US Delegation Research Articles

‘Once and For All’: The Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the Institutionalisation of Women's Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

AbstractThough the slogan predates the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, ‘women's rights are human rights’ has become inextricably linked to US First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's keynote address at the 1995 Conference in Beijing. The speech turned a line socialised by transnational feminist organisers into a State Department mantra with long‐lasting policy ripples still felt today. This article uses new sources from the Office of the First Lady to examine the intra‐departmental dynamics, policy architecture and domestic political considerations that shaped the content of the speech and the Clinton Administration's conception of women's rights as human rights. Early documents show that a focus on human rights was not inevitable, as other policy areas were better developed with more public support. But fear of rollback from previous international standards, external pressures from civil society, a desire to link foreign policy with domestic political aims and ultimately a strong backlash to American participation at the Conference on the basis of China's human rights record all elevated women's human rights as a US delegation priority.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Co-Optation at the Creation: Leaders, Elite Consensus, and Postwar International Order

This article analyzes how democratic leaders cultivate an elite consensus in favor of participating in international institutions. We theorize two tactics to prevent elite dissent. Delegating early policy development to technocratic and nonpartisan experts can set a depoliticized tone. Later integration of opposition elites into the process can create powerful advocates that expand support to a consensus. We assess contrasting fates of the United Nations (UN) and International Trade Organization (ITO). Haunted by Woodrow Wilson’s failure to win approval for the League of Nations, leaders outsourced early planning for a UN to the Council on Foreign Relations. Later, Franklin D. Roosevelt and top aides tapped moderate Republicans for the US delegation to San Francisco, creating powerful Republican advocates. In contrast, leaders developed the ITO in-house and excluded legislative elites in final negotiations, provoking elite dissent. These tactics shed new light on leaders, elites, and the domestic politics of international order and hegemony.

Особенности процесса принятия решений в США по вопросу Транстихоокеанского партнерства (2010–2012 годы)

The article is devoted to thestudy of thespecifics of the TPP negotiation process and the analysis of the role of the Office of the US Trade Representative in its organization. Special attention is paid to the structures that had a key influence in the formation of the proposals promoted by the American delegation during the negotiations. The author comes to the conclusion that the members of the Trade Advisory Committees played a critical role in the development of the proposals that determined the agenda of the US delegation in relation to the TPP.

Tenth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Changing of the US Position (1981)

40 years ago, the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). Although the United States, together with the USSR and other major maritime powers, initiated the conference, in 1981, after Reagan became President of the United States, it called for a comprehensive review of the draft Convention that had by then been prepared. Proponents of continuing the compromise policy were removed from the US delegation at the Conference. American efforts during the 10th session of the Conference were focused on delaying negotiations and preventing the formalisation of the Convention text to prolong the work of the Conference for another year. Drawing on US Department of State documents and up-to-date academic literature, the author examines the conduct of US diplomacy during the first year of the Reagan Administration at the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, during the preparation and work of the 10th session of the Conference (1981). He concludes that US policy at the 10th session of the Conference was in line with the general policy direction of the US Administration, which had made a definitive break with the détente policy and staked on a new aggravation of the international situation. The Administration's relationship with big business, dissatisfied with the provisions of the draft Convention regarding deep seabed mineral development beyond national jurisdictions, also appears to have been an important factor behind the change in the US position on the draft Convention.

ПОЛ Б. АНДЕРСОН И ПОЕЗДКА ЦЕРКОВНЫХ ЛИДЕРОВ США В МОСКВУ В 1956 Г.

Paul B. Anderson (1894–1985) stood out as a leading Western advocate for Orthodox Christians in the USSR. In March 1956 Anderson traveled to Moscow as a key member of a delegation representing the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA for meetings with leaders of several Christian church bodies. He acted based on knowledge of Orthodox history and Soviet politics and was the only Russian-speaker in the US delegation. He took a moderate, balanced, and diplomatic approach – avoiding both the uncritical celebration of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) or the condemnation of the church’s leaders due to their cooperation with the government. The Moscow visit, and the visit to the US that followed, contributed to a strengthening of ties among these church organizations and the 1961 entry of the ROC into the World Council of Churches. However, the meetings also illustrated the challenges of engaging in church activism during the post-Stalin era. This account demonstrates the significant contribution of Anderson to the building of informed and constructive connections among the believers of the US and USSR.

ПРОЦЕСС ПРИНЯТИЯ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ РЕШЕНИЙ В США НА ПРИМЕРЕ ТОРГОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ С КИТАЕМ (2018–2020 ГГ.)

The article studies the development and implementation process of the US trade strategy towards the People’s Republic of China in 2018–2020. The author tries not only to describe the state of things but thoroughly analyze the peculiarities of the decision-making procedure in trade during Donald Trump’s tenure. The President was a hardliner and thought that maximum pressure would force Beijing to make concessions. We can discern two aspects which have decreased that strategy’s efficiency. First, Trump’s persona has destabilized the diplomatic process. Inconsistency and ever-changing rhetoric have deepened the crisis in the Sino-American relations. Second, right from the beginning, the president did not understand the way the decision-making process worked. The formation of the team in charge of trade took almost a year. In the end, a special group was set up; it managed to elaborate a plan of coordination with the PRC and also secure the Congress support. However, it was unable to establish a regular communication system with the president, who even during the negotiations was openly contradicting the official position of the US delegation. Thus, despite a relatively efficient decision-making system (from a structural standpoint: advisors, cooperation with the Congressional Committees), Trump turned out to be inept to develop a long-term strategy to regulate the commercial relations between the USA and the PRC.

A Conversation With … Kamali Thompson MD, MBA, US Olympic Alternate in Fencing and Orthopaedic Surgery Resident.

A Conversation With … Kamali Thompson MD, MBA, US Olympic Alternate in Fencing and Orthopaedic Surgery Resident.

Stanley Surrey, the 1981 US Model, and the Single Tax Principle

2021 marks the fortieth anniversary of the 1981 US Model Tax Treaty as well as the fifth anniversary of the 2016 US Model Tax Treaty. The first author has repeatedly argued that the 1981 Model gave life to the single tax principle (‘STP’). The 2016 Model updates effectively implemented the principle that cross-border income should be taxed once – that is not more and but also not less than once. For example, the 2016 Model does not reduce withholding taxes on payments of highly mobile income that are made to related persons that enjoy low or no taxation with respect to that income under a preferential tax regime. The aim of this article is to identify with relative certainty the origins of the STP. The purpose is to give a systematic and historical interpretation of the STP by looking at the context during which it was purportedly founded. This article draws extensively on published and unpublished writings of the main architect of US international tax rules, Stanley Surrey, and is the result of archival research conducted at the Historical & Special Collections of Harvard Law School Library. The aim of this article is to show that the origins of the STP, from the perspective of the United States as a source country, can be traced to the eight-year period from 1961 to 1969 when Surrey, a Harvard law professor (1950-1984) became the first US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. As far as tax treaties are concerned, Surrey made two major contributions to applying the STP in practice. First, the tax treaties negotiated by Surrey: (1) the Luxembourg-United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1962), (2) the 1963 protocol to the treaty with the Netherlands applicable to the Netherlands Antilles, and (3) the Canada-United States Income Tax Treaty (1966) took pains to enforce source-based taxation in cases where there was no residence-based taxation of passive income. Second, it was during Surrey’s time at the US Treasury Department that the US delegation wrote two notes to the OECD Fiscal Committee recommending the establishment of a new Working Group which would address the problem of Tax Avoidance through the Improper Use or Abuse of Tax Conventions. This article discusses Surrey’s contributions to the practical implementation of the STP. Tax system, tax reform, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Velvet Revolution, nullum tributum sine lege, income tax, property tax, VAT.

The First World Festival of Negro Arts, Dakar 1966: Contexts and Legacies

Reviewed by: The First World Festival of Negro Arts, Dakar 1966: Contexts and Legacies ed. by David Murphy Yohann C. Ripert The First World Festival of Negro Arts, Dakar 1966: Contexts and Legacies ED. DAVID MURPHY Liverpool UP, 2016. xii + 224 pp. ISBN 9781781383162 cloth. The First World Festival of Negro Arts, Dakar 1966: Contexts and Legacies is a collection of ten essays that investigate art performances and postcolonial practices at a major cultural event promoted by Léopold Sedar Senghor, as well as the event's influence in large-scale spectacles of culture and the role of archives and archival-making from 1966 to 2016. Edited and introduced by David Murphy, the book is the only publication dedicated to a festival that some have cited as the "apotheosis" of Negritude (vii). Its most important contribution to the fields of African and postcolonial studies, however, is to combine multifaceted readings that go beyond Negritude and question the ways in which both Cold War ideology and Pan-African ideals haunted the First World Festival of Negro Arts, including how painters, choreographers, writers, and intellectuals have used the encounter to strengthen the ties between the African "homeland" and black peoples in the diaspora—especially in the United States. Though the book does not expand on the history of preceding cultural events (such as the 1956 Congress of Black Writers and Artists and its second iteration in 1959, as well as the 1962 Conference of African Writers of English Expression) to a 1966 festival (FESMAN) that aimed to create a platform for bolstering transnational blackness, David Murphy's thorough introduction theorizes the festival as "an attempt to produce a global community through a shared blackness" (5). Engaging with the most recent literature on aesthetics and politics in the postcolonial period, Murphy focuses on the political climate framing the festival's organization and stages its performance within a double bind that black intellectuals, artists, and statesmen faced after independence: between the reality of nationalism and the imagination of a postcolonial globality. To that end, Murphy questions both the "involvement of the important US delegation" in Senegal and the larger "role of culture in a post-imperial world" (9). In the volume's first part, "Contexts," each chapter engages with the double bind by offering a remarkable archival work on different aspects of the festival: staging of a "tradition" in art exhibitions (Vincent), creation of an "authentic" African ballet (Kringelbach), performance of the past in carefully programmed theatrical plays (Quinn and Bush), and coverage in popular media (Jaji). Perhaps [End Page 202] the strongest connection between these five chapters is their critical approach to the influence of and challenge to Senghor's aesthetic positions at the festival. Hélène Kringelbach not only analyzes how "the past was being reimagined in neo-traditional performance through the selection and standardization of a limited number of preforming practices" (74), she also retrieves from the archives a letter between Senghor's longtime ally Alioune Diop and Gray Cowan (Columbia University professor and future President of the African Studies Association) for academic expertise on "traditional African dances"—a request that seems to reveal an ideological contradiction between Senghor's strong sense of traditionalism and a lack of knowledge about those supposedly innate traditions. Similarly, Brian Quinn's close reading of Senghor's and Malraux's opening speeches revisits the "reworking of the relationship between culture and the State" (84) and then proceeds to analyze the behind-the-scenes of the festival's staging of Amadou Cissé Dia's Les Derniers Jours de Lat Dior to uncover a troubling instrumentalization of culture that "heads of states such as those in the audience at FESMAN" (95) can use for the mobilization of a nationalist sentiment. In the second part of the book, "Legacies," the focus turns to the festival's afterlives: from the 1969 Algiers festival conceived as a direct response to the Dakar event (Anderson) and the 1977 Lagos Festival explicitly hailed as its direct successor (Apter), to the making of the PANAFEST archive that examines the relation between those three festivals and the Zaire 1974 music festival (Vincent and Malaquais) and a more theoretical consideration of "festivalism" in Africa...

Radiological Weapons (Excerpts from the History of Ban Talks)

Abstract. The article highlights the history of radiological weapons ban negotiations. In 1948, the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments identified radiological weapons as WMD. Since as early as the 1960s, some states have put forward proposals to ban radiological weapons at the international level as potentially threatening human lives and the environment. In 1977 to 1979, a treaty banning radiological weapons was approved on the basis of a draft developed at bilateral Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, which could have become an important impetus for further actions in limiting the arms race. The careful preparation of the text of the future treaty by the USSR and US delegations raised expectations that its finalisation by the Disarmament Commission would not take much time. The reality, however, was far different. In December 1979, the Afghan war broke out. In response to the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, the United States took a whole set of measures, including the refusal to continue bilateral talks on the prohibition of radiological weapons. The author notes that control over radioactive materials was strengthened at the national level, without waiting for an international legal definition of radiological weapons. Political ambitions of a number of countries have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from achieving positive results. The author emphasises that today nuclear terrorism is regarded by world leaders as an urgent global-scale security threat, as confirmed by the international Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. in 2016, attended by delegations from over 50 countries. The author states that the issue of the radiological weapons prohibition remains pending. Keywords: radiological weapons, Conference on Disarmament, Ukrainian diplomatic history, USA, Geneva, USSR.

AMERİKA'DA DEVE BİRLİĞİNİN KURULMASI VE BİR OSMANLI DEVE SÜRÜCÜSÜ HACI ALİ (Hİ JOLLY)

After the Mexican-American War in 1846-1848, the United States gained a vast territory called the Mexican cession that included the modern states of Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado and New Mexico. With the discovery of gold in California in 1849 the US had to cope with “the California Golden Rush” when large numbers of Americans moved to the new state. To construct new railroads, to move supplies and to settle the newly acquired territory entailed travelling across North America. One of the solutions was to use camel that is called Ship of Desert. With the approval of the Congress, an American delegation headed by Henry C. Wayne travelled to the Ottoman Empire in 1855-6 and purchased more than 70 camels and formed the US Camel Corps. used as pack animals in the Southwestern United States, the camels were sold at auction after the Civil War. The US delegation also hired eight Ottoman citizens who were camel drivers and trainers. Of these trainers, the most famous was Haci Ali, the son of a Greek mother and Syrian father. Ali worked as a camel driver camel driver for the US Army for several years. Since the Americans could not pronounce his name “Haci Ali”, they called him Hi Jolly. Toward the end of his life, Ali settled in Quartzsite where he died in 1902. In time he became a legend and in 1936 a monument (Hi Jolly Monument) was dedicated to Hadji Ali and the Camel Corps in the Quartzsite Cemetery. In addition a festival is held for him on January 10 every year

The Afghan question in the work of SC & GA of UNO in January, 1980

In December, 1979 sub-units of the Soviet Army invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, eliminated Hafizullah Amin from power, established the government of Babrak Karmal and occupied the country. These events caused the condemnation of the international community, that were reflected by the statement on the Afghan question in the agenda of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly in January, 1980. The minute-books of SC of the UNO, as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions are the main sources of research of this problem. The discussion of the Afghan question in the UN Security Council lasted from 5 to 7 January, 1980, involving 42 countries. The USSR Representative to the United Nations O. Troyanovskyi and Foreign Minister of DRA Sh. M. Dost tried to persuade all those present that Soviet troops had been brought to Afghanistan at the invitation of a legitimate Afghan government to repulse allegedly externally-aggressive aggression. Herewith they referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and the DPA. Most of the delegations (primarily the US delegation, Pakistan, the Chinese People’s Republic, Great Britain) rejected the arguments of the Soviet and Afghan sides and condemned Soviet aggression and called for the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Afghanistan immediately. The Soviet Union and the DRA were supported only by a few delegations of Soviet satellites (Poland, the GDR, Hungary, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Laos and Vietnam). But during the vote on the anti-Soviet resolution on January 7, 1980, the USSR expected vetoed it. After that, the consideration of the «Afghan question» was postponed to the General Assembly, where 108 countries condemned the Soviet aggression on January, 14 (18 countries abstained, the same number supported the USSR). The discussion of the «Afghan question» at the United Nations Organization in January, 1980 assured that the Soviet Union had suffered a loud defeat in the international arena, its authority was severely undermined. This was also confirmed by the end of the policy of "discharging" and the subsequent eruption of the Cold War in international relations. In addition, the consideration of the Afghan question at the UNO has shown the lack of a mechanism for influencing an aggressor country that has a veto power in the UN Security Council. The USSR was expected to veto the Security Council resolution, and the decisions of the General Assembly were recommendatory. This is particularly relevant in terms of the current UN crisis in deterring the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, the DPRK, Syria and others like that.

GyanPrakashEmergency Chronicles: Indira Gandhi and India's Turning PointPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 439 pp. Index.

GyanPrakashEmergency Chronicles: Indira Gandhi and India's Turning PointPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 2019. 439 pp. Index.

Theory to Practice: Reflections on a Consulting Life

AbstractIn this essay, I recount my career experiences as a research consultant in Washington DC. These experiences, over the course of 23 years, provide examples of how theory and research can be used to guide practice. The account is chronological, beginning with my first consulting assignment in 1975, where I worked with a US delegation on resolving a negotiation impasse, to the 1990s where I directed study groups on a variety of human performance and international conflict resolution topics. These projects consisted both of applications of research‐based knowledge and the generation of research ideas for new projects. By immersing myself in both theory and practice, I could transform basic research into applied insights and induce research ideas from practice. This was the kind of career that Jeff Rubin aspired to having. The IACM Rubin award recognizes the way that his aspiration was fulfilled by one of his colleagues.

‘America First’ in the ILO: assertive, yet unaccountable

From the very outset, the US had an unusual relationship with the ILO: it was not itself a member of the ILO at its founding but the first International Labour Conference in 1919 was held in Washington, and the US Secretary of Labor chaired the session. In 1934 the US joined the ILO, and in 1938 it ratified its first five ILO conventions, although this enthusiasm rapidly tailed off. Through the 1940s the US ratified only one more convention, with a further single ratification in the 1950s, and no further ratifications at all through the 1960s and 1970s. Into the late 1980s and 1990s there were only a handful of further ratifications, leaving the US with an abysmal record of ratification overall. To date it has ratified just 14 of 189 ILO Conventions, including only two of the fundamental or ‘core’ instruments. In 1948 the ILO Conference was held in San Francisco, at which session Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association was adopted. The US delegation at the Conference voted unanimously in favour of the instrument, and ratification of the instrument was subsequently recommended by the Secretary of Labor, and submitted to the Senate by letter on 27 August 1949, signed by President Truman. But here the ratification process stalled. Somewhat incredibly, 70 years later, this advice remains technically ‘pending’ before the Senate1. In 1977, the US withdrew from the ILO altogether. But the retreat was short lived, and just over two years later the US re-joined. Its return was welcome, not only politically, but also as the largest contributor to the Organisation, paying 22 percent of the ILO’s budget. Altogether, US contributions to the Organisation are in the region of US$100 million per year, comprised of both regular funding and support to the ILO’s technical assistance programmes. Perhaps emboldened by its importance as a donor, the US has never been shy to push its agenda within the ILO, where US delegates frequently speak out against other States for breach of the freedom of association instruments. But, while keen to hold others to account, the US itself has throughout remained almost entirely unaccountable to ILO’s core processes, which concern only those countries that have ratified the Conventions. The US position used to gain a sort of regional camouflage due to the fact that its neighbours, Mexico and Canada, had both held off ratification of ILO Convention 98. But following the ratification of that instrument by both countries (somewhat ironically, both nudged by US pressure during the negotiation of the USMCA trade agreement, which obliged Mexico in particular to effect extensive changes to its collective bargaining framework2), the US now stands out like a sore thumb as the only country in the Americas that has not ratified either of the core freedom of association conventions. Prospects for ratification In the first US follow-up report to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the government acknowledged that ‘aspects of [the US system] fail to fully protect the rights to organise and bargain collectively of ail employees in all circumstances’. But its subsequent report stated simply that US law and practice are ‘generally in compliance’ with ILO principles. Over the following decade the US variously reported ‘no developments’, ‘no change’ in policy, or ‘no current plans to pursue ratification’ of either Convention. In 2015, however, the US reported to the ILO that on 15 May 2014 a presidential committee had agreed that its Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS) would ‘intensify its work of reviewing the legal feasibility of US ratification of selected ILO Conventions, including Conventions 87 and 98’. This development, however, is now of no more than historical interest, following the election of Donald Trump at the close of 2016. In the early stage of the Trump presidency, there were fears that the US might significantly reduce its participation in many UN forums, with budget cuts of 50 percent mooted3. The ILO itself has been among those agencies earmarked for cuts at this level4. So far, the US Congress has blocked many of the proposed cuts, and the ILO budget anticipates US contributions continuing at the regular level5. Against...

‘America First’ in the ILO: assertive, yet unaccountable

From the very outset, the US had an unusual relationship with the ILO: it was not itself a member of the ILO at its founding but the first International Labour Conference in 1919 was held in Washington, and the US Secretary of Labor chaired the session. In 1934 the US joined the ILO, and in 1938 it ratified its first five ILO conventions, although this enthusiasm rapidly tailed off. Through the 1940s the US ratified only one more convention, with a further single ratification in the 1950s, and no further ratifications at all through the 1960s and 1970s. Into the late 1980s and 1990s there were only a handful of further ratifications, leaving the US with an abysmal record of ratification overall. To date it has ratified just 14 of 189 ILO Conventions, including only two of the fundamental or ‘core’ instruments. In 1948 the ILO Conference was held in San Francisco, at which session Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association was adopted. The US delegation at the Conference voted unanimously in favour of the instrument, and ratification of the instrument was subsequently recommended by the Secretary of Labor, and submitted to the Senate by letter on 27 August 1949, signed by President Truman. But here the ratification process stalled. Somewhat incredibly, 70 years later, this advice remains technically ‘pending’ before the Senate1. In 1977, the US withdrew from the ILO altogether. But the retreat was short lived, and just over two years later the US re-joined. Its return was welcome, not only politically, but also as the largest contributor to the Organisation, paying 22 percent of the ILO’s budget. Altogether, US contributions to the Organisation are in the region of US$100 million per year, comprised of both regular funding and support to the ILO’s technical assistance programmes. Perhaps emboldened by its importance as a donor, the US has never been shy to push its agenda within the ILO, where US delegates frequently speak out against other States for breach of the freedom of association instruments. But, while keen to hold others to account, the US itself has throughout remained almost entirely unaccountable to ILO’s core processes, which concern only those countries that have ratified the Conventions. The US position used to gain a sort of regional camouflage due to the fact that its neighbours, Mexico and Canada, had both held off ratification of ILO Convention 98. But following the ratification of that instrument by both countries (somewhat ironically, both nudged by US pressure during the negotiation of the USMCA trade agreement, which obliged Mexico in particular to effect extensive changes to its collective bargaining framework2), the US now stands out like a sore thumb as the only country in the Americas that has not ratified either of the core freedom of association conventions. Prospects for ratification In the first US follow-up report to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the government acknowledged that ‘aspects of [the US system] fail to fully protect the rights to organise and bargain collectively of ail employees in all circumstances’. But its subsequent report stated simply that US law and practice are ‘generally in compliance’ with ILO principles. Over the following decade the US variously reported ‘no developments’, ‘no change’ in policy, or ‘no current plans to pursue ratification’ of either Convention. In 2015, however, the US reported to the ILO that on 15 May 2014 a presidential committee had agreed that its Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS) would ‘intensify its work of reviewing the legal feasibility of US ratification of selected ILO Conventions, including Conventions 87 and 98’. This development, however, is now of no more than historical interest, following the election of Donald Trump at the close of 2016. In the early stage of the Trump presidency, there were fears that the US might significantly reduce its participation in many UN forums, with budget cuts of 50 percent mooted3. The ILO itself has been among those agencies earmarked for cuts at this level4. So far, the US Congress has blocked many of the proposed cuts, and the ILO budget anticipates US contributions continuing at the regular level5. Against...

Stassen Again by Steve Werle

Reviewed by: Stassen Again by Steve Werle Jeffrey Kolnick Steve Werle, Stassen Again. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2015. 248 pp. $18.95. Steve Werle’s biography of Harold Stassen provides a much-needed window into a world where the Republican Party had a significant and assertive moderate wing. For many decades, Stassen was at the center of this middle way. Born in 1907 and raised on a small farm in what is today the inner ring suburb of West St. Paul, Stassen lived through most of the twentieth century and played a role in shaping many of its important characteristics. Werle focuses primarily on Stassen’s quest to create an international architecture of peace during and after World War II, but we also learn how he worked to move the Republican Party toward more moderate positions on labor and welfare. Without really explaining Stassen’s decision to join the Republican Party, Werle informs us that from an early age he adopted a reformist attitude and challenged long-established conservative positions within the party. Raised during the Progressive era and coming of age politically during the Great Depression and the rise of fascism and militarism, Stassen understood that simpleminded conservatism had no political future and that threats to freedom [End Page 169] and democracy from the right were as dangerous and real as those from the left. He also understood that an unregulated marketplace was as much a threat to prosperity as a centrally planned economy. Having served as the Dakota County district attorney, he was elected governor of Minnesota in 1938. Stassen proposed a wide-ranging reform agenda, including the state’s first civil service law, the establishment of the state office of social security and public welfare, and a massive reorganization of the state administrative and finance offices. Significantly, Stassen embarked on passing the Minnesota Labor Peace Act of 1939. Borrowing ideas from legal experts and scholars at the University of Minnesota— who in turn borrowed ideas from other countries, particularly Denmark and Norway— the act called for the creation of an office of a state labor conciliator who could force closed-door negotiations for ten days before a strike or lockout could be called. If a compelling public interest was at stake, an additional cooling off period could be called where a fact finding commission would review the dispute between labor and management. Such a proposal accepted as normal the potential conflicts between bosses and workers and sought to use the power of government to encourage negotiations when the two parties saw no alternative to a strike or a lockout. Reelected three times, Stassen resigned the governorship in 1943 to join the war effort in the Naval Reserve. From that point forward, Werle argues, Stassen focused on global security issues. As a commander in the Navy, Stassen worked closely with Admiral William Halsey and was involved in liberating prisoners of war in the Pacific. Stassen was then appointed one of seven Americans to head the US delegation that created the United Nations. Werle sets out in some detail the interesting story of how Stassen played a key role in overcoming the profound challenges of drafting language dealing with the legacy of colonialism. Here, common ground needed to be found between former colonial powers reluctant to give up their old ways and new nations demanding freedom. Stassen was a fierce internationalist who sincerely sought a world order based on universally accepted rules and negotiation, rather than bombs and threats of violence. In the end, the strength of this biography is the way Werle demonstrates Stassen’s commitment to what he calls “the middle way.” Within the Republican Party there was a conservative wing and a progressive wing, and they struggled for power through all of Stassen’s political life. Harold Stassen never wavered in his commitment to this middle way. One is reminded in reading this book that both major parties had within them deeply conservative [End Page 170] and progressive elements well into the last decades of the twentieth century. Werle is clearly an admirer of Stassen, and the book could have been more evenhanded in its analysis of foreign policy generally and the Cold War...

NPs Can Provide Evidence to Influence Health Policies

As an individual you have the right to make any decision you want about your personal health, even one that is not in your best interest. However, policy decisions should be made on the best evidence available and not discredited beliefs. Period. Knowledge based on observation of natural phenomena, trial and error, experience, and when possible, well-designed experiments should be the standard for decision making, especially when those decisions impact resource allocation for programs or services that protect or impact the health of populations. Just a few examples from the news in the past couple of years include what are commonly called gag rules. The “Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance” policy restricts up to $8.8 billion in health funds from going to foreign organizations, even if the organization uses its own funds to advocate for polices that enable women to have choices regarding reproduction. While this may not seem so bad on the surface, it severely limits the ability of these organizations to offer other much needed health services (Human Rights Watch, 2018Human Rights Watch (2018). US Finds “Gag Rule” Flaws, but Makes no Changes. February 14. Human Rights Watch Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/us-finds-gag-rule-flaws-makes-no-changesGoogle Scholar). Restrictions were being planned to impact similar organizations in the United States at the time of this writing and may have been enacted by the time this editorial is published (Davis and Haberman, 2018Davis, J.H. & Haberman, M. (2018). Trump Administration to Tie Health Facilities’ Funding to Abortion Restrictions. New York Times, May 18. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/politics/trump-funding-abortion-restrictions.htmlGoogle Scholar). Restrictions on communications from federal science agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and Human and Health Services on using certain terms, such as climate change and evidence-based, can have a serious impact on public narratives and undermine the decision-making processes that are critical to the nation’s health now and in the future (Dennis and Eilperin, 2018Dennis, B. & Eilperin, J. (2018). EPA staffers get talking points playing down human role in climate change. The Washington Post. March 28. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/03/28/epa-staffers-get-talking-points-downplaying-human-role-in-climate-change/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a8ae73fb8cdGoogle Scholar). More recently, many news reports quoted scientists who said the attempt of the US delegation at the United Nations-affiliated World Health Assembly in July to water down a resolution on mother’s milk as the optimal choice for infant feeding is contrary to resounding scientific evidence. Many health care specialists responded that those who are charged with making policy are putting the interests of corporations, such as formula manufacturers, before those of the women and children of the world. Of note, our nursing organizations have responded to these threats to our health. For example, the American Academy of Nursing and the American Nurses Association provided a prompt response to the World Health Assembly Resolution on Breastfeeding opposing any language other than full support of human milk as critical for infant health and development throughout the world (American Academy of Nursing & American Nurses Association, 2018American Academy of Nursing & American Nurses Association (2018). American Academy of Nursing and American Nurses Association Statement on U.S. opposition to World Health Assembly Resolution on Breastfeeding. July 12. Retrieved from: https://www.nursingworld.org/news/news-releases/2018/aan-ana-oppose-who-breastfeeding-resolution/Google Scholar). We should continue to support our nursing organizations and their significant political influence and involvement. However, individual NPs who follow guidelines established as best practice have the responsibility to hold accountable those we elect or appoint to policy-making positions. We are experts on patient health and well-being and can speak, argue, and provide examples of how current or proposed policies are or may impact the health of many people in the future. Use your knowledge base in evidence and experience whenever there is a chance—even if you have to make the chance—to educate policy makers how to make decisions using more than hearsay and pressure from special interests.

Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center: The First 25 Years

Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center: The First 25 Years