Intellectuals are a problem, and they should be-both to themselves and others. Fortified by this conviction, I was provoked to write this essay when, while reading The Guardian, I came across a brief commentary-Julian Baggini's Wisdom's Folly-on Plato's account of trial of Socrates, at which latter purportedly proclaims, the unexamined is not worth living. After pointing out that this maxim sounds unobjectionable (par. 1), Baggini goes on to suggest that actually it is profoundly because would be no need to exhort us to examine our if we did not think that there were human beings who do not, and so have valueless, lives (par.2). Let us consider this claim carefully. Of course assuming that one's fellow humans are themselves valueless or bestial is deplorable-worse than elitist. Such assumptions are bound up in a sense of personal superiority, enabled by structures that often remain unknown or unacknowledged. However, decrying structures that position one's fellow creatures unfavorably is a different matter. Baggini himself points out in defense of his denunciation of examined life as that [t]he bulk of humankind, today and in history, has been far too busy struggling for survival to engage in philosophical analyses (par. 3). About struggle, at least, he is right.As I type this sentence in 2012, one fifth of global human population in absolute poverty, unable to secure even minimally adequate subsistence, and majority of world is simply poor, scraping by in urban shanty towns or rural villages, with little leisure for lengthy philosophical analyses. 1 Nevertheless, Baggini's suspicion that examined life-under conditions of structural inequality-is merely a philosopher's ruse for asserting superiority over struggling majority, even if it were often true, would be a misdirected critique. To be sure, no one could assert that so-called intellectuals are always dedicated to justice; many have supported horrendous regimes or, at very least, been unwittingly complicit with ordinary oppression. Raymond Williams's withering assessment of culture of teashop at Cambridge supports Baggini's charge of elitism all too well.2 But, for Williams, such dubious elitist characters do not exhaust meaning of intellectual. His approach is dialectical, and, therefore, he considers multiple effects of intellectuals in totality. As soon as one follows Williams's example, fecund areas start to emerge in Baggini's universally bleak landscape: critical function of intellectuals and avid participation of many intellectuals in struggles of oppressed. To bracket from picture intellectuals whose examined life propels them toward critique of injustice and affiliation with movements of progressive resistance is, willy-nilly, to ally-however unintentially-with right-wing populists. After all, Ayn Rand novels and Fox News produce strikingly similar accusations to Baggini's when they denounce supposed university and media elite.This convergence is worth pointing out because usual upshot of such attitudes toward intellectuals is historically frequent but lamentable one of advancing putative social (from either above or below) by administration of symbolic or actual hemlock-that is by purging, exiling, ridiculing, ignoring, or censoring intellectual elites (including Socrates, to whom Baggini points an accusatory finger, without mentioning hemlock part). This strategy does not produce equality in a desirable sense. I will argue instead that a leveling worth having depends upon universalizing conditions that enable examined life, or-as Pierre Bourdieu once evocatively put it-the struggle for universalization of privileged conditions of existence which render pursuit of universal possible (110). …