US Dollar Funding Research Articles

Reserves Were Not so Ample After All

Abstract We show that the likelihood of a liquidity crunch in wholesale US dollar funding markets depends on levels of reserve balances at the financial institutions that are the most active intermediaries of these markets. Heightened risk of an imminent liquidity crunch is signaled by significant delays in intra-day payments to these large financial institutions over the prior two weeks. Our study contributes to the broader dialogue surrounding the Federal Reserve’s ongoing quantitative tightening (QT).

A Hierarchical-Dealer-Centric Model of FX Swap Valuation

This paper constructs a model of foreign exchange (FX) swap valuation based on dealers’ behavior and the hierarchy of the global dollar funding system. International investors use these currency derivatives to synthetically fill their US-dollar funding gaps. In this model, three attributes of market structure drive the valuation of FX swaps: market-making costs (measured by dealers’ bid-ask spreads), dollar funding liquidity risk (measured by CIP deviation and market imperfections), and FX swap market liquidity (measured by dealer competition). The goal is to understand how market design influences the cost of US dollar funding and its spillover effects. FX dealers are vital institutions in this ecosystem, as their balance sheets connect national monetary systems to the global dollar funding markets. For currencies with low FX turnover, central banks act as market makers, while private banks serve as dealers for currencies with the highest FX turnover. Studying the “dollar funding gap” through the lens of FX swap dealers is a crucial aspect often overlooked in international finance scholarship.

Global Risk, Non-Bank Financial Intermediation, and Emerging Market Vulnerabilities

Over the last two decades, the unprecedented increase in non-bank financial intermediation, particularly the rise of open-end mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, accounts for nearly half of the external financing flows to emerging markets, exceeding cross-border lending by global banks. Evidence suggests that investment fund flows enhance risk sharing across borders and provide emerging markets access to more diverse forms of financing. However, a growing body of evidence also indicates that investment funds are inherently more vulnerable to liquidity and redemption risks during periods of global financial market stress, increasing the volatility of capital flows to emerging markets. Benchmark-driven investments, namely passive funds, appear particularly sensitive to global risk shocks, such as tightening US dollar funding conditions, compared to their active fund counterparts. The procyclicality of investment fund flows to emerging markets during times of global stress poses financial stability concerns, with implications for the role of macroprudential policy.

A framework for economic performance recovery in South Africa during the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic

In the trajectory to protect people and ensure national security regarding the rapid spread of the Corona virus disease pandemic, restrictions measures adopted by the South African government have caused severe collateral damages to the local economy. This article aims to provide a framework for economic performance recovery while dealing with the pandemic consequences. Using primary and secondary data, the retrieved statistical model depicts that 96.90% of the COVID-19 Economic Performance Recovery’ behaviour depends on the movement of COVID-19 Banking revitalisation, COVID-19 Financial policies, COVID-19 Management Process, COVID-19 Stakeholders Involvement and COVID-19 Future perspectives since the correlation is very strong and positive with coefficients that are respectively 96.4%, 95.1%, 95.6% and 94.9%. The stakeholders’ involvement component was not significant with a p-value of .143 but its combination with other factors enhances economic performance recovery. The regression standardised residual for C19EPR with an asymmetric probability distribution characterised by a negative skewness of - .531 long left tail and the Kurtosis of -.977. For banking revitalisation, repo rate should be increased while banking regulations, loan guarantee scheme and the provisional mortgage forbearance to borrowers initiated with the pandemic should be suspended. Structural reforms should be implemented to sustain the implementation of the recovery plan namely the restructuration of trade policies and lowering barriers entry for business movements, supporting labour-intensive sectors like agriculture and tourism for inclusive growth and catalysing education and skills development. National and global pandemic -related stakeholders should be improved to support direct fiscal support and government guarantee schemes in addition to measures to provide liquidity to banks markets, alleviate US Dollar funding shortages. As part of the future perspectives to mitigate the pandemic issues, government should systematically monitor market price increase, and reduce exceptions for public policy considerations. In overall, recovery of economic performance in South Africa will depend on the GDP improvement and an increase of the repo rate. Furthermore, standard local issues like incessant trade disruptions, business declines, unemployment, drop of government revenues, orientated national funding and poverty increase should be improved as well. However, South African government only has to observe decentralised and implement international policies defined in the settings of the pandemic.

FX Swap Valuation As a Cost of Filling Dollar Funding Gap: A Hierarchical and Dealer-Centric Perspective

This paper constructs a model of the FX swap valuation, the cost of synthetic dollar borrowing, based on the dealers’ behavior and the hierarchy of international finance. In this model, three fundamentals- market-making costs (measured by dealers’ bid-ask spreads), dollar funding liquidity risk (measured by CIP deviation), and the FX swap market liquidity (measured by the dealers’ competition)- derive the valuation of FX swap. The goal is to understand the financial instability spillovers between FX swaps and offshore US-Dollar funding markets through the “dealers” channel. FX dealers are vital institutions that connect different national monetary jurisdictions in the international monetary system. For currencies where FX turnover is low, market makers are central banks. On the other hand, those dealers are primarily private banks for currencies with the highest FX turnover, such as the US dollar. Nevertheless, studying the “dollar funding gap” through the lens of FX swap dealers is a feature that often gets overlooked in International Political Economy scholarship.

The impact of COVID-19 on the standard & poor 500 index sectors: a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model

Purpose This paper aims to examine the impact of the daily growth rate of COVID-19 cases in the USA (COVIDg), the Federal Fund Rate (FFR) and the trade-weighted US dollar index (USDX) on S&P500 index daily returns and its 11 constituent sectors’ indices for the time period between January 22, 2020, until June 30, 2020. Design/methodology/approach The study uses the multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) model to gauge the impacts over the whole period of study, as well as over two sub-periods; first, January 22, 2020, until March 30, 2020, reflecting uncertainty in the US markets and second, from April 1, 2020, until June 30, 2020, reflecting the lockdown. Findings Results of the MGARCH model reveal a negative and significant relation between COVIDg and S&P500 index daily returns over the first sub-period and the whole study period in the following sectors, namely, communications, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health, technology and materials. Yet, COVIDg showed a positive and significant relation with S&P500 index daily returns during the second time period in the following sectors, namely, communication, consumer discretionary, financial, industrial, information technology (IT) and utilities. Besides, USDX showed a negative significant effect on S&P500 index daily returns and on the daily return on each of its 11 constituent sectors over the second sub-period and the whole period. Further, FFR showed a significant effect only in the second sub-period, specifically, a negative effect on the daily return of the financial sector and a positive effect on the daily return of the technology sector index. Nevertheless, FFR had a positive significant effect on the daily return of the utilities sector index for the whole period under study. Research limitations/implications The impact of the crisis on the S&P500 index can be assessed only with some limitations owing to available global data and the limited time frame of the lock-down. Practical implications The study proposes supporting a smooth, functioning and resilient financial system; increasing fiscal measures by the US Government to increase liquidity on constraints; measures by The Federal Reserve to alleviate US dollar funding shortages; support market integrity; ensure continuous transparency and sharing of information; support the health sector, as well as consumer-based sectors that faced demand shocks and facilitate investments in the technology sector. Originality/value The originality of this paper lies in the examination of the impact of the novel COVID-19 pandemic on each of the 11 sectors constituting the S&P500 index separately, reflecting how the main economic sectors formulating the US economy reacted to the shock during the peak time of the pandemic to observe a full picture of the economic consequences amid the pandemic.

Non-US Global Banks and Dollar (Co-)Dependence: How Housing Markets Became Internationally Synchronized

US net capital inflows drive the international synchronization of house price growth. An increase (decrease) in US net capital inflows improves (tightens) US dollar funding conditions for non-US global banks, leading them to increase (decrease) foreign lending to third-party borrowing countries. This induces a synchronization of lending across borrowing countries, which translates into an international synchronization of mortgage credit growth and, ultimately, house price growth. Importantly, this synchronization is driven by non-US global banks’ common but heterogenous exposure to US dollar funding conditions, not by the common exposure of borrowing countries to non-US global banks. Our results identify a novel channel of international transmission of US dollar funding conditions: As these conditions vary over time, borrowing country pairs whose non-US global creditor banks are more dependent on US dollar funding exhibit higher house price synchronization.

From CIP-deviations to a market for risk premia: A dynamic investigation of cross-currency basis swaps

The persistent deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIP) since 2007 indicate that specific frictions continue to exist, which prevent them from being arbitraged away. In this study, we investigate the cross-currency basis swap market. We put forward the argument that the risk premium expressed via the CIP-deviation constitutes a unique market that determines its own equilibrium price after receiving feedback from various sources, including contagion within the market itself. We investigate contagion using a TVP-VAR framework of analysis that measures the extent of connectedness across the bases on all G10 currencies against the US dollar between 2007 and 2017. Our main findings indicate that connectedness is event-dependent. Furthermore, we provide evidence that net-transmitting bases are typically associated with banking sectors with significant overseas operations (e.g. EUR and JPY). Safe-haven currencies (e.g. CHF and JPY) tend to assume a net-receiving role during periods of stress. On a pairwise level, results confirm that during tranquil times in international financial markets, connectedness subdues and even reaches negligible levels – particularly for stable banking systems (e.g. CAD) or without significant US dollar funding gaps (e.g. AUD).

What Do Deviations from Covered Interest Parity and Higher FX Hedging Costs Mean for Asia?

Asian countries have high demand for US dollars and are sensitive to US dollar funding costs. An important, but often overlooked, component of these costs is the basis spread in the cross-currency swap market that emerges when there are deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). CIP deviations mean that investors need to pay a premium to borrow US dollars or other currencies on a hedged basis via the cross-currency swap markets. These deviations can be explained by regulatory changes since the GFC, which have limited arbitrage opportunities and country-specific factors that contribute to a mismatch in the demand and supply of US dollars. We find that an increase in the basis spread tightens financial conditions in net debtor countries, while eases financial conditions in net creditor countries. The main reason is that net debtor countries are, in general, unable to substitute smoothly to other domestic funding channels. Policies that promote reliable alternative funding sources, such as long-term corporate bond market, or stable long-term investors, including a “hedging counterpart of last resort,” can help stabilize financial intermediation when US dollar funding markets come under stress.

Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis

This note analyzes recent trends in offshore US dollar funding markets and explores the drivers of dollar funding costs during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Preliminary evidence suggests that only part of the sharp increase in observed dollar funding costs can be attributed to the standard supply- and demand-side factors analyzed in the October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), including the dollar funding fragility of non-US global banks. Changes in market structure since the global financial crisis, as well as heightened uncertainty and tensions in the commercial paper market, may provide further explanations for the movements in dollar funding costs in late March 2020. The US Federal Reserve’s swap line arrangements have helped lessen strains in dollar funding markets, but funding pressure remains significant for some emerging market economies, notably those with-out access to the swap lines. Furthermore, tighter dollar funding conditions appear to have accompanied increases in financial stress in the home economies of affected non-US global banks and to have generated adverse spill-over effects in the form of cutbacks in cross-border lending.

Global Financial Stability Notes: The Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis: Some Observations

Global Financial Stability Notes: The Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis: Some Observations

Global Banks’ Dollar Funding

Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems’ resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.

Global Banks’ Dollar Funding: A Source of Financial Vulnerability

Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems’ resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.

Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis

Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis

Global Banks' Dollar Funding: A Source of Financial Vulnerability

Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems' resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.

Role of Cross Currency Swap Markets in Funding and Investment Decisions

A US dollar funding premium in the EUR/USD cross currency swap market has been in existence since 2008. Whilst there are many reasons behind this dislocation, since 2014 the divergence in monetary policy between the euro area and the United States has played a growing role. This paper aims at exploring and gaining more insight into the role the Eurosystem’s Expanded Asset purchase Programme (APP) has had in guiding investment and funding decisions and its influence on the cross currency basis. The downward pressure on yields, exerted by the APP, has made euro assets less attractive and has led investors to search for yield abroad. At the same time, the decline in yields and tighter credit spreads have attracted US corporate issuers to the euro market in search of cheaper funding costs. These cross-border flows from issuers and investors have played a strong role in driving the US dollar funding premium. The purpose of this study is to gauge whether these changing trends in cross-border flows have implications for the implementation of the Eurosystem’s APP. Beyond the structural increase in the US dollar funding premium described above, a cyclical component has led to an amplification of the premium over balance sheet reporting dates, due to new bank regulations. This paper also analyses the behaviour of euro area banks in cross currency swap markets over balance sheet reporting dates, using the money market statistical reporting (MMSR) dataset in order to discern whether the increase in the US dollar funding premium at these specific points in time has an adverse impact on the transmission of monetary policy.

Cross-border transmission of emergency liquidity

Abstract We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.

Dollar Funding and Firm-Level Exports

How do financial frictions in currency markets affect firm-level exports? We bring new answer to this question by looking at a recent episode in the summer of 2011 when the cost of US dollar funding increased markedly for European banks and their clients. Our analysis relies on a unique dataset of matched banks and exporters located in France. We measure the exposure of individual exporters to the 2011 dollar funding shock using information about their lending banks' crossborder US dollar liabilities before the shock. Controlling for observed and unobserved firm-level factors and product-destination-level demand effects, we find robust evidence that more exposed firms reduced more their exports to the United States in the twelve months that followed the shock. The magnitude of this financial trade cost is equivalent to a counterfactual rise in US tariffs by 2 to 5 percentage points. Finally, we document various transmission channels related to firms' natural hedging, market power, relations with US banks in France or use of financial instruments to hedge.

Swapové linky federálneho rezervného systému - medzinárodný veriteľ poslednej inštancie

After 2007, financial market turmoil began and shortage of dollar funding liquidity disrupted not only the US dollar funding market but also overseas. To address the shortage of dollar liquidity, the FED introduced swap lines with systematic important central banks, including emerging markets. The paper discusses the main feature of the FED’s swap lines in the context of the funding pressures on the FX swap market. The main objective of the paper is to reveal technical aspects and effectiveness of the swap lines. The paper explains connectivity between un/secured money markets and the FX swap market during the financial and debt crises. The FX swap market was hit significantly. During the liquidity crisis of 2007-2010, the main driver of the deviation from covered interest parity was a shortage of dollar liquidity jointly with counterparty risk. During the debt crisis, the main driver was counterparty risk of the euro zone banks and sovereigns. The FED swap lines were used as a liquidity backstop. The paper concludes that the swap lines were an effective tool of cooperation between central banks and significantly alleviated the pressure on the FX swap market. In addition, the swap lines were flexible, supported financial stability, no losses were recorded, the problem of adverse selection was avoided and exit was successful. Finally, the swap lines have become a permanent tool for solving temporary shortages of foreign currency liquidity in national banking systems.

The Drivers of European Bankss US Dollar Debt Issuance: Opportunistic Funding in Times of Crisis?

This paper provides a comprehensive investigation of the determinants of US dollar-denominated long-term debt issuance by European banks. The database used allows the drivers of foreign-currency issuance identified in the literature, including variables at the individual firm (e.g. bank) level, to be explored. The analysis covers overall US dollar issuance as well as Yankee debt issuance, which is defined in this paper as bonds denominated in US dollars issued in domestic US markets by non-US issuers. In addition, issuance determinants are investigated during both crisis and non-crisis periods. The main findings are the following. European banks issue US dollar debt to naturally hedge their US dollar assets (with US dollar exposures obtained from BIS international banking statistics), but they also make extensive use of deviations in covered interest parity and even in uncovered interest parity, particularly after the crisis. There is also evidence that banks issue in US dollars for strategic reasons and that heightened volatility has a negative impact on US dollar issuance. Bank-specific variables are also relevant drivers of US dollar debt issuance: banks with higher asset growth, with a banking subsidiary in the United States and with a high credit rating are more likely to issue in US dollars than others. Bank-specific structures, as captured by deposit and loan ratios, also have a relevant impact on US dollar funding activity in some cases. The results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and to different definitions of covered and uncovered cost savings.