Unrated Firms Research Articles

Why Do Firms Issue Hybrid Bonds?

This study examines why firms issue hybrid bonds. Hybrid bonds can be structured so that they can be classified as either debt or equity under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and/or by credit rating agencies. We exploit this setting to examine whether firms consider leverage based on IFRS and/or credit ratings when structuring hybrid bonds. We find the following: First, unrated firms issue hybrid bonds that are classified as equity under IFRS if their IFRS-based leverage is higher. Rated firms issue hybrid bonds classified as equity by credit rating agencies if their credit rating is at risk and when their credit rating deteriorates. Second, drawing on the debt contracting value of accounting information and credit ratings, we expect and find that rated firms with stronger credit ratings issue hybrid bonds structured to be classified as equity solely by credit rating agencies but as debt under IFRS. Conversely, rated firms with a weaker credit rating and a higher default risk issue hybrid bonds that are classified as equity under IFRS and by credit rating agencies. Firms incur considerable interest costs when issuing hybrid bonds, suggesting that firms associate substantial benefits with an equity classification under IFRS and/or by credit rating agencies.

Legality rating and corporate efficiency: evidence from a conditional nonparametric frontier analysis

Promoting legality and productivity is a central issue in modern economies. In this paper, we investigate the implications of a public policy that aims at achieving these goals through the adoption of the so-called legality rating (LR). The latter reduces corporate risk uncertainty by abating asymmetric information between companies that use good legal, fiscal and ethical practices and the credit system. We match companies whose legal and ethical practices have been certified by the Italian government—through the assignment of the LR—with a sample of unrated firms, and apply recent advances in nonparametric frontier analysis to assess the economic performance. We highlight a positive relationship between legality rating and firms’ production efficiency. Our findings also show that legality rating policy is an effective tool to enhance inter-regional technological catching-up of businesses.

The impact of central bank digital currency variation on firm's implied volatility

The paper investigates whether a firm's implied volatility is affected by the volatility of central bank digital currencies. Our sample covers 2853 listed companies in the United States from 2014 to 2018. First, we find the variation of central bank digital currency has a positive impact on a firm’s implied volatility. Second, the healthier firms’ conditions can reduce the relationship between central bank digital currency variation and a firm’s implied volatility. Third, the positive relation between central bank digital currency and firm’s implied volatility still exists in investment-grade, speculative-grade, and unrated firms. Finally, to eliminate the endogeneity problem, we adopt simultaneous equation models (SEM) and find our results are still robust after excluding endogenous concerns. Our research provides a reminder for corporate managers and new implications for policymakers.

An Equity-Implied Rating Model for Unrated Firms

An Equity-Implied Rating Model for Unrated Firms

Unintended Consequences of the Dodd–Frank Act on Credit Rating Risk and Corporate Finance

AbstractPrior research finds that Dodd–Frank Act’s regulations on credit rating agencies (CRAs) increase rated firms’ risk of rating downgrades, regardless of their credit quality. Our difference-in-difference estimates suggest that after Dodd–Frank, low-rated firms, which face steep costs from a further downgrade, significantly reduce their debt issuance and investments compared to similar unrated firms. Our results are not driven by credit supply or the financial crisis. They reveal an unintended consequence of Dodd–Frank: Greater regulatory pressure on CRAs leads to negative spillover effects on firms concerned about credit ratings, regardless of their credit quality.

Supply of credit and corporate bond covenants

We study whether shocks to the supply of capital affect bond covenant structures using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. and the subsequent regulatory changes as an exogenous contraction in the supply of speculative-grade credit around 1989. We find that speculative-grade firms increase their covenant use significantly more than the investment-grade firms in the post-1989 period. This result is robust to using alternative control groups such as using only the BBB-rated firms, unrated firms, and employing matched sample analysis. Consistent with a supply effect, the increase in covenant use is higher for firms with high costs of switching to alternative sources of funds and high dependence on external finance. Overall, our results suggest that shifts in credit supply affect not only the debt amounts but also the bond covenant structures. Even contracting terms of firms with access to public debt markets are not immune to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

Inventory Policy Choice and Cost of Debt: A Private Debtholders’ Perspective

Prior research suggests that last-in-first-out (LIFO) inventory policy produces higher accruals quality than first-in-first-out (FIFO), leading to lower information risk for LIFO firms. Equity investors, in turn, price lower information risk by giving a premium to LIFO firms. Prior research also suggests that LIFO inventory policy, by understating aggregate earnings and net assets, creates hidden reserves that can be released to produce higher future earnings. Prior research, however, is silent on how debtholders price inventory policy choice. Focusing on private debtholders, we explore three research questions: (a) Do private debtholders price LIFO differently from FIFO? (b) If so, how does downside risk affect the pricing of LIFO? and (c) What is the underlying reason for the pricing effect, accounting quality, or hidden reserves? First, we find that LIFO is associated with a lower loan spread than FIFO. Not surprisingly, the pricing effect of LIFO is larger in high-inflation years than in other years. Second, we find that the pricing effect of LIFO is much larger for unrated firms than for rated firms. Third, we find that the negative association between LIFO and loan spread is driven primarily by hidden LIFO reserves rather than accounting quality. Overall, our evidence shows that inventory policy choice affects private debtholders’ pricing decisions, and this effect is primarily due to future earnings implications of hidden LIFO reserves.

CREDIT RATINGS AND THE COST OF ISSUING SEASONED EQUITY

AbstractI examine the effects of issuer credit ratings on the costs associated with seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The evidence from a panel of SEOs from 1990 to 2014 shows that when firms issue seasoned equity, those with issuer credit ratings pay reduced investment banking fees. I confirm these results by conducting a propensity‐score matched‐sample comparison analysis of firms that obtain new, long‐term issuer credit ratings with an unrated control group. Controlling for known determinants of SEO fees, I find that firms that obtain a new credit rating before issuing seasoned equity pay significantly reduced investment banking fees. In economic terms, underwriting fees for newly rated firms are 7.2% lower than those for similar, yet unrated firms. Finally, I examine the indirect costs of issuance and find evidence that credit‐rated firms face reduced market‐based costs to issue. Rated firms incur lower dilutionary costs to issue and have more positive abnormal returns surrounding the issue.

Credit Rating Agencies and Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: An Unintended Consequence of the Dodd-Frank Act

Prior research finds that Dodd-Frank Act’s regulations on credit rating agencies (CRAs) increase rated firms’ risk of rating downgrades, regardless of their credit quality (see Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015)). Our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that after Dodd-Frank, low-rated firms, which face steep costs from a further downgrade, significantly reduce their debt issuance and investments compared to similar unrated firms. Our results are not driven by credit supply or the financial crisis. They reveal an unintended consequence of Dodd-Frank: Greater regulatory pressure on CRAs leads to negative spillover effects on firms concerned about credit ratings, regardless of their credit quality.

Dissecting the Performance of Socially Responsible Firms

High-rated ESG (environmental, social, governance) firms do not outperform low-rated ESG firms in international markets. However, ESG-rated firms in general outperform unrated firms after controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, operating profitability, and investment. The following explanations are provided for these observations. First, though higher ESG ratings predict higher operating profitability and lower investments, these positive return-generating firm characteristics are not priced within the universe of ESG-rated firms, causing the insignificant return difference between high-rated and low-rated ESG firms. Second, the positive excess returns of ESG-rated firms over unrated firms reflect price corrections arising from the reversal of investors’ expectation errors concerning the impact of ESG characteristics on the firm’s future fundamental performance and are therefore the outcome of mispricing.

Information Asymmetry and the Bond Coupon Choice

ABSTRACTWe examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry.JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M21; M41.

Information Asymmetry and the Bond Coupon Choice

We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry of unrated firms relative to rated firms. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences are the same when using alternative research designs to measure changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry.

Credit Ratings and Earnings Management around IPOs

AbstractThis study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (EM) through accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that firms going public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income‐enhancing accrual‐based and real EM in the offering year. The monitoring by a credit rating agency (CRA) and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. We also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for CRAs to effectively restrain EM. Moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is not linked to future earnings and is negatively related to post‐issue long‐run stock performance. However, for rated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance and is unrelated to long‐run stock performance following the offering. The evidence indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative purposes.

Does the Riskiness of R&D Outweigh Its Benefits? The Perspective of US Private Lenders

AbstractWe investigate the relationship between R&D investments and loan spread. Prior research documents that R&D is associated with greater future benefits and risks, suggesting that the valuation of R&D depends on a tradeoff between the two. Some research finds that bondholders consider that the benefits of R&D outweigh its risks: R&D is negatively associated with bond yields. This is surprising given that debt holders are more concerned about downside risk due to asymmetric payoffs. Using data on private debt from the US, we find an overall positive association between loan spread and R&D intensity, suggesting that the riskiness of R&D appears to outweigh its benefits for private lenders. Furthermore, an asymmetric payoff structure implies that the risks of R&D for lenders increase with default risk. Consistent with this argument, we find a positive association between R&D and loan spread for firms that are smaller, with high default‐risk ratings, unrated (no public debt), or in industries with weaker legal protection. Unrated firms are in the most R&D‐intensive group and make up nearly 60% of the firms with private debt. Consequently, studies that exclude unrated firms are likely to present an incomplete picture of the perspective of debt holders on R&D.

The impact of capital shocks on M & A transactions

Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether an exogenous shock to the supply of financial capital mitigates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and incentivizes managers to channel available financial resources into value-increasing acquisitions. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a difference-in-differences approach to mitigate endogeneity concerns. To address the concern that substantial differences between the treatment and control groups may violate the parallel-trend assumption of the D-in-D approach, the authors use a propensity score-matching procedure and construct a matched sample for their empirical analysis. Findings – The authors find that below-investment-grade firms are significantly less likely to make acquisitions relative to unrated firms following the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989. Conditional on initiating a successful acquisition, below-investment-grade acquirers are less likely to acquire diversifying targets and public targets, but more likely to acquire subsidiary targets. In addition, below-investment-grade acquirers experience higher post-merger operating and stock performance for acquisitions initiated in the post-shock period. Originality/value – The authors demonstrate that capital shocks negatively impact managers’ propensity to make acquisitions, which are considered a well-established outlet for agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. In addition, managers who are subject to capital shocks tend to manage available financial resources more efficiently and make better acquisition decisions that lead to greater value creation.

Do group affiliated firms specialize in debt? Evidence from Pakistan

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the debt structure of group affiliated firms in Pakistan for the period of 2009-2011. The study seeks to know the level of debt specialization in group affiliated firms. If they do; then how are they different from stand-alone firms? Design/methodology/approach – The study primarily uses Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Excl90 as measures of debt specialization, which are further used in cluster, threshold and conditional analysis. Corporate groups are characterized to subsidize their affiliates through internal debt market and loan guarantee. Logistic regression model is used to analyze association among the measures of debt specialization and firm-specific characteristics for group affiliated and stand-alone firms. Findings – The results show that about 85 percent firms use more than 50 percent of debt from one debt type. However, group affiliated firms are more inclined toward debt specialization than stand-alone firms. Tangibility and book leverage are negatively and significantly associated to the measures of debt specialization. Moreover, internal debt market and loan guarantee are suggestive reasons of debt specialization in group affiliated firms. Practical implications – This study highlights the issue of group affiliation and its significance on firm’s debt structure. It has implications for determination of the optimal financing strategy. In the context of emerging economies, group affiliated firms can create market imperfections as a protection shield. In case of emerging markets, it is recommended to strengthen regulatory mechanism to avoid such market imperfections. Originality/value – Prior studies have explored the phenomenon of debt specialization for rated and unrated firms. However, firm group affiliation is widely studied in the context of capital structure. This is a pioneer study to establish and analyze a link between firm group affiliation and debt specialization.

Competing Debt-Equity Classification Regimes: Do Firms Care More About Accounting Standards or Rating Agencies?

Our study examines firms’ motivation to issue hybrid securities and whether firms care more about their classification under accounting standards or their treatment by rating agencies. We focus on hybrid bonds, which became the most relevant hybrid security for European non-financial firms. Depending on the chosen structure, hybrid bonds will (i) decrease GAAP leverage or/and (ii) support firm’s credit rating. Our findings document that firms issue hybrid bonds in quarters when their incentive to manage credit ratings increases. Conversely, changes in GAAP leverage ratios do not seem to impact firm’s decision to issue a hybrid bond. When comparing the types of hybrid bonds issued across rated and unrated firms, our findings reveal that rated firms more often choose to issue hybrid bonds that are classified as debt under accounting standards. These findings suggests that European rated firms care more about the treatment of a hybrid security by rating agencies than about its classification under accounting standards.

Credit Rating Impact on Earnings Management Around Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (EM) through accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that firms going public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income-enhancing accrual-based and real EM in the offering year. The monitoring by a credit rating agency (CRA) and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. We also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for CRAs to effectively restrain EM. Moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at-issue income-increasing EM is not linked to future earnings and negatively related to post-issue long-run stock performance. However, for rated issuers, at-issue income-increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance and unrelated to long-run stock performance following the offering. The evidence indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative purposes.

The Bond Discount Puzzle

Bond contract terms are designed to alleviate capital market frictions. While extant literature examines bond maturity as a contract term that mitigates frictions, a closely related mechanism, the coupon, remains unexplored. We examine the role of coupon choice in addressing capital market frictions in the bond market. Controlling for other bond contract terms, and using Regulation Fair Disclosure as an exogenous shock to information asymmetry between rated and unrated firms, we find that information asymmetry is an important determinant of the coupon choice. In our multivariate tests, we further find that inefficient liquidation costs and to a lesser extent agency costs and taxes affect the coupon choice. Taken together, our results suggest the coupon rate is a distinct contract term used to address capital market frictions.

Can Ratings Have Indirect Effects? Evidence from the Organizational Response to Peers’ Environmental Ratings

Organizations are increasingly subject to rating and ranking by third-party evaluators. Research in this area tends to emphasize the direct effects of ratings systems that occur when ratings give key audiences, such as consumers or investors, more information about a rated firm. Yet, ratings systems may also indirectly influence organizations when the collective presence of more rated peers alters the broader institutional and competitive milieu. Rated firms may be more responsive to ratings systems when surrounded by more rated peers, and ratings may generate diffuse or spillover effects even among unrated firms. We test these arguments by analyzing how rated and unrated firms change their pollution behavior when more firms in their peer group are rated on environmental performance. Results indicate that the presence of more rated peers is often associated with emissions reductions. This relationship varies, however, by whether a firm was rated, whether the rating was positive or negative (if rated), and, often, features of the competitive and regulatory environment.