U.S. Citizenship And Immigration Services Research Articles

Immigrant Indians’ identity in second-generation Asian American context: interpretation of ethnicity, gender and religion

PurposeThis paper aims to interpret the multidimensional Asian American identity of immigrant Indians in terms of pan-ethnicity, gender and religion.Design/methodology/approachThe social construction and experience of race in the US and the intersection of multiethnic Asian American identity with race, gender and religion will be used in critically commenting on the interview of primary ethnic identity of Indian Americans including the pan-ethnic identity of Indians in the US as Asian Americans, the Mar Thoma Church community, the second-generation Patel family's union formation in terms of gender identity.FindingsThe future directives include Asian American Movement (AAM) which is trying to incorporate Indians as pan-ethnic identity assimilation and the process of holding American identity as primary identification of Indians.Practical implicationsPolicy recommendations are that the US Census Bureau should include Indian Americans as separate ethnic identity for Indian immigrants like the Chinese Americans. USCIS (US Citizenship and Immigration Services) should reform policies to include the wives of H-4 visa holders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should provide secure living environment for Indian immigrants. The US Department of Labor should provide equal opportunities for women in their immigration policies.Originality/valueThis paper will critically analyze the interview results of primary ethnic identity and justify the hypotheses of Asian American identity of Indians, whether (1) they merge with the American identity as part of cultural assimilation or (2) retain their Asian identity beyond Americanized identity or (3) go beyond both American and Asian identity to restate their Indian ethnicity.

Child Maltreatment & Child Migration: Abuse Disclosures by Central American and Mexican Unaccompanied Migrant Children

While gang violence, community violence, and domestic violence have been recognized as contributing factors to Central American migration, less is known about the intersection between child maltreatment and migration. This article uses secondary data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviews with unaccompanied minors from Central America and Mexico to examine child maltreatment. It provides information on the abused children, their abusers, and the questions that led to their disclosure of maltreatment. It finds that girls reported maltreatment at higher rates than boys; only girls in this sample reported sexual abuse and intimate partner violence; and boys experienced physical abuse more than any other form of maltreatment. Overall, girls experienced all forms of abuse at higher rate than boys. Fewer than half of this sample described maltreatment as an explicit reason for migration, even those who viewed it as a type of suffering, harm or danger. In addition, some disclosures suggest that childhood transitions, such as in housing, schooling, or work status, warrant further inquiry as a potential consequence of or contributor to maltreatment. The article recommends that professionals engaged with migrant children in social services, legal services, or migration protection and status adjudications should inquire about maltreatment, recognizing that children may reveal abuse in complex and indirect ways. Protection risks within the home or family environment may provide the grounds for US legal immigration protections, such as Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) or asylum. Practitioners working with unaccompanied migrant children should use varied approaches to inquire about home country maltreatment experiences. Maltreatment may be part of the context of child migration, whether or not it is explicitly mentioned by children as a reason for migration. Policy Recommendations US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) should update SIJS regulations to reflect changes in the law, and modify application procedures to incorporate research knowledge on the impact of trauma on children. The US Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Health and Human Services (HHS), should ensure that all children in immigration proceedings receive legal representation through public-private partnerships overseen by the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Passage of Senate Bill 3108, the Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2021, 1 would at least guarantee legal representation for unaccompanied minors. Codify legal standards (via USCIS regulation, or Congressional statute) for granting asylum based on gender and gender-based violence, and include standards for children and youth. Adjudicators from USCIS, Asylum Offices, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) should consider new information about painful, traumatic, or shame-inducing experiences—such as child maltreatment—as part of the gradual process of disclosure, rather than negatively reflecting on the credibility of the applicant. Federal agencies with immigration responsibilities such as USCIS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and ORR, should be included in the federal government’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) Interagency Task Force for Trauma-Informed Care. These agencies should require new trainings for immigration adjudicators, including immigration judges, asylum officers, Border Patrol agents, and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers, on interviewing and making decisions related to children. Legal service providers should adopt a holistic approach to service provision that includes social workers as part of the child’s legal team.

Entrance Fees: Self-Funded Agencies and the Economization of Immigration

This article examines the financing structure of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an executive branch administrative agency that is almost entirely funded by fees paid by applicants and petitioners for immigration benefits. This article interrogates the fundamental economic and normative justifications for the use of user fees in the immigration context to argue that the USCIS’s funding structure is both inapt and ineffective at implementing Congress’s immigration policies. Moreover, by effectively shielding the executive branch from budgetary oversight, these user fees fund operations that are misaligned with Congress’s intent for the USCIS, which frustrates the constitutional system of checks and balances based on separation of powers principles. In short, the legal and economic rationales that have traditionally been used to justify user-fee funding for administrative agencies—to manage the availability of public goods, to control or promote externalities, to overcome information disparities, and to deter natural monopolies—all fail on their own terms as they do not reflect the realities of the immigration system. Two further justifications—notions of fairness and instrumental revenue enhancement—are more plausible conceptually and are thus more often invoked but are themselves fundamentally misaligned with the realities of the immigration and naturalization process.

Public Interest Comment on the Department of Homeland Security’s Proposed Rule: Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center improves regulatory policy through research, education, and outreach. As part of its mission, the Center conducts careful and independent analyses to assess rulemaking proposals from the perspective of the public interest. This comment on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposed rule regarding the collection and use of biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) does not represent the views of any particular affected party or special interest but is designed to evaluate the effect of DHS’s proposal on overall consumer welfare. This public interest comment begins by summarizing the proposed rule and discussing the statutory authority delegated to DHS. It then evaluates the department’s regulatory impact analysis, emphasizing the rule’s failure to comply with established requirements for regulatory analysis. Then, our comment argues that the rule’s 30-day comment period should be reopened to allow the public to have a meaningful opportunity to comment. We conclude by summarizing the key recommendations included in the comment.

Reading the Myth of American Freedom: The U.S. Immigration Video

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) department offers immigrants wishing to naturalize, or become citizens, a package of study aids for the citizenship test, including a video. This essay argues that the video is much more than a study aid; it furthers the myth of American freedom, a myth that effectively erases the struggles of marginalized groups. Situated within critical cultural studies and semiotics, the essay describes the content of the video and interprets the myth. The deployment of diversity is considered, along with implications for immigrants who intersect with some of the marginalized or absent groups.

Challenging H-1B Denials in Federal Courts: Trends and Strategies

The denial rate for H-1B petitions has quadrupled over the past few years, increasing from six percent in fiscal year (FY) 2015 to twenty-four percent in FY 2018. After President Trump issued his ‘‘Buy American and Hire American’’ executive order in April 2017, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has effectively raised the standard of proof on H-1B petitions. USCIS has used several reasons to deny H-1B petitions, including claims that the employer failed to show that a position qualifies as a ‘‘specialty occupation,’’ impermissibly assigned employees to third-party worksites, or failed to pay the required wage. Under USCIS’s recent approach, many H-1B petitioners are virtually faced with a ‘‘preordained denial’’ regardless of how well they respond to requests for evidence (RFEs) or appeal their denial to the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). More and more H-1B petitioners have challenged the legality of H-1B denials by filing complaints in federal court. Many have succeeded in getting their H-1B denials reversed. We have compiled a spreadsheet of over fifty federal court cases brought against USCIS in the last two years concerning H-1B denials. This article presents the litigation trends we have observed and offers strategies for immigration attorneys considering litigation to challenge an H-1B denial. The bottom line: sue!

Post-Denial Strategies: How to Get From 'No' To 'Yes'

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) seems to be denying more petitions than ever these days. Cases that were solid approvals a few years ago now are receiving denials, even though the law and regulations have not changed. But don’t give up hope. Opportunities exist to overcome denials. This practice advisory focuses on post-denial strategies for petitions filed with USCIS, not strategies in immigration court. The article discusses motions to reopen, motions for reconsideration, appeals to the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), and litigation. This practice advisory also discusses when filing a new petition may be a better option, and how the beneficiary’s status, including unlawful presence, may affect the options.

The Reorganization of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Its Effects

Few studies have assessed the consequences of reorganization on the perceptions of employees. The article examines the effects of the reorganization of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on employee perceptions. It is based on the Federal Human Capital Survey, an important dataset prepared by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to improve the performance of federal agencies. The article assesses changes by comparing measures using t-tests and analysis of variance. The results show that the reorganization of the agency had a statistically significant effect on employee perceptions of performance, goal communication, internal communication, and resources.

DACA and the Supreme Court: How We Got to This Point, a Statistical Profile of Who Is Affected, and What the Future May Hold for DACA Beneficiaries

Executive Summary In June 2012, the Obama administration announced the establishment of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which sought to provide work authorization and a temporary reprieve from deportation to eligible undocumented young immigrants who had arrived in the United States as minors. Hundreds of thousands of youth applied for the program, which required providing extensive evidence of identity, age, residence, education, and good moral character. The program allowed its recipients to pursue higher education, to access more and better job opportunities, and to deepen their social ties in the United States. This article provides a statistical portrait of DACA recipients based on administrative data from US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and estimates drawn from the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) Census data. It finds the following: As of September 30, 2019, there were 652,880 active DACA recipients. Sixty-six percent of recipients are between the ages of 21 and 30. The top five countries of birth for DACA recipients are Mexico (80 percent), El Salvador (4 percent), Guatemala (3 percent), Honduras (2 percent), and Peru (1 percent). DACA recipients reside in all 50 states and Washington, DC, and in US territories including Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. The top five states with the highest number of DACA recipients are California (29 percent), Texas (17 percent), Illinois (5 percent), New York (4 percent), and Florida (4 percent). Eighty-one percent of DACA recipients has lived in the United States for more than 15 years. Six percent is married to US citizens, 4 percent to lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and 13 percent to undocumented immigrants. Among US-born children younger than 18 years, 346,455 have at least one DACA parent. Fifty-five percent of DACA recipients graduated from high school, 36 percent has some college education, and 7 percent a bachelor’s degree or higher. Ninety-five percent is employed. The Trump administration rescinded the DACA program in September 2017, leaving recipients and their families in a legal limbo. Federal litigation led to a nationwide preliminary injunction and DACA’s partial reinstatement for existing recipients. At this writing, the case is before the US Supreme Court, which will determine the program’s fate. Beyond its statistical portrait, the article provides testimonies from DACA recipients who recount how the program improved their lives and their concerns over its possible termination. It also provides recommendations for Congress, local and state governments, and immigration advocates. In particular, it recommends passage of legislation that would create a path to citizenship for DACA recipients and programs and policies to support and empower young immigrants.

Fixing What’s Most Broken in the US Immigration System: A Profile of the Family Members of US Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents Mired in Multiyear Backlogs

Executive Summary The US Department of State (DOS) reports that as of November 2018, nearly 3.7 million persons had been found by US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to have a close family relationship to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) that qualified them for a visa, but were on “the waiting list in the various numerically-limited immigrant categories” ( DOS 2018 ). These backlogs in family-based “preference” (numerically capped) categories represent one of the most egregious examples of the dysfunction of the US immigration system. They consign family members of US citizens and LPRs that potentially qualify for a visa and that avail themselves of US legal procedures to years of insecurity, frustration, and (often) separation from their families. Often criticized in the public sphere for jumping the visa queue, it would be more accurate to say that this population, in large part, comprises the queue. While they wait for their visa priority date to become current, those without immigration status are subject to removal. In addition, most cannot adjust to LPR status in the United States, but must leave the country for consular processing and, when they do, face three- or 10-year bars on readmission, depending on the duration of their unlawful presence in the United States. This population will also be negatively affected by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposed rule to expand the public charge ground of inadmissibility ( Kerwin, Warren, and Nicholson 2018 ). In addition, persons languishing in backlogs enjoy few prospects in the short term for executive or legislative relief, given political gridlock over immigration reform and the Trump administration’s support for reduced family-based immigration.

(In)credible Subjects: NGOs, Attorneys, and Permissible LGBT Asylum Seeker Identities

AbstractIn this paper, I demonstrate how statist logics concerning acceptable lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender (LGBT) immigrants permeate civic spheres, creating new forms of exclusion for asylum seekers in the United States. Existing research on US asylum policy and procedures as they pertain to LGBT claimants suggests that a “gay enough” litmus test typifies U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudications, such that officers expect claimants to engage in conspicuous consumption of stereotypical commodities and culture and to appear visibly “LGBT,” either through gender non‐conformity or by being “out.” My analysis focuses on the social as well as legal lives of LGBT asylum seekers in the United States. Drawing on ethnographic and interview data collected at specialist NGOs, I argue that limited ideas about LGBT subjectivity often structure NGO workers’ attitudes and practices in ways that echo USCIS criteria for granting asylum. I demonstrate how NGO client selection and intake processes assume homonormative ideals and subtly yet effectively replicate existing adjudication norms. Within ostensibly non‐governmental spaces, LGBT asylum seekers experience suspicion, surveillance, and pressure to conform to NGO workers’ expectations of “credible” claimants. Contrary to NGOs’ stated intentions, these processes extend, rather than challenge, existing barriers to asylum.

A Decade of Policy Failure: The Impact of Mass Refugee Fraud on the U.S. Immigration System

This year marks the passing of a full decade since the greatest refugee fraud crisis in modern times. The overseas P-3 refugee “family reunification” program was suspended in 2008 following revelations of shocking fraud levels. The program restarted in 2012 with significant processing improvements, including a DNA-screening requirement. Left unresolved was the issue of thousands of fraudulent refugees who were admitted to the United States before the suspension. In contravention of clear principle, solid evidence, and direct experience, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) continued to use the wrong screening strategy to process the pre-suspension P-3 caseload. USCIS disbursed domestic immigration benefits to fraudulent refugees without in-person interviews for many benefits, without required DNA tests for any benefits, and without administrative fraud checks for older cases. A Niagara of overseas refugee fraud was met with a dribble of domestic defense. This was staggering irresponsibility, possibly the biggest blunder in immigration history. Yesterday’s fraudulent refugees became today’s green card holders, international travelers using refugee travel documents, and U.S. citizens. There were other follow-on consequences. First, fraud of this magnitude multiplies the chances of terror. Second, significant numbers of human trafficking victims, mostly women and children, were not identified because of deficient screening. Third, legions of fraudulently-admitted refugees took full advantage of public assistance benefits. Finally, USCIS proposed a plan in 2013 to prematurely dispose centralized records connected to the fraud-ridden program. The domestic P-3 system in 2018 is on a trajectory toward collapse, the same fate that befell the overseas program in 2008 after twenty years of dysfunction. It is not too late to arrest the steep decline. New DHS and USCIS leaders are sure to understand a hard-learned policy lesson that somehow eluded their predecessors: both sides of the P-3 immigration continuum needed reform. Sensible fraud intervention measures should have been instilled in both systems, not just in the overseas program, to stem the rolling devastation of mass refugee fraud.

Wait time for permanent residency and the retention of immigrant doctoral recipients in the U.S.

More than 65% of foreign doctoral recipients remain and work in the U.S. after graduation. Using data from the Survey of Earned Doctorates, the Survey of Doctoral Recipients, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), this paper estimates the impact of wait time for permanent residency (Green Card status) on the migration decisions of foreign doctoral recipients graduating from U.S. universities. Results indicate that for a recent immigrant doctoral recipient, an additional year of wait time decreases the probability that he or she will remain in the U.S. by 5.5 percentage points. I also find that the negative impact of wait time on immigrant retention in the U.S. is temporary: Five years after graduation, there is no difference in retention between foreign doctoral recipients who faced long Green Card wait times and those who faced none.

How the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Has Undermined US Refugee Protection Obligations and Wasted Government Resources

Seeking asylum is a human right, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”) prohibit the United States from returning refugees to persecution, and the 1980 Refugee Act set up a formal process for applying for asylum in the United States. However, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) created a barrage of new barriers to asylum. These impediments have blocked many refugees from accessing asylum in the United States and inserted additional layers of technicalities, screening, and processing, undermining the effectiveness of the US asylum system. The barriers imposed by IIRIRA are significant. They include a filing deadline on asylum applications, which prevents genuine refugees from receiving asylum if they cannot prove they have filed the application within one year of arriving in the United States. IIRIRA also established summary deportation procedures, including “expedited removal” and “reinstatement of removal,” which block asylum seekers from even applying for asylum or accessing an immigration court removal hearing, unless they first pass through a screening process. Finally, IIRIRA imposed “mandatory detention” on certain immigrants, including asylum seekers who are placed in expedited removal proceedings upon their arrival at a US port of entry. Each of these provisions imposed new processes and procedures that have contributed to an increasingly ineffective immigration system. The current backlog in the immigration courts has reached a record high, surpassing half a million cases, while the backlog of affirmative asylum cases before the Asylum Division of US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has increased by a factor of six in just three years. Backlogs, which lead to long delays in adjudication, undermine system integrity as bona fide asylum seekers wait for years in legal limbo — some with families waiting abroad in dangerous and life-threatening situations — and individuals without meritorious claims may be encouraged to file applications to receive a work permit during the lengthy waiting period. Twenty years later, as the world faces the largest global refugee crisis since World War II, the asylum barriers injected into the US system under IIRIRA have proven harmful to refugees, and detrimental to the US asylum system. This paper highlights recent research, litigation, and advocacy efforts that have further brought to light the rights violations and systemic inefficiencies generated by IIRIRA. It concludes with a series of recommendations, calling on the US government to eliminate these counterproductive barriers and to take steps to assure access to asylum.

Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration's Failed Reform of ICE Family Detention Practices

The United States has long struggled with the practice of detaining immigrant families and over time, most reform efforts have flagged, if not failed. This paper examines the impact of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) through an exploration of the evolution of the family residential center (FRC) for families in immigration custody, established prior to the 9/11 terrorist attack by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and expanded by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in its aftermath. The paper provides an inside look at how policymakers, at various points in the Obama administration, sought to roll back its most infirm practices and the fate of those efforts. It begins with a brief history of family detention in the United States, continues with a summary of the reforms undertaken both early and late in the Obama administration, and examines the significant challenges it faced and the less progressive positions it adopted during its first and second terms in office. The paper concludes with a discussion of reasons for the rapid reversal of its previous reforms and provides recommendations to achieve a civil, civil system of immigration enforcement for families and all others, which means nothing less than the transformation of the immigrant detention system from a criminal to a civil paradigm, consistent with the population and legal authorities.2 The need for such an effort is all the more urgent in light of executive actions taken in the early days of the Trump administration and their initial outcomes. Among those thwarting admissions are orders to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to seal the US borders, shun refugees fleeing from war-torn regions until “extreme vetting” measures are put into place, and reassess others who have already been issued visas. Additional orders issued to ICE expanded and expedited the removal of persons whose conduct could result in charges or convictions as well as those with criminal charges or convictions, resulting in a 38 percent increase in arrests by ICE agents within the first 100 days of the Trump administration (Dickerson 2017b; Duara 2017).

Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration's Failed Reform of ICE Family Detention Practices

The United States has long struggled with the practice of detaining immigrant families and over time, most reform efforts have flagged, if not failed. This paper examines the impact of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) through an exploration of the evolution of the family residential center (FRC) for families in immigration custody, established prior to the 9/11 terrorist attack by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and expanded by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in its aftermath. The paper provides an inside look at how policymakers, at various points in the Obama administration, sought to roll back its most infirm practices and the fate of those efforts. It begins with a brief history of family detention in the United States, continues with a summary of the reforms undertaken both early and late in the Obama administration, and examines the significant challenges it faced and the less progressive positions it adopted during its first and second terms in office.The paper concludes with a discussion of reasons for the rapid reversal of its previous reforms and provides recommendations to achieve a civil, civil system of immigration enforcement for families and all others, which means nothing less than the transformation of the immigrant detention system from a criminal to a civil paradigm, consistent with the population and legal authorities.[1] The need for such an effort is all the more urgent in light of executive actions taken in the early days of the Trump administration and their initial outcomes. Among those thwarting admissions are orders to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to seal the US borders, shun refugees fleeing from war-torn regions until “extreme vetting” measures are put into place, and reassess others who have already been issued visas. Additional orders issued to ICE expanded and expedited the removal of persons whose conduct could result in charges or convictions as well as those with criminal charges or convictions, resulting in a 38 percent increase in arrests by ICE agents within the first 100 days of the Trump administration (Dickerson 2017b; Duara 2017). [1] For further discussion of the concept of a civil, civil system of immigration enforcement, see Schriro (2009).

Several Diverse Effects of Reorganization: Evidence from the USCIS

While many presidential administrations choose to reorganize executive branch agencies, each for different reasons, few studies have assessed the diverse consequences of reorganization. We examine the effects of reorganization of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the lenses of employee perceptions. Our results show that reorganization of the federal agency had statistically-significant effects on employees’ perceptions of performance, goal communication, internal communication, information sharing, leadership, entrepreneurship, competency, and resources. However, reorganization did not have statistically-significant effects on perceptions of cooperation, performance communication, empowerment, or performance-oriented culture.

H-1bs: How Do They Stack Up to US Born Workers?

Combining unique individual level H-1B data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and data from the 2009 American Community Survey, we analyze earnings differences between H-1B visa holders and US born workers in STEM occupations. The data indicate that H-1Bs are younger and more skilled, as measured by education, than US born workers in the same occupations. We fail to find support for the notion that H-1Bs are paid less that observationally similar US born workers; in fact, they appear to have higher earnings in some key STEM occupations, including information technology.

Social Studies Preservice Teachers' Citizenship Knowledge and Perceptions of the U.S. Naturalization Test

Teacher educators from six states invited their social studies methodology students to complete an abbreviated version of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Naturalization Test. The preservice teachers were also asked to share their conceptions of citizenship and evaluate the naturalization test. The findings from this study indicate that although this sample of preservice teachers had limited conceptions of citizenship, most were able to get a satisfactory score on the test. The authors discuss the implications of these results and suggest ways to broaden citizenship education in teacher preparation programs.

Using the Standards to Evaluate the Redesign of the U.S. Naturalization Tests: Lessons for the Measurement Community

In 2001, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) began the process of redesigning the U.S. naturalization tests due to concerns that the current testing procedure may not be sufficiently uniform, and that the test content may not be appropriate. A National Research Council committee issued recommendations, based largely on the Standards, to ensure that the redesigned tests would be scientifically and politically defensible; however, USCIS chose not to follow much of the committee's advice. This article summarizes some lessons for the measurement community and possible strategies for getting policymakers to pay more attention to the Standards.