US Analysts Research Articles

BETWEEN “STRATEGIC ALTRUISM” AND “SELECTIVE COOPERATION”: US POLICY DILEMMA TOWARD INDIA

This paper discusses the US dilemma of policy making on India. The paper begins with a retrospective look at the US-India relations since Modi came to power, and a predictive analysis of the policy on India under the Biden administration, in order to show how the US perspective on India’s role in US global and regional strategies has changed. The paper demonstrates that China is one of the pivotal external variables that promote US-India relations. The review of policy is followed by a discussion of strategic assessments of India policies by US analysts and experts on India. These can be classified into two policies: “strategic altruism” and “selective cooperation,” each of which represents a type of US-India relation. Through comparing these assessments, the paper concludes that the United States faces a dilemma in policy making on India, with US policy makers unable to reach an agreement on fundamental issues concerning US-India relations.

Challenging U.S. Security Assessments of Africa

ABSTRACTFor decades, Africa lay at the periphery of US security policy. Attention to the continent intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks amid claims that East Africa and the Sahel had become hubs of terrorist activity. Despite this shift, US analysts and policymakers continue to frame security threats in Africa using a traditional, Cold War-influenced paradigm. Commonly used indicators are based on mainstream security studies, which provides a narrow view of security. Using Critical Security Studies, this article provides a broader and more inclusive assessment of security threats in Africa.

Rusia en el Mediterráneo. ¿Un nuevo competidor para la Unión Europea?

The so-called Arab was a wonderful idea for many European and US analysts, but over the years it has been observed what remains of all the radical changes. The European Union has failed to take the opportunity to strengthen its partnerships with the countries of North Africa and increase its influence. The Russia's desire of being a global actor found a favorable window of opportunities in the region once the results of such Spring were obvious. Russia has increased its presence and influence in the region through the signing of different agreements in particular on military sales, energy and nuclear plants, in addition to the strengthening of trade, tourism and cultural ties.

Was the Global Settlement Effective in Mitigating Systematic Bias in Affiliated Analyst Recommendations?

Regulators have recently relaxed some provisions of the Global Research Analyst Settlement of 2003 (the “Global Settlement”) and associated reforms, which arose from charges that conflicts of interest within investment banks had induced the issuance of fraudulent or otherwise misleading analyst research reports. We examine the effectiveness of the Global Settlement in reducing the systematic optimism observed in stock recommendations of analysts whose employer is a merger and acquisition (“M&A”) advisor for the covered firm (“affiliated analysts”), by comparing the optimism exhibited in stock recommendations issued by these analysts and by unaffiliated analysts before and after the Global Settlement. To control for the impact on analyst optimism of other time varying factors, our sample includes cases from the US and from other countries in which the Global Settlement had no direct impact. We argue that if the Global Settlement was effective, there should be a reduction in the relative optimism of affiliated analysts following this reform, and that reduction in the relative optimism should be greater for affiliated US analysts, than for affiliated analysts from non-US countries. When optimism is measured over a 180-day period surrounding the M&A announcement, we find a significantly greater reduction in US affiliated analysts’ optimism than occurs outside the US. However, evidence regarding analysts’ optimism in the 90-day period prior to the announcement of an M&A deal is mixed.

The Uzbek Wild Card in the New Great Game in Central Asia

Beginning in early 2013, US analysts detected a shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy—a move to increasingly rely on bilateralism as the basis for the state’s international relations. President Islam Karimov’s rejection of Russia’s self-proclaimed role of hegemon in Central Asia has likely contributed to this newfound policy approach that places Tashkent in a position to increase social and economic ties with the region’s emerging powerhouse—China. Although Uzbekistan has expressed consistent interest in establishing closer ties with the US, the withdrawal of US forces from the region diminishes the ability of the US to remain a plausible partner. This new approach to foreign relations will not fully prevent Uzbekistan from participating in the region’s multilateral organizations, but rather it is seen as an attempt to create some spacing between Tashkent and Moscow. This paper argues that active multistate cooperation between Uzbekistan, its Central Asian neighbors, and the region’s superpowers—Russia, China, and the United States—is necessary for the containment of extremism in Afghanistan following the International Security Assistnace Force drawdown in 2016. However, if Uzbekistan abandons multilateralism to the degree that neighboring Turkmenistan has and relies on the neorealist tenet of self-help in addressing political and security threats, the state will inevitably expose itself to Russian meddling. Uzbek cooperation with Vladimir Putin in the areas of economic development and security will continue but will be approached very cautiously due to the alarm resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

China's Concept of Military Strategy

ABSTRACT: China's concept of military strategy is very different from that of the United States. This article examines the various components of the strategic thought of the People's Liberation Army and how its theory of strategy can be applied in contemporary times. Among other things, the article offers US analysts template for confronting Chinese strategy. ********** There is an American joke that perfectly explains what Mao referred to as the of Chinese military strategy: Vinnie is in jail. His father writes to tell him he wishes Vinnie were home now to dig up the tomato garden. Vinnie writes back not to do that, since that is where he buried the bodies. The next day the FBI digs up the ground and finds no bodies. A day later Vinnie writes, 'under the circumstances, Dad, that was the best I could do.' Yet very few Americans would recognize in this joke connection to Chinese military strategy, since the United States view of strategy is so different. Vinnie made someone (the FBI) do something for the agency (look for the bodies) that they were actually doing for someone else (Vinnie and his dad). To get someone to do something for himself that he thinks is in his own interests, but which is actually in your interests, is the essence of strategy, according to Mao. The United States Armed Forces, according to Joint 'Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (1) This definition is more kinetic than potential (the ideas having been generated) and it envisions employing power as the means to achieve an objective. The definition restricts itself to the use of diplomacy, information, military, and economic means as the employment preference. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China appears to define strategy more broadly and analytically than the US military. The PLA definition has several components as part of its comprehensive nature. While the official definition has changed little over the past twenty years, internal discussions have surfaced about information-age strategy. As result, Chinese strategy is now mix of the old and new and, from this author's vantage point, includes the following: 1. Official definitions highlighting Chinese strategy's comprehensive nature and use of analytical judgment (planning and the use of strategic guidelines; remnants from the past play prominent role) 2. An analytical thought process seemingly more prominently Marxist than before. It examines the strategic environment through the lens of objective reality and applies subjective judgment to manipulate that environment to one's advantage 3. The use of stratagems integrated with technological innovations. This hybrid combination is paired with specific aspects of an enemy's intelligence-judgment-decision process to induce the enemy to make decisions as one would expect 4. The constant search for strategic advantage or shi, which is also goal of the Chinese strategic game of Weiqi or Go. Shi is sought everywhere, whether it be with the use of forces, electrons, or some other aspect of the strategic environment 5. The objective of deceptively making someone do something ostensibly for himself, when he is actually doing it for you. Each of these items is explained below, along with few comments from retired PLA officers who specialized in strategy. Together, these various elements of the PLA's strategic template offer analysts method through which to understand and respond to the Chinese approach to, for example, the cyber environment or the South China Sea. Without the template, analysts are prone to mirror-image Western views of the strategic environment, and thereby develop improper responses to PLA activities. …

Skin memories: On race, love and loss

During African-American slavery, the rape of slave women by their masters was ubiquitous. This unrecognized atrocity shaped the US economy and has informed race relations. This history is written into the skin of US analysts, but it has not penetrated psychoanalytic theory, practice, or consciousness. My article traces the historical abuse of slave women’s bodies and the transgenerational effects of the exploitation. This tracing proceeds through an intimate look at the author’s personal analysis, in which she, a Russian-Jewish patient, is treated by a light-skinned African-American analyst. In the transference, the history of slavery emerges: the analyst’s apparent whiteness echoes with rape on the plantation. Racial guilt and conflict is worked through motifs of loss, forced separation, and internalized racism.

Taiwan Strait détente and the changing role of the United States in cross-Strait relations

Détente in the Taiwan Strait has raised questions about the United States’ role in future cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Washington welcomes and encourages peaceful interactions across the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, however, it is increasingly concerned about Beijing gaining more control of the dynamics and direction of future cross-Strait relations. As some US analysts suggest, if Taiwan drifts towards closer relations with China, Washington has to reconsider its national interests. US anxiety over Taiwan is further aggravated by its perception of a rising and more assertive China in the Asia–Pacific region, as reflected by the emerging debate on US Taiwan policy and its overall strategy towards China. The role of the United States in cross-Strait relations is undergoing some adjustments as Washington ‘pivots’ its strategic focus to Asia and as its relations with China become more salient in its Asian policy. In the long run the rivalry between Washington and Beijing in Asia would eventually have a negative bearing on cross-Strait relations.

Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field

One of the largest security concerns facing the United States today is how to mitigate its vulnerability to cyberweapons. Over the past twenty years, cyberthreats have evolved from solitary hackers motivated by monetary gain and prestige to organized crime and state actors. The sophistication and capabilities of these threats grows in direct proportion to the level of connectivity in society. Despite this steady development of cyberthreats, relatively little attention is given to discerning how these threats will impact warfighting and the international system. Most of the current literature on cyberwarfare considers it, at best, a force multiplier. Many scholars disregard its effects as a standalone attack vector, citing various reasons from US responses to Pearl Harbor and 9/11 to the inability of strategic bombing in World War II to subdue the civilian populations in England and Germany, absent combined military operations. These perspectives are correct in arguing that offensive cyberoperations without traditional, conventional power will be largely futile. This analytical approach, however, presumes that cyberweapons will be used in an offensive, first-strike manner. The long-range strike capabilities of cyberwar have the potential to be extremely effective when employed as an anticoercion weapon. In essence, a strong cyber capability is a deterrent force that will largely mitigate outside interference in domestic and regional affairs. Because there are no confirmed cases of a large-scale, state-sanctioned cyberattack, analysts are currently forced to explore different weapon systems and theories to help both the fighter and the politician understand how cyberweapons can be utilized and what vulnerabilities this new class of weapon creates. Given the unique characteristics of cyberspace and cyberweapons, no existing technology or theory will provide an adequate understanding. Nevertheless, by borrowing tenets from both strategic airpower theory and early debates on nuclear weapons doctrine and deterrence, the approximate capabilities of cyberweapons become far less opaque. The concept of strategic airpower has developed over the past century into one of the main tenets of modern war. (1) Strategists understand its limitations in winning a war of existential proportions but also found it exceedingly useful in short duration conflicts between two unequal parties. The air superiority required for a strategic air campaign costs trillions of dollars and requires an extensive network of overseas bases for airfields and ports that can accommodate carrier battle groups. This level of investment is beyond the capacity of most states. As a result, cyberweapons have the potential to become an equalizing force because they require a fraction of the investment but are able to execute most of the same missions. Additionally, early nuclear theory wrestled with many of the same problems that we now face in attempting to understand cyberweapons. While the United States and Soviet Union eventually came to the same conclusion about the true utility of nuclear weapons in war, it took two decades to do so. While cyberweapons may turn out to be awe inspiring enough to create a new form of mutually assured destruction (MAD) (2), it is far more likely that early thinking regarding demonstration shots and defense on the cheap dovetailing into massive retaliation will be more insightful. Just as the industrial revolution brought about a fundamental change in warfare, the information age is ushering in a new, low-cost option for strategic defense. Cyberwarfare capabilities can now accomplish most of the strategic tasks that once required air supremacy. According to US analysts, everything from health care to the power grid is a viable cyber target. (3) A cursory look at the targets of recent US air campaigns illustrates how much civilian infrastructure is targeted in a strategic bombing campaign. In today's interconnected world, both civilian infrastructure and military installations are increasingly vulnerable to cyber disruption. …

Reg-FD and the competitiveness of all-star analysts

We examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the competitive advantage of All-Star analysts as measured by turnover in the rankings. Institutional Investor All-Americans, chosen by votes of institutional investors based on overall helpfulness, experienced a significant increase in turnover as Reg-FD was implemented. Non-US analysts and US analysts ranked solely on the basis of public stock recommendations did not. Within a few years, however, All-American turnover returned to pre-Reg-FD levels, suggesting that the new All-Americans built a competitive advantage stressing aspects of performance less dependent on privileged communication.

News & Notes

AbstractCervical cancer risk falls when OCs stoppedThe increased risk of cervical cancer associated with oral contraceptives (OCs) declines after use ends and returns to baseline after 10 years, Cancer Research UK has shown (Lancet 2007; 370: 1609‐21).The new analysis pooled data from 24 studies involving a total of 16 573 cases and 35 509 controls. In women up to 50 years old in developed countries, OC use was associated with a higher incidence of cervical cancer, increased from 3.8/1000 among never‐users to 4.0/1000 after 5 years and 4.5/1000 after 10 years. This was the first study to show that the risk decreased when OC use ended, with similar risks between patient subgroups.Little evidence comparing osteoporosis treatmentsWhile there is good evidence that the bisphosphonates and other therapies are effective in the treatment of osteoporosis, few comparative data are available and their relative efficacy is uncertain, say US analysts (Ann Intern Med 2008; 148(3); published online 18 Dec 2007).Their systematic review of 75 randomised trials and 24 metaanalyses found good evidence that bisphosphonates, oestrogen, parathyroid hormone and raloxifene reduced vertebral fracture risk compared with placebo, and fair evidence for calcitonin. For hip fractures, there was good evidence for the efficacy of oestrogen, alendronate and risedronate, and fair evidence supporting zoledronic acid; the efficacy of vitamin D varied with the analogue, dose and study population.A larger database provided safety data: raloxifene and oestrogens (alone or combined) increased the risk of thrombosis and etidronate increased the risk of oesophageal ulceration and gastrointestinal perforations, ulcerations and bleeding.Bevacizumab delays progression of metastatic breast cancerInitial treatment of metastatic breast cancer with a combination of bevacizumab and paclitaxel increases progression‐free survival but not overall survival, a new study shows (N Eng J Med 2007; 357: 2666‐76).Among 722 women who received 4‐weekly cycles, median progression‐free survival was 11.8 months with combination therapy compared with 5.9 months with paclitaxel alone. Although one‐year survival was higher with combination therapy (81.2 vs 73.4 per cent), median survival was similar in the two groups (26.7 vs 25.2 months). Combined therapy was associated with a higher incidence of hypertension, proteinuria and cerebrovascular ischaemia.Testosterone has mixed effects in older menTestosterone supplementation in older men with low testosterone levels (<13.7nmol/l) does not improve cognition or functional status, according to investigators from The Netherlands (JAMA 2008; 299: 39‐52).Six months' treatment with testosterone undecanoate 80mg twice daily increased lean body mass, decreased fat mass and improved insulin sensitivity compared with placebo.However, high‐density lipoprotein‐cholesterol was decreased and the prevalence of metabolic syndrome was higher than with placebo (48 vs 36 per cent, P=0.07). There was no effect on quality of life, prostate safety or bone mineral density.Information for people undergoing gender changeThe Department of Health has published information resources for people undergoing gender change, their families and healthcare staff.The leaflet Transgender experiences – information and support explains gender dysphoria and its treatment, individuals' rights and choices and sources of support. A guide to hormone therapy for trans people is a booklet explaining treatment in detail. Both can be downloaded from the Department of Health website (www.dh.gov.uk). Copyright © 2008 Wiley Interface Ltd.

Value of analyst recommendations: International evidence

We evaluate the value of analysts’ recommendations in the G7 countries. Stock prices react significantly to recommendation revisions in all countries except Italy. We find the largest price reactions around recommendation revisions and the largest post-revision price drift in the US. Neither differences in the timing of recommendation revisions relative to earnings announcements nor differences in industry coverage explain the superior performance of the US analysts’ recommendations. Tests within a subsample of ADRs indicate that the most likely explanation for the superior performance is that the US analysts are more skilled at identifying mispriced stocks than their foreign counterparts.

Health Reform in Brazil: Lessons to Consider

US analysts and decisionmakers interested in comparative health policy typically turn to European perspectives, but Brazil-notwithstanding its far smaller gross domestic product and lower per capita health expenditures and technological investments-offers an example with surprising relevance to the US health policy context. Not only is Brazil comparable to the United States in size, racial/ethnic and geographic diversity, federal system of government, and problems of social inequality. Within the health system the incremental nature of reforms, the large role of the private sector, the multitiered patchwork of coverage, and the historically large population excluded from health insurance coverage resonate with health policy challenges and developments in the United States.

Affect, language and communication. 41st IPA Congress plenary session.

The author discusses Hernández's enriching and clarifying paper, which directs us to the limitations of language with regard to affective movements that barely attain the condition of thinkability and thereby to the important and confusing topic of enactments, which are the lingua franca for the communication of dangerous and repudiated affects. Enactments bridge the interface between what is expressible, and inexpressible, between what is forgotten and what is pressing for revival, between reality and fantasy and also between one-person and two-person psychologies. Conceptually the term enactment facilitates the integration of the concepts of fantasy, projective identification and countertransference. Steiner's richly detailed and moving clinical report demonstrated the value of the concept of projective identification for understanding his patient's communication of affects. The concept has been neglected until recently by many US analysts; one source of confusion has been the assumed reliability of the analyst's emotional reactions as an indicator of what the patient is feeling. The author asks whether Steiner is speaking loosely or literally when he says that his patients put their feelings into him, citing examples to demonstrate that the value of the concept of projective identification would be enhanced by a clarification of this question.

The Soviet defence burden: Estimating hidden defence costs

WHAT IS THE REAL SHARE of the Soviet Union's output allocated for defence purposes? This question has been debated for decades with the objective of ascertaining not only real Soviet defence expenditure but also the total size of the Soviet economy. The debate continues today despite the publication of previously secret Soviet GNP and defence budgetary statistics.1 According to Soviet government officials, defence expenditure comprises less than 7-8% of total GNP, a level comparable to that of the USA.2 In comparison, the CIA has estimated that the Soviet defence burden has declined from 17% to around 15% during the past two years.3 An alternative view advocated by many Soviet economists and some US analysts is that the real defence burden had been well above 20%.4 What are the reasons for such diverse estimates of the Soviet defence burden, given the increased openness on the part of Soviet government officials? The current consensus is that prices of Soviet defence goods and services do not reflect the real cost of resources allocated for defence relative to the cost of resources allocated for consumption and investment. Thus, critics of official Soviet and CIA estimates argue that prices in the defence sector are set at an artificially low level by means of various direct and indirect subsidies to conceal the real size of the defence burden. The same critics also argue that the official Soviet defence budget excludes a number of defence-related outlays which must be accounted for as part of the total defence burden. Those analysts who rely on US intelligence estimates believe that the CIA building block approach-pricing individual weapon systems and servicesmakes it possible to correct for most of the known inadequacies of Soviet centrally administered prices. Critics of US Intelligence estimates argue, however, that the building block approach is not well designed to measure the cost of goods and services produced in a unique Soviet military economy. This supposedly results in a significant underestimation of various hidden Soviet defence costs. As a rule, critics base their arguments on circumstantial evidence and 'common sense' arguments, making little attempt to analyse these costs within the framework of Soviet national accounts. For this reason, CIA officials readily dismiss alternative estimates based on criticising the building block approach as speculative and unwarranted.