Universal Designated Verifier Signature Research Articles

A quantum resistant universal designated verifier signature proof

<abstract><p>In order to ensure that only the designated person can verify the signer's signature on the message, Steinfeld et al. introduced the concept of Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS), which enables a designator who has obtained a signature on a message from the signer to designate the signature to any desired designated verifier. This idea was developed to address the privacy concerns of the signature holder at the time of certificate distribution. They are appropriate for applications that demand the designer's secrecy. The fact that the designated verifier must generate a public key with regard to the signer's public parameter for signature verification is a significant drawback of UDVS methods. In cases where the verifier is unable to begin the key generation procedure, this constraint is inapplicable. Baek et al. developed the idea of "Universal Designated Verifier Signature Proof (UDVSP)", which does not require the verifier's public key for verification, to get around this restriction. All existing UDVSP constructions are based on a discrete logarithm problem, which is vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. As a result, an efficient quantum resistant UDVSP is built on a hard problem in coding theory, as suggested by NIST reports. The scheme's security against forgeability and impersonation attacks is examined using the random oracle model.</p></abstract>

A universal designated multi verifiers content extraction signature scheme

A notion combined the content extraction signature and the universal designated verifier signature was put forth by Lin in 2012. Specifically, it allows an extracted signature holder to designate the signature to a prospective verifier. However, existing designs become inefficient when multi verifiers are involved. To improve the efficiency, in this paper, we extend the notion to the universal designated multi verifiers content extraction signature (UDMVCES). Implementing our new scheme, the extracted signature holder can efficiently designate the signature to multi verifiers. Additionally, we provide the security notions and prove the security of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model. To illustrate the efficiency of our UDMVCES scheme, we analyse the performance of it. The analysis shows that the computation costs and signature lengths of the new scheme are independent of the number of verifiers.

Universal designated verifier signature scheme with non-delegatability in the standard model

The notion of a Designated Verifier Signature (DVS) scheme allows a signer to create a signature which is only verifiable by an intended verifier. DVS is a very useful scheme for authenticating a signer without interfering with her privacy. In 2003, Steinfeld et al. extended this notion to enable a Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme. In UDVS, everyone who holds Alice’s traditional signature on a message (the signature holder), can transform it into a DVS for a specific verifier. Non-delegatability is a critical property of a DVS scheme in applications where responsibility of a signer is important and can not be delegated to another entity. Shim (Information Science, 2014) posed an open problem on how to construct a non-delegatable UDVS scheme. Since then, it has been well acknowledged that constructing a UDVS scheme which is non-delegatable remains as an elusive research problem. Furthermore, gaining a construction which is based on the standard model (without random oracles) is most desirable in practice. In this work, we present an affirmative answer to the aforementioned open research problem. We present the first non-delegatable UDVS scheme and prove its security requirements in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first non-delegatable UDVS scheme, which fills the gap in the existing literature. Furthermore, when the signer is considered as the signature holder, our scheme is also considered as the first non-delegatable DVS scheme in the standard model.

On delegatability of designated verifier signature schemes

Lipmaa et al. introduced a new security notion of designated verifier signature schemes, non-delegatability: neither a signer nor a designated verifier can delegate the signing rights to any third party without revealing their secret keys. In this paper, we classify designated verifier signature schemes into three types and then discuss delegatability of existing designated verifier signature schemes, strong designated verifier signature schemes and universal designated verifier signature schemes, and open research issues.

Detection and analysis of secure intelligent universal designated verifier signature scheme for electronic voting system

Security is a paramount concern for various applications, such as electronic voting system as sensitive data is to be transmitted among the nodes during transmission. Recently, Wu and Lin (Inf Technol Control 42:231---237, 2013) proposed a new probabilistic signature scheme and used it to construct two universal designated verifier signature schemes. They demonstrated that their scheme was secure under the bilinear inverse Diffie---Hellman assumption. However, in this paper, we will show that their scheme cannot provide unforgeability, i.e., the adversary could forge a legal signature of any message. The analysis shows that their schemes are not suitable for practical applications. To overcome these weaknesses, we proposed three improved schemes which are provably secure in the random oracles. In summary, our contributions in this paper was listed in following three folds: (1) we have shown that Wu et al. schemes cannot provide unforgeability, i.e., the adversary could forge a legal signature of any message. (2) We have proposed three improved schemes which overcomes the drawbacks of Wu et al. scheme and finally, (3) we have implemented the real-time packet analyzer for detection of invalid signature in electronic voting system using Snort. The analysis shows that the existing scheme is not suitable for practical applications and our implemented scheme is able to detect the vulnerability in the electronic voting system. The designed scheme generated alerts at regular intervals so that administrator takes adequate measures to mitigate the intrusion presented in the system.

On the security of a novel probabilistic signature based on bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem and its extension.

Probabilistic signature scheme has been widely used in modern electronic commerce since it could provide integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation. Recently, Wu and Lin proposed a novel probabilistic signature (PS) scheme using the bilinear square Diffie-Hellman (BSDH) problem. They also extended it to a universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) scheme. In this paper, we analyze the security of Wu et al.'s PS scheme and UDVS scheme. Through concrete attacks, we demonstrate both of their schemes are not unforgeable. The security analysis shows that their schemes are not suitable for practical applications.

Secure Universal Designated Verifier Signature and its Variant for Privacy Protection

Based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (BIDHP), we first propose a provably secure probabilistic signature scheme. Furthermore, we extend it into two universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes under the same computational assumption. The first one is a conventional UDVS scheme for one designated verifier while the other is designed for cooperative multi-verifier. UDVS schemes aim at protecting the privacy of signature holders and have practical benefits to the applications, e.g., the certificate for medical records and income summary, etc. The comparison results demonstrate that the signature generation and designation of our scheme are both pairing-free, which could benefit the application of devices with constrained computation. We also give formal security proofs of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.itc.42.3.3532

Secure universal designated verifier identity‐based signcryption

ABSTRACTIn 2003, Steinfeld et al. introduced the notion of universal designated verifier signature (UDVS), which allows a signature holder, who receives a signature from the signer, to convince a designated verifier whether he is possession of a signer's signature; at the same time, the verifier cannot transfer such conviction to anyone else. These signatures devote to protect the receiver's privacy, that is, the receiver may want to prove to any designated verifier who he is in possession of such signature signed by the known signer but reluctant to disclose it. Moreover, the receiver also does not want the verifier to be able to convince anyone that he is in possession of such signature. In the existing UDVS schemes, a secure channel is required between the signer and the signature holder to transfer the signature. This paper, for the first time, proposes the notion of universal designated verifier signcryption without this secure channel by combining the notions of UDVS and signcryption. We give the formal definitions and a concrete construction of universal designated verifier identity‐based signcryption scheme. We also give the formal security proofs for our scheme under the random oracle model. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A novel probabilistic signature based on bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem and its extension

Digital signatures are just like hand-written ones, which guarantee integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation. On the basis of an intractable mathematical assumption, that is, bilinear square Diffie–Hellman problem, we give a concrete construction of the first provably secure probabilistic signature scheme and its extension to a universal designated verifier signature scheme. A universal designated verifier signature scheme allows any signature holder to designate a publicly verifiable signature to a specific verifier such that only the designated verifier can validate the signature for protecting the privacy of signature holder. In addition, the designated verifier is unable to convince any third party of the fact. Such schemes can be applied to privacy-preserving electronic applications such as the certificate for medical records and income summary. Our scheme is especially suitable for computation constrained devices because the signature generation and designation are pairing free. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A new way to generate a ring: Universal ring signature

A ring signature enables an individual of a group to sign a message on behalf of the group without revealing the identity of the real signer. It is useful in the application of leaking authoritative secrets in an anonymous way. In this paper, we define a new type of ring signature called “Universal Ring Signature” (US(1,n)). In our scheme, a ring is not generated by a signer but by a signature holder. A signer just sign a message by a “standard” digital signature and when necessary, a signature holder can modify the standard digital signature into a ring signature by spontaneously conscript arbitrarily n−1 entities and/or n−1 messages at most. In addition, the signature holder generating the US(1,n) is not required to have any public/private key-pair. With this modification to the original ring signature, we allow any signature holder (ie., user of the signature) to protect personal privacy including signer anonymity and message ambiguity from the perspective of himself (instead of a signer). This kind of new protocol is useful when a signature is actually a certificate signed by a certificate issuer. We will show how to use this scheme to protect the identity of a certificate issuer and protect some sensitive information on a certificate. We will also show the relationship of our scheme with the standard ring signature and the relationship of our scheme with the universal designated verifier signature. Our scheme can actually be regarded as a generic construction of these two schemes. The security concerning to the unforgeability and privacy are also defined and proved in the random oracle model.

An ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme

In an ID-based universal designated verifier signature scheme, a single signer generates a signature that can only be verified by a designated verifier using a simplified public identity such as an e-mail address. In this paper, we expand the scheme to a multi-user setting for generating and verifying signatures in practical applications. An ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme based on bilinear pairings is proposed that allows a set of multi-signer to cooperatively generate a signature and designate a set of multi-verifier to verify it. The security of the proposed scheme is demonstrated to be resistant to existentially forgery from adaptive chosen-message and chosen-ID attacks under the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem.

Generic constructions for universal designated-verifier signatures and identity-based signatures from standard signatures

The authors give a generic construction for universal (mutli) designated-verifier signature schemes from a large class of signature schemes, referred to as Class ℂ. The resulting schemes are efficient and have two important properties. Firstly, they are provably DV-unforgeable, non-transferable and also non-delegatable. Secondly, the signer and the designated verifier can independently choose their cryptographic settings. The authors also propose a generic construction for (hierarchical) identity-based signature schemes from any signature scheme in ℂ and prove that the construction is secure against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks. The authors discuss possible extensions of our constructions to identity-based ring signatures and identity-based designated-verifier signatures from any signature in ℂ. Finally, the authors show that it is possible to combine the above constructions to obtain signatures with combined functionalities.

An identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme secure in the standard model

Universal designated verifier signature was first introduced by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk in Asiacrypt 2003. In the universal designated verifier signature scheme, any holder of a signature can designate the signature to any desired designated verifier, such that only the designated verifier will believe that the signature holder holds a valid signature. In SecUbiq’05 [Zhang Fangguo, Susilo Willy, Mu Yi, Chen Xiaofeng, 2005. Identity-based universal designated verifier signatures. In: The First International Workshop on Security in Ubiquitous Computing Systems, Nagasaki, Japan, LNCS 3823. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 825–834] first extended this notion to the identity based setting and proposed two identity based universal designated verifier signature schemes. However, the security of their scheme is based on the random oracle model. Up to now, there is no provably secure identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme in the standard model. In this paper, we propose the first identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme whose security can be proven in the standard model based on the hardness of the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem.

Identity-based universal designated multi-verifiers signature schemes

An identity-based (ID-based) universal designated verifier signature (ID-UDVS) scheme allows a signature holder to designate a specific verifier of the signature by using a simplified public identity such as e-mail address. In the paper, we present an efficient identity-based universal designated multi-verifiers signature (ID-UDMVS) scheme by extending a single verifier to a set of multi-verifiers for verification of a signature. To achieve our goal, we construct an ID-based signature scheme providing batch verification and then, using this scheme as a building block, we firstly propose an ID-UDMVS scheme with constant signature size. Interestingly our construction method can be used as a generic method transforming an ID-UDVS scheme, which is defined in a bilinear version of the so-called ∑ protocol, to an ID-UDMVS scheme.

Certificateless universal designated verifier signature schemes

Universal designated verifier signature schemes allows a signature holder to designate the signature to a desire designated verifier, in such a way that only designated verifier can verify this signature, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact. The previous constructions of universal designated verifier signature rely on the underlying public key infrastructure, that needs both signers and verifiers to verify the authenticity of the public keys, and hence, the certificates are required. This article presents the first model and construction of the certificateless universal designated verifier signature scheme, in which the certificates are not needed. The proposed scheme satisfies all the requirements of the universal designated verifier signature in the certificateless system. Security proofs are provided for the scheme based on the random oracle model, assuming that the Bilinear diffie-hellman (BDH) problem is hard to solve.

Secure universal designated verifier signature without random oracles

In Asiacrypt 2003, the concept of universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) was introduced by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk. In the new paradigm, any signature holder (not necessarily the signer) can designate the publicly verifiable signature to any desired designated verifier (using the verifier’s public key), such that only the designated verifier can believe that the signature holder does have a valid publicly verifiable signature, and hence, believes that the signer has signed the message. Any other third party cannot believe this fact because this verifier can use his secret key to create a valid UDVS which is designated to himself. In ACNS 2005, Zhang, Furukawa and Imai proposed the first UDVS scheme without random oracles. In this paper, we give a security analysis to the scheme of Zhang et al. and propose a novel UDVS scheme without random oracles based on Waters’ signature scheme, and prove that our scheme is secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption.