Unjustified Belief Research Articles

The focus account of false hope.

False hope is costly for individuals, their loved ones, and society. Scholars have defined false hope as one that involves an epistemically unjustified belief. In this paper, I argue that this account of false hope is incomplete and that false hope should be conceptualized in terms of the way in which the agent attends to or focuses on a highly desired but unlikely outcome. I explain how this account better captures the distinctiveness of false hope.

What is the tertiary norm of belief?

Abstract Timothy Williamson (in ‘Justifications, excuses, and sceptical scenarios’) distinguishes three kinds of norm for belief, which he calls ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’. He argues that a belief is justified if it satisfies the primary norm and excused if it satisfies only the tertiary norm. The argument turns on cases of intuitively unjustified belief in which the tertiary norm is satisfied, on Williamson’s rough-and-ready statement of that norm. I argue that, once we state the tertiary norm more carefully, it is clear that it is not satisfied in these cases. So we need some other reason to think that the tertiary norm is not justifying.

Absorbed in deceit: modeling intention-driven self-deception with agential layering

ABSTRACT The paradoxical nature of intentional self-deception has led many philosophers to view self-deception as predominantly non-intentional. I propose that approaching self-deception from an agency-theoretic perspective allows us to rescue the idea that self-deception can at least be driven by intention. By modeling the ‘acting as if’ method of self-deception with agential layering, developed by Nguyen [2020. Games: Agency as Art. New York: Oxford University Press], I argue that intention-driven self-deception is no more mysterious than other activities that involve self-effacing ends: ends we must pursue indirectly. That is, self-deception can occur when agents pursue the self-effacing end of forming what they take to be an epistemically unjustified belief by submerging themselves in a layer of agency in which they can act as if they already hold that belief. By intentionally adopting this pretense and shaping their agency around it, they forget that their agency is layered at all, and may thereby form a full-fledged belief. This model avoids objections to views that treat self-deception itself as intentional and does so while appealing only to resources already used to explain our everyday activities. I then apply my model to a core case of bad faith from Sartre to show that intention-driven self-deception can clarify how we are responsible for inauthenticity.

Epistemic consequentialism as a metatheory of inquiry

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far, the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints.

Responsibility and Perception

I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. Only this position, I claim, accounts for the higher epistemic standard required of perceptual experts. Section I defends this standard and applies it to a pair of cases in which either an expert umpire or a complete novice judge a force play in baseball. I argue that when the latter, but not the former, fails to follow rules about perceiving force plays, their resulting belief is justified. Section II shows that this difference can be explained by the fact that the novice, but not the expert, formed her experience responsibly. Section III shows that alternative explanations of the expert’s unjustified belief—from defeat, reliability, and inference—fail. Section IV shows that the epistemic relevance of responsible experience formation has broad implications for the epistemology of perceptual beliefs.

Interpreting China’s overbuilding through a behavioral perspective: The role of developers’ excessive optimism

ABSTRACT Few studies have examined the psychological factors that shape real estate developers’ overbuilding behaviors in China. Through a behavioral lens, this study explores the effect of developers’ excessive optimism on the formation of overbuilding in Ordos City, China. It finds that excessive optimism, manifested by the firm yet unjustified belief in a long-lasting real estate boom, was prevalent among developers who built vacant and unfinished new residential projects in the Dongsheng District, Ordos. It also discovers the crucial roles of the pro-growth local governments and the booming real estate market—including the easy availability of credit, especially the pervasive informal finance—in reinforcing developers’ excessive optimism in Dongsheng. This study confirms the positive effect of market booms on investors’ excessive optimism. Moreover, it sheds light on the role of the state in shaping excessive optimism and reveals that the state’s proactive participation and investment in market transactions can reinforce developers’ over-optimism. This article suggests that studies on excessive optimism should adequately consider its socioeconomic and politico-institutional settings. This study verifies the validity and necessity of adopting a behavioral perspective to interpret China’s overbuilding and calls for further inquiry into the underexplored scholarship at the intersection of behavioral science and real estate development in China.

Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value: (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage-point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stefánsson and Bradley call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.

Reference collection of plant phytoliths from the Caatinga biome, Northeast Brazil

Located in northeastern Brazil, the Caatinga biome is characterized by a semi-arid climate with vegetation adapted to high temperatures, low precipitation and uneven rainfall distribution throughout the year. The unjustified belief that the Caatinga ecosystem is poor in biodiversity and endemism, makes it the most undervalued and botanically unknown Brazilian biome, despite there being several phytogeographical areas, and a significant number of rare endemic taxa. Phytoliths are biomineralizations of silica (Si) that precipitate inside or between plant cells during the process of photosynthesis or evapotranspiration, giving the plant organism a series of benefits and evolutionary advantages. In this study, 33 species from 16 different families typical to the region were analyzed, in order to establish modern reference collections enabling further environmental reconstitution studies using phytoliths as proxy, contributing, therefore, to improved knowledge on the Caatinga biome. The results showed that Caatinga plants produce a large amount of biomineralizations, the most prevalent being tracheids, followed by polyhedral, globular granulate, elongate and trichomes (lanceolate hair cells), among others. The types of silicification found may be related to the environmental characteristics of the Caatinga, whereby plants develop mechanisms against desiccation. The deposition of Si in plant cells may be a survival strategy in this environment. Despite some limitations, phytoliths have been shown to be promising tools for improving knowledge on the vegetation of this region, as well as for use in paleoenvironmental studies in the biome.

Is belief superiority justified by superior knowledge?

Individuals expressing belief superiority—the belief that one's views are superior to other viewpoints—perceive themselves as better informed about that topic, but no research has verified whether this perception is justified. The present research examined whether people expressing belief superiority on four political issues demonstrated superior knowledge or superior knowledge-seeking behavior. Despite perceiving themselves as more knowledgeable, knowledge assessments revealed that the belief superior exhibited the greatest gaps between their perceived and actual knowledge. When given the opportunity to pursue additional information in that domain, belief-superior individuals frequently favored agreeable over disagreeable information, but also indicated awareness of this bias. Lastly, experimentally manipulated feedback about one's knowledge had some success in affecting belief superiority and resulting information-seeking behavior. Specifically, when belief superiority is lowered, people attend to information they may have previously regarded as inferior. Implications of unjustified belief superiority and biased information pursuit for political discourse are discussed.

A Recent Attempt to Disprove the Resurrection of Jesus and Supernatural Beliefs

The Miracle Myth1 by the University of Wisconsin philosopher Larry Shapiro addresses Jesus’ resurrection and supernatural beliefs in the context of the miracles question. This Review Article outlines briefly Shapiro’s argument, including some critical responses. Shapiro begins with a 2010 American Pew Forum survey on miracles and the afterlife, where 79 per cent of respondents either ‘completely’ or ‘mostly’ agreed that miracles occur today, with about the same per cent accepting an afterlife (pp. ix–x). Are these views based on faith alone, or are there reasons here? Shapiro states his goal: ‘to convince you that no one has ever had or currently has good reasons for believing in miracles’ (p. xiv). The first of seven chapters and two appendices is entitled ‘Justified and Unjustified Belief’ (pp. 1–16), addressing philosophical grounds for faith. Chapter 2 is crucially concerned chiefly with defining and conceptualizing the nature of miracles. For Shapiro (pp. 18–19, 25), such a definition begins with the requirement of supernatural causal forces, typically of a divine nature. Though distinctions between supernatural causes and divine intervention might be made, these ideas are usually conjoined (pp. 26, 47, 152).

Odra River in Lower Silesia: probabilistic analysis of flood risk dynamics as part of sustainable development of water management

One of most common natural catastrophes in Poland are undoubtedly floods. Climatic change contributes to more and more often and violent occurrences of the maximum flow in rivers, which increases flood damage. Inadequate land management and the unjustified belief in the effectiveness of technical flood control measures can also contribute to flood damage. The development of water management (including flood protection) should be carried out in a sustainable way by integrating social, environmental, and economic objectives. In flood protection, those measures that are least invasive to the natural environment should be used first; in particular, non-technical flood protection methods (e.g., flood risk assessment and management, and the proper definition and management of flood plains). One of the bases for the sustainable development of water management is the preparation of models that can help us calculate the likelihood of maximum flow and to identify areas that are at risk of flooding. On this basis, the proper spatial policy and prevention of flood effects will be possible. This article presents the probabilistic analysis carried out on the flood risk dynamics for a selected area of the Odra River basin. The authors based their risk dynamic assessment on the results from the distributions of the maximum values for a selected hydrological characteristic – the flow rate. Based on the daily flow data from the years of 1994–2013 collected at a hydrological station on the Odra River in Malczyce, the 30-day flow maxima were set individually for four 5-year periods. Then, a probabilistic model of the maximum flow was developed based on these peaks for each 5-year period. The resulting models were used to estimate flood risks and for analyzing the dynamics for the studied area.

Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief

AbstractUnder what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ.

The Role of Forensic Examination at Trials in China

Expertise gains increasing acceptance and importance at trials in China. Currently, the forensic examination quality management system of China has been preliminarily established. There are problems, however, for example, laws and regulations related with forensic examination are not comprehensive, forensic institutes pursue their own economic profits excessively and judges sometime have undue blind faith in scientific evidence in fact-finding. These are hindering forensic examination from being put into full play duly. In 2005, the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Administration of Forensic Examination strengthened the neutrality of forensic institutes. The Criminal Procedure Law and the Civil Procedure Law revised in 2012 initially set up the expert assistant system, which is expected to break the excessively credulous but unjustified belief in scientific evidence and solve pertinent problems. We need to focus on the following aspects: First and foremost developing a unified set of rules on forensic examination; secondly, judges need to strengthen their own ability to review scientific evidence and determine its reliability; thirdly, we should actively promote fundamental legal education reform to remedy the insufficiency of legal understanding of forensic science; and finally, the existing expert assistant system must be further improved to help judges and litigants effectively to identify and use expertise.

Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem

AbstractAs we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views.

Preventing the Next Financial Crisis? Regulating Bankers' Pay in Europe

This article offers a critical appraisal of the way in which executive pay in financial institutions is regulated in the European Union. Despite the widely acknowledged role of executive pay in causing the financial crisis, regulators and policy makers were reluctant to intervene because of the ideology of shareholder primacy and an unjustified belief that this was a matter for companies and their shareholders alone. As a result, the original regulatory scheme which was introduced was very weak. The European Parliament responded to these developments by capping executive pay. The article argues that, while this cap is a crude instrument, it can be justified on economic grounds because it considerably reduces the likelihood of a future financial crisis, with all the social costs that would entail. If it also results in much higher fixed pay, that is a matter of concern for shareholders alone, and might even force them into the activism so long expected of them.

Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference

People differ in their threshold for satisfactory causal understanding and therefore in the type of explanation that will engender understanding and maximize the appeal of a novel product. Explanation fiends are dissatisfied with surface understanding and desire detailed mechanistic explanations of how products work. In contrast, explanation foes derive less understanding from detailed than coarse explanations and downgrade products that are explained in detail. Consumers' attitude toward explanation is predicted by their tendency to deliberate, as measured by the cognitive reflection test. Cognitive reflection also predicts susceptibility to the illusion of explanatory depth, the unjustified belief that one understands how things work. When explanation foes attempt to explain, it exposes the illusion, which leads to a decrease in willingness to pay. In contrast, explanation fiends are willing to pay more after generating explanations. We hypothesize that those low in cognitive reflection are explanation foes because explanatory detail shatters their illusion of understanding.

MEMORY FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF UNFORGOTTEN CARELESSNESS

Abstract: According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.

Density Matrix in Quantum Mechanics and Distinctness of Ensembles Having the Same Compressed Density Matrix

We clarify different definitions of the density matrix by proposing the use of different names, the full density matrix for a single-closed quantum system, the compressed density matrix for the averaged single molecule state from an ensemble of molecules, and the reduced density matrix for a part of an entangled quantum system, respectively. We show that ensembles with the same compressed density matrix can be physically distinguished by observing fluctuations of various observables. This is in contrast to a general belief that ensembles with the same compressed density matrix are identical. Explicit expression for the fluctuation of an observable in a specified ensemble is given. We have discussed the nature of nuclear magnetic resonance quantum computing. We show that the conclusion that there is no quantum entanglement in the current nuclear magnetic resonance quantum computing experiment is based on the unjustified belief that ensembles having the same compressed density matrix are identical physically. Related issues in quantum communication are also discussed.

Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source

It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believed/rationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to p/rationality with respect to p) at T1 via a non-memorial source. Thus, according to this view, memory cannot make an unknown proposition known, an unjustified belief justified, or an irrational belief rational–it can only preserve what is already known, justified, or rational. In this paper, I argue that condition (i) is false and, a fortiori, that condition (ii) is false. Hence, I show that, contrary to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, memory can function as a generative epistemic source.

Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology

The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification are in fact in reflective equilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory choices in empirical sciences. If reflective equilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology.