Union Defence Force Research Articles

Urban counterinsurgency: the Union Defence Force and the suppression of the 1922 Rand Revolt

ABSTRACT In early 1922, in the wake of a global depression followed by rapidly deteriorating labour and economic conditions, several thousand white mine workers on the Witwatersrand in the Union of South Africa went on strike. These miners armed and organised themselves into commandos and took to the streets. During the opening phases of the unrest, these paramilitary units clashed with the South African Police. By the beginning of March, the strikes transformed into a violent insurrection with railway workers also joining its ranks after negotiations between the mine workers, mine owners, and the government failed and new militant leadership assumed command. As chaos and disorder engulfed large tracts of the Johannesburg goldfields and levels of violence assumed new proportions, the state’s legitimacy increasingly came under threat. In response, martial law was declared, and elements of the Union Defence Force were deployed to quell the so-called 1922 Rand Revolt. Historically unaccustomed to urban warfare and without an appropriate doctrine, the defence force became involved in several high-intensity urban counterinsurgency operations against the strike commandos. Drawing from a variety of archival material, this article investigates the combat operations undertaken by the UDF to suppress the 1922 Rand Revolt.

The 1914 South African industrial strike: the first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force

ABSTRACT The first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force (UDF) since its inception in 1912 was to suppress a violent labour strike in January 1914. Because the inexperienced UDF was still assimilating various British and Boer military traditions, the Permanent Force was not yet sufficiently organised to quell the strike on its own. Therefore, the commandos of the Citizen Force Reserve were deployed. The traditional commando system of the former Boer republics and the Transvaal Colony was thus briefly revived to subdue the strike, in the unstable and complex South African socio-economic environment of 1914. This operation marked the end of the Boer commando system in its established format. It formed part of a vanishing military culture and was destined to be replaced by the modernising military systems of the early twentieth century. The deployment of burghers during the strike sets the background against which the article investigates both the customary and changing nature of military service for the long-established commandos. This article explores the conditions, abilities, and experiences of the ‘burghers’ on commando that participated in the crushing of the strike from a social-military history perspective.

The Union Defence Force and the suppression of the Bondelswarts Rebellion, 1922

ABSTRACT From the proclamation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Union Defence Force (UDF) had been deployed to suppress several internal disturbances. These unrests varied in terms of their scale, intensity, and geographic location, and represented dissatisfied and disenfranchised parts of the population, both in the Union and South West Africa (now Namibia). The uprisings in turn tested the organisation, force structure and strategies of the defence force. The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, although brave and tragic, provides a lens through which to investigate the first large scale rural counterinsurgency operation conducted by South African forces after the end of the First World War. These operations occurred only months after the quelling of the 1922 Rand Revolt on the Witwatersrand. The reputation of the Bondelswarts as guerrilla fighters, and the fear of further unrest breaking out across the territory, prompted the South African authorities to seek a rapid resolution to the simmering unrest in the desolate terrain of southern South West Africa. The result of this brief and violent conflict also held far reaching political consequences. This article investigates the uprising and rural counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the South African authorities in suppressing the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922.

Sandfontein: An Operational Re-examination of the Battle, Contextualised within General J.C. Smuts’ First Phase of the German South West African Campaign 1914

Abstract The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first defeat. Historians have used this long-forgotten battle as a lens to view the divisive political and military aspects of the Union’s early history. Unfortunately, some of their scholarship has passed through a distorted lens. Official histories were the first to obfuscate military and leadership shortcomings and interfere with the operational context surrounding Sandfontein. Theirs was for political reasons—a mission to protect delicate reputations and mollify a divided population. Historians have erroneously assumed that General J.C. Smuts’ initial plan for the invasion of German South West Africa 1914 was modified to exclude Walvis Bay/Swakopmund’s occupation. Instead, delays in occupying Walvis Bay/Swakopmund placed the UDF’s forces at Lüderitzbucht in a precarious position. Sandfontein, a desperate attempt to distract the Schutztruppe, was an operational failure, rather than the tactical faux pas portrayed by historians.

All just grandiose plans and talk: The destruction of Oswald Pirow’s reputation as Minister of Defence, 1940

The popular perception of Oswald Pirow is that of an incompetent Minister of Defence, much derided for his bush carts pulled by oxen in the era of the blitzkrieg doctrine of dive-bombers and tanks. However, this was not the perception of him in the years between 1933 and 1939. When Pirow became Minister of Defence in 1933, the Union Defence Force was in a poor state. During the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933, austerity measures had reduced the already small army to an insignificant force. In what has been described as a Pirowian renaissance he succeeded in improving the preparedness of the Union Defence Force drastically. Ian van der Waag points out that with the outbreak of the Second World War, South African defences were in abetter state of preparation than during any other period in its peacetime history. This was a considerable achievement, as Pirow had to deal with the vehement hostility of the National Party who viewed the Union Defence Force as a tool to serve British imperialism. In addition, the average white voter was extremely reluctant to pay taxes to fund a standing army, while the rise of Nazi Germany made it near impossible tosecure modern armaments from Britain. What ultimately destroyed Pirow’s reputation as Minister of Defence was his disastrous performance in the 1940 parliamentary session. His vindictive attacks on Jan Smuts made it possible for the premier to launch a devastating counterattack, condemning him as a fraud and an incompetent windbag. In the process, Smuts succeeded in destroying Pirow’s reputation as a highly regardedadministrator and as a potential prime minister.

Legislative disconnect or institutional gatekeeping? Challenges of researching South Africa's military past

The Department of Defence Archive in Pretoria is the repository of all military documents generated by the Union Defence Force, the South African Defence Force and the South African National Defence Force. This makes it the foremost source of primary information for researchers of South African military history. However, an almost total ban on access to archival documents from 1 January 1970 onwards complicates research into later periods. In fact, anyone researching post-1970 military-related topics has to apply for access to archival documents through the Promotion of Access to Information Act. The traditional weapon in the armoury of the historian – the systematic trawling of archives – is thereby negated, while the methodology of post-1970 historical research differs significantly from commonly accepted historical practices. Finding aids, the only access route to classified information in this analogue archive, offer only the briefest descriptions of the content of files, and researchers need almost esoteric intuition to identify documents that are even remotely relevant to their research. Additionally, a fee is payable for declassification, and the process can take several months to complete. This review article reports on the theoretical workings of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, and uses an actual research example as a case study to illustrate the practical implications of conducting research at the Department of Defence Archive in South Africa based on classified military documentation.

Counterinsurgency in South Africa: the Afrikaner Rebellion, 1914–1915

ABSTRACT The entry of the Union of South Africa into the First World War, as well as the subsequent invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA), served as a trigger to the Afrikaner Rebellion. In September 1914 the Union Defence Force (UDF) suffered a major reverse at the Battle of Sandfontein. However, in addition to the German threat, South Africa faced a second, more serious internal threat. The socio-economic realities of early-twentieth-century South Africa, felt most keenly among rural Afrikaners, magnified the rift between the competing interests of Afrikaner nationalists and the Union government loyal to the Crown. The Union’s entry into the war was a step too far for many Nationalist Afrikaners and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the rebellion. As a result, the operational focus of the UDF shifted to the internal military threat posed by Afrikaner rebel forces. The Afrikaner Rebellion brought about the first counterinsurgency operation of the UDF within the borders of South Africa. By harnessing its operational and tactical mobility, and operating from the central position and along internal lines of communication, the UDF swiftly dealt with the rebel revolt. This article evaluates the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the UDF in suppressing the Afrikaner Rebellion.

SLUIT NOU AAN! South African Union Defence Force recruitment posters from the Second World War

South Africa entered the Second World War ill-prepared and divided into pro- and anti-war factions. The Union Defence Force (UDF) required recruits for a variety of roles but the right to bear arms was confined to white male citizens. Despite the numerous daunting challenges that faced the recruiters, the number of white men who enlisted reached or even exceeded the required figures. To persuade men to volunteer authorities launched successive propaganda campaigns which included the public display of posters. This article examines the South African recruitment posters of the Second World War that were aimed at all eligible white men. It provides a brief introduction to the UDF’s recruitment requirements, a description of the production of propaganda and an analysis of the symbols used in the recruitment posters. The analysis shows that the posters employed a variety of visual symbols. These can be categorised into three broad groupings: the first group signified loyalty to the Allied forces, the second expressed allegiance to South Africa, and a third set was aimed specifically at Afrikaners. The use of such symbols is illustrated through examples of South African recruitment posters and posters from the Allied nations.

Military Law practitioners and academic discourse: A Sine Qua Non for developing Military Law

There has been limited development in South African military law since the inception of the Union Defence Force in 1912. Military law has mainly evolved as a way to enforce discipline in a force consisting of mostly conscripted members and a historical comparison of the relevant legislation shows no renewal in military justice or its processes in spite of a shift to a new all-volunteer force. Surely the approach towards discipline and military justice should also change. However, the limited development seen since was only brought about when necessitated by Constitutional challenges and external factors. This also seems true for the military law practitioners’ understanding of what military law entails. Generally military law is understood as the criminal law of the soldier, limiting it to the realm of military justice. Considering the expanding role of armed forces internationally, and the secondary roles of its employment, there is a clear need for a broadening of the definition and scope of military law as a discipline. The author argues that there are a number of other disciplines that can be of great assistance in a broadening of our understanding of military law. This article therefore argues that there is a critical need to develop military law as well as our understanding of what is entails. This then requires the development of a legal-academic discourse within the discipline.

South Africa Mobilises: The First Five Months of the War

When war broke out in August 1914, the Union of South Africa found itself unprepared for what lay ahead. When the Imperial garrison left the Union during September 1914, supplies, equipment and a working knowledge of British military procedures reduced considerably. South Africa was, in effect, left starting from scratch. Yet, within five months and despite having to quell a rebellion, the Union was able to field an expeditionary force to invade German South West Africa and within a year agree to send forces to Europe and East Africa. This article explores how the Union Defence Force came of age in 1914.

Deneys Reitz and the First World War: An Introduction to the Department of Defence Archival Holdings

The historical sources detailing South Africa’s participation in the First World War are vast, and range from official publications to regimental histories, private diaries and first-hand accounts. The Department of Defence (DOD) Documentation Centre is the custodian of all military archival material generated since the inception of the Department on 1 July 1912. Nonetheless, the material in the repository remains underutilised, despite the number of researchers who have worked or those who are now working on the military history of the Union Defence Force (UDF) during the Afrikaner Rebellion, as well as the campaigns fought in German South West Africa (GSWA), German East Africa (GEA), the Middle East and Europe. The centennial commemoration of the First World War gave rise to an increase in both professional and amateur military historical research, and a resurgence in First World War studies globally. A large number of researchers are expected to consult the First World War material at the Documentation Centre. An increase in interest in a variety of themes relating to South Africa and South African participation in the war is already detected. This article reports on a review of the Documentation Centre’s First World War holdings in relation to South Africa’s participation in the war by using Deneys Reitz, of Commando fame as a lens to illustrate the range of information available to researchers.

‘Good Hunting’: German Submarine Offensives and South African Countermeasures off the South African Coast during the Second World War, 1942-1945

By the latter half of 1942, the High Command of the German U-boats (BdU) realised that the ‘sinking results’ of the North Atlantic had decreased immensely. The successes of the Allied anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic precluded the successful employment of the German submarines in said waters. It was realised that the ‘sinking potential’ of the Cape Town–Freetown convoy route, in terms of tonnage, had increased exponentially by the latter half of 1942. This sudden increase was a direct result of the successful German submarine operations in the North Atlantic during 1939–1942. The first German submarine offensive in South African waters during 1942, Operation Eisbar, was aimed at striking a devastating blow to shipping off the South African coast. By the end of December 1942, an estimated 310 864 tons of shipping had been sunk through Operation Eisbar and the first U-cruiser operation alone . The success of Operation Eisbar led to a further two German submarine offensives being launched by the BdU in South African waters during the remainder of the Second World War, with a number of opportunistic attacks also made by submarines travelling to the Far East. This article has three specific aims. First, to discuss the Union Defence Force’s (UDF) threat perception and operational readiness in terms of the maritime defence of its coast, and the merchant shipping that rounded it, over the period September 1939 to October 1942. Second, to explain the nature and extent of the German submarine operations in South African waters [i] between October 1942 and February 1945. Last, the South African and Allied counter-measures to the German submarine threat off the South African coast will be discussed. By drawing from a myriad of primary archival sources, private and official correspondence, and a host of secondary sources, the background, nature, successes and failures of the German submarine operations, and the South African counter-measures are elucidated.

Propaganda Tricks – Good and Bad: The Posters of the Mobile Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section of the South African Union Defence Force from January to July 1945

This article begins to address the lack of research on South African poster propaganda from the Second World War by offering an account of the posters produced by the Mobile Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section of the South African Union Defence Force (UDF) from January to July 1945 in Rome, Italy. The article proceeds by providing the context for the posters, followed by an analysis of the three main poster categories; health, education, and entertainment and recreation. The article argues that the posters align with a view of advertising as a form of propaganda because they employ a variety of appeals, symbols and statements to persuade the audience to act in ways which would safeguard their health; to educate them to become liberal, democratic citizens and to keep up their morale so that they would remain loyal to the UDF. The analysis of the posters shows the use of both rational and emotional appeals to persuade the audience. It is argued that the use of these appeals as well as the conception, production and style of the posters were closely linked to commercial advertising practices of the time.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA

Surprisingly, in a country so involved in the twentieth-century’s major wars, with few exceptions, South African professional historians have for decades turned their backs on writing about the armed forces. It seemed that for the Afrikaner historians, the World Wars and the Union Defence Force were ‘English’ with only the Anglo-Boer War worthy of attention. The Anglophone historians, for their part, seemed to think that to show an interest in the armed forces would be to align themselves with Afrikaner nationalism and with apartheid. All too often, when professionals who ignore military studies become interested in writing their superficial knowledge is reflected in their approach to writing about military subjects.

Duty to Empire? South Africa's Invasion of German South West Africa, 1914-1918

Before war broke out in August 1914, the Union of South Africa had determined to include the German colony of South West Africa in the Union fold if ever an opportunity arose. So, when Britain went to war on 4 August 1914, the British War Cabinet request that South Africa put the German wireless stations in the South West African territory out of action was likely to be met with favourable response. It was, but not by all as this paper will set out.In 1914, South Africa as a country was only four years old and was still trying to heal the wounds caused by the Anglo-Boer or South African War of 1899-1902. The Union Defence Force (UDF) was even younger, having been approved in 1912. Where the Union had already had a number of years to develop, the UDF was in effect starting from zero.

The battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African military reform and the German South-West Africa campaign, 1914–1915

The German South-West Africa campaign and the battle at Sandfontein, which marked the first foreign deployment of the Union Defence Forces (UDF), as well as its first active participation in a war, are now largely forgotten. Yet this belies the importance of the campaign and of the first-battle experience at Sandfontein, for in many ways this was significantly unlike subsequent military operations of the German South-West Africa campaign and the wider South African participation in the First World War. This article uses the campaign as a lens through which to analyse the nature and organization of the UDF in 1914 and to assess the difficulties the South African staffs faced. South African military thinking, in terms of how it shaped Sandfontein and was in turn affected by that first-battle experience, is also investigated.

'Send your books on active service' : the books for troops scheme during the Second World War, 1939-1945

During the Second World War, the South African Library Association coordinated the Books for Troops Scheme that distributed thousands of books and magazines to soldiers in the Union Defence Force. The scheme presented the chance to demonstrate the democratic values of books and libraries, and to improve the social standing of the library profession. This article argues that personal squabbles, regional tensions, racialism and the regulation of reading by the Army Education Services prevented the South African Library Association from making a more forceful impact on the South African public.

From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of Battle in East and North Africa, 1940-1941

After J.C. Smuts (1870–1950) had managed to unseat J.B.M. Hertzog (1866–1942) as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa it was clear that the country would enter the Second World War on the side of Great Britain. In spite of extensive changes and an increased budget the Union Defence Force (UDF) found itself in a state of war on 7 September 1939 with a Permanent Force of only 5 400 men with limited training and antiquated equipment. While Hitler’s armies conquered Western Europe the Springboks prepared to go North and in spite of trepidations about the might of Mussolini’s East African Empire the First South African Infantry Division set sail for East Africa in mid-July 1940. In five short months, Mussolini’s East African Empire had been torn to shreds. Victorious in every major engagement, the South Africans embarked for Egypt in June 1941. Here they encountered similar logistical problems as were prevalent before they embarked for East Africa. With two divisions in the field and a third in training, UDF planners had a trying time marshalling enough motorised transport to enable the Springboks to keep pace with the increased mobility that was a hallmark of desert warfare. Expecting to build on their success over the Italians the South Africans confidently went into battle, but by November 1941, the 5 th South African Infantry Brigade was annihilated and the victors of East Africa badly mauled. Fighting low-moraled Italian armies in the bush and mountains of Abyssinia was quite easy; beating the Germans in the desert would be a different story altogether.

The First South African Armoured Battle in Italy during the Second World War: The Battle of Celleno – 10 June 1944

The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the chance to expand its military capabilities to that of armoured warfare. An armoured division further offered South Africa the opportunity to equip the UDF with modern fighting equipment and to master the art of combined warfare. Actual deployment in Italy differed vastly from the training which the division received in North Africa, for Italy was arguably, largely “untankable”. The Division’s first battle occurred at Celleno, on 10 June 1944, where it was able to “prove” itself by securing its first victory. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the Battle of Celleno is only superficially covered. Primary sources are however abundant, thus adding to the rich history which is available on the Division. This article analyses the Battle of Celleno, fought by 11 SA Armoured Brigade, in the context of the notion of “first battles”.1 Emphasis will be placed on the training received prior to deployment, the Battle of Celleno, the lessons that were learned by the division at Celleno, and the way these influenced future operations in Italy. The Division’s combined-arms approach is also evaluated, with specific emphasis on changing patterns of leadership, command, and employment of the Division after Celleno. Keywords : Union Defence Force, Italy, 6th South African Armoured Division, 11th South African Armoured Brigade, first battles, Celleno.

Decline and Fall: Why The South African Civilian Defence Secretariat Was Dissolved In 1966

Briefly, between 1912 and 1966 there was an independent Secretary for Defence, described in the Acts and the Permanent Force Regulations as the “Permanent Head of the Department”. Not only was this not true in practice after the establishment in 1918 of the office of Chief of the General Staff (later at various times General Officer Commanding the UDF, Commandant-General and Chief of the SADF) but the meaning of the characterisation was never clearly defined. A minefield of prerogatives and consequent overlapping developed between the two office holders and their staffs. Those attempts at solution all ignored the fundamental constitutional principles behind the establishment of the Secretariat as well as the principles of organizational theory, ambiguity about authority, mministerial failures, the personalities involved and ill-considered appointments and also the failure to exploit the benefits of a Secretariat. After years of conflict, worsened by the demands of the Second World War and recommendations by several committees of enquiries and the Public Service Commission, the Secretariat was taken into the SADF, in a civilian capacity under the Comptroller. Between 1966 and 1968 it was absorbed into the various Staff Sections at DHQ. The results were perhaps a mixed blessing. In some areas it was very successful. But many of the defects remained. Key Words : Accounting Officer, Chief of the General Staff, Executive Commanders, Ministerial policy, Permanent Head, Secretariat, Union Defence Forces.