US Bank Holding Companies Research Articles

Credit Risk Management and US Bank-Holding Companies: An Empirical Investigation

This paper empirically evaluates the impact of ownership structure on the cost of credit in US banks. It does so by comparing their grouped option-adjusted credit spreads on the outstanding debt issues. As the overall risk of the creditors is reflected in the yield spread of the firms’ outstanding bonds, separately classifying bank-holding companies and stand-alone banks and controlling risk ratings, maturities, and issue sizes enables us to compare the yield spreads tied to ownership structure. After computing the option-adjusted yield spreads of outstanding operating and holding company bonds, we used these values in a master regression equation to test the statistical and economic significance of the binary variable separating the option-adjusted spreads of the two sets. Our work finds that when the S&P ranks and maturities are controlled, US bank-holding companies finances with higher cost of credit compared with stand-alone banks, although holding companies add a layer of liability protection due to the legal separation between the assets and the owners. This suggests that certain characteristics of US bank-holding companies, such as higher leverage and higher systematic risk levels, make them riskier compared with traditional stand-alone banks, offsetting the benefits of forming a holding company.

CEO risk-culture, bank stability and the case of the Silicon Valley Bank

We examine the link between CEO risk-culture and bank stability. Using textual analysis, we construct novel bank CEO risk-culture indicators by analysing Earning Calls transcripts (EC) of 160 US Bank Holding Companies (BHC) for the period between 2002 and 2023. We illustrate and discuss our findings using the case of the recently collapsed Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). We observe a weaker emphasis on governance by SVB in comparison to the benchmark sample. We also show an alignment between CEO risk-culture of SVB and other banks’ CEOs with the highest uninsured deposits, including the later collapsed First Republic Bank. Finally, our regression analysis shows that negative metrics of the CEO risk-culture decrease bank stability.

On the “double leverage” of US insurance groups

We show that a high degree of “double leverage” inside US insurance groups affects in a negative way their financial strength. Double leverage occurs when the parent firm finances the purchase of subsidiaries’ equity using external debt proceeds, i.e., without changing its stand-alone capital. The previous evidence shows that the double leverage of US Bank Holding Companies leads the firms to become riskier (Bressan, 2018b) and less efficient (Bressan et al., 2021). While regulators give instructions for the assessment of double leverage inside banking groups, in the insurance sector this topic has not received enough attention from either regulators or scholars. This article aims to fill this lack of knowledge by using data from the balance sheets of US insurance groups during the years 2000–2021, showing that indicators for the solvency and the performance of insurers decrease significantly in measures of double leverage. These findings deliver important implications for future policymaking. As we analyze accounting data from consolidated balance sheets, we argue that regulators should more carefully consider whether consolidation rules are sufficiently informative about the financial stability of insurance groups. This is an important task in relation to the systemic relevance of insurance corporations. Finally, this article is a starting point for follow-up research testing, for example, the link of double leverage to captive insurance (Weterings, 2014) and reinsurance (Park & Xie, 2014; Bressan, 2018a).

Cyclicality of Liquidity Creation: Non-linear Evidence from US Bank Holding Companies

Cyclicality of Liquidity Creation: Non-linear Evidence from US Bank Holding Companies

Banking Finance Experts Consensus on Compliance in US Bank Holding Companies: An e-Delphi Study

Compliance measures emphasized in the Dodd-Frank Bill 2010, Section 165 is a response to the 2008 financial crisis, that requires large banks to maintain a minimum capital ratio. The Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) regulates capital of Bank Holding Companies (BHC) through compliance Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 2009 and Comprehensive Capital Adequacy Review (CCAR) 2011 annual stress test of capital. The Fed imposed a minimum capital ratio of 8% that has derailed the risk management objective of capital adequacy, as bank managers are forced to take on more risk to meet the capital ratio. This study concerns senior manager practices that can be effective in meeting compliance requirements posed by the Fed for BHCs. Through a qualitative e-Delphi study, 10 banking finance experts were convened to build consensus on senior manager’s practices that can be effective in meeting compliance requirements. Data were collected from three electronic questionnaires submitted through Qualtrics. Data were analyzed using theoretical triangulation, coding, and thematic analysis. Four important considerations were identified that could bolster compliance measures effectiveness: (a) emphasis placed on understanding regulatory consultant compliance, (b) maintenance of effective and independent compliance align to organizational objectives, (c) clear definition of data source for compliance analytics. These considerations of compliance practices may help senior bank managers reduce risky behaviors and investments that cause significant bank losses.

Efficient Capital Regulation of US Bank Holding Companies: An Integrative Literature Review

Background: Most Bank holding companies (BHCs) sustains significant losses and increased risk exposure which caused them to become insolvent. BHCs that become insolvent have a negative impact on the U.S. economy. There is a lack of effective practice towards capital regulation that causes BHC to incur significant losses. Methodology: This integrative literature review focused on studying current research findings on efficient capital regulation practices in relation to governance, risk management, internal control, assurance and compliance in BHCs. A wide range of search terms was used to extract and select pertinent peer-reviewed literature from numerous search engines and databases, with emphasis on studies published within the past 5 years. Findings: This integrative literature review provides in-depth knowledge of capital regulation, governance, risk management, internal control, assurance and compliance practices in BHCs. An effective practice towards capital regulation may help senior bank managers reduce risky behaviors and investments that causes significant bank losses. Originality: This integrative literature review can be used by future researchers as foundational material to extend theoretical foundations and the results of related studies. It has helped to highlight Compliance and Ethics Group's standard' concepts and inform recommendation for future research that identifies effective practices towards capital regulation in BHCs.

Quality Versus Quantity: The Case of U.S. Bank Capital Buffers

We find that larger US bank holding companies (BHCs) hold lower quality capital buffers than their smaller peers. US BHCs’ capital buffer quality is found to be a function of their operational complexity, risk-weighted assets and profitability. We, however, find no evidence that large US BHCs trade–off capital buffer quality with their liquid asset investments. On average, US BHCs narrow the gap between their actual and target buffer quality by 49.5 per cent per quarter. This (buffer quality) adjustment speed, however, is substantially faster than that observed in pre-GFC US studies of buffer size. The well capitalised US BHCs (top 20 percent) adjust their buffer quality 8 percent faster than poorly capitalised ones. The latter seem to face impediments in raising new capital due to higher reputation costs. The costs of adjusting buffers also seem an important explanation for holding higher quality buffers. Our results shed more light on the trade-offs associated with banks holding higher quality capital buffers.

The Effects of Internal Control Systems on Risk, Profitability and Compliance of the US Banking Sector: A Quantitative Approach

A strongly quantitative research to investigate whether and how the components of the internal control systems affect the US banking sector. Based on COSO, Basel Committee Frameworks and on the literature, the components of the internal controls were quantified. Independent variables were analyzed in three different regression models, with the credit risk, the profitability and the compliance being the dependent variable in each model. A panel set of data was used comprising by the 210 biggest US Bank Holding Companies for the fiscal years 2013-2017. Most of the data were taken from the proxy statements (DEF 14A) and from the 10-K Statements, due to their qualitative nature. Αll the components of internal controls significantly affect the credit risk, while they significantly affect the profitability and the compliance of US banks, except from the Risk Assessment component in the first case, and the Control Environment component in the second case respectively.

The Role of Stability and Ownership Structure in Determining the Efficiency of US Bank Holding Companies

During the last three decades,the focus of regulatorshas been to enhance the stability of the financial system.However, there is little research as to how the desire for higher financial stability for bank holding companies would affect their efficiency. Byusing a dataset of 553 US Bank Holding Companies (BHC)for the period 2004 to 2015 and a dynamic panel methodology,this study investigates whether the efficiency of BHC was affected by the requirement for higher stability and ownership structure during the sample period. The empirical findings suggest that BHC with higher stability (lower risk levels) are relatively more efficient. Regarding the ownership structure, we find evidence that BHC with a higher proportion of institutional ownership, especially those that exerting market discipline such as mutual funds and hedge funds,positively affects the efficiency of BHC. On the other hand,a higher level of government ownership adversely impacts the efficiency of BHC.Overall empirical findings support the regulatory view that higher stability levels and close monitoring by shareholders help in improving efficiency. The results remain robust with alternative measures of efficiency. Thesefindings have implications for regulators and investorsalike asthere is a need to carefully evaluate regulatory policies such that they may not adversely affect efficiency while keeping the banking sector healthy and stable.

How Useful Is Basel III's Liquidity Coverage Ratio? Evidence From US Bank Holding Companies

AbstractThis paper approximates a construction of Basel III's Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) for US bank holding companies. This study examines (i) the LCR's marginal contribution to a firm's systemic risk and (ii) whether the LCR can predict ex ante which banks are most exposed to systemic losses in a true systemic event. Panel regressions from 2002 to 2015 show that the LCR is associated with lower relative systemic risk, measured by ΔCoVaR. The LCR may be used conjunctively with marginal expected shortfall to predict a firm's systemic losses during the crisis of 2007–2008.

Earnings announcements and quoted bid-ask spreads of U.S. Bank Holding Companies

This paper investigates the relationship between earnings announcements and quoted bid-ask spreads of US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). Using a large sample of daily BHC market data, I hypothesize and find evidence of a positive relation between earnings announcements and the quoted bid-ask spread. I argue that this result is due to earnings releases helping to increase information asymmetries between informed traders and market makers.

Banking, Not Banking and the Valuation of Banks

Rethinking of bank business models, fueled by the recent crisis and tightened capital requirements, is under growing attention from financial research on banks. Effects of the income structure on banks’ performance and value creation are central items. Market valuations of banks are of particular interest since they reflect combined expectations for profitability and risk. To date, studies refer to aggregated components of earnings. Hence findings provide with limited insight on the value-contribution of specific activities and, further, they tend to conflict.The present paper proposes an original investigation of the value-contribution of different activities, based on a sample of 218 quoted US Bank Holding Companies throughout 2003-2009 (a full economic cycle). With regard to an historical debate and a major issue for banks’ stakeholders, it emphasizes on the contribution of traditional banking services as opposed to various non-banking activities. The contribution of banking is found to be influenced by its components: interests on loans tend to contribute negatively but banking fees positively. Besides banking fees, the valuation of the smaller BHC is also supported by customer investment services. The larger BHC may benefit from a broader spectrum of non-banking activities, such as insurance, as opposed to interests on loans. Trading has a negative influence for all specifications. These results are robust to underlying effects on ROE and risk. The hierarchy of value-contributions is next addressed. For all samples, of which also BHC with the highest banking fees within banking income, customer investment services over-perform banking. Insurance activities under-perform banking, even for the larger BHC and BHC with lowest banking fees intensities.

US bank holding companies: Structure of activities and performance through the cycles

The development of market-based finance has supported a larger involvement of banks in non-banking activities over the last decades. Does diversification beyond “traditional” banking result in actual diversification of earning risks and superior risk-return profile? Existing studies on bank performance address the effect of earnings based on accounting types and for specific time periods. With the exception of proprietary investments and financial leverage, knowledge with regard to underlying activities is scarce and little conclusive to date. Other studies, mainly stemming from central banks, do not focus on activity types or risk-return but evidence a marked influence of economic conditions and financial markets on banks' income.The paper proposes a twofold original contribution by addressing the influence of economic conditions and financial markets on specific activities conducted by banks. Based on granular data from a panel of US Bank Holding Companies (BHC), it first aims at estimating profitabilities related to “traditional” banking services and to (customers) investment services conditional to the environment. The study is then extended by the simulation of multiple scenarios to assess the expected performance of activities (profitability and risk) as well as the extent of uncertainty. Diversification into investment services is found to improve the expected risk-return. Also, well calibrated interest rate mismatch (between assets and liabilities) further supports performance. Deviations from historical volatilities and correlations of influential variables may cause diversification benefits to vary. Results however also suggest that the uncertainty of ROE associated with such diversification is limited compared to banking alone.

The Net Stable Funding Ratio of US Bank Holding Companies: A Retrospective Analysis

We calculate the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for US Bank Holding Companies between 2001-2013. We find, that for the vast majority of cases the NSFR was compatible with the Basel III threshold. In addition, we document a significant deterioration of about 10% of the NSFR during the post-financial crisis period. Moreover, the NSFR exhibits significant heterogeneity across size segments, with its mean level dropping at a decreasing rate.The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR hereafter) is a structural micro-prudential metric of maturity transformation risk, introduced by the Basel Committee of Bank Supervision (BCBS hereafter) in its Basel III accord (BIS, 2010; Gobat et al., 2014).

The Interaction between Risk, Return-Risk Trade-Off and Complexity: Evidence and Policy Implications for US Bank Holding Companies

This paper examines two aspects of bank risk with a particular emphasis on examining the interaction between them. Moreover, throughout the analysis we differentiate between non-complex and complex banks, the latter of which could be seen as holding a further level of risk. We wish to establish how these risk behaviours interact with bank specific, market structure and economic factors. Key results indicate that earnings volatility (business risk) increases with market power but decrease with size and output. While risk-taking (managerial risk) decreases with market power and increases with size and output. Furthermore, in examining return per unit of risk, results demonstrate that increase return and risk-taking is associated with bank specific factors and the economic environment, whereas decreased risk taking is associated with market structure. This suggests a management of risk, which increases around factors under bank control or improving external environment but decreases with the interaction of competitors. Overall, the results suggest that policy should focus on liquidity and equity buffers that should operate counter-cyclicality but size and market structure per se are not determining factors for higher risk. In terms of the recent financial crisis, it is likely that the great moderation that proceeded it lead to higher risk-taking due to higher economic growth but without the necessary buffers being built up.

Model uncertainty and systematic risk in US banking

This paper uses Bayesian Model Averaging to examine the driving factors of equity returns of US Bank Holding Companies. BMA has as an advantage over OLS that it accounts for the considerable uncertainty about the correct set (model) of bank risk factors. We find that out of a broad set of 12risk factors only the market, real estate, and high-minus-low Fama–French factors are reliably related to US bank stock returns over the period 1986–2010. Other factors are either only relevant over specific subperiods or for subsets of bank holding companies. We discuss the implications of our findings for empirical banking research.

Time-Varying Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk Exposures of US Bank Holding Companies

We study the time-varying risk exposures of US bank holding companies for the 1986 to 2012 period by decomposing total bank risk into systematic banking-industry risk, systematic market-wide risk, and idiosyncratic bank risk. Banking-industry risk factors directly relate to the banks’ financial intermediation functions while market-wide risk factors affect all stocks. In contrast, idiosyncratic risk reflects individual bank risk characteristics. We analyze the systematic bank risk factors in time series regressions, determine their importance with a democratic orthogonalization technique, and explore the idiosyncratic risk in a panel regression framework. Our results suggest that corporate credit risk and real estate risk are most detrimental in crisis periods, while banks’ interest-rate-risk sensitivity changes over the last decade. The banks’ leverage, loan-loss provisions, fraction of real estate loans, and proportion of non-interest income relate to the differences in individual bank risk. Moreover, banks’ idiosyncratic risk contains a strong state-level business cycle component. Our results are robust to alternative risk factor specifications. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the structure and time-variation of banks’ systematic and idiosyncratic risks.

Credit Risk Measurement, Leverage Ratios and Basel III: Proposed Basel III Leverage and Supplementary Leverage Ratios

The Basel III Leverage Ratio, as originally agreed upon in December 2010, has recently undergone revisions and updates – both in relation to those proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – as well as proposals introduced in the United States. Whilst recent proposals have been introduced by the Basel Committee to improve, particularly, the denominator component of the Leverage Ratio, new requirements have been introduced in the U.S to upgrade and increase these ratios, and it is those updates which relate to the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio that have primarily generated a lot of interests. This is attributed not only to concerns that many subsidiaries of US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) will find it cumbersome to meet such requirements, but also to potential or possible increases in regulatory capital arbitrage: a phenomenon which plagued the era of the original 1988 Basel Capital Accord and which also partially provided impetus for the introduction of Basel II. This paper is aimed at providing an analysis of the recent updates which have taken place in respect of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in respect of recent amendments introduced by the Basel Committee and proposals introduced in the United States. As well as highlighting and addressing gaps which exist in the literature relating to liquidity risks, corporate governance and information asymmetries, by way of reference to pre-dominant based dispersed ownership systems and structures, as well as concentrated ownership systems and structures, this paper will also consider the consequences – as well as the impact - which the U.S Leverage ratios could have on Basel III. There are ongoing debates in relation to revision by the Basel Committee, as well as the most recent U.S proposals to update Basel III Leverage ratios and whilst these revisions have been welcomed to a large extent, in view of the need to address Tier One capital requirements and exposure criteria, there is every likelihood,indication, as well as tendency that many global systemically important banks (GSIBS), and particularly their subsidiaries, will resort to capital arbitrage. What is likely to be the impact of the recent proposals in the U.S.? The recent U.S proposals are certainly very encouraging and should also serve as impetus for other jurisdictions to adopt a pro-active approach – particularly where existing ratios or standards appear to be inadequate. This paper also adopts the approach of evaluating the causes and consequences of the most recent updates by the Basel Committee, as well as those revisions which have taken place in the U.S, by attempting to balance the merits of the respective legislative updates and proposals. The value of adopting leverage ratios as a supplementary regulatory tool will also be illustrated by way of reference to the impact of the recent legislative changes on risk taking activities, as well as the need to also supplement capital adequacy requirements with the Basel Leverage ratios and the Basel liquidity standards.

Do Competitive Disadvantages Really Arise from 'Over Complying'?: Proposed Basel III Leverage and Supplementary Leverage Ratios Re-Visited

The Basel III Leverage Ratio, as originally agreed upon in December 2010, has recently undergone revisions and updates – both in relation to those proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – as well as proposals introduced in the United States. Whilst recent proposals have been introduced by the Basel Committee to improve, particularly, the denominator component of the Leverage Ratio, new requirements have been introduced in the U.S to upgrade and increase these ratios, and it is those updates which relate to the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio that have primarily generated a lot of interests. This is attributed not only to concerns that many subsidiaries of US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) will find it cumbersome to meet such requirements, but also to potential or possible increases in regulatory capital arbitrage: a phenomenon which plagued the era of the original 1988 Basel Capital Accord and which also partially provided impetus for the introduction of Basel II. This paper is aimed at providing an analysis of the most recent updates which have taken place in respect of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in respect of recent amendments introduced by the Basel Committee and revisions introduced in the United States. Amongst these notable developments, the Final or rather nearly finalised Standard issued by the Basel Committee in January 2014, as well as the 2014 U.S Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios are worth mentioning. Sometimes the competitive disadvantages resulting from over compliance or stringent measures may generate costs which are actually minimal when compared to those costs which could potential arise in a scenario where economic disruptions and crises do occur where such „over compliance“ measures are not implemented. So when do measures become over-compliant? What may be regarded as over-compliance for a particular jurisdiction may not necessarily be the case for another. Conversely what may be required for minimal compliance purposes in certain jurisdictions may prove inadequate for certain major economies.

Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring, or also influencing?

This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher (semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market influencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect influencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization.