United Nations Mission Research Articles

The Planning and Implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo

This article evaluates the planning process and initial implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo (EULEX). It shows that the original intention was to have a smaller presence than the predecessor United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Yet as a result of a lack of settlement on the international status of Kosovo, the European Union ended up with a robust mandate and it was unable to make a fresh start in order to distinguish itself from the United Nations. EULEX has, nonetheless, successfully established itself, but it remains too early for a final judgment.

Civilian protection and the image of the ‘total spoiler’: reflections on MONUC support to Kimia II

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.

The Role of International Peace Cooperation by Japan Self-Defense Forces in Peace Building: A Case Study of Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces Dispatch to United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

The Role of International Peace Cooperation by Japan Self-Defense Forces in Peace Building: A Case Study of Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces Dispatch to United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

Strategic Approaches to Reintegration: Lessons Learned from Liberia

SIX YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT, EX-COMBATANTS are no longer considered a serious threat to peace and stability in Liberia. Systematic surveys conducted by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) show that there is no national network of ex-combatants, although local groups of ex-combatants still exist in some locations. From a security perspective, the reintegration of ex-combatants has been largely successful in Liberia. This good news is not a coincidence; it is due to six years of sustained effort to reestablish rule of law throughout the country, to rebuild institutions, to promote early recovery, and to reintegrate the former fighting forces as well as other war-affected populations. The government, with support from the United Nations, many bilateral and multilateral partners, and national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), has worked diligently to achieve this. This, however, does not mean that all problems related to reintegration are completely resolved. First, there are some persistent localized networks of ex-combatants. These networks often continue to exist for economic reasons as ex-combatant groups engage in a variety of legal and illegal activities. The involvement of these groups in illegal economic activities and other criminal behavior is a particular concern, which UNMIL is addressing jointly with the government, UN agencies, and various international partners. The second challenge is unemployment, or, more broadly, the lack of livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants as well as for the general population. Ex-combatants have received training, counseling, and career advice, but livelihood opportunities are scarce in a postwar economy, with a very precarious employment situation (85 percent do not earn enough to lift themselves and their families over the one-dollar-a-day poverty line, according to a 2009 International Labour Organization [ILO] study (1)). Faced with a lack of livelihood opportunities, ex-combatants and other high-risk youths sometimes resort to illegal means of income generation, contributing to insecurity and hampering their community reintegration. When a 2008 US Institute for Peace study asked Liberian ex-combatants if they would fight again, two-thirds responded with a categorical no. The remaining one-third cited poverty and lack of economic opportunity as the main reasons that could make them go back to war. Interestingly, women ex-combatants appeared more ready to fight again for economic reasons than men. Unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities are therefore considered serious security concerns. Since 2003, an array of efforts have been undertaken to reintegrate ex-combatants in Liberia, from classic disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) to strategic monitoring and community-based interventions that aim at promoting alternative livelihoods. This article is considering what those efforts have achieved and what was not achievable, explain why it is time to end targeted assistance to ex-combatants in Liberia, and propose the next steps to be taken. The DDRR Program in Liberia, 2003-2009 An important milestone in UNMIL's mandate occurred on 21 July 2009: the completion of the reintegration component of the official DDRR program, nearly six years after it began. Following a faltering start in December 2003, the disarmament and demobilization component resumed on 15 April 2004, and when it ended on 4 November 2004, over 101,000 persons had been disarmed and demobilized. This number greatly exceeded the initial estimates of 35,000-38,000 ex-combatants, a projection based on the ascribed strength of the warring factions. The jump in the number of DDRR beneficiaries was partly due to a lowering of entrance criteria, namely the amount of weapons to be handed over in order to be eligible for demobilization and reintegration assistance. The relaxing of entrance criteria boosted the number of DDRR beneficiaries, posing a challenge to the planning and implementation of the program. …

Addressing symptoms but not causes: stabilisation and humanitarian action in Timor‐Leste

Asia's newest nation--Timor-Leste--has an unenviable track record of two Australian-led military stabilisation missions, five United Nations (UN) missions, and a vast humanitarian and international response over the course of the past decade. Two distinct approaches to stabilisation can be observed on this small half-island. The first is a 'security-first' approach, where development activities are complementary and serve to support security sector assistance, while the second emphasises traditional development activities and institution-building as the foundation for a stable country. Whereas these different approaches highlight various interpretations of the underlying problems and the task at hand, efforts aimed at stabilisation have crystallised the challenges of coordinating and integrating activities that are clearly interlinked and interdependent, whether within a UN integrated mission or implemented by bilateral actors. Consequently, the question of whether, or how, to measure progress towards this shared objective has gone largely unaddressed.

Answers to MCQs

Contact dermatitis to Staphylinid beetle is a well known entity worldwide. Paederus sabaeus (Econda) species of this insect was responsible for a widespread occurrence of this dermatitis in United Nations (UN) troops posted in Congo. This study was undertaken to observe the various aspects of this unique dermatitis in the mission area.All clinically diagnosed cases of contact dermatitis to Econda occurring in Indian troops posted to UN mission in Congo during the study period were included. Their epidemiological and clinical characteristics with treatment options were studied in detail.A wide range of dermatological manifestations were seen in the subjects under study. Few of the manifestations observed in the study have not been reported earlier in literature. Most of the reactions occurred on the exposed areas. Treatment options were guided by the site and the severity of the reaction.Contact dermatitis to Staphylinid beetle can mimic various other dermatoses and has to be considered in the differential diagnosis in all dermatological consultations during the peak season in the Congo mission area. The insect was found to have certain definite behavioural patterns, the knowledge of which would help in preventing this dermatosis.

Irritant dermatitis to staphylinid beetle in Indian troops in Congo

Background: Contact dermatitis to Staphylinid beetle is a well known entity worldwide. Paederus sabaeus (Econda) species of this insect was responsible for a widespread occurrence of this dermatitis in United Nations (UN) troops posted in Congo. This study was undertaken to observe the various aspects of this unique dermatitis in the mission area. Methods: All clinically diagnosed cases of contact dermatitis to Econda occurring in Indian troops posted to UN mission in Congo during the study period were included. Their epidemiological and clinical characteristics with treatment options were studied in detail. Result: A wide range of dermatological manifestations were seen in the subjects under study. Few of the manifestations observed in the study have not been reported earlier in literature. Most of the reactions occurred on the exposed areas. Treatment options were guided by the site and the severity of the reaction. Conclusion: Contact dermatitis to Staphylinid beetle can mimic various other dermatoses and has to be considered in the differential diagnosis in all dermatological consultations during the peak season in the Congo mission area. The insect was found to have certain definite behavioural patterns, the knowledge of which would help in preventing this dermatosis.

Conflict resolution in Western Sahara

This paper examines the democratisation agenda laid out by Western governments for the North African region vis-a-vis their Realpolitik conflict containment approach towards the Western Sahara conflict. Western policymakers conceive the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as a safety net that contains tension in the region and enables geo-strategic and economic partnerships with Algeria and Morocco. This paper underlines that the international community could play a greater role in promoting the long-term stability of the North African region by pursuing innovative policies geared towards addressing the root causes of the Western Sahara conflict.

Paradoxes of internationalisation of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon

Historically it is not strange that the Anglophone elites in Cameroon took their case to the international community, since this was a strategy that they employed during the British colonial period. A number of petitions and constant visits were made to the United Nations (UN) by Anglophone elites concerning British neglect of their territory. These petitions were made in the form of presentations before the United Nations in New York or whenever there was a visiting UN mission to the trust territory. Nonetheless, since the early 1990s, the pattern of petitions has changed drastically. Petitions against the new state are different from those earlier petitions against colonialism. The aim of the petitions against the new state has been to draw the attention of the UN and the international community to the injustices inflicted upon minority English-speaking Cameroonians by the ruling government. The Anglophone elites believe that, by making their plight known to the international community, the latter might intervene to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons.

List of Contributors

Global Responsibility to Protect 2 (2010) 335–337 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187598410X519598 brill.nl/gr2p List of Contributors Adekeye Adebajo has been Executive Director of the Centre for Confl ict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, since 2003. He previously served as Director of the Africa Programme of the New York–based International Peace Academy, when he was also an adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Aff airs. Before then, he served on United Nations missions in South Africa, Western Sahara, and Iraq. Dr Adebajo is the author of Building Peace in West Africa ; Liberia’s

Laboratory of the International Community? Role of International Organizations in the Re-establishment of the Rule of Law in Kosovo

INTRODUCTION (1) Various interventions of an international community in failed states or otherwise unstable territories have showed the crucial importance of the rule of law in re-establishing order in post-conflict societies. The territorial status of the world's newest state, Kosovo, was resolved by its unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. The current situation in Kosovo brings many points of major legal interest. This paper discusses the roles and goals of international and local organizations and institutions in Kosovo and evaluates their impact upon post-conflict capacity-building efforts. However, the effectiveness of these institutions is undermined by various challenges which erode respect for the rule of law in Kosovo. There are many areas undermining the rule of law efforts, such as organized crime and corruption, serious deficiencies in the justice system (including, inter alia, lack of witness protection), human rights violations, and high unemployment. This paper focuses on two of these areas--organized crime and human rights concerns. First, the legal basis of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and its task in fighting the organized crime will be briefly examined. Second, the role of a newly established Constitutional Court of Kosovo acting also as the final arbiter of the interpretation and application of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will be assessed. The final chapter offers some recommendations for the future since it is argued that most of the challenges which were faced by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still exist in Kosovo. WHAT ROLE DOES THE EULEX MISSION PLAY IN KOSOVO? EULEX is the EU's largest civilian operation ever deployed, both in terms of personnel and budget. (2) In order to strengthen stability in the region, the European Union shall assist Kosovo by means of a European Security and Defence Policy mission. EULEX is a technical rule of law mission which covers three main components: police, customs, and justice. EULEX should assist Kosovo authorities by mentoring, monitoring, and advising while respecting the local ownership. The legal basis for the establishment of EULEX is the Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP (Joint Action) supported by all twenty-seven EU member states. In addition to the Joint Action, EULEX is also claiming to be operating under the general framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), (3) which is explicitly mentioned in the Joint Action. One could argue that this is a rather broad interpretation of Resolution 1244. Resolution 1244 was clearly adopted in a different time (1999) and a different context (UNMIK as an international administration, and KFOR as international security force entered Kosovo as the part of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia), i.e., in a situation which in no way anticipated the independence of Kosovo. Obviously, there is no reference in Resolution 1244 to EULEX as such. At the same time, the UN Security Council did not replace Resolution 1244; therefore, the legal basis of a new mission from an international law point of view was not clear-cut. This can be illustrated by the fact that the Kosovo authorities have repeatedly stated that Resolution 1244 is no longer relevant and that the institutions of Kosovo have no legal obligation to abide by it. The relationship between and EULEX has often been described as EULEX taking over from UNMIK or replacing UNMIK. However, a change of the legal status of Kosovo has and will continue to have a significant impact on a different role and mandate of EULEX. EULEX is not a successor of UNMIK; accordingly, there was no formal handover. In addition, the issue of the (non)recognition of the independence of Kosovo has an impact on EULEX status and effectiveness in the whole territory of Kosovo, including the parts with the Serbian majority. …

A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH AN INTEGRATIVE EXPLANATORY MODEL

This paper explores the Kosovo Conflict through the use of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and the Integrative Explanatory Model. The paper discusses the perceptions of two conflicting sides, the Kosovo Serbs and the "West" represented by the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), investigating how from a perspective different from the common branding of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Albanians as the victims, the West can be perceived as contributing to an exacerbation of the situation by the "rational loop" which leads to an aggravation of the human rights situation and the "cognitive loop" which leads to a support of independence under unsatisfactory human rights situations. The Integrative Explanatory Model provides a holistic representation of the main factors of the conflict, supplementing the mechanism unraveled by the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model.

Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07

In the slums of Haiti, where pistol and machete wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, a UN peacekeeping mission managed to established law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) succeeded by ‘taking on’ the gangs in a series of military and police ‘search and arrest’ operations in 2006–07. The achievement was made possible by thorough ‘intelligence preparation of the environment’. This paper tells the story of the ‘intelligence-led’ military–police–civil operations and how they transformed the Haitian slum of Cité Soleil from a foreboding place inaccessible to police for years to one in which the UN workers could safely walk its streets. The functions, structures, problems and challenges of the mission's intelligence capability are described, especially the work of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Human intelligence proved to be key, while technologies helped considerably. Within the United Nations, intelligence remains a controversial and sensitive matter but the Haiti mission provides a valuable model of how to gather and use actionable intelligence.

Getting the Property Questions Right: Legal Policy Dilemmas in Post-Conflict Property Restitution in Kosovo (1999-2009)

The restoration of property rights after a conflict involves key legal policy decisions, such as using the domestic courts or creating ad hoc commissions, which determine the extent to which the interests of displaced persons are protected. In 1999, following the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo undertook the difficult task of restoring possessions lost by the persons displaced as a consequence of the Kosovo conflict, as well as those of persons affected by the discriminatory laws and policies of the Milosevic regime during the previous decade.This paper describes and evaluates comparatively the most important legal policy dilemmas (use of the domestic courts, types of claims addressed and remedies provided) involved in the process and examines how they were addressed by the international administration. In this sense, the paper evaluates the design of the first mass claims mechanism, the Housing and Property Directorate, an internationally run body competent for conflict related residential property claims, and the impact of this on the implementation of its mandate. The article then analyzes the legal policy dilemmas and the internal legislative turmoil that took place within the United Nations Mission in Kosovo during the transformation of the Housing and Property Directorate into the Kosovo Property Agency, a hybrid international/domestic body competent for the resolution of private agricultural and commercial property claims linked to the conflict.The authors aim to identify and understand lessons that may be used when designing future post-conflict property restitution mechanisms to ensure both fairness and efficiency. They argue that a better predesign situation analysis, preferably at the ‘micro’ level, is needed to address the needs of the victims. The authors advocate for more comprehensive property rights protection regimes, which do not centre on the ‘return home’ policy and that take into account the interests of informal dwellers. They consider that more effective decision making is necessary at the policy level. A clearer understanding of the nature of mass claims mechanisms and of the need for procedural exclusion of the domestic judiciary in certain cases will help prevent future delays in justice and benefit the victims.

Rising Violence in Connection with Dam Constructions in the Northern Nile Valley (This is a Briefing Note produced by the United Nations Mission in Sudan - UNMIS - in June 2007 in Khartoum)

Rising Violence in Connection with Dam Constructions in the Northern Nile Valley (This is a Briefing Note produced by the United Nations Mission in Sudan - UNMIS - in June 2007 in Khartoum)

The legal construction of the social security system of the Republic of Kosovo

Abstract Following the international community's unsuccessful attempts to broker an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, the territory of Kosovo controversially declared independence on 17 February 2008. This article provides a description and analysis of the social protection system immediately after the declaration of independence. In the aftermath of conflict, and faced by enormous economic difficulties, Kosovo's society could not expect a complete restoration of the social security system. To date, the United Nations Mission has committed itself to building a minimum legal framework, seeking to give answers to main and essential challenges. But the core structure of the social security system is yet to be laid. Nonetheless, in a complex situation such as that of Kosovo, the realization of a social protection framework must be seen as an essential mechanism for reconstruction and peacekeeping.

Stabilising the Eastern DRC

The stabilisation of the Eastern Democratic Republic of congo (DRC) is based on the implementation of the Goma and Nairobi agreements, supported by the stabilisation plan of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The aim of the stability core programme is to help stabilise the Eastern DRC and protect civilians by improving the security environment and extending state authority. To achieve this MONUC and its partners will support the government of the DRC with the containment of armed groups, to put in place basic elements of state authority and ensure the return of refugees and IDPs, and so improve regional relations, too.

Personnel fatalities in United Nations missions, by year, up to 30 June 2008

(2008). Personnel fatalities in United Nations missions, by year, up to 30 June 2008. African Security Review: Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 71-74.

Canada and United Nations Peace Operations

Canadians take pride in the peacekeeping legacy of their country. Looking back over the history of United Nations (UN) peace operations, episodes that loom large include Lester B. Pearson's role in the creation of the first peacekeeping force, the rapid deployment of Canadian troops to Cyprus, the battles of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Medak Pocket in Croatia, and the actions of Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire as force commander in Rwanda. Until 1989, Canada had participated in every UN mission. In total, Canada contributed more than 10 percent of total UN military personnel deployed since 1947.1The perception of Canada as a leader in UN-led peace operations suffers when juxtaposed against Canada's current troop contributions.3 In October 2007, there were 173 individuals-mostly police-deployed to UN-led peace operations. The number of Canadian forces (CF) personnel deployed to UNled peace operations, at 58, was at its lowest point since the creation of the first peacekeeping force in 1956. Moreover, Canada had no military or police officers located in the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) in New York and no military commanders, police commissioners, or special representatives of the UN secretary general were Canadian.3 These numbers seem to paint a bleak picture of Canada's commitment to UN-led peace operations, particularly when contrasted with the 2774 soldiers Canada contributed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan during the same time period.4 While most NATO operations are UN-mandated, they are not synonymous with UN-led operations. Contributing to one organization's operations to the exclusion of another's can have serious political consequences.It is extremely important for Canada to reenergize its commitment to UN-led peace operations. In light of the recent emphasis on NATO-led operations-particularly since NATO began engaging in out-of-area operations, such as its mission in Afghanistan and its technical support to the African Union (AU) in Darfur-questions have been posed about whether Canada should distance itself from UN-led peace operations, which have come under fire for being too politicized. This view is short sighted. It was fewer than 15 years ago when Canada pulled its forces out of Germany following its reunification and the signature of the conventional forces in Europe treaty, that it was accused of neglecting the alliance in favour of the UN (which was heavily engaged in the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other missions), an accusation that dogged Canada's political engagement at NATO until it made a substantial commitment to the NATO-led international security assistance force in 2003. Canada cannot afford to run the same risk at the UN. With 192 members to NATO's 26 and engagement in a broad array of social, political, cultural, and security issues, the UN will remain Canada's main forum for engaging with the world into the foreseeable future. Even within the security sphere, the UN remains the most relevant forum for a wide variety of security issues that other political organizations simply cannot address: coordination of security actors, civilian police, peacebuilding, human security, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation, security sector reform, refugees, humanitarian aid, and humanitarian relief operations. These aspects of peace operations are areas in which Canada can gain valuable political currency by employing its existing strengths. This can only be accomplished through the UN.This discussion identifies what avenues Canada can take in the midterm to ensure it continues to contribute in a meaningful way to UN-led peace operations. It concludes that Canada can best contribute to UN-led peace operations by augmenting its capacities in the areas of administration, coordination, and training, as well as by ensuring the provision of resources for police tasks, aiding with civilian recruitment, providing leadership in gender integration, and supporting enabling arrangements for mission-essential equipment. …

South East Europe's electricity sector: Attractions, obstacles and challenges of Europeanisation

The Energy Community is a bold experiment in integration, creating a regional energy market between the European Union and nine South East European partners – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and the United Nations Mission on behalf of Kosovo. This paper examines the challenges posed by the application of the EU model of energy regulation and the acquis communautaire, and the ability of States to meet those challenges. An investigation of governance in the countries of South East Europe (SEE), including analysis based on the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, suggests a lower overall performance of governing institutions in SEE, compared with countries of the EU 25. The paper, therefore, considers whether the EU energy model is appropriate in South East Europe at this stage. The EU model confers certain institutional resources, but at the same time imposes significant costs of compliance with the energy chapter of the acquis. It remains to be seen which of these two opposing factors will dominate, but the analysis suggests that for some countries in the region, regulatory reform alone may not be sufficient.