Universal Propositions Research Articles

Evaluation of the Maqāṣid al-Sharī’ah Liberalization: An Examination of the Notion of ‘Prioritizing Public Interest over Textual Evidence’

The effort to reconstruct Islamic law from liberal Muslim groups has a positive influence and acceptance for some people. However, the majority of Muslims have not been able to accept and prefer to follow the mindset and methodology of previous scholars. The concept of maqāṣid al-sharī’ah of liberal Muslim thinkers is methodologically considered not to have a strong basis because it dares to ignore the legal provisions in the specific daily, which are considered not in line with the purpose of the law and the benefit. Maqasid al-shari'ah should be built on efforts to integrate the texts of particular propositions into the texts of universal propositions (kully) so that the purpose of legal legislation can be understood. This article critically examines the concept of maqāṣid al-sharī’ah developed by liberal Muslim thinkers, especially in Indonesia. This study explicitly emphasizes the importance of Islamic law in realizing the benefits and being a solution to various problems of contemporary life. The benefit to be achieved is the ultimate and universal benefit, namely the benefit obtained through legal formulation efforts by making specific texts as a foothold to understand the purpose of the law. It is not an assumptive benefit (mawhūmah) obtained through legal reconstruction efforts based on the purpose of the law and the benefit but ignores the texts of particular arguments.

Os limites da razão em Immanuel Kant

With base in the Ilustration project, Immanuel Kant rushes to the exam of the ends limits of the reason, with the target of evidencing the limits and domain of the Metaphysics. For Kant, the classic Metaphysics could not be considered a rigorous science, as the mathematics or the pure science of the nature (the physics), for lacking a previous treatment concerning the powers and limits of the reason. This problem imposes to this ability, fundamentally, the task of illuminating the problem of the nature and production of its universal propositions, necessary and objective, constituent in specific of the transcendental’s beginnings of the sciences. In this attempt, raised by the reason, we glimpse the challenge of the project of an autonomous knowledge.

全称命题在互动中成立的方式——关于语言控制的思辨技巧

全称命题在互动中成立的方式——关于语言控制的思辨技巧

Reviving Jewish Theology: From A Soft Maimonidean to a Practical Biblical Metaphysics

AbstractThis essay is my contribution to the project of reviving Jewish theology as an enterprise in which language and thought make positive statements about God. This project is necessitated by what I see as the failures of the negative or “apophatic theologies” of postmodernism to generate and support a vibrant Jewish religious life. My strategy is to retrieve from medieval philosophy what I call a “soft metaphysics” as a framework and series of axioms for thought and practice rather than the demonstration of universal propositions of truth. I then turn to the Hebrew Bible for a textual hermeneutics and a “practical metaphysics” in which theology is tasked with attending to the needs of the human spiritual life.

Making Economics More Useful: How Technological Eclecticism Could Help

Keynes thought it would be “splendid” if economists became more like dentists. Disciplinary economics has instead become more like physics in focusing on concise, universal propositions verified through decisive tests. This focus, the author argues, limits the practical utility of the discipline because universal propositions form only a part of new policy recipes. The author further suggests that, as in engineering and medicine, developing economic recipes requires eclectic combinations of suggestive tests and judgment. Additionally, the author provides a detailed example of how a simulation model can help evaluate new policy combinations that affect the screening of loan applications.

Leibniz’s Inductive Challenge

Abstract Leibniz’s metaphysics is often interpreted as being based solely on reason, so that experience would not provide a true foundation but only an analogy to it. Against this reading, this article first recalls that, according to Leibniz, experiences are necessarily implied by the demonstrative nature of metaphysics, for they take the place of an infinite chain of demonstrative steps that we cannot explain. It then argues that what he calls the two “first experiences” – namely, that “I think” and “a variety of things are always thought by me” – play a decisive role in justifying the Monadology’s key propositions that “there are substances” and “there are composites”. Although Leibniz never uses the term induction in this context, this – often neglected – role of singular first-person experiences in the grasping of universal propositions constitutes a real inductive moment in his metaphysics.

Ethical Action through “Ambiguity” in Existentialism and Kanhwa Chan

In this paper I explore resonances and disparities between “doubt” (yi 疑) as evoked in the dialectic of Chan “examining the topic” (kanhua 看話, Kor. kanhwa) practice, and the phenomenology of ambiguity that Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) explored in her early work The Ethics of Ambiguity. I take de Beauvoir as a voice from the turning point into modernity, and amplify its resonance with voices from the Chan/Sŏn tradition. Comparing the challenges de Beauvoir articulates with perspectives from Chan, I engage with the following perennially irresolvable postmodern questions: How might authentic grounding for ethical practice be argued while eschewing dualistic and objectifying universal propositions? Is it possible or desirable to be completely free from existential ambiguity and doubt in the world of consequential action? Or does one at best become free to make choices whose degree of skillfulness depends on the extent to which one recognizes the infinite tension of ambiguity?

Making economics more useful: how technological eclecticism could help

ABSTRACT Keynes thought it would be ‘splendid’ if economists became more like dentists. Disciplinary economics has instead become more like physics in focusing on concise, universal propositions verified through decisive tests. This focus, I argue, limits the practical utility of the discipline because universal propositions form only a part of new policy recipes. I further suggest that, as in engineering and medicine, developing economic recipes requires eclectic combinations of suggestive tests and judgement. Additionally, I offer a detailed example of how a simulation model can help evaluate new policy combinations that affect the screening of loan applications.

Making Economics More Useful: How Technological Pluralism Could Help

Keynes thought it would be “splendid” if economists became more like dentists. Disciplinary economics has instead become more like physics in focusing on concise, universal propositions verified through decisive tests. This focus, I argue, limits the practical utility of the discipline because universal propositions form only a part of new policy recipes. I further suggest that, as in engineering and medicine, developing economic recipes requires eclectic combinations of suggestive tests and judgment. Additionally, I offer a detailed example of how a simulation model can help evaluate new policy combinations that affect the screening of loan applications.

Investigating 10th grade students’ understanding of the structure of deductive proof

Miyazaki, Fujita, and Jones define the structure of deductive proofs as the relational network via deductive reasoning that combines singular and universal propositions. Related to the theory, this research aims to investigate students understanding of the structure of deductive proofs. Researchers conducted a qualitative research to 30 students of 10th grade. The data was collected from geometrical proof test that focused on Sine and Cosine rule. The result of this research showing the lack of students understanding of the structure of deductive proofs. For the future research, researchers wonder whether to apply a flow-chart proof or a table proof to teach mathematical proving can improve students understanding of the structure of deductive proofs.

The Scope of the Focus Particle ʾInnamā in the Qurʾān

According to traditional Arabic grammar, the particle ʾinnamā has two functions: it serves as an emphatic particle (ḥarfu taʾkīd) or as a particle of restriction (ḥarfu ḥaṣr) denoting “only.” Our research focuses on the restrictive function of ʾinnamā, particularly its scope. Scholars typically explain that ʾinnamā is restricted to clause-initial position, while it always effects the last component in that clause. Our examination raised several findings regarding this particle: First, sentences introduced by ʾinnamā are often categorical statements discussing what it takes to be a believer, an unbeliever; of being God, the Devil or the Prophet. It is therefore comparatively easy to interpret and paraphrase them as conditionals or “if... then” statements. Also, these universal affirmative or negative propositions lend themselves as premises for further deductions that might be drawn from them. Second, the scope of ʾinnamā is versatile ‒ it can be a noun phrase, a prepositional phrase or a verbal phrase followed by its direct object, a relative clause or a complete sentence. These distinctions are not always clear-cut; in some cases there is a choice between two possible domains or scopes, depending on the structure of the ʾinnamā clause. In most cases, however, the verses allow one interpretation only, which is reducible to a genuine symbolic form of modern logic notation.

Euler zirkuluen erabilera intentsionalak silogistika kategorikorako

Artikulu honetan proposatuko ditut intentsionalki interpreta daitezkeen Euler zirkuluen sistema bi. Ikusiko denez, sistemok zehatz-mehatz egokitzen dira Aristotelesen jatorrizko sistemarekin eta modu artezean eta intuitiboan irudikatzen dute onartze existentziala, zeina zenbait modu silogistikok baliodun izateko behar duten. Aldi berean, proposizio partikularren irudikatzeetara ere hedatzen da proposizio unibertsalen eulertar irudikatzeek duten jatorrizko intuitibotasuna, zeren eta alboratu egiten baitira zirkuluak ebakitzea eta existitzen diren izakiak ad hoc markatzea.

Fārābī and Avicenna on Contraposition

The rule of contraposition has been investigated thoroughly by Arabic logicians. In this paper, we study the work done by Fārābā and Avicenna, the fathers of Arabic logic. Fārābā studied contraposition of universal affirmatives, discussed its four forms, and discovered a relation between one form and the conversion of negative universals. Although Fārābā and logicians before him have used contraposition only for conditionals, as well as for indefinite and universal affirmative categorical propositions, Avicenna generalized the rule to all the four Aristotelian quantified categorical propositions. However, many of his ideas on contraposition were opposed by his 12th and 13th century followers, which are to be investigated later.

Underdetermination in Late Postclassical Ḥanafī Legal Theories

This article argues that Ḥanafī uṣūlī s of the later phases of the postclassical period understood uṣūl to be universal propositions that were underdetermined with respect to their evidentiary bases. Though the purpose of such propositions was to confer actionable certainty to particular legal effects, the later tradition imagined the main charge of uṣūl al-fiqh on a meta-theoretic level, i.e., to determine how such propositions could themselves be suitably grounded. In casting the discourse within the framework of naturalized technical methods and distinctions from fields of logic and philosophy, the tradition generally granted the relational and systemic validity of each proposition in terms of the grounding it received from another underdetermined proposition. This second-order perspective of the tradition reveals that uṣūl were systemically and relationally valid, but individually underdetermined. Thus the application of the attribute of relational validity to them and to the effects for which they are serviceable is apt.

Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties

AbstractOne reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory – and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories,ceteris paribus – is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been championed by Richard Swinburne in recent years. I outline the objections to this line of argument present in the literature, and suggest some novel resources open to Swinburne in defence. I then argue that scientists' preference for universal nomological propositions constitutes a very strong reason for supposing that theism is simpler than parodical alternatives in virtue of its positing omni-properties rather than parallel ‘mega-properties’.

Circling the Void: Derrida's Style of Counting

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarc BothaMarc Botha is a research associate on the Leverhulme Trust ‘Tipping Points’ project in the Department of English Studies, Durham University, and Lecturer in English at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. His principal areas of research and publication are minimalist aesthetics, configurations of minimalism in continental philosophy, and fragility. His monograph, Persistence and Transfiguration: A Theory of Minimalism will be published in 2015 by Bloomsbury. He is currently co-editing two collections of essays: Cosmopoetics: Trajectories of Change in Contemporary Thought (Bloomsbury) with Heather Yeung, and Critical Transitions: The Expanding World of Contemporary Poetics (Palgrave) with Patricia Waugh. Email: m.j.botha@durham.ac.uk

Universal vs. particular reasoning: a study with neuroimaging techniques

The article investigates some general properties of universal vs. particular propositions occuring in syllogistic arguments, in order to explore the kind of interaction played by these two forms of reasoning inside cognition. The theoretical framework of our analysis is represented by recent developments of linear logic, focusing on the distinction between positive vs. negative status of logical operators (connectives and quantifiers). In the first part of the article, this distinction is introduced and applied to the analysis of the categorical propositions occurring in Aristotelian syllogism, the deductive paradigm particularly considered in psychological studies about human reasoning. In the second part of the article, an experimental research is presented in which the positive vs. negative alternation is studied in the transition from a universal (vs. a particular) categorical proposition to its contradictory, a particular (vs. a universal) categorical proposition; the experimental research is based on a reasoning task which shows that significant differences are exhibited by the two types of transitions.

On ceteris paribus laws in economics (and elsewhere): why do social sciences matter to each other?

Stipulating universal propositions with a ceteris paribus clause is normal practice in science and especially in economics. Yet there are several problems associated with the use of ceteris paribus clauses in theorising and in policy matters. This paper first investigates three questions: how can ceteris paribus clauses be non-vacuous? How can ceteris paribus laws be true? And how can they help in formulating successful policy interventions in a diversity of contexts? It turns out that ceteris paribus clauses are not always used legitimately. They are meant to fence off a theory from disturbing factors, but economists who do not specify the clause well enough tend to fence variables in rather than off. In such cases, it would be better to use theoretical abstraction, which is something very different from the use of ceteris paribus clauses. However, abstract theorising conceptually leads one away from the concrete detail of real world situations in which policies take place. Hence, a fourth question arises: how can policy interventions be properly designed on the basis of abstract laws? To answer this question, I defend interdisciplinarity in concept choice.

Zur Einheit der modalen Syllogistik des Aristoteles

On the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or – equivalently – from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions.

Pi on Earth, or Mathematics in the Real World

We explore aspects of an experimental approach to mathematical proof, most notably number crunching, or the verification of subsequent particular cases of universal propositions. Since the rise of the computer age, this technique has indeed conquered practice, although it implies the abandonment of the ideal of absolute certainty. It seems that also in mathematical research, the qualitative criterion of effectiveness, i.e. to reach one’s goals, gets increasingly balanced against the quantitative one of efficiency, i.e. to minimize one’s means/ends ratio. Our story will lead to the consideration of some limit cases, opening up the possibility of proofs of infinite length being surveyed in a finite time. By means of example, this should show that mathematical practice in vital aspects depends upon what the actual world is like.