Universal Presuppositions Research Articles

Rational Presupposition, Normativity and Pluralist Expression: A Cross-Cultural Perspective on the Universality of Philosophy

The question of the universality of philosophy is highlighted when seen from a crosscultural perspective, for it reveals the tension between particularity and universality, as well as the connotations of the universality of philosophy. In terms of philosophical activities concerned with the content of Chinese life experience, the universality of philosophy, the particularity of Chinese thought, and the uniqueness of Chinese expression together constitute a persistent theoretical tension. We distinguish the universality of philosophy from universal philosophy; the former stems from the universal presupposition of rational capacity and points to the richness and pluralism of the empirical world while maintaining a dynamic balance between universality and pluralism in normative attitudes of discourse practice and conceptual activity. From the perspective of cultural subjectivity, it is necessary to avoid misleading views that equate the universality of philosophy with Western philosophy; moreover, normativity cannot be understood as specific censorship rules. The universality of philosophy requires a sense of boundaries and a normative attitude that will ensure that people from different contexts can enter into dialogue on the basis of rational ability and construct a space for dialogue and understanding. The concern for diverse objects based on the richness of experience gives philosophical concepts and arguments pluralist differences that encompass cultural differences and autonomy at the level of expression. All in all, it is only on the basis of the universality of philosophy that we can understand the normative requirements of philosophical activities and the pluralism of cross-cultural philosophical reflection.

The doctrine of double effect in ethics education

Ethics education is a vast term for learning experiences aimed to assist students in developing ethically, whether in terms of increased ethical awareness and understanding or greater motivation to act ethically in the world. The article discusses the doctrine of double effect in the context of ethical education between deontology and consequentialism. The authors note that it is impossible to agree the doctrine of double effect with contrarian normative positions. In the first part of the article, authors argue in favor of the doctrine of the double effect as an independent ethical principle. In the second part of the article, authors consider the doctrine of double effect by using the example of an armed conflict situation in the terms of international humanitarian law. The main thesis of the article is that the doctrine of double effect should be considered as a universal presupposition of both ethical and educational regulation.

Interpreting presuppositions in the scope of quantifiers: "every" vs. "at least one"

This paper experimentally investigates presupposition projection from the scope ofthe quantifiers every and at least one, as triggered by the factive verb be aware and the iterativeadverb again. The first issue we are concerned with is whether presuppositions projectuniversally or existentially from quantified sentences. Different theoretical accounts endorseopposing views here (e.g., Heim, 1983; Geurts, 1999; Beaver, 2001; Schlenker, 2008, 2009;Fox, 2012), while recent experimental work (Chemla, 2009; Tiemann, 2014) suggests thatthe force of the projected presupposition varies by quantifier. The second issue we look atis how the descriptively observed readings arise—in particular, as a direct result output fromthe projection mechanism, or via additional, independent mechanisms such as domain restriction(e.g., Geurts and van Tiel, 2016): if the domain of the quantifier is restricted, this canyield what looks like non-universal inferences in light of the overall, unrestricted domain, evenif the projection mechanism itself yields a universal presupposition. Finally, we test whetherthe presupposed content also forms part of the entailed content, at least for certain triggers(Sudo, 2012; Klinedinst, 2016; Zehr and Schwarz, 2016). Our results yield clearly differentpatterns for every and at least one, with every giving rise to universal presuppositions, which,to a very limited extent, can be weakened by domain restriction, and at least one overwhelminglygiving rise to non-universal presuppositions. Our results also indicate the availability ofpresupposition-less readings for both triggers in the task at hand, apparently more prevalentthan domain restriction. Thereby, we present novel evidence that helps to pinpoint which of thetheoretical options can be substantiated experimentally.Keywords: Presupposition projection, quantifiers, domain restriction, entailment.

Decomposing universal projection in questions

Revising a proposal by Guerzoni (2003), we propose to derive universal projectionof presuppositions in wh-questions, where attested, from a family of three felicity conditions onquestion use. Assuming that these felicity conditions can be violated under certain conditions,this proposal predicts a typology of contexts where universal projection can exceptionally beunattested. We propose that this prediction is correct, presenting a family of scenarios wherethe expected absence of universal projection is observed.Keywords: wh-questions, universal presupposition projection, felicity conditions, bridge principles.

Existentialism and Humanism: Humanity—Know Thyself!

At times, an individual in modernity can feel dehumanised by work, by administration, by technology, and by political power. This experience of being dehumanised can take the individual to an existential awareness of the priority of existence over essence. But what does this existential experience mean? Are there ways in which this experience can reconnect the individual to her being human, or to her being part of humanity? Any such reconnection is further complicated by the suspicion that universal presuppositions concerning ‘humanity’ or ‘human being’ or ‘humanism’ carry pretensions of imperialist grandeur that must be challenged. How, then, might one proceed to connect existential vertigo with a culture of humanism that, while resisting such pretensions, nevertheless can find meaning for the dehumanised individual? In what follows I argue that a concept of modern metaphysics, with an aporetic (Hegelian) logic of subjective experience, can carry this reconnection of the I and the We, offering meaning not in the resolution of their opposition, but in learning that the meaning of their opposition, and the meaning of humanity, is learning, is our education. I argue that it is only within modern educational metaphysics that humanity and the individual Know Thyself.

Jacques Ranciere’s Politics of Literature, Writing and Aesthetics in the Letters of John Keats

Through his numerous works on the philosophy of aesthetics, literature and writing Jacques Rancière has crafted a body of work based on the premise of equality as recognized through aesthetics. In the introduction to the English translation of Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics, author Gabriel Rockhill writes Rancière supports abolishing "any presupposed inequalities of intelligence". Rancière argues against any "privileged position usurped by philosophy in its various attempts to speak for others, be it the proletariat, the poor, or anyone else who is not 'destined to think'" Rancière's political positioning of aesthetics finds "those who have no name, who remain invisible and inaudible, can only penetrate the police order [politics] via a mode of subjectivization that transforms the aesthetic coordinators of the community by implementing the universal presupposition of politics: we are all equal". I suggest Rancière's theories on the politics of aesthetics, literature and writing are present in letters written by 19th century Romantic poet John Keats.

Habermas' formal pragmatics and the speech act of Stephen

The concept of formal pragmatics exhibits the potential for rationality that is supposed to be implicit in the everyday language practices of societies. It is located in certain idealisations that guide communicative action to the extent that communication is linked to validity. While this reconstructive theory seeks to identify universal presuppositions of everyday communication in modern societies, this paper will show that it can be transposed onto an ancient communication (Stephen’s speech) as an example of communicative action. Interpreting Stephen’s speech according to Habermas’ formal pragmatics in the communicative framework, infers a conception of purpose and potential to build on this example for other speech acts and communicative processes in the Bible. The problem with communicative rationality is that it cannot be reduced to any local context without the risk of it becoming useless for universal application and falling into moral relativism. However, the Bible is full of idealised normative suppositions that can provide standards for justifiable purposive and illocutionary activity. Even though Habermas hopes to provide a post-metaphysical alternative to pre-modern ideals of normativity, it will be shown that the pre-modern biblical text can still be an inspiration for the communicative rationality he sought after. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the speech act of Stephen in Acts 6:8–7:60 in relation to his formal pragmatics within the context of communicative action, as an example of critical biblical interpretation.

Habermas' formal pragmatics and the speech act of Stephen

The concept of formal pragmatics exhibits the potential for rationality that is supposed to be implicit in the everyday language practices of societies. It is located in certain idealisations that guide communicative action to the extent that communication is linked to validity. While this reconstructive theory seeks to identify universal presuppositions of everyday communication in modern societies, this paper will show that it can be transposed onto an ancient communication (Stephen’s speech) as an example of communicative action. Interpreting Stephen’s speech according to Habermas’ formal pragmatics in the communicative framework, infers a conception of purpose and potential to build on this example for other speech acts and communicative processes in the Bible. The problem with communicative rationality is that it cannot be reduced to any local context without the risk of it becoming useless for universal application and falling into moral relativism. However, the Bible is full of idealised normative suppositions that can provide standards for justifiable purposive and illocutionary activity. Even though Habermas hopes to provide a post-metaphysical alternative to pre-modern ideals of normativity, it will be shown that the pre-modern biblical text can still be an inspiration for the communicative rationality he sought after. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the speech act of Stephen in Acts 6:8–7:60 in relation to his formal pragmatics within the context of communicative action, as an example of critical biblical interpretation.

Presuppositions of quantified sentences: experimental data

Some theories assume that sentences like (i) with a presupposition trigger in the scope of a quantifier carry an existential presupposition, as in (ii); others assume that they carry a universal presupposition, as in (iii). (i) No student knows that he is lucky. (ii) Existential presupposition: At least one student is lucky. (iii) Universal presupposition: Every student is lucky. This work is an experimental investigation of this issue in French. Native speakers were recruited to evaluate the robustness of the inference from (i) to (iii). The main result is that presuppositions triggered from the scope of the quantifier aucun‘no’ are in fact universal. But the present results also suggest that the presuppositions triggered from the scope of other quantifiers depend on the quantifier. This calls for important changes in the main theories of presupposition projection.

SLIDING MODE PREDICTION TRACKING CONTROL DESIGN FOR UNCERTAIN SYSTEMS

ABSTRACTIn this paper, a tracking control algorithm based on sliding mode prediction for a class of discrete‐time uncertain systems is presented. By creating a special model to predict the future sliding mode function value and by combining feedback correction and receding horizon optimization approaches, which are extensively applied in predictive control strategy, a discrete‐time sliding mode control law for tracking problem is constructed. With the designed control law, closed‐loop systems have strong robustness to matched or unmatched uncertainties as they eliminate chattering. Besides, in the robustness analysis, the boundary condition for uncertainties, which is a universal presupposition in sliding mode control method, is not required. Numerical simulation and cart‐pendulum experiment results illustrate the validity of the proposed algorithm.

Digging One's Own Grave

The paper aims to demonstrate that some points in the explication of the figurative expression digging one's own grave via the concept of blending given by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner are problematic: (1) Not under- standing the consequences of one's deeds is an almost universal presupposition of and impulse or motivation for actualizing any utterance with a forewarning or gloating content (e.g., proverbs), not the singularity characterizing just the expression of grave-digging as such. (2) The inversion of causal and temporal structure is not the case because of metonymic association between the con- cepts of the grave and death, as a result of which specific causal and temporal order loses any significance. Many synonymous examples can be given in which the image refers to events before the death, between the death and funeral, as well as those after burial. (3) The source domain needs not to be restricted to natural death and modern civilized funerals but should include also the cases of violent deaths, e.g., the scenario of execution and the scenario of hunting and trapping. Preliminarily, a very brief synopsis of the main phases of development of cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor and some favourite examples of blends, used also in previous works, is provided.

Stirner and Foucault: Toward a Post-Kantian Freedom

1.Max Stirner and Michel Foucault are two thinkers not often examined together. However, it has been suggested that the long-ignored Stirner may be seen as a precursor to contemporary thought.1 Indeed, there are many extraordinary parallels between Stirner's critique of Enlightenment humanism, universal rationality, and essential identities, and similar critiques developed by thinkers such as Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and others. However, the purpose of this paper is not merely to situate Stirner in the poststructuralist tradition, but rather to examine his thinking on the question of freedom, and to explore the connections here with Foucault's own development of the concept in the context of power relations and subjectivity. Broadly speaking, both thinkers see the classical Kantian idea of freedom as deeply problematic, as it involves essentialist and universal presuppositions which are themselves often oppressive. Rather, the concept of freedom must be rethought. It can no longer be seen in solely negative terms, as freedom from constraint, but must involve more positive notions of individual autonomy, particularly the freedom of the individual to construct new modes of subjectivity. Stirner, as we shall see, dispenses with the classical notion of freedom altogether and develops a theory of ownness [Eigneheit] to describe this radical individual autonomy. I suggest in this paper that such a theory of ownness as a non-essentialist form of freedom has many similarities with Foucault's own project of freedom, which involves a critical ethos and an aestheticization of the self. Indeed, Foucault questions the anthropological and universal rational foundations of the discourse of freedom, redefining it in terms of ethical practices.2 Both Stirner and Foucault are therefore crucial to the understanding of freedom in a contemporary sense--they show that freedom can no longer be limited by rational absolutes and universal moral categories. They take the understanding of freedom beyond the confines of the Kantian project--grounding it instead in concrete and contingent strategies of the self.

John Chrysostom on Philemon: A Second Look

Recently in this journal Allen D. Callahan argued for a bold, distinctive interpretation of Paul's Epistle to Philemon. Contrary to the conventional interpretation, Onesimus was not a (runaway) slave, but was Philemon's own estranged blood brother. Rather than an appeal for forgiveness for afugitivus, or a request to retain a slave for further service, the Epistle to Philemon is the apostle's attempt to bring about reconciliation between two brothers. Callahan's thesis constitutes a powerful reminder of how the interpretation of each of Paul's letters, perhaps especially this shortest and most subtle letter, depends acutely upon the interplay between historical reconstruction of the original context and the text itself. Callahan calls for a reconsideration of the most basic, universal presupposition of the interpretation of the letter—that Onesimus was Philemon's slave.

Dōuas a wide scope universal quantifier*

Abstract May (1977, 1985) argues that the rule of Quantifier Raising (QR), which is an instance of Move 8 is operative at the level of Logic Form (LF) in English. Based on the assumption that QR is operative at the level of S‐Structure (SS) in Chinese and that the lexical item dōu is relevant to the application of QR at SS in Chinese (Gao 1989, 1990), this paper, by demonstrating a set of properties of dōu, aims to argue that dōu is a wide scope universal quantifier. The paper intends to demonstrate that a quantifier which co‐occurs with dōu is unambiguous and always has wide scope; that a wh‐question word becomes a universal quantifier if it co‐occurs with dou and again it always has wide scope; that dōu forces an NP or a QP in the object position to move preverbally and thus forces it to have wide scope interpretation; and that even an existential quantifier or an ordinary noun or noun phrase will have universal presupposition if it appears with dōu. The significance of the argument that dōu is a wide s...