Unitary Actor Research Articles

How bureaucratic competition shapes foreign aid allocation: The case of South Korea's aid agencies

AbstractWhat explains aid allocation–donor interests or recipient needs? This research debate has generated a number of studies, which generally conclude that both motivations matter. One limitation of this literature is that donor governments are conceptualized as unitary actors with coherent preferences. In this study, we relax this assumption and focus on the interests and interactions of bureaucratic agencies within a donor government. We argue that these agencies compete as they seek to control a larger share of the foreign aid budget because foreign aid is a valuable policy instrument for bureaucratic agencies. This competition results in emulation: the agency that leads the government's development cooperation policy emulates other agencies' provision of domestic benefits, while the lead agency's competitors mimic its aid allocation patterns. We test our expectations using data on bilateral aid disbursed by four bureaucratic agencies of the South Korean government and find evidence of both types of emulation strategies. Our results point to the role played by a mostly overlooked group of domestic‐level actors in donor countries and the importance of bureaucratic politics and competition.

Assessing Power and Hierarchy in Cyberspace: An Approach of Power Transition Theory

This study explores the application of Power Transition Theory (PTT) to cyberspace, aiming to establish a comprehensive framework for understanding and measuring cyber power. Utilizing PTT’s national power model, the research treats states as rational and unitary actors, integrating the rational actor model to assess state behavior in cyberspace. The objectives include defining cyber power, developing a novel metric for its evaluation, and categorizing states within a hierarchical structure of cyber power. By analyzing key components such as data resources, digital economic strength, and cyber political capacity, the study provides a nuanced understanding of cyber power dynamics. The results demonstrate that the traditional IR theories retain relevance in the cyber domain, offering a valuable lens for comprehending global cyber governance and geopolitical competition. This foundational work sets the stage for future analyses of power transitions within cyberspace, highlighting the critical interplay between traditional power metrics and emerging digital landscapes.

Ontological Crisis and the Compartmentalization of Insecurities

Abstract This article explores state responses to a major ontological crisis, which produces insecurities requiring contradictory foreign policy responses. I propose that leaders in such dire situations may respond by compartmentalizing insecurities, articulating distinct narratives relevant to different insecurities. Such a split might seem inconsistent for leaders within the same government, but it can enable them to navigate a precarious crisis by exploiting the state’s internal complexity to address the contrasting insecurities that a crisis generates. I explore this approach by analyzing Georgia’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which created a major ontological crisis in Georgia. Its two most prominent leaders (the president and the prime minister) reacted by consistently voicing contradictory positions about the country’s foreign policy. This divergent messaging becomes comprehensible when we see them as responses to different concerns: one responding to deep ontological insecurities over Georgia’s relationship with other states, its place in the international system, and the coherence of its dominant autobiographical narrative; the other responding to the threat of war and related existential concerns at the individual and collective levels. Problematizing the state as a unitary actor, this article demonstrates how unpacking its constitutive agents can help us better understand how leaders navigate complex ontological crises.

Building Peace after Self-Determination and Partition: Faulty Assumptions?

Abstract Since the 1990s, scholars have debated whether partition, the most radical solution to ethnic conflicts, promotes peace or not. Drawing on the peacebuilding and war recurrence literature, I contribute to this debate by theorizing reasons that newly independent states emerging from partition are likely to suffer from new conflicts between former pro-independence allies. At the domestic level, former pro-independence groups, assumed to be a unitary actor by partition proponents, are likely to fragment as their unity was based on achieving the goal of independence. Furthermore, newly independent states tend to suffer from very weak institutions, and citizens develop strong frustrations toward their new states because their unrealistically high expectations are unmet. At the international level, international peacebuilders tend to wrongly assume that the unity within the pro-independence camp will last after independence and that the pro-independence people are essentially “good guys.” As a result, they often misunderstand the post-conflict political dynamics of new states, which reduces the effectiveness of their peacebuilding efforts. My arguments are illustrated through analyzing why Timor-Leste and South Sudan, the closest to typical partition cases in the twenty-first century, faced the 2006 Crisis and the 2013 Civil War, respectively.

Control from the core? The impact of cabinet committees on ministers’ legislative activity

AbstractMinisters may be powerful policy initiators, but they are not equally powerful. Cabinet control mechanisms have become a crucial part of cabinet governance, which can serve to contain agency loss and consequently constrain ministers in the policymaking process. However, empirical studies have not focused on the impact of such control mechanisms on individual ministers’ political outcomes. I turn attention to certain cabinet committees as intra-cabinet control mechanisms and argue that members of these enjoy a policymaking advantage compared to nonmembers. Analyzing ministers’ number of laws proposed to parliament in Denmark from 1975 to 2022, I look beyond parties as unitary actors and provide evidence for this causal relationship. Membership of the Economic Committee increases ministers’ legislative activity. Thus, even within parties in cabinet, ministers have unequal possibilities to act as policy-seeking. These findings offer new insights into political parties in governments, cabinet governance, policymaking, and legislative processes.

Frame your friends close and your enemies closer: how al-Masra newspaper imagines individuals

ABSTRACT Armed groups are well-known for discussing their allies and adversaries in unitary actor terms. However, individuals also play an important part in the discourse of armed groups. Focusing on jihadist propaganda, we adopt a multi-method approach to examine the influence of individuals on militants’ diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. We do so by analyzing original data collected from 1250 articles in al-Masra, an Arabic language newspaper linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Quantitatively, we record the number of articles in which numerous jihadist figures and leaders from Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and the United States were mentioned to measure their significance in al-Masra’s contents. Qualitatively, we explore al-Masra’s discourse surrounding these different individuals. Rather than only framing friends and foes in unitary actor terms, we find that individuals played a central role in al-Masra’s framing efforts. Yet, the extent to which al-Masra discussed different personalities varied across organizations as well as countries. These findings contribute to scholarship on individuals in conflict processes, armed group framing strategies, and jihadist propaganda.

Australia: No party convergence where we would most expect it

Classic spatial theory expects parties to converge on the same ideological position given certain assumptions. Many of these assumptions fail to hold in most countries, which may account for why this prediction frequently fails to materialise. Due to a unique combination of institutions, Australia presents the best chance for the theory to work: all votes must flow to either of the two major parties, parties approximate unitary actors, and elections see turnout as high as any democracy. If convergence should happen anywhere, it should be in Australia, and many argue that Australian parties indeed fulfil this prediction. However, in contrast to much of the literature, we do not find Australian politics to be unusually centrist. Based on five measures of ideology, we do not find convincing evidence that Australia’s party system is any more convergent than any other.

Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation by Vipin Narang

How do states acquire the nuclear bomb? Vipin Narang’s Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation is a compelling new contribution that answers the question comprehensively and adds a new analytical toolkit to help us understand how states pursue the nuclear bomb. Narang proposes a pivot away from focusing on why questions to how questions. In doing so, he focuses on the choices of nuclear proliferation strategy that lie in front of states seeking to build a nuclear weapon. The book, thus, marks a welcome shift away from the previous focus of the literature on why states build the bomb to really examining the process of how they do it. Furthermore, by highlighting the role of domestic political variables in the ultimate choice of a proliferation strategy, the book moves away from the standard realist assumption of the state as a unitary actor in nuclear decision-making. Contrary to the common perception that states sprint toward making a nuclear weapon as soon as they decide to acquire them, this book posits that states pursue different types of proliferation strategies: hedging (developing to build a bomb if required), sprinting (building the bomb as quick as possible), sheltered pursuit (using the cover of a patron major power to build a bomb), and hiding (secretly building the bomb). These different strategies of proliferation disaggregate what it means to pursue a nuclear weapon by highlighting the different stages of nuclear development that states might be in on their way to becoming a nuclear-weapon state. Within these different strategies, the “varieties of hedging” highlight a rich spectrum of hedging behavior—from technical hedging to insurance hedging to hard hedging—that helps us understand the actions of potential proliferators that may sometimes not seek a bomb but just a “bomb option” (p. 125). Thus, states either simply may put the technological pieces in place to build a bomb (technical hedging), or be further along the way developing the ability to have an accelerated nuclear weapons program if required (insurance hedging), or have all the pieces in place to build a nuclear weapon without overtly crossing the threshold (hard hedging). This is a useful framework that adds considerable nuance to the study of nuclear latent states, like Japan and South Korea, that are considered to have the capacity to build the bomb if they so desired.

Intra-party heterogeneity and voter perceptions of party positions

Do voters correctly perceive left-right positions of political parties? This question received considerable attention in the literature in the past decades. Previous research has shown that most voters have somewhat ‘correct’ perceptions of where parties are located on a left-right dimension, but that both individual and party level factors influence how much those perceptions deviate from the real positions. This paper adds to this literature, relaxing the unitary actor assumption and introducing heterogeneity to the analysis. Using data from elite surveys to measure intraparty preference heterogeneity on two dimensions, I demonstrate that voters' misperceptions of party positions strongly increase the more heterogeneous the positions of party elites are on the economic dimension, but not on the sociocultural dimension, and that the effect size depends on how salient this dimension is for the party. The findings have implications for future research on mass-elite linkages, representation, as well as voting behavior.

Vaccine hesitancy and respect for public health measures: Citizens’ trust in politicians and public servants across national, subnational and municipal levels of government

Research shows that citizens' trust in government is associated with lower vaccine hesitancy and an increased willingness to follow public health measures. Thus far, however, the population health literature has largely conceptualized “government” as a unitary actor. This article furthers our understanding of this relationship by examining two important features of modern governance that have largely gone unexamined: (1) that governing involves popularly elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats; and (2), that governing often comprises many levels of government within the same country. Analyzing survey data from Canada with various multivariate regression models, this article finds that the relationship political trust has with vaccine hesitancy and intention to follow for public health measures is more complex than presently recognized. Specifically, a larger change in citizens’ public health behaviors is associated with trust in public health officials than with trust in government, and of particular importance is trust in national public health authorities, despite the fact that public health measures in Canada are largely the jurisdiction of subnational governments. The implications of these findings for population health research and policymakers are discussed.

Framing States: Unitary Actor Language and Public Support for Coercive Foreign Policy

Abstract A defining feature of public (and, often, scholarly) discussion of international affairs is the treatment of states as unitary actors, that is, akin to individual persons. Drawing upon social–psychological research, we theorize that such unitary actor (UA) framing increases the degree to which adversarial states are perceived as entitative—that is, as relatively united—and, thus, the perceived complicity of a country's people in their government's actions. We therefore hypothesize that UA framing increases citizens’ support for indiscriminate, coercive policies against target states. In a content analysis of US elite statements spanning three decades, we first establish that UA framing is exceedingly common, occurring in nearly two-thirds of all references to adversarial states. We then conduct a series of survey experiments on US adults, finding that, compared to frames in which a state is described as more factious and disunited, UA framing is associated with significantly greater willingness to impose harmful, indiscriminate economic sanctions and military strikes against target states. Our results highlight the utility and applicability of entitativity to political science research, and have important implications for the role of elite discourse in bolstering public support for hawkish foreign policymaking.

Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia

AbstractThis article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities.

Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin's war on Ukraine

Abstract Controversy has surrounded realist explanations of the causes of Russia's war against Ukraine, particularly John Mearsheimer's charge of western responsibility. This article seeks to clarify and contextualize his argument, situating it within the broader paradigm. Realism, and even its narrower offensive sub-school, offers a wide range of contrasting interpretations, depending on which major actors are studied and what characteristics they are endowed with. Like its classical predecessor, structural realism is premised on implicit views of human nature. In an effort to explicate some of these assumptions about the behavioural micro-foundations of states and their leaders, the article investigates main components of structural theory—including power differentials, ‘rational’ interests and states as unitary actors—and connects these concepts to base emotions like fear and anger. It argues that realists do well to differentiate between the aspirations of states and individual leaders' quest for power and status. In the same vein, reference to Russian security concerns may be emblematic of elites' perceived challenges of cultural subordination, and Putin's personal fears for the stability of his regime. Engagement with realist thought is essential, in part because of its continuing influence on policy-making (particularly in Russia) and in order to forestall improper co-option of caricaturized versions of realist arguments.

Gerrymandering in State Legislatures: Frictions from Axiomatic Bargaining

Theories of partisan redistricting postulate unitary actors maximizing their party’s expected seat share. Yet, the partition of a fixed supply of friendly voters necessarily implies a tragedy of the commons. We recast partisan redistricting as a bargaining game among the sitting representatives of the party controlling the map. The status quo is the threat point, explaining why changes are frequently minor. This bargaining framework implies that highly competitive districts will receive more help from redistricting if they are already represented by the party in charge. Employing a regression discontinuity design with precinct-level data, we find support for this prediction. (JEL C78, D72)

Investigating Leaders: Integrating the Study of Individuals in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) has long studied leaders and individual decision makers. In contrast, international relations (IR) long favored the system level of analysis, treating the state as an abstract unitary actor. However, IR has begun to rediscover the individual level of analysis, making this an opportune time to consider the contributions of both FPA and IR to the study of leaders and decision makers. This article reviews how FPA and IR study individual decision makers, highlighting prominent approaches in each field, comparing these approaches –highlighting similarities, differences, and connections –and discusses appropriate applications of each in empirical research. The contribution ends with suggestions for integrating the FPA and IR approaches to the study of leaders and individual decision makers, highlighting how this integration benefits the ability of both FPA and IR to address interesting research questions regarding the role of leaders and individual decision makers in international politics.

The Cold War Origins of Global IR. The Rockefeller Foundation and Realism in Latin America

AbstractThe literature on global international relations (IR) has argued that the discipline develops in the footsteps of world politics, but no sustained attention has been given to more immediate causes such as the funders that pay for IR teaching and scholarship. These donor–recipient relations have only attracted the attention of authors interested in cultural hegemony and those contributing to the recent historiography of IR. Among the latter, some have studied how during the Cold War the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to buttress classical realism in the United States and Western Europe. This article connects and moves forward IR historiography and the global IR literature by shedding light on philanthropic foundations’ attempts to further a specific IR theory—classical realism—and area studies in the global south. The article argues that world politics influenced global IR, but this influence was mediated by highly contingent events. Even a proximate cause like science patronage, let alone “world politics,” is not a sufficient cause capable of determining IR theories and disciplinary boundaries. Donors may achieve some impact but only under specific circumstances such as the ones explored here, that is, the donor is a unitary actor determined to advance its agenda by resorting to conditionality, alternative donors and funding are scarce, the discipline is either poorly or not institutionalized, and the recipient perceives the donor's preferences as legitimate. The article uses previously untapped, fine-grained, primary sources to unravel philanthropy's impact on Latin America's first IR center. Because science patronage is exposed to many sources of indeterminacy and to contingency, donors cannot determine scholarship, which makes cultural hegemony all but impossible. Still, IR scholars need to study their patrons to understand their discipline, in and outside Europe and the United States.

Australian debate of the China question: the COVID-19 case

ABSTRACT Debate within Australia regarding the bilateral relationship with China is complex, contentious and often lacks clarity. Informed by basic international relations theory, we identify two dividing lines within this debate. First, whether understanding China’s behaviour is most effectively done through a unitary actor framework, or whether it is essential to look inside the ‘black box’ of the Chinese party-state. Second, whether one is more concerned about the ‘Thucydides trap’ or ‘Munich’—that is, are the consequences of an overreaction or an underreaction more concerning when interpreting China’s intentions and responding to perceived threats. These dividing lines generate four ideal-type policy viewpoints that we label Balancers, Hedgers, Engagers and Reformers, and apply in the Australian context. We then overlay our framework onto the public debate in Australia, selecting a specific bounded case study: commentary and analysis concerning China’s behaviour throughout the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, in particular responding to Australia’s call for an international inquiry. Our objective is to progress an often circular debate by offering an accessible frame that clarifies and synthesises fundamental disagreements.

A House Divided against Itself. The Intra‐institutional Conflict about the Powers of the European Parliament

AbstractMany authors suggest that MEPs seek to extend the power of the EP in their daily parliamentary work. A central assumption in this literature is that the EP is a unitary actor that desires more power for itself. In other words, scholars assume that the conflict over the power of the EP is inter‐institutional and not intra‐institutional. In this article we seek to test this idea. Informed by the history of the parliamentarization of Europe's national parliaments, we argue that the conflict about the power of the EP is likely to have an intra‐institutional component. An empirical analysis of voting in the EP supports this notion. We find that the question of how much power the EP should have is as important as the question of how much power the EU should have in understanding how MEPs vote.

Australian Debate of the China Question: The COVID-19 Case

Debate within Australia regarding the bilateral relationship with China is complex, contentious and often lacks clarity. Informed by basic international relations theory, we identify two dividing lines within this debate. First, whether understanding China’s behaviour is most effectively done through a unitary actor framework, or whether it is essential to look inside the “black box” of the Chinese party-state. Second, whether one is more concerned about the “Thucydides trap” or “Munich”—that is, are the consequences of an overreaction or an underreaction more concerning when interpreting China’s intentions and responding to perceived threats. These dividing lines generate four ideal-type policy viewpoints that we label Balancers, Hedgers, Engagers and Reformers, and apply in the Australian context. We then overlay our framework onto the public debate in Australia, selecting a specific bounded case study: commentary and analysis concerning China’s behaviour throughout the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, in particular responding to Australia’s call for an international inquiry. Our objective is to progress an often circular debate by offering an accessible frame that clarifies and synthesises fundamental disagreements.

Chinese financial statecraft in Southeast Asia: an analysis of China’s infrastructure provision in Malaysia

Since 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative has become China’s signature foreign economic policy campaign. While there have been debates on the initiative’s implementation and implications, an emerging consensus suggests that the export of capital-intensive infrastructure is a key driving factor of China’s financial statecraft. For Southeast Asian countries, such Chinese efforts are useful in plugging their domestic infrastructure gaps, not least in the remote parts of their territory. Against this backdrop, this article examines arguably two of the most prominent Chinese infrastructure projects in Malaysia – the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP). It posits three inter-related arguments. Firstly, unlike conventional analyses which commonly treat the Chinese state as a singular, unitary actor, both the central and provincial governments in China’s multi-layer state structure have played important roles and demonstrated different characteristics in Chinese infrastructure overture towards Malaysia. Secondly, one observes contrasting patterns of well-coordinated state-business relations in the ECRL project versus loose, decentralised state-business relations driven largely by Guangxi province and market forces for the MCKIP. Thirdly, the implementation of both the ECRL and the MCKIP has been heavily constrained by the political-institutional environment of Malaysia as the host country, illustrating that Chinese financial statecraft, in the form of infrastructure provision, generates considerably less impact than what popular rhetoric suggests.