Uninsurable Income Risk Research Articles

Uninsurable Income Risk and the Welfare Effects of Reducing Global Imbalances

Uninsurable Income Risk and the Welfare Effects of Reducing Global Imbalances

Homeownership rates, housing policies, and co-residence decisions

Abstract Homeownership rates differ widely across European countries. We document that part of this variation is driven by differences in the fraction of adults co-residing with their parents. Comparing Germany and Italy, we show that in contrast to homeownership rates per household, homeownership rates per individual are very similar during the first part of the life cycle. To understand these patterns, we build an overlapping-generations model where individuals face uninsurable income risk and make consumption-saving and housing tenure decisions. We embed an explicit intergenerational link between children and parents to capture the three-way trade-off between owning, renting, and co-residing. Calibrating the model to Germany we explore the role of income profiles, housing policies, and the taste for independence and show that a combination of these factors goes a long way in explaining the differential life-cycle patterns of living arrangements between the two countries.

Public debt and welfare in a quantitative Schumpeterian growth model with incomplete markets

This paper quantifies the welfare effects of counterfactual public debt policies using an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets. The economy features public debt, Schumpeterian growth, infinitely-lived agents, uninsurable income risk, and discount factor heterogeneity. Two versions of the model are specified, one with households holding equity in the group of innovating firms. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to match the degree of wealth inequality, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the firms’ exit rate, the average growth rate, and other standard long-run targets. When comparing balanced growth paths, I find large welfare gains in equilibria characterized by governments accumulating public wealth. The result is robust to the mechanism used to generate a highly concentrated wealth (i.e., preference heterogeneity or “superstar” income shocks). Welfare effects decompositions show that level effects and growth effects reinforce each other. The responses of both the intermediate goods and their market conditions are key in explaining the large level effects. The version of the model without equity is computationally easier to solve, allowing to consider transitional dynamics. Taking into account the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium, I show that the transitional welfare costs are not large enough to change the sign of the welfare effects stemming from a change in public debt. I find that eliminating public debt would lead to a 0.8% increase in welfare, while moving to a debt/GDP ratio of 100% would entail a welfare loss of 0.5%. A decomposition analysis shows that growth accounts for approximately 50% of the overall welfare effects.

The Welfare Effects of Social Insurance Reform in the Presence of Intergenerational Transfers

Abstract Family support in the form of intergenerational transfers could serve as a substitute for the public transfer system, especially when the public safety net is weak. These intergenerational transfers could be impacted by changes in public insurance. Conversely, induced changes in family transfers could also impact the effectiveness of a public insurance program. What is the impact of social insurance reform on household welfare in the context of intergenerational transfers? This paper investigates this question by using an overlapping generations general equilibrium model where parents and their children are linked by intergenerational transfers. In the model, individuals differ in earnings ability and face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk, health risk, and mortality risk. This paper calibrates the model to key features in the urban Chinese economy. Using this calibrated model, this paper finds that households on average experience a welfare gain from an increase in the social insurance benefits but that this effect differs across households conditional on their economic status. This paper then provides a decomposition of these welfare changes into three channels: a direct policy channel, an intergenerational-transfers channel, and a general equilibrium channel.

CO-MOVEMENT OF STEADY-STATE GOVERNMENT DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT

To understand whether and how movements of government debt and household debt are related, stationary equilibrium government debt and household debt are characterized in a politico-economic model where office-seeking policymakers decide government debt and individual voters can borrow facing uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. An increase in uninsurable income risk unconditionally raises stationary equilibrium government debt and aggregate household debt together, while an increase in household-loan collateral value or population aging conditionally does so, entailing positive correlations between these two debts’ movements. In contrast, an increase in interest rate conditionally causes these two debts to move in the opposite directions.

Are unconditional lump-sum transfers a good idea?

The role of unconditional lump-sum transfers in improving social welfare in heterogenous agent models has not been thoroughly understood in the literature. We adopt an analytically tractable Aiyagari-type model to study the distinctive role of unconditional lump-sum transfers in reducing consumption inequality due to ex-post uninsurable income risk under borrowing constraints. Our results show that in the presence of ex-post heterogeneity and in the absence of wealth inequality, unconditional lump-sum transfers are not a desirable tool for reducing consumption inequality—the Ramsey planner opts to rely solely on public debt and a linear labor tax (in the absence of a lump-sum tax) to mitigate income risk without the need for lump-sum transfers, in contrast to the result obtained by Werning (2007), Azzimonti and Yared (2017), and Bhandari et al. (2017) in models with ex-ante heterogeneity.

The Welfare Effects of Social Insurance Reform in the Presence of Intergenerational Transfers

Family support in the form of intergenerational transfers could serve as a substitute for the public transfer system, especially when the public safety net is weak. Intergenerational transfers could be impacted by changes in public insurance. Conversely, induced changes in family transfers could also impact the effectiveness of a public insurance program. What is the impact of social insurance reform on household welfare in the context of intergenerational transfers? This paper investigates this question by using an overlapping generations general equilibrium model where parents and their children are linked by intergenerational transfers. In the model, individuals differ in earnings ability and face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk, health risk, and mortality risk. This paper calibrates the model to key features in the urban Chinese economy. Using this calibrated model, this paper finds that households on average experience a welfare gain from an increase in the social insurance benefits but that this effect differs across households conditional on their economic status; some households may even experience a welfare loss. This paper then provides a decomposition of these welfare changes into three channels: a direct policy channel, an intergenerational transfers channel, and a general equilibrium channel.

FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY

AbstractWe document a strong empirical relationship between higher income inequality and stronger recessive impacts of fiscal consolidation episodes across time and space. To explain this finding, we develop a life‐cycle economy with uninsurable income risk. We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of several European economies, including inequality and fiscal structures, and study the effects of fiscal consolidation programs. In our model, higher income risk induces precautionary savings behavior, which decreases the proportion of credit‐constrained agents in the economy. These agents have less elastic labor supply responses to fiscal consolidations, which explain the correlation with inequality in the data.

Family planning in a life‐cycle model with income risk

SummarySeveral US states have recently restricted the access to abortions. We study fertility intentions and how family planning and abortions are used as mechanisms to control fertility among couples facing income risk. We formulate and estimate a life‐cycle consumption‐saving model with uninsurable income risk and imperfect contraceptive control that matches fertility behavior in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) well. We use the estimated model to investigate how family planning and abortions are used to control fertility in our model. Our simulations suggest that income risk affects family planning and that abortion is used to control fertility due to the presence of income risk. This indicates that the availability of abortions might play a role as an insurance mechanism.

Housing Wealth Effects: The Long View

AbstractWe provide new time-varying estimates of the housing wealth effect back to the 1980s. We use three identification strategies: ordinary least squares with a rich set of controls, the Saiz housing supply elasticity instrument, and a new instrument that exploits systematic differences in city-level exposure to regional house price cycles. All three identification strategies indicate that housing wealth elasticities were if anything slightly smaller in the 2000s than in earlier time periods. This implies that the important role housing played in the boom and bust of the 2000s was due to larger price movements rather than an increase in the sensitivity of consumption to house prices. Full-sample estimates based on our new instrument are smaller than recent estimates, though they remain economically important. We find no significant evidence of a boom–bust asymmetry in the housing wealth elasticity. We show that these empirical results are consistent with the behaviour of the housing wealth elasticity in a standard life-cycle model with borrowing constraints, uninsurable income risk, illiquid housing, and long-term mortgages. In our model, the housing wealth elasticity is relatively insensitive to changes in the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) for two reasons: first, low-leverage homeowners account for a substantial and stable part of the aggregate housing wealth elasticity; second, a rightward shift in the LTV distribution increases not only the number of highly sensitive constrained agents but also the number of underwater agents whose consumption is insensitive to house prices.

The Distributional Implications of Fiscal Devaluations

This paper explores the distributional implications of a fiscal devaluation acquired through a shift from labor to consumption taxes in an open-economy Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian model with incomplete markets and uninsurable income risk. A permanent fiscal devaluation perfectly mimicking a nominal devaluation in aggregate implies an increase in transfers balanced by lower profits. This leaves the representative agent unaffected. However, as the higher transfers affect all agents symmetrically, while decreased profits impact agents according to their wealth, distributional effects arise. The implicit insurance provided by higher transfers benefits wealth-poor agents and mitigates the equity concerns associated with fiscal devaluations.

Aggregate Demand and Sovereign Debt Crises

Sovereign debt crises coincide with deep recessions. I propose a model of sovereign debt that rationalizes large contractions in economic activity via an aggregate-demand amplification mechanism. The mechanism also sheds new light on the response of consumption to sovereign risk, which I document in the context of the Eurozone crisis. By explicitly separating the decisions of households and the government, I examine the interaction between sovereign risk and the precautionary savings motive. When a default is likely, households anticipate its negative consequences and cut consumption for self-insurance reasons. The resulting shortage in aggregate spending worsens economic conditions through nominal wage rigidities, boosting default incentives and restarting the vicious cycle of high spreads and low demand. I study the implications of this feedback mechanism in a model where the government of a small open economy borrows from foreign lenders but some of the debt is held by heterogeneous domestic savers subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk. I calibrate the model to Spain in the 2000s and find that about a third of the output contraction is caused by default risk. More generally, sovereign risk exacerbates volatility in consumption over time as well as across agents, creating large and unequal welfare costs even if default does not materialize.

Inequality and the marriage gap

Marriage is one of the most important determinants of economic prosperity, yet most existing theories of inequality ignore the role of the family. This paper documents that the distributions of earnings and wealth are highly concentrated, even when disaggregated into single and married households. At the same time, there is a large marriage gap: married people earn on average 26 percent more income, and they hold 35 percent more net worth. To account for these facts, I develop a general equilibrium model where females and males face uninsurable income risk and make decisions on consumption-savings, labor supply and marriage formation. In a calibrated version of the model, I show that selection into marriage based on productive characteristics, an effective tax bonus for married couples, and stronger bequest motives for households with descendants are key to accounting for the marriage gap in earnings and wealth. A policy experiment of moving from joint tax filing for married couples to separate filing yields output gains and more marital sorting.

Transmission of Monetary Policy with Heterogeneity in Household Portfolios

This paper assesses the importance of heterogeneity in household portfolios for the transmission of monetary policy in a New Keynesian business cycle model with uninsurable income risk and assets with different liquidity. In this environment, monetary transmission works through investment, but redistribution lowers the elasticity of investment via two channels: (i) heterogeneity in marginal propensities to invest, and (ii) time variation in the liquidity premium. Monetary contractions redistribute to wealthy households who have high propensities to invest and a low marginal value of liquidity, thereby stabilizing investment. I provide empirical evidence for countercyclical liquidity premia and heterogeneity in household portfolio responses. (JEL E12, E32, E52, G11, G51)

The Discounted Euler Equation: A Note

We present a simple model with income risk and borrowing constraints that yields a ‘discounted Euler equation’. This feature of the model mutes the extent to which news about far future real interest rates (i.e. forward guidance) affects current outcomes. We show that this simple model approximates the outcomes of a rich model with uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints in response to a forward guidance shock. The model is simple enough to be easily incorporated into simple New Keynesian models. We illustrate this with an application to the zero lower bound.

Low Homeownership in Germany - A Quantitative Exploration

The homeownership rate in Germany is one of the lowest among advanced economies. To better understand this fact, we analyze the role of three specific policies which discourage homeownership in Germany: an extensive social housing sector with broad eligibility criteria, high transfer taxes when buying real estate, and no tax deductions for mortgage interest payments by owner-occupiers. We build a lifecycle model with uninsurable income risk and endogenous homeownership in order to quantify the policy effects on homeownership and welfare. We find that all three policies have sizable effects on the homeownership rate. At the same time, household welfare would be reduced by moving to a policy regime with low transfer taxes and mortgage interest tax deductions, but it would improve in the absence of social housing, in particular when coupled with housing subsidies for low-income households.

The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited

In recent years, central banks have increasingly turned to forward guidance as a central tool of monetary policy. Standard monetary models imply that far future forward guidance has huge effects on current outcomes, and these effects grow with the horizon of the forward guidance. We present a model in which the power of forward guidance is highly sensitive to the assumption of complete markets. When agents face uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints, a precautionary savings effect tempers their responses to changes in future interest rates. As a consequence, forward guidance has substantially less power to stimulate the economy. (JEL E21, E40, E50)

Dynamic effects of labor supply: A mechanism explaining cross-sectional differences in hours

This paper first establishes the empirical fact that over the last quarter of the 20th century, the average weekly hours worked increased for workers in the highest wage quintile while it decreased for the ones at the lowest. In 1976, a worker in the lowest quintile worked 2.8 hours more per week than a high wage worker (worker in the highest quintile), but by 2006, the low wage worker worked 1 hour less. During this period, there was also a wide increase in wage inequality. The typical mechanism in which hours are only determined by contemporaneous wages cannot simultaneously explain the pattern found in both variables for every quintile.This paper attempts to reconcile these cross-sectional trends in both hours and wages for the US during this time period. As a first step, we show that compositional changes (in education, occupation and age) within quintiles can only explain a fraction of the observed pattern. Next, we propose a mechanism in which individuals' current decisions of how much to work take into account two components: the contemporaneous benefit of the wage received, and also how current hours worked affects the probability of moving across the wage distribution in later periods. The latter dynamic component is estimated from our dataset. We find that changes over time in how hours affect these probabilities provided incentives that differ across the quintiles, and are consistent with the labor supply decisions observed in the data. We incorporate these two components into an equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents with uninsurable income risk. We are able to replicate the decline in hours for the bottom of the distribution as well as the increase at the top. The ratio of hours worked between the two groups delivered by the model also fits the trend found in the data.

Precautionary saving or denied dissaving

Precautionary saving in response to uninsurable income risk can in principle explain the stylized fact that aggregate saving increases with the variance of income, but it is controversial how much of the observed variation in incomes is, in fact, unpredictable. Borrowing constraints offer an alternative explanation that does not require consumers to be uncertain about their future income. This paper employs a three-cohort, overlapping generations model with quadratic utility and no capital to show that, if agents are patient enough, heterogeneity alone can account for more than half the decrease in the equilibrium interest rate caused by a borrowing constraint. The possibility of facing a binding borrowing constraint in the future induces saving, and this saving increases with the cross-sectional variation in income. Another channel that pushes down the interest rate is the direct effect caused by currently constrained agents not being allowed to dissave. For patient agents, the two channels have roughly the same impact on the interest rate.

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