Unregulated Banking System Research Articles

Would a free banking system stabilize NGDP growth?

Since the 2008 financial crisis, a number of economists have suggested that central banks should follow an NGDP-targeting rule. Other researchers have argued that a free and unregulated banking system stabilizes NGDP growth as an unintended consequence. We explore this argument in a simple model of a free banking system. We find that a free banking system does indeed stabilize NGDP growth in response to aggregate demand shocks. However, we find that in response to aggregate supply shocks it stabilizes the inflation rate. An implication of this is that, unlike an NGDP-targeting central bank, a free banking system would not allow for disinflation or even deflation in response to a positive aggregate supply shock.

Monetary Policy under Zero Reserve Requirement in Canada

Current development shows that financial system tends to move to the direction where controls over banking system would be very minimum. Banks are no longer required to hold afraction of their assets as required reserve with the central bank, and deposits are not subject to interest rate regulation. Fama (1980, 1983) argues that with the absence of reserve ratio price determinacy still holds through the control over currency supply. However, recent development also indicates that the control over currency supply is not any more in the hand of central banks but determined by the demand of the people. Consequently, price level is uncontrollable. Black (1970) even goes further to conclude that the unregulated banking system will bring the traditional monetary theories to an end. This paper deals with the implications of recent development in financial system in Canada. This paper argues that even though there is no longer reserve requirement and currency supply is determined by demand side, the Bank of Canada still has control over nominal magnitude of the economy, namely interest rates, which in turn influence aggregate demand and prices.

Private Liquidity and Banking Regulation

We show that the regulation of bank lending practices is necessary for the optimal provision of private liquidity. In an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors, we show that neither an unregulated banking system nor narrow banking can provide the socially efficient amount of liquidity. If the bankers provided such an amount, then they would prefer to default on their liabilities. We show that a regulation that increases the value of the banking sector’s assets (e.g., by limiting competition in bank lending) will mitigate the commitment problem. If the value of the bank charter is made sufficiently large, then it is possible to implement an efficient allocation. Thus, the creation of a valuable bank charter is necessary for efficiency.

Money Dynamics with Multiple Banks of Issue: Evidence from Spain 1856-1874

This paper analyzes the Spanish monetary system from 1856, when the Bank of Spain was created, to 1874, when it was awarded the monopoly of emission. This period was characterized by the emergence of an unregulated banking system, with multiple banks of issue entitled to emit bank notes. We focus on two main issues: i) the large fluctuations in the money supply during this period; and ii) the lack of a lender of last resort in the banking panic of 1866. To analyze this, we construct a new dataset on money supply aggregates. The paper also estimates the economic impact of monetary fluctuations with the help of a calibrated new Keynesian model. Our results suggest that money supply shocks had a milder effect on inflation and output than the one predicted by the theory.

Monetary Policy under Zero Reserve Requirement in Canada

Current development shows that financial system tends to move to the direction where controls over banking system would be very minimum. Banks are no longer required to hold afraction of their assets as required reserve with the central bank, and deposits are not subject to interest rate regulation. Fama (1980, 1983) argues that with the absence of reserve ratio price determinacy still holds through the control over currency supply. However, recent development also indicates that the control over currency supply is not any more in the hand of central banks but determined by the demand of the people. Consequently, price level is uncontrollable. Black (1970) even goes further to conclude that the unregulated banking system will bring the traditional monetary theories to an end. This paper deals with the implications of recent development in financial system in Canada. This paper argues that even though there is no longer reserve requirement and currency supply is determined by demand side, the Bank of Canada still has control over nominal magnitude of the economy, namely interest rates, which in turn influence aggregate demand and prices.

Capital regulation, heterogeneous monitoring costs, and aggregate loan quality

This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure. After analyzing an unregulated banking system, we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks. To gauge the impact of capital requirements, we define loan ‘quality’ in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population. Under the assumption of a specific cross-sectional distribution of banks, our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending, but has an ambiguous effect on loan ‘quality’. Nevertheless, once capital requirements are in place, the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan ‘quality’ by toughening capital requirements.

Contagious bank failures in a free banking system

This paper develops a model of an unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement. Whilst such a system may dominate one with a public safety net in reducing moral hazard in lending and therefore the scope for individual bank insolvency, it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank failures following a systemic shock or an aggregate liquidity shortage.