Uniform Determination Of Death Act Research Articles

The Fundamental Concept of Death-Controversies and Clinical Relevance: The UDDA Revision Series.

When the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) was recently in the process of revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), Neurology® ran a series of debates over certain controversial issues being deliberated. Omitted was a debate over the fundamental concept underlying brain death. In his introductory article, Bernat offered reasons for this omission: "It is not directly relevant to practicing neurologists who largely accept brain death, do not question its conceptual basis, …." In this article I argue the opposite: the fundamental concept of death is highly relevant to the clinical criteria and tests used to diagnose it. Moreover, most neurologists in fact disagree with the conceptual basis articulated by Bernat. Basically, there are 3 competing concepts of death: (1) biological: cessation of the integrative unity of the organism as a whole (endorsed by Bernat and the 1981 President's Commission), (2) psychological: cessation of the person, equated with a self-conscious mind (endorsed by half of neurologists), and (3) the vital work concept proposed by the 2008 President's Council on Bioethics. The first actually corresponds to a circulatory, not a neurologic, criterion. The second corresponds to a "higher brain" criterion. The third corresponds loosely to the UK's "brainstem death" criterion. In terms of the biological concept, current diagnostic guidelines entail a high rate of false-positive declarations of death, whereas in terms of the psychological concept, the same guidelines entail a high rate of false-negative declarations. Brainstem reflexes have nothing to do with any death concept (their role is putatively to guarantee irreversibility). By shining a spotlight on the deficiencies of the UDDA through attempting to revise it, the ULC may have unwittingly opened a Pandora's box of fresh scrutiny of the concept of death underlying the neurologic criterion-particularly on the part of state legislatures with irreconcilably opposed worldviews.

Squaring the Circle. Brain death and organ transplantation.

The adoption of brain death played a crucial role in the development of organ transplantation, but the concept has become increasingly controversial. This essay will explore the current state of the controversy and its implications for the field. The brain death debate, long limited to the bioethics community, has in recent years burst into the public consciousness following several high-profile cases. This has culminated in the reevaluation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which is in the process of being updated. Any change to the UDDA has the potential to significantly impact the availability of organs. The current update to the UDDA introduces an element of uncertainty, one the brain death debate had not previously had.

Perspectives of Medical Organizations, Organ Procurement Organizations, and Advocacy Organizations About Revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA).

The Uniform Law Commission paused work of the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) in September 2023. Thematic review was performed of comments submitted to the Uniform Law Commission by medical organizations (MO), organ procurement organizations (OPO), and advocacy organizations (AO) from 1/1/2023 to 7/31/2023. Of comments from 41 organizations (22 AO, 15 MO, 4 OPO), 34 (83%) supported UDDA revision (50% OPO, 33% MO recommended against revision). The most comments addressed modifications to "all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem" (31; 95% AO, 75% OPO, 47% MO), followed by irreversible versus permanent (25; 77% AO, 50% OPO, 40% MO), accommodation of brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) objections (23; 100% OPO, 80% MO, 32% AO), consent for BD/DNC evaluation (18; 75% OPO, 47% MO, 36% AO), "accepted medical standards" (13; 36% AO, 33% MO, 0% OPO), notification before BD/DNC evaluation (14; 100% OPO, 53% MO, 9% AO), time to gather before discontinuation of organ support after BD/DNC determination (12; 60% MO, 25% OPO, 9% AO), and BD/DNC examiner credential requirements (2; 13% MO, 0% AO, 0% OPO). The predominant themes were that the revised UDDA should include the term "irreversible" and shouldn't (1) stipulate specific medical guidelines, (2) require notification before BD/DNC evaluation, or (3) require time to gather before discontinuation of organ support after BD/DNC determination. Views on other topics were mixed, but MO and OPO generally advocated for the revised UDDA to take a functional approach to BD/DNC, not require consent for BD/DNC evaluation, and not require opt-out accommodation of BD/DNC objections. Contrastingly, many AO and some MO with religious affiliations or a focus on advocacy favored the revised UDDA take an anatomic approach to BD/DNC or eliminate BD/DNC altogether, require consent for BD/DNC evaluation, and require opt-out accommodation of BD/DNC objections. Most commenting organizations support UDDA revision, but perspectives on the approach vary, so the Drafting Committee could not formulate revisions that would be agreeable to all stakeholders.

Potential Threats and Impediments to the Clinical Practice of Brain Death Determination: The UDDA Revision Series.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) revision series in Neurology® originated in response to the plan of the Uniform Law Commission to create a revised Uniform Determination of Death Act (rUDDA) to address contemporary controversies associated with brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) determination. This article contextualizes these, and other, controversies and reviews the extent to which they represent potential threats and impediments to the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination. It also explains the reasons that our rapidly evolving understanding of the brain's ability to recover from injury should not influence the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination. Finally, it explores the myriad ways in which the American Academy of Neurology has addressed potential threats and impediments to the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination and the implications potential changes to the UDDA may have on the future of the clinical practice of BD/DNC determination.

Inconsistency between the Circulatory and the Brain Criteria of Death in the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that "an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase "cessation of functions." By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. By the other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency.

A Review of End-of-Life care in the US: The conundrum in the absence of a guiding framework

End-of-life care is a topic that many consider to be an uncomfortable one given its emotional, ethical, and legal complexities. The scope of legal death in the US was made clearer by the approval of the 1981 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). The act is completely adopted word for word by most US states, but there are states like Louisiana that adopted the UDDA with some included criteria for neurological death. It is important to note that the UDDA is a legal guide used to make legal and medical decisions rather than a law that must be followed completely. With the advancement of medical technology, individuals can be kept alive through a variety of medical interventions that sustain necessary physiological functions, such as breathing, in the absence of complete mental status or other basic functions considered to be fundamental to life These modalities at times blur the line between life and death, and disagreement exists on the technical definitions and applications of these terms. The result is an ethical gray area in which medical care can be provided, but the question of whether it should be provided remains. This article is meant to examine the ethical and societal implications of end-of-life care to an individual who- depending upon the definition- may be considered dead.

Should the Revised Uniform Determination of Death Act Address Objections to the Use of Neurologic Criteria to Declare Death?

In response to concerns about the declaration of death by neurologic criteria, the Uniform Law Commission created a drafting committee to update the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) in the Fall of 2021. One of the key questions for the committee to address was the following: Should the revised UDDA address objections to the use of neurologic criteria to declare death? This article (1) provides historical background and survey results that demonstrate the need to address this question; (2) summarizes the ethical principles that support and oppose accommodation of objections to the use of neurologic criteria to declare death; (3) reviews accommodation in other areas of medicine and law; (4) discusses existing legal and hospital guidance on management of these objections; (5) examines perspectives of stakeholder medical societies and expert health care professionals, lawyers, ethicists, and philosophers on whether the revised UDDA should address these objections; (6) identifies some questions for the drafting committee to consider when deciding whether the revised UDDA should address objections to the use of neurologic criteria to declare death; and (7) summarizes the potential downstream effects of the drafting committee's decision.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act is Being Revised.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), the recommended legal statute for determination of death in the United States, was initially formulated in 1981. Forty years later, because of the concerns of experts in medicine, law, ethics, and philosophy, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) created a drafting committee to update the UDDA. The drafting committee, which has until 2023 to propose revisions to the ULC Executive Committee, will need to determine how to address the following key questions about the UDDA: (1) Should the term "irreversible" be replaced by the term "permanent"? (2) Is absence of hypothalamic-pituitary-axis-induced antidiuretic hormone secretion included in "all functions of the entire brain," and if so, how can we reconcile the fact that this is not tested in the medical standards for determination of death by neurologic criteria published by the American Academy of Neurology and the Society of Critical Care Medicine, American Academy of Pediatrics, and Child Neurology Society? (3) What are the accepted medical standards for determination of death? (4) Is consent needed to determine death? and (5) How should objections to the use of neurologic criteria to declare death be handled? Once the ULC finalizes revisions to the UDDA, individual states will have the opportunity to decide whether to adopt the revisions in whole or in part. Hopefully, the revised UDDA will provide clarity and consistency about the legal distinction between life and death for physicians, lawyers, and the public at large. The events that led to the formation of the drafting committee and the potential consequences of revising the UDDA are discussed herein.

Revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act to Align the Law With Practice Through Neurorespiratory Criteria.

Although the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) has served as a model statute for 40 years, there is a growing recognition that the law must be updated. One issue being considered by the Uniform Law Commission's Drafting Committee to revise the UDDA is whether the text “all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem” should be changed. Some argue that the absence of diabetes insipidus indicates that some brain functioning continues in many individuals who otherwise meet the “accepted medical standards” like the American Academy of Neurology's. The concern is that the legal criteria and the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria are not aligned. We argue for the revision of the UDDA to more accurately specify legal criteria that align with the medical standards: brain injury leading to permanent loss of the capacity for consciousness, the ability to breathe spontaneously, and brainstem reflexes. We term these criteria neurorespiratory criteria and show that they are well-supported in the literature for physiologic and social reasons justifying their use in the law.

Donation after cardiac death in heart transplantation: is there an ethical dilemma?

In an attempt to address the organ shortages in heart transplantation, USA centres have begun utilizing donation after cardiac death (DCD) as an alternative to traditional donation after brain death (DBD). As this paradigm continues to expand, there is a need to address the medico-legal and ethical aspects of DCD donation, which is the focus of the current review. Current protocols use criteria established by the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which is explicit in defining the irreversibility of circulation and brain function in determining death. By the nature of DCD, the patient may not meet death criteria from a biological systems perspective of irreversibility, and thus, the moral dilemma ensues on whether removing vital organs violates our legal and moral obligations to the patient. In the current article, we review the ethical issues raised with DCD and define DCD protocols and their ability to comply with established regulatory guidelines while respecting the wishes of patients and their surrogates through informed decisions making about organ donation and end-of-life care.

Death determination and donation after circulatory death: Can physicians reconcile cardiorespiratory death and irreversible loss of brain function?

Declaration of cardiorespiratory death, as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), requires irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function. A physician’s ability to confidently declare death is paramount because death is both a biological and social construct, and can afford a dying patient the opportunity to be an organ donor via donation after circulatory death (DCD). Inconsistencies related to cardiorespiratory death and DCD include the specific language used in the UDDA, specifically the use of the word “irreversible”. Additionally, in DCD there is a large focus on the auto-resuscitative capacity of the heart, however recently some have argued that instead the focus should shift to the brain and a determination of how long it needs to be without circulation to cease functioning prior to declaring death. In this paper, I discuss inconsistencies with cardiorespiratory death as they pertain to organ donation and posit several possible solutions to mitigate these inconsistencies.

Donation after circulatory death donors in lung transplantation.

Transplantation of any organ into a recipient requires a donor. Lung transplant has a long history of an inadequate number of suitable donors to meet demand, leading to deaths on the waiting list annually since national data was collected, and strict listing criteria. Before the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), passed in 1980, legally defined brain death in the U.S., all donors for lung transplant came from sudden death victims [uncontrolled Donation after Circulatory Death donors (uDCDs)] in the recipient’s hospital emergency department. After passage of the UDDA, uDCDs were abandoned to Donation after Brain Death donors (DBDs)—perhaps prematurely. Compared to livers and kidneys, many DBDs have lungs that are unsuitable for transplant, due to aspiration pneumonia, neurogenic pulmonary edema, trauma, and the effects of brain death on lung function. Another group of donors has become available—patients with a devastating irrecoverable brain injury that do not meet criteria for brain death. If a decision is made by next-of-kin (NOK) to withdraw life support and allow death to occur by asphyxiation, with NOK consent, these individuals can have organs recovered if death occurs relatively quickly after cessation of mechanical ventilation and maintenance of their airway. These are known as controlled Donation after Circulatory Death donors (cDCDs). For a variety of reasons, in the U.S., lungs are recovered from cDCDs at a much lower rate than kidneys and livers. Ex-vivo lung perfusion (EVLP) in the last decade has had a modest impact on increasing the number of lungs for transplant from DBDs, but may have had a larger impact on lungs from cDCDs, and may be indispensable for safe transplantation of lungs from uDCDs. In the next decade, DCDs may have a substantial impact on the number of lung transplants performed in the U.S. and around the world.

Acts that Kill and Acts that Do Not

In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and definite description are employed to show that there exists an internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened without DDR being violated.

Statement in Support of Revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act and in Opposition to a Proposed Revision.

Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the "Guidelines") have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized "medical standard," (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of "brain function," and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct an apnea test without consent and even over a proxy's objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion.

Current Practice Diagnosing Brain Death Is Not Consistent With Legal Statutes Requiring the Absence of All Brain Function.

The legal standard for the determination of death by neurologic criteria in the United States is laid out in the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which requires the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain. Most other nations endorse a "whole-brain" standard as well. However, current practice in the determination of death by neurologic criteria is not consistent with this legal standard, because some patients who are diagnosed as brain-dead, in fact retain some brain function, or retain the capacity for the return of some brain function. In response, the American Academy of Neurology published updated guidelines, which assert that hypothalamic function is consistent with the neurological standard enshrined in the UDDA. Others have suggested that it is an open question whether the hypothalamus and pituitary are part of "the entire brain," as delineated in the UDDA. While we agree that determination of death practices are worthy of continued dialogue and refinement in practice that dialogue must adhere to reasonable standards of logic and scientific accuracy.

Does the Uniform Determination of Death Act Need to Be Revised?

This article critically examines the recent revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) advanced by Lewis and colleagues. The revision only further reinforces the status quo of brain death without taking into account the root cause of the litigations and controversies about the declaration of death by neurological criteria. In view of this deficiency, this article offers two approaches to revising the UDDA, both of which are founded on sound moral principles.

It's Time to Revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

Since 1981, the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) has provided the legal basis for defining brain death in the United States, but ambiguities in its language have led to different interpret...

Controversy in the Determination of Death: The Definition and Moment of Death.

This essay reviews recent controversy in the determination of death, with particular attention to the definition and moment of death. Definitions of death have evolved from the intuitive to the pathophysiologic and the medicolegal. Many United States jurisdictions have codified the definition of death relying on guidance from the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). Flaws in the structure of the UDDA have led to misunderstanding of the physiologic nature of death and methods for the determination of death, resulting in a bifurcated concept of death as either circulatory/respiratory or neurologic. The practice of organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD) raises a number of ethical questions, most prominently revolving around the moment of death and manifested as an expedited time to determination of death, a departure from the unitary concept of death, a violation of the dead donor rule, and a challenge to the standard of irreversibility. Attempts to redefine the determination of death from an irreversibility standard to a permanence standard have significant impact on the social contract upon which deceased donor organ transplantation rests, and must entail broad societal examination. The determination of death is best reached by a clear, strict, and uniform irreversibility standard. In deceased donor organ transplantation, the interests of the donor as a person are paramount, and no interest of organ recipients or of the greater society can justify negation of the rights and bodily integrity of the person who is a donor, nor conversion of the altruism of giving into the calculus of taking.

Evolution of the Criteria of “Brain Death”: A Critical Analysis Based on Scientific Realism and Christian Anthropology

This article examines the evolution of the "brain death" standard from the time of its introduction by the Harvard Committee until the current guidelines established by the American Academy of Neurology. This evolution consists mainly of a selective discarding of certain brain and spinal cord functions that are deemed insignificant. Based on the principles of scientific realism and a Thomistic substance view of human nature, this article shows that the evolved standard contradicts both the Uniform Determination of Death Act definition of brain death and the fundamental tenets of Christian anthropology as taught by the Catholic Church.

Determination of Death by Neurologic Criteria in the United States: The Case for Revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

Although death by neurologic criteria (brain death) is legally recognized throughout the United States, state laws and clinical practice vary concerning three key issues: (1) the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria, (2) management of family objections before determination of death by neurologic criteria, and (3) management of religious objections to declaration of death by neurologic criteria. The American Academy of Neurology and other medical stakeholder organizations involved in the determination of death by neurologic criteria have undertaken concerted action to address variation in clinical practice in order to ensure the integrity of brain death determination. To complement this effort, state policymakers must revise legislation on the use of neurologic criteria to declare death. We review the legal history and current laws regarding neurologic criteria to declare death and offer proposed revisions to the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the rationale for these recommendations.