Unlawful Purposes Research Articles

Personal data protection on the internet under martial law: The case of Ukraine

The objective of this study is to determine the threats to the security of personal data on the Internet as a component of the right to privacy in the conditions of martial law, characteristics and prospects of such legal data protection in the context of Ukraine. Methodology: The study used a set of practical methods, namely: formal and legal, comparative forecasting. These methods were used to examine and classify threats to the security of personal data on the Internet under martial law conditions. Results: The study identified a number of threats to the security of personal data on the Internet under martial law conditions, including: unauthorized access to personal data, alteration or destruction of personal data, disclosure of personal data to third parties without the consent of the data owner, use of personal data for unlawful purposes. The study also examined factors that complicate data protection during cross-border sharing, including: differences in data protection laws and regulations between countries, lack of cooperation between governments on data protection, the complexity of cross-border data exchange processes. Conclusions: The findings of the study suggest that increasing the protection of personal data under martial law conditions requires a comprehensive approach that includes regulatory, organizational and communication measures. In particular, it is necessary to: strengthen data protection legislation under martial law conditions, develop cooperation mechanisms between governments on data protection, promote data protection education and awareness among citizens and organizations.

The procedural fraud that justifies the appeal for a retrial according to the Jordanian Civil Procedure Code

The idea of ​​fraud is considered to have ethical dimensions that find its applications in a wide range of branches of law, both public and private, without exception. Its range is extended to the Civil Procedure Code, which is the common law for all other procedural laws. These procedural laws vary between judicial and non-judicial; Therefore, they must be protected from the fraud and manipulation of the opponents, which are usually aimed at prolonging the litigation period, depriving rights holders of their rights, or misleading justice for an unlawful purpose, which affects the proper course of justice. We have concluded that the possibility of applying the principle of cheating spoils everything on the rules of procedure. Especially, since this principle is one of the universal and stable legal principles without stipulating it in the law, as it is a principle linked to the public order. In addition, the methods of cheating are not limited to the illegal behavior of the opponent but extend to include the concealment and lying of the opponent. Therefore, it is necessary for the legislator to intervene to regulate the rules of fraud in the procedures with explicit texts and not to leave them to the general rules.

Transnational gathering of electronic evidences: challenges and perspectives in the European Union

It is well-known that transnational data flows are rising simultaneously with the increasing use of social media, webmail, messaging services, and apps to communicate, work, socialize and gain information, unfortunately, including also unlawful purposes. Criminal procedural measures for gathering evidence as part of a criminal investigation are usually national in scope, but obtaining electronic evidence often has cross-border implications. Courts and legislatures have often failed to keep pace with rapid advances in digital technology and computer software capabilities. This paper analyzes the European legal framework for the transnational gathering of electronic evidence in Europe. Initially, it argues the challenges of the cross-border gathering of electronic evidence in criminal investigations.

Level of Awareness and Understanding towards Money Mule Among Malaysian Citizens

Objective: Money mule is a bank account used by another person unknowingly or voluntarily by the owner of the account to obtain a reward or by fraudulent means for illegal or illegal financial transactions. Syndicates usually get these mule accounts (also known as surrogate accounts) by deceiving those who need extra income and have a low level of financial literacy. This study will determine the level of awareness towards money mule and understanding towards the dangerous of money mule. In this research, both quantitative and qualitative approaches will be employed with surveys and interviews. 
 Methodology: A Systematic Review was conducted in this study considering potential articles published from January 2020 to October 2021. Electronic data collection through Goggle Scholar (50 journals) was identified to studies related to the level of awareness on money mule or money laundering.
 Findings: This study concludes that, although the law enforcement agencies have the power to investigate money laundering and terrorism financing under the act, Malaysia is lacking in having a good investigative support system to assist the law enforcement agencies during the investigation process.
 Implications: Special attention should be given to any complex and unusual business transactions, especially if there seems to be an unlawful purpose. Programs to educate public on money laundering should be found in order to raise awareness towards money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Mapping Tools for Open Source Intelligence with Cyber Kill Chain for Adversarial Aware Security

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) tools are used for gathering information using different publicly available sources. With the rapid advancement in information technology and excessive use of social media in our daily lives, more public information sources are available than ever before. The access to public information from different sources can be used for unlawful purposes. Extracting relevant information from pools of massive public information sources is a large task. Multiple tools and techniques have been developed for this task, which can be used to identify people, aircraft, ships, satellites, and more. In this paper, we identify the tools used for extracting the OSINT information and their effectiveness concerning each other in different test cases. We mapped the identified tools with Cyber Kill Chain and used them in realistic cybersecurity scenarios to check their effusiveness in gathering OSINT.

Criminal law guarantees of human dignity and development of biotechnology

The article examines the impact of biotechnology progress on changing criminal law. The author concludes that somatic rights do not constitute a new generation of human rights but enrich the dignity of the individual. Due to the natural nature of these rights, they can only be regulated to a small extent by law, which also limits the possibility of imposing prohibitions. Criminal law must address the task of guaranteeing the dignity of the individual. There is a need for clearer regulation of circumstances that exclude the crime of an act, such as the consent of the victim and reasonable risk. Criminalization of biotechnology applications where there were no signs of abuse should be considered unreasonable. Scientific progress has created uncertainty in the application of certain rules of criminal law. This requires the improvement of sentencing rules and the calculation of the statute of limitations of criminal prosecution. The need to criminalize new types of acts against the person, to introduce responsibility for crimes against artificial organs, as well as organs and tissues separated from a person, was analyzed. Issues of criminal legal assessment of illegal acts with human embryos are considered. It was concluded that it is necessary to include genetic information in the area of privacy protected by criminal law. An analysis of the development vectors of criminal law shows the impossibility of effective deterrence by prohibitions of certain ways of self-determination of the individual. The Russian legislator in this matter shows reasonable restraint. When further improving the criminal law, it is unacceptable to use the design of formal offences. As criminal-forming signs of prohibited acts, there can be both objective characteristics (the method of medical intervention caused by harm) and subjective ones — motive, purpose (for example, performing a sex reassignment operation for unlawful purposes). This will allow criminal law not to stand in the way of biotechnological progress, helping medical legislation determine some boundaries. The article analyses the norms of criminal law, the provisions of international conventions, and the practice of constitutional proceedings.

Limiting Consent in Criminal Law: DPP v Brown [2018] IESC 67

The Irish Supreme Court in DPP v Brown (Brown) recognised the absence of consent as part of the ‘assault causing harm’ offence in section 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 (the 1997 Act). This corrected a decade-old mistaken view of ‘assault’ in section 3 meaning something different from ‘assault’ in section 2 of the 1997 Act. The Supreme Court in Brown split three-two, however, on whether an unlawful purpose or motivation for the activity in question invalidates consent in respect of the section 3 offence. This article will show the minority’s analysis to be more robust than the majority’s. In particular, the article highlights a remarkable feature of the Brown majority holding – that it effectively jettisons what it recognises as an element of an offence (that is, the absence of consent) by upholding a conviction where that element was not proven at trial. The article considers Brown’s implications, and observes the substantial challenge the case demonstrates for criminal law to reflect and limit the power of consent. Noting the complex role of consent in criminal law serves to qualify the available liberal and legality-based critiques of the Supreme Court majority approach in Brown.

Changes in Public Entities Caused by the Crisis. A Case Study of the Polish Public Prosecutor’s Office

Public organizations are in a state of crisis at the moment of significant institutional changes in their structures (Boin and t’Hart, in: Wagnedaar, 2000, pp. 9-31), and the greater the number of people affected - the more the crisis in the organization is felt. In connection with the ordinance of the Minister of Health of 13 March 2020 (Journal of Laws of 2020, item 433), announcing the state of epidemic threat in the territory of the Republic of Poland, common units of the prosecutor's office faced a new challenge regarding a quick and effective response to crimes arising in connection with the use of the state of emergency for unlawful purposes.

An Advanced Abnormal Behavior Detection Engine Embedding Autoencoders for the Investigation of Financial Transactions

Nowadays, (cyber)criminals demonstrate an ever-increasing resolve to exploit new technologies so as to achieve their unlawful purposes. Therefore, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) should keep one step ahead by engaging tools and technology that address existing challenges and enhance policing and crime prevention practices. The framework presented in this paper combines algorithms and tools that are used to correlate different pieces of data leading to the discovery and recording of forensic evidence. The collected data are, then, combined to handle inconsistencies, whereas machine learning techniques are applied to detect trends and outliers. In this light, the authors of this paper present, in detail, an innovative Abnormal Behavior Detection Engine, which also encompasses a knowledge base visualization functionality focusing on financial transactions investigation.

Identity Theft Among Older Adults: Risk and Protective Factors

Although financial exploitation and fraud targeting older adults have been the focus of increasing academic attention, research on identity theft among older adults is virtually nonexistent. Identity theft refers to an intentional, unauthorized transfer or use of a person’s identifying information for unlawful purposes (Federal Trade Commission 1998). Society’s growing reliance on technology to transfer and store private information has created increased opportunities for financial predators to access and misuse personal data. Results from the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Identity Theft Supplement show that nearly 1 in 10 adults aged 65 or older experienced identity theft in the past year, with financial losses totaling $2.5 billion. Given the high frequency and cost of identity theft among older Americans, more research is needed to guide prevention efforts and interventions that support recovery. This paper examines the risk factors, protective factors, costs, and consequences of identity theft victimization among older adults, focusing on differences between those aged 65-74 and those 75 or older. Findings suggest that the prevalence of identity theft is lower among those 75 or older (6.6% versus 10.3%), but those 75 or older experienced higher average losses per identity theft incident ($155 vs $96). Compared to those aged 65-74, a lower percentage of adults aged 75 or older engaged in online shopping, thereby reducing their risk of identity exposure (48% versus 24%). However, they were also less likely to engage in protective behaviors such as checking credit reports, changing passwords, checking account statements, and using security software.

Specific Issues Related to Countermeasures Against Technology of Using Cryptocurrency for Unlawful Purposes

In this article are described problems of legislative regulation in the sphere of cryptocurrency turnover in the Russian Federation, demonstrated the need of development and improvement of counteracting methods against technology of using cryptocurrency for unlawful purposes. By analyzing means of committing crimes with use of cryptocurrencies in the criminal world, it is concluded about small scale of criminal business, which is based on new for criminals virtual currency. It is noted that technologies of committing crimes with use of cryptocurrencies are steadily evolving, which create new challenges for law enforcers. Enhancing the effectiveness of countermeasures against technology of using cryptocurrency for unlawful purposes requires an international legal regulation, cooperation of law enforcers at supranational level.

The Concept and Essence of Estoppel

The article considers the issue of determining the legal nature of prohibition of changeable conduct committed for an unlawful purpose. The study is based on the analysis of civil law specific principles operation when estoppel is applied. The conclusion is drawn that the basis of estoppel lies in the operation of several principles of civil law, and the main principle is the principle of good faith. The rule of estoppel demonstrates the lack of consistency among civil law principles, when they are allowed to compete with each other. The article provides an overview of opinions with respect of estoppel definitions given in the Russian scientific literature. This is necessary to solve the problem of implementing rules concerning estoppel in the Russian legal system, since the law-maker has followed the path of enshrining certain kinds of estoppels in the legislation rather than formulating a universal rule that prohibits inconsistent and evasive behavior in the Civil Code of the RF. The author proposed an independent definition of estoppel as a universal category.

The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings

The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. The Dangerous Weapons Act provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon to show that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court’s interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon was regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not been designed for use as a weapon. The Act, however, requires the object to be capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon, in circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an unlawful purpose, attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a dangerous weapon at gatherings, even if the person carrying the weapon does not intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise such control, as well as that the object is capable of causing death and inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose.
 
 The Act does not apply to the following activities: (a) possession of dangerous weapons in pursuit of any lawful employment duty or activity; (b) possession of dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural activities or lawful sport, recreation or entertainment or (c) legitimate collection, display or exhibition of weapons. It is suggested that these exclusions are acceptable if the religious and cultural events referred to are not of a "protesting" or "confrontational" nature. If such events are indeed "protesting" or "confrontational" in nature, they are covered by section 17 of the Constitution (which authorises only peaceful and unarmed assembly, demonstration, picketing and the presentation of petitions). Religious and cultural events of a "protesting" or "confrontational" character, where dangerous weapons are displayed, run the serious risk of turning violent, and may result in a violation of section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, which embodies the right of everyone to be free from all forms of violence.
 

BETWEEN REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE AND MALICE IN THE LAW OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: A COMMONWEALTH UPDATE

Although the requirements of absence of a reasonable and probable cause and malice are two distinct elements in an action for malicious prosecution, they sometimes appear inseparable. An absence of reasonable and probable cause might, in instances, be a clear indication of malice on the part of the prosecution. However, while the absence of reasonable and probable cause is often deduced from the conduct of the prosecutor, judged from the objective standpoint of a reasonable prosecutor possessed of the same information, malice is inferred from the state of mind of the prosecutor as to whether he or she genuinely intended to bring the accused person to justice, or had operated from the angle of vengeance, improper purpose, targeted malice or for any unlawful purpose. Such inference can easily be drawn where the investigating officer and the prosecutor knowingly relied on fabricated information – Minister of Safety and Security v Tyokwana 2015 (1) SACR 597 (SCA). The burden of proof of both elements, though extensively canvassed by the Australian High Court in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500 (HCA), has been taken a step further by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in State of NSW v Quirk [2012] NSWCA 216. The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa has maintained in Woji v Minister of Police 2014 (1) SACR 409 (SCA) that negligence or gross negligence, short of dolus eventualis, would not suffice in a claim for malicious prosecution. The defendant must have been aware of the wrongfulness of his or her conduct in initiating or continuing the prosecution, but nevertheless continued to act, reckless as to the consequences of his or her conduct.

The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings

The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. The Dangerous Weapons Act provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon to show that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court’s interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon was regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not been designed for use as a weapon. The Act, however, requires the object to be capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon, in circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an unlawful purpose, attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a dangerous weapon at gatherings, even if the person carrying the weapon does not intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise such control, as well as that the object is capable of causing death and inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose.The Act does not apply to the following activities: (a) possession of dangerous weapons in pursuit of any lawful employment duty or activity; (b) possession of dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural activities or lawful sport, recreation or entertainment or (c) legitimate collection, display or exhibition of weapons. It is suggested that these exclusions are acceptable if the religious and cultural events referred to are not of a "protesting" or "confrontational" nature. If such events are indeed "protesting" or "confrontational" in nature, they are covered by section 17 of the Constitution (which authorises only peaceful and unarmed assembly, demonstration, picketing and the presentation of petitions). Religious and cultural events of a "protesting" or "confrontational" character, where dangerous weapons are displayed, run the serious risk of turning violent, and may result in a violation of section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, which embodies the right of everyone to be free from all forms of violence.Keywords: Dangerous weapons, culture, public gatherings, demonstrations, religion.

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil: Its legal and judicial recognition in Ethiopia

Upon acquisition of legal personality a company enjoys certain attributes such as limited liability. While the separate legal personality of a company enables it to enjoy rights and assume obligations quite different from its members, the limited liability of shareholders refers to the fact that the company alone is liable for its debts. However, such privilege of limited liability may not always exist when the legal personality of a company is abused and used for illegitimate or unlawful purposes and other reasons. This article examines some of the grounds by which the corporate veil can be pierced under Ethiopian law and the role of courts in recognizing the doctrine. Based on the analysis of the relevant legislative provisions and some court cases, it is found that Ethiopian company law, though not sufficient, provides some clear grounds of piercing the corporate veil and certain possible grounds which may call for the application of the doctrine. It is also argued that Ethiopian courts should apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, through the purposive interpretation of the statutory provisions, if doing so produces equitable results and fairness.

On Record Date, Empty Voting, and Hidden Ownership - Some Remarks on EU Directive 2007/36/Ce from a European Perspective

Adoption in Europe of a record date system for the entitlement to attend and to vote at meetings of listed companies calls for reflection on the possible split between ownership over shares and entitlement to vote. As widely experienced in the US, the more the record date is far from that of the meeting, the more these effects may be relevant. Also, where entitled to vote are necessarily others (nominees or street holders) than final investors (beneficial owners), votes are frequently cast by the former regardless of what the interests of beneficial owners are. This may result in “hidden ownership”, when beneficial owners object identification (OBO). After Hu and Black, “empty voting” means the situation where someone votes without being the holder of the economic interest in the shares.In 2009, Delaware legislation attempted to solve some of these situations by reducing the incidence of excessive distance between the record date and the exercise of the vote; due to the depositary system of listed shares, however, the problem of hidden ownership remained largely without solution. EU Directive n. 36/2007/CE also deals with these issues. On the one hand, setting the record date no further than 30 days before that of the meeting, it essentially avoids significant separation between ownership and entitlement to vote. However, the reasons for introducing such a system when ICT enables real-time verification of records, thus making the record date anachronistic, remain unclear. On the other hand, hidden ownership is considered an issue the EU shall not address. So may do the member States and various European countries consider the problem of hidden ownership. Hidden ownership in Europe is basically not permitted, as all nominees for shares of listed companies must disclose to issuers the agent on whose behalf they act. Some legal systems provide for a general disclosure rule, so granting issuers and minorities the right to compel disclosure. In case information is not given, the voting rights are frozen (so provide French, German and, with some limits, English law). Other member States do not provide for tools granting ex ante disclosure, but do not permit to hide ownership in an attempt to achieving unlawful purposes (so in Italy and Spain).This article explores these issues and states some conclusions. A) Notwithstanding entitlement to vote is to be granted to those showing on the records at the record date, the issuer is allowed to object that registration was never supported by a reasonable economic interest other than hiding ownership and permitting unlawful results. B) In general, ownership may not be hidden in case the law requires disclosure; if voting rights are frozen, the issuer shall prevent the shareholder or any nominee or trustee from exercising the right to vote.

Individual and structural influences shaping pharmacists' decisions to sell syringes to injection drug users in Atlanta, Georgia.

To better understand the individual (e.g., attitudes and beliefs) and structural (e.g., laws and regulations) factors that influence and shape pharmacists' decisions about selling syringes to injection drug users (IDUs). Qualitative research. Metropolitan Atlanta. PARICIPANTS: 20 practicing pharmacists who work in or near areas of high drug use in Atlanta, and nine pharmacists who are considered leaders in their profession in Georgia. Semistructured, in-depth interviews. Individual and structural factors that influence pharmacists' decisions about selling syringes to IDUs. Pharmacists reported that they use their professional discretion in making syringe sale decisions and that these decisions are influenced by individuals factors such as their personal attitudes and beliefs about the nature and causes of drug use, and by structural factors such as the Georgia Board of Pharmacy regulation stating that syringes cannot be sold if they will be used for an "unlawful purpose." IDUs' access to sterile syringes from pharmacies in Atlanta, would likely be increased by (1) providing practicing pharmacists with professional education programs that describe the broad professional support for IDU access to sterile syringes and why blood-borne infection prevention is a legitimate medical purpose for selling syringes and (2) removing or modifying the restrictive Board of Pharmacy regulation governing syringe sales.

Anthropomorphic Projection And Chapter Eight Of The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Punishing the Good Organization When It Does Evil

Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became effective in 1987, Chapter Eight, which relates to lawful organizations, did not come into force until 1991. Chapter Eight is aimed at lawful organizations, as opposed to those with unlawful purposes at the outset, charged with federal crimes. The fundamental flaw criticized in this article is that this new structure amounts to an inappropriate and unworkable projection of human characteristics onto organizations of all types. The scope of the chapter covers all organizations, whether for profit or not, whether religious educational, and whether formal or informal. This is more than a critique of the use of legal fiction to make the law work. The notion of the juridical personhood of the corporation is just that: Juridical Personhood which creates a way for the courts of the world to deal with organized human activity. The leap that has been taken here is the assignment of human, even humane or the lack of humane characteristics to an organization. The assumption is that what we call organizational culture can be read to mean organizational morality. This makes little or no ontological sense and flies in the face of what we know about how organizations decide to act or forbear.

Policing the transmission of pornographic material

Abstract This paper considers possible future developments which may give rise to criminal sanctions against network providers and those involved in a commercial capacity with the distribution of pornographic material on the Internet. The focus is on the UK government response but the perspective is international. It is argued that the policing problems are not unique to pornography or the Internet. In isolating pornography as an issue and transmission on the Internet as a problem, the policing reaction is seen in the context of the state's overall response to pornography. A combination of the transmission of digital information for possible unlawful purposes and responsibilities of commercial facilitators present policing problems similar to those in money laundering, where they have led to draconian regulations backed by criminal sanctions directed at financial institutions. It is proposed to identify and discuss these developments and consider the applicability of policing methods to network providers and distributors who may, innocently or negligently, be involved in the distribution of pornographic material. Part of this analysis will also involve some limited discussion of the application of money laundering regulations to the Internet. The identification of common themes creates a framework within which the control of electronic data transmission and responsibilities of commercial facilitators are isolated as the central policing problems for the Internet.