US Special Forces Research Articles

Initial report on special operations clinical training at a civilian academic medical center.

Military-civilian partnerships for combat casualty care skills training have mostly focused on traditional, combat surgical team training. We sought to better understand US Special Forces (SF) Medics' training at West Virginia University in Morgantown, West Virginia, a Level 1 trauma center, via assessments of medical knowledge, clinical skills confidence, and technical performance. Special Forces Medics were evaluated using posttraining medical knowledge tests, procedural skills confidence surveys (using a 5-point Likert scale), and technical skills assessments using fresh perfused cadavers in a simulated combat casualty care environment. Data from these tests, surveys, and assessments were analyzed for 18 consecutive SF medic rotations from the calendar years 2019 through 2021. A total of 108 SF Medics' tests, surveys, and assessments were reviewed. These SF Medics had an average of 5.3 years of active military service; however, deployed experience was minimal (73% never deployed). Review of knowledge testing demonstrated a slight increase in mean test score between the precourse (80% ± 14%; range, 50-100%) when compared with the postcourse (82% ± 14%; range, 50-100%). Skills confidence scores increased between courses, specifically within the point of injury care ( p = 0.09) and prolonged field care ( p < 0.001). Technical skills assessments included cricothyroidotomy, chest tube insertion, and tourniquet placement. This study provides preliminary evidence supporting military-civilian partnerships at an academic Level 1 trauma center to provide specialty training to SF Medics as demonstrated by increase in medical knowledge and confidence in procedural skills. Additional opportunities exist for the development technical skills assessments. Therapeutic/Care Management; Level IV.

US Special Forces transformation: post-Fordism and the limits of networked warfare

Abstract The last two decades have witnessed a rapid rise in the use, size and capability of many western Special Operations Forces (SOF). A response to the global jihadist threat, the growing presence, prominence and technology-enabled lethality of SOF in conflict zones has resulted in increased scholarly attention. Some have argued that their rise is indicative of important and ongoing changes in the character of war itself. One of the most influential of these works is Steven Niva's study of the transformation of US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Task Forces in Iraq. Niva argues that JSOC (more accurately its Task Force 714 Command Headquarters, henceforth TF714) was forced to adopt a networked organizational structure to counter Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). For Niva, this transformation provided evidence of a shift towards ‘counter-net’ and ‘chaoplexic’ forms of warfare conceptualized by Bousquet in this journal. This article uses new primary and secondary sources to critique these claims. It argues that although a network approach was an important part of TF714's transformation, it was only one part. Instead, JSOC's transformation is more accurately understood through a post-Fordist industrial framework of the centralization of management control and the simultaneous decentralization of decision-making; the integration of core and periphery forces; outsourcing; and a network approach to knowledge. From this analysis, it argues that post-Fordist, rather than network or chaoplexic theory, best describes even the most networked military organizations in the twenty-first century, and that more broadly, fully networked warfare is unlikely given the frictions associated with the coming ‘binary’ battlefield.

Islamic terrorism in Mozambique and the role of the United States

The author explores the origins of the current Islamist insurgency in the northern province of Mozambique Cabo Delgado and the factors that enabled it to develop: a local traditional Islamic leadership out of touch with the interests of younger Muslims; an economic and social deprivation in the North of Mozambique amid a wealth of natural resources; the corruption and an ineffective local governance. The current and potential assistance to Mozambique”s flagging counterterrorism efforts on the part of African states – SADC’s members and USA are also reviewed though Washington while supporting SADC’s military operations limited itself until recently to periodical participation of the US special forces in the training of Mozambican security detachments to fight local jihadists.

Carl Wilhelm Sem-Jacobsen: Aerospace Neurophysiology and Deep Brain Stimulation Pioneer.

The Norwegian physician Carl Wilhelm Sem-Jacobsen (1912–1991) was a pioneer in deep brain stimulation and aerospace neurophysiology, but for several reasons, his story has remained untold. During WW2, he collaborated with a renowned military underground resistance group against the Nazi occupants and then had to flee to neutral Sweden. He returned to participate in the liberation of Northern Norway as a Captain in the US Special Forces also working with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services—precursor for CIA) and received a citation from General Eisenhower for his contributions. Sem-Jacobsen then spent several years in the US training in psychiatry and clinical neurophysiology at the Mayo Clinic. He constructed his own medical technical devices, was among the first to develop deep brain stimulation, and made the smallest EEG and EKG recording systems yet produced, also used by the American astronauts walking on the Moon. But he was more an inventor than a researcher, and few of his observations were published in peer-reviewed medical journals. He built his own neurophysiologic institute for neurosurgery, deep brain recordings, and deep brain stimulation in Oslo's main psychiatric hospital, but was sponsored by US military forces and NASA. He knew CIA Director William E. Colby personally, and rumors soon flourished that Sem-Jacobsen conducted secret mind control experiments for American authorities and the CIA. These accusations were investigated, and long after his death, he was officially absolved by a Hearing Committee appointed by the Norwegian Government. Nevertheless, all his personal files were burnt by his family who was still harassed by investigative journalists. Sem-Jacobsen also documented some of his work on film, but the whereabouts of these films have remained unknown. I searched for them for several years and recently discovered numerous films and photographs in an old barn in rural Norway. These films and photographs document in-action neurophysiology recordings in divers, pilots, and astronauts, and they show how Sem-Jacobsen in collaboration with experienced neurosurgeons in Oslo conducted the very first trials with deep brain stimulation in patients with Parkinson disease. He apparently even tried subthalamic stimulation as early as in the 1950s.

LIMITER – CONSTRUCTIVE COMPONENT, NECESSARY FOR DETERMINING A SUBJECT SHORT-POINTED WEAPONS

The systematic analysis of the world experience of civilian use of knives not as cold weapons showed that at present the knife did not become the main attribute of equipping tourists, fish men and even hunters. In particular, today there are very few types of hunting, during which the knife is used to finish off the beast or to protect against it. At the same time, as the practice of hunting management proves, during hunting there are many uses for the knife, even without considering it as a means for cooking. This, in particular, sharpening various stakes (for a tent, a hut, a campfire), skinning a game, preparing chips for a fire, scraping ice from skis or marsh mud from shoes. To do this, in accordance with current state technical standards, any folding knife must have a lock, and the blades of all knives must be of sufficient thickness so as not to break from the load. Handles of hunting knives should be comfortable to hold so that your hand will not get tired during long-term work. For all knives, according to the technical requirements, the length and thickness of the blade must be consistent, as well as the angle of inclination of the tip relative to the axis of the blade. With regard to the above, an interesting example is the collection of knives by the Swedish company Eriksson, consisting of four models, made in the configuration of the Swedish finca. The knives have a handle and a blade of a classic Finnish knife, but with a one-sided stopper. Their blades, depending on the color of the handle, are made of different types of steel. Knives with blue plastic handles have stainless steel blades, and knives with red handles are made of carbon steel. It is believed that in Sweden almost every construction worker walks with such a knife in his pocket. It should be noted that according to the current method of forensic investigation of cold weapons and structurally similar products in it, these knives can be attributed to cold weapons by the size of the blade. It is also interesting an urban-type knife, which is not a cold weapon of the Worden Tactical Medium Company. Renowned wizard Kelly Warden, an instructor for American Rangers, designs this knife. Since 2001, Kelly Warden has been the main consultant on impact and blade weapons of Detachment 1 of the US Special Forces. He trains Special Forces hand-to-hand combat with the use of a knife, machete, baton, sticks, as well as the method of forceful detention. The blade length of the knife described is 74 mm, thickness – 3.8 mm; the handle has a sub-finger protrusion to prevent the arm from slipping on the blade. The knife does not have a standard stopper, which, in addition to protecting it from slipping the hand on the blade, must prevent the hand from sinking into the victim’s body. By all measures, this knife is not a cold weapon in accordance with the requirements of the criminal law of Ukraine. Kelly Warden believes that the knife as a means of self-defense levels the difference in weight, height and physical strength, but its main drawback is its damaging ability. The proposed article is devoted to this circumstance, the definition of the role of the restrictor in classifying a knife as a cold weapon.

Pakistan’s grand strategy: the poverty of imagination

ABSTRACT This article is concerned with a significant grand strategic choice that Pakistan faces concerning its relations with China. The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has deteriorated since the US Special Forces found and killed Osama Bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad in May 2011. Instead, Pakistan has been recalibrating its grand strategy enabling it to get closer to China. The country has received large Chinese investment to start several infrastructural projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. We argue that Pakistan is making a grave strategic mistake. Its partnership with China is unnatural and it will count against its core interests in the future. We suggest that Pakistan should reorient its grand strategy in order to bring it closer to Western democracies. Doing so will ensure greater security, economic development and sovereign independence for Pakistan.

‘The perfect counterinsurgent’: reconsidering the case of Major Jim Gant

ABSTRACTIn 2009, Major Jim Gant published a treatise online entitled One Tribe at a Time, outlining a strategy for victory in Afghanistan based on the still untested counterinsurgency doctrine developed by General David Petraeus. Gant was given the opportunity to put theory to the test by returning to the village of Mangwal in eastern Kunar Province. Evaluation of Gant’s mission has been overshadowed by the scandal that led to his resignation from the US Special Forces. This essay provides a re-examination of Gant’s time in Mangwal based on interviews with residents of Mangwal and an appraisal of the lessons that can be learned from Gant’s attempt to put counterinsurgency principles into practice.

Characteristics of PCDD/Fs in soil and sediment samples collected from A-So former airbase in Central Vietnam

A-So airbase, located in A-Luoi Valley — Central Vietnam, is a former military base occupied by US Special Forces between 1963 and 1966. The storage of Agent Orange in A-So airbase during the Vietnam War now poses a high potential for PCDD/F contamination in soils and sediments. In order to evaluate the occurrence and characteristics of PCDD/Fs in A-So former airbase, which has been reserved for a long time and suffered almost no significant anthropogenic impacts, soil and sediment samples were collected from 40 sites of two adjacent zones A and B in an area of 160,000 m2. Seventeen 2,3,7,8-substituted PCDD/Fs were analyzed using HRCG/HRMS (US EPA method 1613). Results indicate that concentrations of PCDD/Fs measured in zone A ranged from 95.0 to 4534 ng kgdw−1 (4.58 to 746 ng TEQ kgdw−1), while those in zone B were in the range of 80.8–4150 ng kgdw−1 (2.70–89.0 ng TEQ kgdw−1). The concentrations of PCDD/Fs observed in zone A are higher than those in zone B, suggesting that PCDD/Fs could be transported from zone A to zone B through surface soil erosion and runoff events. The main contributor to the total TEQ concentration was 2,3,7,8-TCDD, which was the indicator of Agent Orange contamination, accounting for 91 ± 9% and 72 ± 17% of the total TEQ concentrations measured in zones A and B, respectively. Comparison of PCDD/F concentrations in different soil layers reveals that the topsoil layer (at depth < 1 m) contributed 81–95% to the total PCDD/Fs in the study area, indicating that future remediation projects should focus on this topsoil layer. Since PCDD/F contamination in A-So airbase has not significantly improved for the last 20 years, remediation projects are urgently needed in order to mitigate the negative impacts of PCDD/F contamination on human health and wellbeing.

Using Machine Learning to Predict Lower-Extremity Injury in US Special Forces.

Musculoskeletal injury rates in military personnel remain unacceptably high. Application of machine learning algorithms could be useful in multivariate models to predict injury in this population. The purpose of this study was to investigate if interaction between individual predictors, using a decision tree model, could be used to develop a population-specific algorithm of lower-extremity injury (LEI) risk. One hundred forty Air Force Special Forces Operators (27.4 ± 5.0 yr, 177.6 ± 5.8 cm, 83.8 ± 8.4 kg) volunteered for this prospective cohort study. Baseline testing included body composition, isokinetic strength, flexibility, aerobic/anaerobic capacity, anaerobic power, and landing biomechanics. To evaluate unilateral landing patterns, subjects jumped off two-feet from a distance (40% of their height) over a hurdle and landing single-legged on a force plate. Medical chart reviews were conducted 365 d postbaseline. χ automatic interaction detection (CHAID) was used, which compares predictor variables to LEI and assigns a population-specific "cut-point" for the most relevant predictors. Twenty-seven percent of operators (n = 38) suffered LEI. A maximum knee flexion angle difference of 25.1% had the highest association with injury in this population (P = 0.006). Operators with >25.1% differences in max knee flexion angle (n = 13) suffered LEI at a 69.2% rate. Seven of the 13 Operators with >25.1% difference in max knee flexion angle weighed >81.8 kg, and 100% of those operators suffered LEI (P = 0.047; n = 7). Only 33% of operators with >25.1% difference in max knee flexion angle that weighed <81.8 kg suffered LEI. This study demonstrated increased risk of LEI over a 365-d period in Operators with greater differences in single-leg landing strategies and higher body mass. The CHAID approach can be a powerful tool to analyze population-specific risk factors for injury, along with how those factors may interact to enhance risk.

‘Drawing the line’ in El Salvador: Washington confronts insurgency in El Salvador, 1979–92

The United States’ intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979–92, represented the largest nation-building effort launched by Washington between the end of Vietnam and the second war with Iraq. Washington deployed US Special Forces advisers to El Salvador to prevent further human rights abuses, emphasise the importance of winning the affection of civilians, and professionalise and reform the Salvadoran military. Overall, the intervention produced mixed results, including a negotiated settlement. Despite reservations about the efficacy of US policy, lessons from El Salvador have been reapplied elsewhere, including most recently in Iraq.

US Special Forces: an other within the self

ABSTRACTIn the post-9/11 era the United States’ (US) Special Operations Forces have become an increasingly prominent feature amongst the country’s vast military options. This article is the first to examine US Special Forces through a critical discursive lens. The article examines the conditions of possibility that US security discourse constructs for its Special Forces, who use some methods of warfare which are more commonly associated with US enemies in constructed notions of US warfare. The article argues that the Special Forces’ representation as an ‘elite’ fighting force in popular US discourse acts to stabilize the Special Forces within the wider discursive structures of US security. This is supplemented by a narrative of mystique and the willingness of the Special Forces to ‘fight fire with fire’ against imagined radical threats. In doing this it is possible to highlight the damaging effect of the Special Forces on understandings of the US Self, which constructs its identity in part through how the US ‘should’ fight wars. Despite the difficulty in articulating the Special Forces as part of the ‘American way of war’, US security discourse has proved remarkably flexible in reconciling the Special Forces within its existing structures.

Hip Arthroscopy for Femoroacetabular Impingement in a Military Population

Background: Femoroacetabular impingement (FAI) can lead to hip pain and early joint degeneration. There have been few reports to date on the outcomes of hip arthroscopy for the treatment of FAI in the military population. Purpose/Hypothesis: The purpose of this study was to compare patient demographics with postoperative outcomes after hip arthroscopy for symptomatic FAI and to identify preoperative risk factors for poor outcomes. The hypothesis was that certain preoperative patient characteristics will be predictive of poorer outcomes and that lower outcomes scores will be associated with a higher likelihood of medical separation from the military. Study Design: Case series; Level of evidence, 4. Methods: Retrospective chart review of active-duty and dependent patients older than 18 years who underwent hip arthroscopy for symptomatic FAI from 2009 to 2014 at a single institution. Results: A total of 469 (309 males and 160 females) surgeries were performed on 456 active-duty personnel and 13 dependent civilians, with a mean 2.5-year follow-up. Overall, 39% (n = 179) were able to return to duty (RTD), 18% (n = 82) were medically cleared to return to normal daily activities but did not remain on active duty, and 43% (n = 195) required referral to the Disability Evaluation System (DES). Increasing rank and male sex were positive predictors and Axis 1 psychiatric diagnosis, revision surgery, concomitant psoas tenotomy, multiple medical comorbidities, and complaints of generalized pelvic pain were negative predictors for returning to duty. US Marine Infantry and Special Forces showed improved RTD rates (50%-86%) compared with administrative, more sedentary, occupations (22%). On average, Single Alpha Numeric Evaluation (SANE) and visual analog scale (VAS) scores improved after surgery, with SANE scores improving 37 ± 28 points and VAS scores improving 2.6 ± 2.5 points. The mean postoperative SANE and VAS scores differed significantly between the RTD group and those not returning to duty; 87 and 1.2 points compared with 69 and 3.6 points, respectively (P < .0001). Conclusion: Hip arthroscopy for the treatment of symptomatic FAI effectively improves pain symptoms and self-reported overall function but shows a much lower than expected return to full, unrestricted active duty in the general active-duty military population. Underlying psychiatric diagnoses, female sex, and more sedentary occupations are associated with lower RTD rates. Furthermore, lower postoperative SANE and VAS scores are associated with lower RTD rates. Only the more active and elite components of the military study population showed RTD rates consistent with previously reported outcomes of return to competitive sports after hip arthroscopy for FAI.

Death Squads and Death Lists: Targeted Killing and the Character of the State

The intention of this paper is to urge critical reflection upon current US practices of targeted killing by considering not just whether acts of targeted killing can be legally justified but also what sort of state we are turning into when we organize the use of lethal force in this way -- maintaining a list of named enemies of the state who are to be eliminated in this way. My paper uses the unpleasant terminology of and to jolt us into this reflection. Of course, there are differences between the activities of death squads in (say) El Salvador in the early 1980s and the processes by which US special forces, intelligence personnel, and drone operators, kill the individuals named on a list of state enemies, one by one. They are not morally equivalent. But the two sets of phenomena are much closer to one another than we ought to be comfortable with. And we certainly should not be comfortable with a world in which death lists and death squads -- even of the respectable American kind -- become a standard practice and standard operating procedure for all states.

Death Lists and Death Squads: Targeted Killing and the Character of the State

The intention of this paper is to urge critical reflection upon current US practices of targeted killing by considering not just whether acts of targeted killing can be legally justified but also what sort of state we are turning into when we organize the use of lethal force in this way -- maintaining a list of named enemies of the state who are to be eliminated in this way. My paper uses the unpleasant terminology of and to jolt us into this reflection. Of course, there are differences between the activities of death squads in (say) El Salvador in the early 1980s and the processes by which US special forces, intelligence personnel, and drone operators, kill the individuals named on a list of state enemies, one by one. They are not morally equivalent. But the two sets of phenomena are much closer to one another than we ought to be comfortable with. And we certainly should not be comfortable with a world in which death lists and death squads -- even of the respectable American kind -- become a standard practice and standard operating procedure for all states.

America's elite: US Special Forces from the American Revolution to the present day

America's elite: US Special Forces from the American Revolution to the present day

‘Has ‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing Under International Law’

The killing of Osama bin Laden by US Special Forces on 2 May 2011 raises several questions of international law with regard to the legality of this particular operation and the permissibility of targeted killings of international terrorists in general. In this paper it will be argued, on the basis of an analysis of the applicable international law, that the killing of bin Laden cannot be justified under international humanitarian law because there is no armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaida. Even if one were to assume the existence of such an armed conflict, bin Laden’s killing would only have been lawful if Al-Qaida were to be considered an organized armed group within the meaning of international humanitarian law and bin Laden could have been killed qua membership in this group. Otherwise, his killing could only have been lawful if he was (still) taking a direct part in hostilities. In any case, in the absence of an armed conflict, under the applicable legal regime of peacetime the killing could only be justified in a situation of self-defence or an immediate danger for others. As this situation did apparently not exist, the killing of bin Laden amounted to an extra-judicial execution. On another note, the operation may also have violated international law by failing to respect Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. Ultimately, this depends on the recognition of a (pre-emptive) right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in particular taking into account the immediacy criterion.

Has ‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden's Killing Under International Law

The killing of Osama bin Laden by US Special Forces on 2 May 2011 raises several questions of international law with regard to the legality of this particular operation and the permissibility of targeted killings of international terrorists in general. In this article it will be argued, on the basis of an analysis of the applicable international law, that the killing of bin Laden cannot be justified under international humanitarian law because there is no armed conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. Even if one were to assume the existence of such an armed conflict, bin Laden's killing would only have been lawful if Al Qaeda were to be considered an organised armed group within the meaning of international humanitarian law and bin Laden could have been killedquamembership of this group. Otherwise, his killing could only have been lawful if he was (still) taking a direct part in hostilities. In any case, in the absence of an armed conflict, under the applicable legal regime of peacetime, the killing could only be justified in a situation of self-defence or an immediate danger for others. As this situation apparently did not exist, the killing of bin Laden amounted to an extrajudicial execution. On another note, the operation may also have violated international law by failing to respect Pakistan's territorial sovereignty. Ultimately, this depends on the recognition of a (pre-emptive) right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in particular taking into account the immediacy criterion.

Targeted Killings and the International Legal Framework: With Particular Reference to the US Operation against Osama Bin Laden

On 2 May 2011, a team of US Special Forces executed an operation against Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. The extraterritorial use of force against a nonState actor in the territory of another State with the aim of using lethal force against an individual is recognized as the phenomenon of targeted killings. Such operations exist on two levels: the extraterritorial use of force in the territory of another State and the use of lethal force against an individual. However, such operations also appear to blur and challenge boundaries within the international legal framework. This paper aims to clarify the existing rules within international law which govern targeted killings. The operation against Bin Laden will be used as a study to facilitate understanding of the legal considerations which arise in assessing the prohibition and permissibility of Targeted Killings under the existing framework of international law. This paper will examine the official US position under international law on targeted killings and the operation against Bin Laden to identify the legal justifications put forward. The paper will then continue to examine these legal justifications under existing frameworks in international law from three legal regimes which come into play: (i) jus ad bellum; (ii) jus in bello; (iii) International Human Rights Law.

III. ASSASSINATION AND TARGETED KILLING—THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN

Osama Bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 in the course of an operation by US special forces (Navy Seals) in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 The US forces were flown by helicopter from neighbouring Afghanistan. The death of Bin Laden renewed questions about the legality of such operations during armed conflicts and during peacetime.2 The potentially applicable law includes international humanitarian law, international human rights law, jus ad bellum and the domestic law of the US and Pakistan.3

Commonwealth News Update

After a decade-long hunt, Osama bin Laden was killed by US special forces in Pakistan, which knew nothing of the raid and denied knowledge of his whereabouts. The Sri Lankan government was accused of violating human rights by a UN panel investigating the civil war. In Nigeria, the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, beat his northern rival, Muhammadu Buhari, in the presidential election. After worldwide protests, Ugandan MPs suspended a bill introducing the death penalty for homosexuals. Top Kenyan politicians were arraigned for trial at the International Criminal Court. Swaziland stepped up its crackdown on civil rights activists. Canada's political landscape was transformed by the federal elections. Samoa leapt into the future.