Understanding Of Liberty Research Articles

The Influence of Renaissance Thought on Martin Luther’s View of Liberty

Abstract Scholars have long acknowledged the substantial influence of the Renaissance movement on Luther’s Reformation. However, due to the absence of comprehensive studies on Luther’s contexts, a thorough and detailed analysis of this influence in Luther’s thought and writings has been hindered. The aforementioned circumstance has resulted in the overall disregard of this contribution in the history of Western philosophy. This paper aims to analyze the distinct impact of Renaissance ideology on the evolution of Luther’s concept of liberty. The first section will discuss the background of Luther’s reform movement and the fundamental place of the humanist concept of liberty in its impact on the destruction of the religious power of the Catholic Church. The second section will examine the significant role played by humanists, such as Erasmus, in shaping Luther’s liberal ideas during his early years. The third section will examine how Luther’s understanding of liberty was developed through his polemical exchanges with Erasmus and other thinkers. This process ultimately resulted in Luther’s distinctive and paradoxical conception of freedom, which highlights Luther’s and humanists’ historical influence on the independence, emancipation, and autonomy of the individual personality in their age. The fourth section will examine the influence of Luther’s paradoxical ontological theory on the development of Western intellectual history. Additionally, it will address the misinterpretation of this intellectual history lineage by the mainstream of Western intellectual history that occurred concurrently. Finally, in the twentieth century, the revival of Luther’s thought, which was gradually revitalized by Heidegger, Karl Barth, and other contemporary scholars, also highlights the significant influence of Renaissance thought on Luther’s theory and the whole history of Western thought.

From Georges Sorel to Peter Costello: Peter Coleman and the Making of Australian Liberal Conservatism

Peter Coleman was the most significant intellectual advocate of a liberal‐conservative politics in Australia from the mid‐twentieth century well into the early twenty‐first century. His worldview drew upon John Anderson, Michael Oakeshott, and Georges Sorel rather than Edmund Burke or John Stuart Mill. Coleman's work demonstrates that Australian liberal‐conservatism is not a coalition but a fusion in which liberal and conservative concepts were translated into a programme for political action. Coleman argued that neoconservatism, in particular the examples of Irving Kristol and Edward Shils, best represented this fusion, but Coleman was also drawn to the traditionalist conservatism of James McAuley. This article applies a morphological approach, as pioneered by Michael Freeden, to the analysis of Coleman's ideological position and focuses on his understandings of liberty, order, and progress. It not only draws upon Coleman's Masters' dissertation upon Sorel, his published writings, parliamentary speeches, but also considers his performance as a government minister and Liberal Party leader in New South Wales and his influence upon Peter Costello.

Quentin Skinner, contextual method and Machiavelli's understanding of liberty

The article examines Quentin Skinner's influential interpretation of Machiavelli's views on liberty, and the sharp divergence between his methodological ideas and his actual practice. The paper explores how Skinner's political ideals directed his interpretation against his own methodological precepts, to offer a basis for a ‘revival’ of republican theory. Skinner's reinterpretation of Machiavelli as a theorist of negative liberty is examined, and refuted. The article analyses Skinner's claim about liberty as the key political value for Machiavelli, and demonstrates that liberty is secondary to empire on the list of Machiavelli's priorities. Skinner's vocabulary and efforts to tone down or ignore Machiavelli's more aggressive ideas are closely examined. The analysis offered in the article, it is suggested, has wider implications, showing the difficulty of applying contextualism in practice, by the very founder of this approach in the history of ideas.

The Political Theory of Thomas More’s Epigrammata

This essay argues that More’s Epigrammata contains a coherent political theory that is inspired by ancient Roman republicanism. More defines “liberty” as the people’s willing obedience to virtuous leaders who rule for the common good, and he claims that popular opinion is the source of legitimacy rather than divine sanction. In doing so, More critiques the Tudor regime and presents an alternative theory of kingship based on his understanding of liberty. However, More also criticizes hereditary monarchy as such and explicitly prefers a republican regime of elected men who share authority among equal peers. This republican regime more effectively promotes the common good, but it depends upon virtue in the rulers and in the citizens. More’s satirical epigrams on virtue and vice are part of his political teaching insofar as they establish his conception of citizen virtue, which supports his republicanism.

Locke's Educational Dimension in Some Thoughts Concerning Education in Function of the Philosophy of Education

In this article the author problematizes Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education and critically re-examines Locke's educational philosophy. By elaborating Locke's Thoughts on the basis of particular and verified reasons, the article concludes that Locke's educational philosophy is closely related to his understanding of liberty and the role of an individual in a political community. Although in his Thoughts Locke did not focus on the question of what education is in order to elaborate on the problem of education, he nevertheless philosophically focused on the question of why and how to educate, that is, he seeks to determine what the goal of education is. In this sense, he found that education primarily serves to strengthen an apprentice’s moral identity and natural character, and offers a number of practical suggestions on how to educate. While on the other hand, Locke sees the ultimate meaning of why to educate in the function of a good education that will prepare an apprentice for free and full political participation in the life of a political community.

Freiheit heißt Leben

Liberty means to live. That is what Christian Jasper is convinced about regarding the understanding of liberty in German law and Christian faith. The author introduces the reader in the letter Samaritanus bonus on the care of persons in the critical and terminal phases of life which the roman catholic Congregation for the doctrine of the faith published on 14th July 2020. Therefore, the author compares theological and legal understandings of the idea of liberty. Whereas the German Constitutional Court puts much emphasis on the defence of autonomy the author highlights that human dignity implies more than the individual right to act arbitrarily. Modern societies require individuals who behave moral. The challenge is to avoid misunderstandings between the different faculties and to find wise compromises between moral expectations and legal rules in a liberal society. The lecture of Samaritanus bonus may help to improve the public discussion.

Adequate Interpretation of Socio-Political Values as a Conceptual Issue in the XXI Century (From the Perspective of the Concepts Used by B. Constant and A. Tocqueville)

The article analyzes the transformation of concepts like liberty, equality, and democracy depending on the political, historical, and socio-cultural context. The author proposes to trace the significant difference in understanding “universal” socio-political values by using the classical liberal theories of B. Constant and A. de Tocqueville compared to modern international political processes. The author uses comparative and historical analysis methods, and a cultural and axiological approach to studying the ideology and politics. The argument is that the ancient understanding of liberty was irrelevant for the society of the XIX century, just as B. Constant’s classical understanding of liberty no longer meets the changing socio-political needs of people living in the XXI century. It does not consider a fundamentally new sphere of human activity like freedom and privacy in the digital world. Recognizing the value of democracy, the author observes that today, A. de Tocqueville’s approach is more than adequate for understanding political processes. For example, the post-election information warfare in the United States in 2020 shows the relevance of the specific understanding of Tocqueville’s democracy as a profound process of total equality spread. The main conclusion is that the political values familiar to modern discourse often are interpreted inadequately to reality since scientific understanding is rigid and lags behind the rapid development of information technologies, globalization, and virtualization.

Sieyès and republican liberty

In On the People’s Terms, Philip Pettit incorporates the Sieyèsian notion of constituent power into his constitutional theory of non-domination. In this article, I argue that Emmanuel Sieyès’s understanding of liberty precludes such an appropriation. While a republican, his conceptualisation of liberty in the face of commercial society stood apart from theories of civic vigilance, preferring instead to disentangle individuals from politics and maximise what he understood to be their non-political freedoms. Sieyès saw that liberty was heightened through relations of representation and commercial dependency. This conception of liberty was pivotal to the identity of the nation, and so allowed Sieyès to assess forms of collective injustice committed by the French nobility. It also provided the normative foundation of his theory of constituent power. For Sieyès, constituent power guarded against legislative excess in a decidedly minimal sense, intending instead to separate citizens from the political sphere so they were not burdened with ongoing participation or public vigilance.

Krise der liberalen Demokratie? Nein! Krise des individualistischen Liberalismus

AbstractThe current crisis of liberal democracy is actually a crisis of individualistic liberalism as recent literature shows by its analysis and more often by its example. Whilst social inequality by many authors is seen as main source of the crisis, it is only the consequence of a contradiction inherent in individualistic liberalism: Equal individual liberty leads to social and in the consequence to political inequality because of the inevitable differences in the use of that individual liberty. However, political equality is a necessary condition of individual liberty as a reciprocal right. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome a purely individualistic understanding of liberty that threatens not only democracy but individual liberty itself.

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.

Distilling Liberty: Reconsidering the Politics of Alcohol in Early New South Wales

Distillation was both clearly banned and the ban widely flouted in early New South Wales. Colonial farmers frequently distilled their excess crops, utilising the expertise of Irish convicts who often came from a traditional rural drinking culture in which illicit distilling was widespread and celebrated. Due to legal ambiguities, the ban relied entirely on the authority of the governors, but was rejected as a breach of the longstanding right of farmers to profit from their crops. Illicit distillation resonated with an ideological critique of despotic colonial government in the age of revolutions, firmly grounded in popular understandings of liberty that were widely felt at all levels of early New South Wales society. In contrast to recent scholarly rejection of a ‘Rum Rebellion’, close analysis of these arguments about distilling shows that both rum and liberty were significant to the 1808 rebellion.

The Evolution of Concept of Liberty in Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes

The article is devoted to the evolution of the concept of liberty in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The article shows the relation between the historical and ideological contexts of the appearance of the doctrine of the «Leviathan”. In particular, author connects the events of the English civil war, the ideological context of that time with the philosophy of Hobbes. A special emphasis is put on the evolution of argumentation of parliament proponents under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy perception, which created the ideological basis for the naturalistic and secular view on political life of the modernity, which came into being as a result of reconciliation of Aristotelian view on self-sufficient civil life with Augustinian concern about otherworldlylife. Thee author considers Hobbes’s philosophy through the lens of the methodology of Cambridge school of intellectual history, which discovered ideological disputes and argumentation of Hobbes’s contemporaries. Philosophy of freedom in this context becomes the sticking point between Hobbes’s understanding of liberty as absence of external obstacles for motion and his ideological adversaries, who were influenced by the neo-roman concept of liberty. The authorshows how the context was reflected in Hobbes’s doctrine of liberty, which was a response to the republican ideas of the Italian Renaissance, which brought a new theory of neo-roman liberty into the England of the XVII century, the central thesis of which was based on the idea that liberty within civil society is undermined by the simple presence of arbitrary will. The ideological dispute of Hobbes and his opponents formed basic elements of contemporary liberal vision of politics, the core of which directly relies on the doctrine of liberty which was initially formulated by Hobbes.

Liberty in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: between the Ancient and the Modern

Rousseau’s philosophy can be situated as a continuum between the ancient and the modern traditions; we argue that it does not fully belong to either and this is particularly evident in his discussion of liberty. Our point of departure is a view that in order to grasp peculiarity of Rousseaus’ understanding of liberty we need to go beyond the liberal tradition and its scheme of thinking about freedom as well as beyond the intuitive understanding of liberty. The second part of the article presents an analysis of the four different meanings of liberty that we find in Rousseau’s theory: natural, social, moral and civil. The most important for political philosophy is his discussion of the shift from the natural to social and civil liberty and the insistence that true freedom cannot be totally separated from morality. Finally, we discuss some of the contemporary interpretations of Rousseau’s political thought which often emphasize one of the different meanings of liberty that we find in his writings.

Liberty in Akhundzadeh's and Kermani's Thoughts

Here I examine the modern idea of liberty in works of Akhundzadeh and Kermani – two leading Iranian intelligentsia under the Qajar Iran (1794–1925). In doing so, first, I set forth a brief (intellectual) background that shows some of the influences of Iranian, Russian, and European scholars on Akhundzadeh and Kermani. Then, their thoughts will be represented systematically by following a simple theoretical framework driven from their works. Applying one model to both cases particularly helps to demonstrate their similarities and differences, as well as how fundamentally different was their understanding of liberty from their contemporaries. To Akhundzadeh and Kermani, life under the Qajars resembled the lawless state of nature, transcending which, however, required more than establishing laws. For the transcendence to occur, a revolution in mind was needed; and for that matter to happen, liberty was a critical prerequisite and consequence.

Friedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi in Correspondence

SummaryFriedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi corresponded with each other for the best part of thirty years. They had shared interests that included science, social science, economics, epistemology, history of ideas and political philosophy. Studying their correspondence and related writings, this article shows that Hayek and Polanyi were committed Liberals but with different understandings of liberty, the forces that endanger liberty, and the policies required to rescue it.

Democracia y dos sentidos de libertad

espanolFrente a la pregunta que indaga las relaciones entre conceptos amplios como democracia y libertad, esta conferencia propone focalizarse en la democracia entendida como mecanismo procedimental (una forma de tomar decisiones politicas), por una parte, y la libertad entendida a la luz de los dos conceptos de libertad de Isaiah Berlin (positiva y negativa), por la otra. La democracia permite que cada individuo participe de la limitacion de su propia libertad, dando asi cabida al concepto de libertad positiva. Se trataria, en otras palabras, de una forma colectiva de autolimitacion. Hay libertad negativa, en cambio, cuando no existe interferencia en la esfera individual. Podria ser factible que existiera libertad negativa sin democracia y libertad positiva sin democracia, aunque es mas probable que ambas florezcan en democracia. La negativa explica mejor las realidades contemporaneas, su fuerza radica en que no se pregunta por “ontologias” ni menos intenta fijarlas para dar sentido a la colectividad. Por lo mismo, el autor echa de menos en los debates actuales la referencia a este concepto de libertad tan primordial. EnglishIn order to answer the question of the relationship between concepts as democracy and liberty that can be defined in so many different ways, this conference proposes focusing, on the one hand, on an understanding of democracy as a procedural mechanism (a way of adopting political decisions), and on the other, on an understanding of liberty in light of the two meanings of liberty according to Isaiah Berlin (positive and negative). Democracy allows each individual to participate in the limitation of his own liberty, thus making room for the positive meaning of liberty. Democracy would be then a collective form of selflimitation. On the other hand, negative liberty exists when there is no interference in the individual sphere. It might be feasible for both negative and positive liberty to exist without democracy, but it is more likely that both will flourish within democracy. Negative liberty, however, best explains the contemporary reality, its force not coming from an “ontology” or any attempt to establish one in order to give meaning to the collectivity. For the same reason, the author misses the reference to such a fundamental concept of liberty in current debate.

The eclipse of equality: arguing America on Meet the press

Red state vs. blue state. Republican vs. Democrat. Fox News vs. The Daily Show. The so-called culture wars have become such a fixture of American politics that dividing the country into rival camps seems natural and political gridlock seems inevitable. Entering the fray, Solon Simmons offers an intriguing twist on the debate: Our disagreements come not from unbridgeable divides, but from differing interpretations of a single underlying American tradition-liberalism. Both champions of traditional liberal values, Republicans have become the party of individual freedom while Democrats wear the mantle of tolerance. Lost in this battle of sides is the third pillar of liberalism-equality. Simmons charts the course of American politics through the episodes of Meet the Press. On the air since 1945, Meet the Press provides an unparalleled record of living conversation about the most pressing issues of the day. In weekly discussions, the people who directly influenced policy and held the reins of power in Washington set the political agenda for the country. Listening to what these people had to say-and importantly how they said it-Meet the Press opens a window on how our political parties have become so divided and how notions of equality were lost in the process. Telling the story of the American Century, Simmons investigates four themes that have defined politics and, in turn, debate on Meet the Press-war and foreign affairs, debt and taxation, race struggles, and class and labor relations-and demonstrates how political leaders have transformed these important political issues into symbolic pawns as each party advocates for their own understanding of liberty, whether freedom or tolerance. Ultimately, with The Eclipse of Equality, he looks to bring back to the debate the question lurking in the shadows-how can we ensure the protection of a peaceful civil society and equality for all?

Can social justice, economic redistribution and voluntariness fit into a single conception of liberty?

Purpose – The paper aims to examine and compare two understandings of liberty that have dealt successfully with the normative and analytical challenge of reconciling liberty with social justice: Philip Pettit's republican liberty as nondomination and Hobhouse's concept of liberty as personal growth available to all. The paper focuses on one particular question: how successful each of these thinkers has been in resolving the tension between voluntariness of action, implicit in the “primary” meaning of liberty (as defined by T.H. Green), with the often heavy demands of social justice policies aiming at social equality and entailing economic redistribution. Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyses two theories of liberty by spelling out the difficulties they aimed to deal with and by assessing the level of success they have achieved in resolving these difficulties, with the objective to demonstrate their originality in the broader context of conceptualising liberty. Findings – The paper criticises Pettit's republican theory from a new perspective and develops an original critique of it; it spells out the achievements of Hobhouse's understanding of liberty in a new light – related to the specific critique of Pettit's republican liberty; and by spelling out the analytical and normative achievements of Hobhouse's liberty as “personal growth available to all” it offers a viable concept of liberty that fits with contemporary conceptualisations but overcomes their shortcomings. Research limitations/implications – As the project is based on analysing texts that have been easy to access, there have not been significant research limitations. Practical implications – The two theories of freedom assessed here (the contemporary republican and the “new liberal”) entail some subtle, but potentially significant differences in public policy implications. While both can justify extended state action, the latter could tailor specific policies in a manner more mindful of the well-being of all parties, even those on the wrong side of social justice. Originality/value – The paper makes an original contribution in three areas: contemporary republican theory of liberty, Hobhouse's theory of liberty and conceptualisations of liberty in general.

Reclaiming two concepts of liberty

The article responds to an influential critique of the view that there is a conceptual distinction between kinds of liberty. The critique in question began with Gerald MacCallum Jr’s famous argument that liberty is a single concept that has a triadic structure between agent, constraint, and end. Against this view, the article argues that the triadic structure offered by MacCallum is unable to conceptualize a particular distinct understanding of liberty. Following Charles Taylor, the article defends the view that there is a distinct ‘exercise-concept’ of liberty that the triadic structure cannot account for. In support of this claim, the article contests a recent argument that an exercise-concept of liberty can be conceptualized in terms of the triadic structure. The article argues that the triadic framework can only conceptualize an exercise-concept of liberty at the cost of abandoning the substance of that framework. To defend this, the article explains that the triadic structure and an exercise-concept are basically conceptually distinct in virtue of the fact that the former embodies a ‘static’ concept, whereas the latter embodies a ‘dynamic’ one. To complete the argument that an exercise-concept is a distinct concept of liberty, the article articulates a common theme that unifies both the triadic structure and an exercise-concept as concepts of liberty.

Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (review)

Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution. By Michal Jan Rozbicki. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011). Pp. 304. Cloth, $35.00.)Reviewed by Sarah KnottLiberty is a social relation and, as such, signifies an asymmetry of social conditions. This is the well-known insight of sociologist and cultural critic Zygmunt Bauman. Armed with an organic and hierarchical view of society, early moderns also knew this. Inequality did not just precede ideas about freedom; it was the very basis of eighteenth-century notions of liberty. The coexistence of inequality and freedom, and the insight that liberty is inherently a privilege that comes at the expense of others, challenges fond beliefs in universal human rights.In Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution, Michal Jan Rozbicki seeks to apply the understandings of Bauman, and of eighteenth-century commentators, to the American Revolution. Historiography has been hampered, he suggests, by importing purist notions of liberty into a premodern past. Elite-centered and hagiographie accounts of the Revolution, such as those of Gordon Wood, just like the people-centered and prosecutorial (231) accounts of Gary Nash and Howard Zinn, presume that modern liberty was foundational. AU have followed too naively the universalist intonations of all men are created equal and unalienable of the Declaration of Independence. Interpreters of both celebrated and forgotten Founders, Rozbicki argues, have indulged in a pious and fundamentally ahistorical accounting of the national founding, falsely celebrating the Founders' courageous prescience, or wrongly chastising leaders for the rank betrayal of women, slaves and ordinary people. Interpretations that point more gently to inconsistencies or to the paradox of freedom and slavery, he suggests, are just as wrong-headed.The ambitious task Rozbicki sets is marked by a welcome openness to theory and a determined historicization. He seeks nothing less than to shuck off modern-minded delusions and to retell the history of liberty and the American Revolution from scratch. The grounding for such a history is culture: [sjetting our sights on culture - the space where shared meanings were formed, identities were negotiated, beliefs were expressed, values were reproduced, and symbolic representations of reality and order were fashioned - would bring Revolutionary liberty down to earth, where it actually resided (234). On that ground, the evolution of American liberty depended primarily on the pursuit of advantage over others and on social aspiration.The resulting account begins with British legacies. The British political classes' belief in an unequal society and in the social order underlay their understandings of liberty; they apprehended freedom as distributed in rank-specific shares. Indeed, it was entirely possible for an Enlightenment thinker such as Frances Hutcheson to advocate the enslavement of the idle poor. Such ideas transferred to the colonial gentry, among whom a hierarchical vision of society and liberty was entirely engrained. Set on independence, the American ruling elite cleverly made an imperial conflict about taxes into a struggle for universal rights, their overblown rhetoric signaling absolute confidence in their right to rule and in the political impotence of nonelites. Meanwhile, the claim to be the natural guardians of a free people's liberty enabled a grounding of political authority even more powerful than that of heredity. But from the 1 780s, other groups adopted similar tactics, taking up universal claims in order to forward particular rights and enfranchisements, and forcing a backlash among their privilege-loving rulers. Unexpected party factionalism only sped up this dynamic, with elite Federalists and Antifederalists alike appealing to ordinary people and unintentionally raising political consciousness. Ultimately, even if they won independence and succeeded in political revolution, the American elite's universalist notions of liberty proved something of an own goal. …