Universal Designated Verifier Signature Scheme Research Articles

Universal designated verifier signature scheme with non-delegatability in the standard model

The notion of a Designated Verifier Signature (DVS) scheme allows a signer to create a signature which is only verifiable by an intended verifier. DVS is a very useful scheme for authenticating a signer without interfering with her privacy. In 2003, Steinfeld et al. extended this notion to enable a Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme. In UDVS, everyone who holds Alice’s traditional signature on a message (the signature holder), can transform it into a DVS for a specific verifier. Non-delegatability is a critical property of a DVS scheme in applications where responsibility of a signer is important and can not be delegated to another entity. Shim (Information Science, 2014) posed an open problem on how to construct a non-delegatable UDVS scheme. Since then, it has been well acknowledged that constructing a UDVS scheme which is non-delegatable remains as an elusive research problem. Furthermore, gaining a construction which is based on the standard model (without random oracles) is most desirable in practice. In this work, we present an affirmative answer to the aforementioned open research problem. We present the first non-delegatable UDVS scheme and prove its security requirements in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first non-delegatable UDVS scheme, which fills the gap in the existing literature. Furthermore, when the signer is considered as the signature holder, our scheme is also considered as the first non-delegatable DVS scheme in the standard model.

On delegatability of designated verifier signature schemes

Lipmaa et al. introduced a new security notion of designated verifier signature schemes, non-delegatability: neither a signer nor a designated verifier can delegate the signing rights to any third party without revealing their secret keys. In this paper, we classify designated verifier signature schemes into three types and then discuss delegatability of existing designated verifier signature schemes, strong designated verifier signature schemes and universal designated verifier signature schemes, and open research issues.

Detection and analysis of secure intelligent universal designated verifier signature scheme for electronic voting system

Security is a paramount concern for various applications, such as electronic voting system as sensitive data is to be transmitted among the nodes during transmission. Recently, Wu and Lin (Inf Technol Control 42:231---237, 2013) proposed a new probabilistic signature scheme and used it to construct two universal designated verifier signature schemes. They demonstrated that their scheme was secure under the bilinear inverse Diffie---Hellman assumption. However, in this paper, we will show that their scheme cannot provide unforgeability, i.e., the adversary could forge a legal signature of any message. The analysis shows that their schemes are not suitable for practical applications. To overcome these weaknesses, we proposed three improved schemes which are provably secure in the random oracles. In summary, our contributions in this paper was listed in following three folds: (1) we have shown that Wu et al. schemes cannot provide unforgeability, i.e., the adversary could forge a legal signature of any message. (2) We have proposed three improved schemes which overcomes the drawbacks of Wu et al. scheme and finally, (3) we have implemented the real-time packet analyzer for detection of invalid signature in electronic voting system using Snort. The analysis shows that the existing scheme is not suitable for practical applications and our implemented scheme is able to detect the vulnerability in the electronic voting system. The designed scheme generated alerts at regular intervals so that administrator takes adequate measures to mitigate the intrusion presented in the system.

On the security of a novel probabilistic signature based on bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem and its extension.

Probabilistic signature scheme has been widely used in modern electronic commerce since it could provide integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation. Recently, Wu and Lin proposed a novel probabilistic signature (PS) scheme using the bilinear square Diffie-Hellman (BSDH) problem. They also extended it to a universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) scheme. In this paper, we analyze the security of Wu et al.'s PS scheme and UDVS scheme. Through concrete attacks, we demonstrate both of their schemes are not unforgeable. The security analysis shows that their schemes are not suitable for practical applications.

A novel probabilistic signature based on bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem and its extension

Digital signatures are just like hand-written ones, which guarantee integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation. On the basis of an intractable mathematical assumption, that is, bilinear square Diffie–Hellman problem, we give a concrete construction of the first provably secure probabilistic signature scheme and its extension to a universal designated verifier signature scheme. A universal designated verifier signature scheme allows any signature holder to designate a publicly verifiable signature to a specific verifier such that only the designated verifier can validate the signature for protecting the privacy of signature holder. In addition, the designated verifier is unable to convince any third party of the fact. Such schemes can be applied to privacy-preserving electronic applications such as the certificate for medical records and income summary. Our scheme is especially suitable for computation constrained devices because the signature generation and designation are pairing free. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

An ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme

In an ID-based universal designated verifier signature scheme, a single signer generates a signature that can only be verified by a designated verifier using a simplified public identity such as an e-mail address. In this paper, we expand the scheme to a multi-user setting for generating and verifying signatures in practical applications. An ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme based on bilinear pairings is proposed that allows a set of multi-signer to cooperatively generate a signature and designate a set of multi-verifier to verify it. The security of the proposed scheme is demonstrated to be resistant to existentially forgery from adaptive chosen-message and chosen-ID attacks under the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem.

An identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme secure in the standard model

Universal designated verifier signature was first introduced by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk in Asiacrypt 2003. In the universal designated verifier signature scheme, any holder of a signature can designate the signature to any desired designated verifier, such that only the designated verifier will believe that the signature holder holds a valid signature. In SecUbiq’05 [Zhang Fangguo, Susilo Willy, Mu Yi, Chen Xiaofeng, 2005. Identity-based universal designated verifier signatures. In: The First International Workshop on Security in Ubiquitous Computing Systems, Nagasaki, Japan, LNCS 3823. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 825–834] first extended this notion to the identity based setting and proposed two identity based universal designated verifier signature schemes. However, the security of their scheme is based on the random oracle model. Up to now, there is no provably secure identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme in the standard model. In this paper, we propose the first identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme whose security can be proven in the standard model based on the hardness of the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem.

Certificateless universal designated verifier signature schemes

Universal designated verifier signature schemes allows a signature holder to designate the signature to a desire designated verifier, in such a way that only designated verifier can verify this signature, but is unable to convince anyone else of this fact. The previous constructions of universal designated verifier signature rely on the underlying public key infrastructure, that needs both signers and verifiers to verify the authenticity of the public keys, and hence, the certificates are required. This article presents the first model and construction of the certificateless universal designated verifier signature scheme, in which the certificates are not needed. The proposed scheme satisfies all the requirements of the universal designated verifier signature in the certificateless system. Security proofs are provided for the scheme based on the random oracle model, assuming that the Bilinear diffie-hellman (BDH) problem is hard to solve.

Secure universal designated verifier signature without random oracles

In Asiacrypt 2003, the concept of universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) was introduced by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang and Pieprzyk. In the new paradigm, any signature holder (not necessarily the signer) can designate the publicly verifiable signature to any desired designated verifier (using the verifier’s public key), such that only the designated verifier can believe that the signature holder does have a valid publicly verifiable signature, and hence, believes that the signer has signed the message. Any other third party cannot believe this fact because this verifier can use his secret key to create a valid UDVS which is designated to himself. In ACNS 2005, Zhang, Furukawa and Imai proposed the first UDVS scheme without random oracles. In this paper, we give a security analysis to the scheme of Zhang et al. and propose a novel UDVS scheme without random oracles based on Waters’ signature scheme, and prove that our scheme is secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption.