entered a new Cold War; the second is that China and the United States are heading for a new Cold War; and the third is that China and the United States will not descend into a new Cold War. Different views reflect different scholarly understandings of the essential properties of the Cold War concept. Fundamentally, the two core features of the Cold War were ideological confrontation and proxy war. Considering that current US–China strategic competition is in the technological rather than ideological domain, and that neither side has instigated any proxy war; however, the phrase “new Cold War” is inappropriate; that of “Porous Curtain” is more apt. The ever-narrowing power gap between China and the United States has undoubtedly prompted the US government’s adoption of a policy of blockade and containment to curb China’s rising power. However, the deep integration of the international system and historical inertia of US–China interaction preclude the US’s complete isolation from China. This has resulted in bilateral relations of a more porous nature. Although the future may not be promising, competition does not necessarily lead to conflict. For this reason, managing the bilateral competitive relationship and striving towards coexistence under competition should be the key task of both countries.

Long-term and short-term liquid fuel security in Australia – What role for the Great Australian Bight?

This article hypothesises that Australia's long-term and short-term liquid fuel security will not be improved by the exploitation of petroleum resources in the frontier Great Australian Bight (GAB) basin. This analysis demonstrates that significant challenges arise regarding Australia's energy policy which promotes the development of the GAB, due to corporate imperatives, global economic conditions, and localised challenges such as depth, distance, and prevailing weather. Furthermore, the closure of over half of Australia's refineries has placed structural demands on Australian refinery capacity. Therefore, even if oil were to be found in the GAB and developed, Australia's current policy approaches to downstream refining capacity mean that any oil discovered would likely be exported. Short term, such policy frameworks would cause a significant deficit in Australia's International Energy Agency (IEA) stockpile capacity, requiring the leasing of oil stocks from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to meet IEA demands. Given these insecurities, this article postulates that Australia's energy security policy, and particularly its liquid fuel security policy, should be revisited, revised, and reformed to ensure liquid fuel security for all sectors of the economy.

How Much Does Oil Shape US Strategic Interests in the Middle East?

How Much Does Oil Shape US Strategic Interests in the Middle East?