Understanding Of Judgments Research Articles

Using stereotype violation to shift causal understanding and attitudes about weight

ObjectiveWe evaluated an approach to weight stigma reduction involving the provision of an exemplar inconsistent with belief systems underlying weight bias. Specifically, that people with higher weight eat unhealthy, high-calorie diets, and people with lower weight eat healthy, low-calorie diets. Providing exemplars that violate the stereotype's assumptions may lead to a change in beliefs, stereotypes, and ultimately, stigma. MethodsIn an experimental, web-based study, 682 US-based participants were randomized to read narrative vignettes about a fictional middle-aged woman portrayed as either having stable, high body weight, or stable, low body weight, and as eating a long-term diet that was either high- or low- in calorie-dense foods. Two stereotype violation conditions involved a woman with higher weight who maintains a low-calorie diet (HWLC) and a woman with lower weight who maintains a high-calorie diet (LWHC). ResultsFor the HWLC exemplar, results were consistent with stereotype change processes including heightened genetic causal attributions, reduced lifestyle attributions, and more positive attitudes toward the exemplar and “women with obesity” in general. Response to the LWHC exemplar was more uneven. ConclusionsFindings have implications in the understanding of judgments that people make about individuals based on their body size, and dietary habits suggest a new route for interventions that address weight stigma reduction.

Decision-making and Utility Theory

Decision-making is a process that would affect people's lives from simple daily decisions even to major life decisions. The understanding of judgment is critical for making better decisions as well as improving individual and collective outcomes. This paper would focus on historical decision theory, utility theory, prospective theory, and their applications in real life. The utility theory of the decision-making theory is a crucial part of the decision-making theories, as well as the prospect theory in the later paper. According to prospect theory and utility theory, people would make decisions based on the relative importance of the options' predicted values, and biases and heuristics would influence their choices. Both theories have applications in many fields such as economics, psychology, and medicine. They are used to form models and predict consumer behavior or financial decisions. Peoples lives are strongly associated with different decision makings, from simple to complex. The decision-making process is essential to human existence and fully connect to humans. By figuring out the decision-making processes, people can identify the factors that would influence the choices and make adjustments based on them. The application of the theories could be more practical. Thus, it is crucial to analyze or quantify it for more stable and reasonable choice-making.

AN INTENSIONAL VIEW OF JUDGMENT IN KANT’S KRV

This paper presents an elucidation of Kant’s notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions (or singular representations); iii) the relation to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the ‘x’ that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical judgments. The overall purpose is to build up an understanding of judgment that supports a latter assessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

The Utility of Clinical Psychology Concepts for Judgment and Decision-Making Research: The Case of Histrionic Features.

This research was conducted to highlight the utility of considering clinical psychology concepts in judgment and decision research. Our overarching thesis is that the judgments and choices people make may often be influenced by clinically relevant phenomena, and that understanding these relationships can, in a reciprocal fashion, help advance our understanding of judgment and decision making as well as specific clinical diagnoses and proclivities. We focused on histrionic personality disorder and conducted four studies that show that histrionic symptomology predicts preferences and choices that facilitate grabbing others' attention, even when such choices cost more money, and are at the expense of giving up more tangible features. In addition to demonstrating a new implication of the histrionic personality, we provide insight into the process underlying this tendency and discuss implications for mental health service providers.

Lawyers' Uses of History, from Entick v Carrington to Smethurst v Commissioner of Police

Lawyers use history in different ways. This is partly because judges are directed to decide consistently with what has been decided before, such that continuity with the past is a matter of legal duty. But, as Maitland said, historical research serves the purpose of explaining and therefore lightening the pressure that the past exercises on the present, and the present upon the future. This article considers – including by reference to images of original documents – the multiplicity of ways in which lawyers use history, including the need for a contextual understanding of judgments, the deployment of expert evidence by legal historians, and the haphazard and imperfect reporting of judgments. It considers three quite different sources of Entick v Carrington, including one manuscript only recently published, and how that decision has been used to address modern disputes.

Arendt's Krisis

ABSTRACTCrisis occupies an ambiguous place in the writings of Hannah Arendt. Not only does crisis undermine categories of judgment, but in doing so it eliminates prejudices as well, forcing us to judge without them. Although Arendt never had an opportunity to fully develop her understanding of judgment, we know that she considered it to be ‘the most political of man’s mental abilities,’ and her writings on education reflect this. In her essay, ‘The Crisis in Education’ she draws a connection between judgment and crisis, linking it to the work of the classroom. It is this relationship, between crisis and judgment, that I examine. In doing so, I turn to two figures central to Arendt’s work – Immanuel Kant and Adolf Eichmann – each of whom embody opposing aspects of what it means to judge, epitomized by a conceptual tension between example and cliché.

Reflections on Veritatis splendor

The encyclical Veritatis splendor represented a renewal of moral theology in the spirit of Vatican Council II. Pope St. John Paul II emphasized Gospel teaching in light of the Old Testament, reiterating the animating role of the Holy Spirit in the New Law. Properly understood, the New Law is not a code of obligations, but a dynamic life of charity made intelligible through grace and the natural law. As a primary connection between human beings and divine law, natural law inclines persons toward the good, thus providing an apprehensible link between human freedom and objective truth—enabling us to determine what is good and evil. This understanding of judgment provides a corrective for theological trends toward proportionalism and consequentialism.

The Complexity of Judgment in the Everyday Work of Educators

We experience judgment in everyday life: the process and the outcome, making and receiving. In this piece, I turn to John Dewey’s notions on how judgments are situational, interpretive, (con)temporary, active, and relational. Contrary to everyday connotations of the word judgment, Dewey reminds us that judgment is more contingent than propositional. The aim of this piece is to re-consider our understanding of judgment in everyday educational work. Crafted from a range of sources, anecdotes are alternated with statements about judgment in the work of school principals and teachers, one to illustrate the other. The form chosen for this project echoes that of Ron Pelias’s 1994 piece on performance in everyday discourse.

Beyond Judgmentalism and Non-Judgmentalism

Contemporary social discourse oscillates between norms against being judgmental and discourse filled with highly judgmental conflicts. The paper suggests the inability to understand the scope and limits of judgment in society requires Christian ethics to recover its own understanding of judgment, including of a final judgment as something other than a courtroom encounter over one’s individual sins. After exploring the centrality of God’s judgment in Scripture as an ongoing activity of social ordering for justice and mercy, I draw on several theologians to develop a different imagination for what final judgment means, rooted in conflicts of social identities, and then identify four key lessons for ethical discourse about social sins.

The adding-and-averaging effect in bundles of information: Preference reversals across joint and separate evaluation.

When does adding mildly favorable information (e.g., job experience at the Railway Credit Union) alongside highly favorable (e.g., job experience at Goldman Sachs) increase versus decrease evaluations of a bundle of information like a resume or product bundle? We posit that whether that package of information is evaluated by itself-in separate evaluation (SE)-or side by side with another package-in joint evaluation (JE)-matters. Across a variety of contexts, four studies show that people "average" in SE and "add" in JE. Consequently, mildly favorable information hurts evaluations in SE but helps in JE. Study 1 demonstrated this "adding-and-averaging effect" among persons with expertise: law professors judging law faculty candidates. Adding middle tier academic publications to a higher tier publication on a CV decreased evaluations of a candidate judged in SE but increased evaluations of the same candidate in JE. Study 3 examined a linear pattern prediction, showing that each piece of mildly favorable information linearly added to the overall impression of a package of information in JE but linearly detracted from evaluations of the identical target in SE. Finally, Study 4 traced these differences in evaluative judgments to a shift in reference points brought about by evaluation mode. Implications for the organization specifically and our understanding of judgment and decision making processes more generally are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Judicial Character of Late Liberal Prudence: Paul v. Davis

Abstract A significant ideological shift has occurred in jurisprudential understanding of the social contract. Reading a landmark opinion from Justice Rehnquist—Paul v. Davis (1976)—as a pivot point for this shift, I identify a specific form of parsimonious judgment that has shaped the contemporary relationship between the individual and the state. Three markers of this form of judgment emerge from the opinion: (1) a claim about risks to state bureaucracy as a significant constitutional interest; (2) a slippery slope argument about institutional competence to discipline linguistic ambiguity; and (3) an interpretive practice that resolves this anxiety by binding precedent around a clear principle. This form of judgment has both ideological and normative significance. The opinion justifies a world of risk management that elevates economic liberty claims to exalted status. It disavows traditional markers of classical prudence, such as reverence for tradition, inflection of personal style as moral character, and orientation toward practical aspects of particular cases. Justifying its authority by performing its own rationale, Rehnquist’s opinion is significant for understanding how strategic invention can alter a democratic culture’s understanding of judgment, including its ethical dimensions.

Adding and Averaging in Organizational Decisions: The Impact of Evaluation Mode

When does adding mildly favorable information (e.g., job experience at the Railway Credit Union) alongside highly favorable (e.g., job experience at Goldman Sachs) increase versus decrease the impressiveness of one’s achievement? We posit that whether a package of information (e.g., a resume) is evaluated by itself–in separate evaluation–or side-by-side with another package–in joint evaluation–matters. Across a variety of organizational contexts, four studies show that people “average” in separate evaluation and “add” in joint evaluation. Consequently, mildly favorable information hurts in separate evaluation but helps in joint evaluation. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated these effects among persons with expertise (e.g., law professors judging law faculty candidates) and hiring experience. Study 3 examined a linear pattern prediction and showed that each piece of mildly favorable information included in a package linearly added to the overall impression in joint evaluation but linearly detracted from judgments of the same target in separate evaluation. Finally, Study 4 traced these differences in evaluative judgments to a shift in reference points brought about by evaluation mode. Implications for the organization specifically and our understanding of judgment and decision making processes more generally are considered.

Fear Factor: Offender and Victim Characteristics and Perceptions of Terrorism

This paper argues that the marriage of an underutilized methodological approach with an understudied substantive area has the potential to increase understanding of an all-too-common, yet insufficiently understood phenomenon: terrorism. The project will consist of a two-part vignette experiment to increase understanding of judgments and perceptions relating to terrorism. In particular, the experiment will examine whether there is a hierarchy of perpetrators or victims in terms of moral and legal judgments of terroristic acts. There are two primary hypotheses, one for each experiment: 1. American experimental subjects are more likely to define a violent act as terrorism and view it more negatively when committed by an actor with a traditionally Muslim name; and 2. American experimental subjects are more likely to view terrorism more negatively when perpetrated against Christian victims than Muslim victims. Additionally, it is hypothesized that if the expected differences are seen, they are due to both a discount on the value of Muslim lives and a markup on the value of Christian lives. If the hypotheses hold, the paper will situate the findings with a discussion of policy implications and recommendations for the criminal justice system. Pilot data collection is described and discussed.

The judgement processes involved in the moderation of teacher-assessed projects

Classroom-based assessments have the potential to enhance validity by facilitating the assessment of important skills that are difficult to assess in written examinations. Such assessments tend to be marked by teachers. To ensure consistent marking standards, quality assurance procedures are needed. In the context of continued debate over the robustness of assessment by teachers, this research aimed to provide insights into the cognitive and social processes involved in the moderation of project work in General Certificate of Secondary Education qualifications (taken by many 16 year olds in England). The research involved nine examiners across three subject areas ‘thinking aloud’ whilst moderating the marks given to six students (treated as a mock school). The participants were also interviewed. These methods were chosen to provide an in-depth look at the judgement processes involved. The research provides an improved understanding of moderation judgements and how aspects of this process relate to existing theories of judgement. Improving our understanding of the judgement processes involved when an examiner moderates teacher marking can help to evaluate the appropriateness of this assessment method, may contribute to debate on whether teacher marking can be sufficiently well verified by quality assurance procedures, and may inform moderation practice.

Authority and Reality in the Work of Oliver O’Donovan

Running throughout the work of Oliver O’Donovan is a discussion of the nature of authority, and its relation to reality, and to freedom. While holding fast to the maxim that authority is the correlate of freedom, O’Donovan’s understanding of authority moves, as a result of his engagement with the nature of political authority, to emphasise the idea of social mediation. This leads, in the most recent works, to a description of authority as an event in which reality is disclosed. Arguably, this formal account does not adequately distinguish the element of practical direction within authority, meaning that it may struggle to explain some ways in which we speak about authority’s presence, and its misuse. However, there may be resources for making this distinction within O’Donovan’s understanding of judgment as an act of moral discrimination with a twofold form. O’Donovan’s is an elegant and economical account of authority, promising to provide a simple analysis that encompasses the peculiarities of authority and illuminates a wide range of phenomena.

Ästhetische Objektivität

Abstract The question posed in this paper is in what sense we should say that our judgments about works of art can claim to be objective. It draws upon recent discussions in analytical aesthetics on the one hand and on the work of Hegel, Gadamer and McDowell on the other. The aim of the paper is to argue for the possibility of an objectivistic understanding of judgments on works of art. It does so by trying to render the foundations of subjective accounts of such judgments problematic and by trying to show that the difference between objective and mere intersubjective claims of judgments isn’t a valid difference at all.

Judging Clarissa’s Heart

This essay considers literary sentimentalism’s contribution to the modern discourses of autonomy by bringing into focus its under-read motif of judgment. The idea that one should judge for oneself, especially in moral matters, stands at the center of Samuel Richardson’s paradigmatic sentimental novel, Clarissa; or The History of a Young Lady . But Clarissa upholds more than one understanding of judgment, with varying implications for sentimentalism’s place within the larger liberal Enlightenment. On the one hand, Richardson’s heroine represents her judgments as instinctive responses, the work of her judging heart, which mysteriously reveals God’s laws. On the other hand, she understands judgment to entail scrutinizing the heart from a standpoint of relative impartiality. This latter account is sentimentalist because it takes impartiality to be a contingency of Clarissa’s epistolary friendship with Anna Howe, who helps Clarissa gain distance from her heart’s promptings by becoming a co-spectator of them. I suggest that the first, broadly religious, paradigm of judgment identifies Clarissa only ambiguously as an independent moral agent: while she is justified by the highest principles to defy worldly authority, she nonetheless remains God’s obedient servant. By contrast, the second, broadly secular paradigm--one that resonates with a Kantian tradition of aesthetics extending from Kant to Hannah Arendt--mobilizes an at once less transcendental and more compelling understanding of autonomy as moral independence nurtured by friendship and debate.

Arendt’s Hermeneuticl Interpretation of Kantian Reflective Judgment

Hannah Arendt's reading of reflective judgment in the philosophy of Kant deserves particular attention not only for her understanding of plurality but at least as much for its hermeneutical stance, although this last was neither her intention nor did she ever wrote specifically on that subject. As is well known, for Arendt The Critique of Judgment is the most political of all Kant's works. This unusual interpretation of the third critique is clearly exhibited in the general framework of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy.1 These lectures dating from 1970 are accepted as the core of her thoughts on judgment,2 which constituted the unwritten part of The Life of the Mind published in 1 974.3 This last and unfinished work can be regarded not only as an investigation between theoretical and practical reason, but also as bridging the gap between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa by the mediation of judgment. In this essay, I draw upon these lectures in order to examine aesthetical reflective judgments concentrating upon two of their general qualities: they are subjective judgments although they are dependent upon intersubjective judgments, and as I will indicate, they have a distinct hermeneutic significance. Surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the importance Arendt places on the hermeneutic significance of reflective judgments. It is the argument of this essay that in light of these hermeneutic shifts such major components of Arendt's thought as plurality, speech and action, common sense, and understanding are connected organically with what she calls reconciliation in her Denktagebuch. My discussion will be presented in four stages. First, I will indicate Arendt's debt to Kant by examining their common critical attitude toward the traditions in which their respective reflections were rooted in order to clarify their respective conceptions of the phenomenon of a common world. Second, I will focus on the qualities of aesthetical reflective judgments in the Critique of Judgment, which will provide a general view of the way in which Arendt appropriated the third critique. Third, in relation to these qualities, I will delineate the meaning of publicness, enlarged thought, and common sense. In the final section, I will provide an analysis that demonstrates the influence of Kant's notion of common sense upon Arendt's understanding of judgment and reveals the hermeneutic scope of her political theory. Her position will become even clearer when interpretation is considered in its relation to understanding and reconciliation. These analyses aim to provide a ground for understanding the intrinsic connections between Arendt's investigations and the interpretative character of political judgments, and even of judgments in general. The Influences of Kant on Arendt and Arendt's Lectures on Kant Although there are always obvious difficulties and complexities in finding the influences of one thinker upon another, in this case the affinities and the differences are suggestive enough to venture certain connections with some confidence. It is, of course, beyond doubt that Kant and Arendt lived in completely different lifeworlds and many influences of these different worlds can be found in their works. Although they both wrote during and after transformative periods in Europe and both had undergone the experience of revolution,4 the most striking difference between them is their elaboration of reason and the direction that reason takes. This point can be regarded as a decisive one especially when their understanding of the individual is analysed. But this strikingly different viewpoint is immediately balanced by consideration of their critical attitude toward each of their traditions. Despite their different lifeworlds, they shared one absolutely fundamental belief, namely, that a critical manner is essential for the development of any understanding of an issue. This essential characteristic receives special emphasis in both thinkers' mature works. …

Brunswik'S Lens Model in Human Factors Research: Modern Applications of a Classic Theory

As we develop new ways of looking at decision making in applied contexts, such as those outlined in naturalistic decision models, it is easy to assume that these new models should be used in place of ‘old’ theories in investigations of human decision making – and in many cases it may be appropriate to do so. In substituting the new for the old, however, it is important not to lose sight of the potential contributions that theoretically sound and empirically tested models can make to our understanding of judgment and decision making in modern environments. The purpose of this panel is to highlight a classic theoretical and methodological approach to the judgment process, Egon Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism and associated Lens Model framework (e.g., 1943; 1956; Hammond & Stewart, 2001), to present its basic tenets, and to discuss its viability and applicability in the context of modern human factors investigations (Kirlik, 2001). In particular, defining facets of Brunswikian theory and the Lens Model make this approach ideal for explorations of human judgment in high-technology environments.

THE IMAGINATION GOES VISITING

Owing to her focus on the gendered norms of propriety, Jane Austen tends to be identi�ed as a novelist of convention rather than of modernity. In this essay, however, I argue for a more �uid reading of Austen's gender politics as well as the modernity of her work, by examining the understanding of judgment that she articulates in her �rst published novel, Sense and Sensibility (1811). I place this novel in the context of an extensive discourse of critical judgment, which �ows from the Enlightenment to such theorists of the public sphere in the twentieth century as Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib. In keeping with this tradition, Austen identi�es judgment to be profoundly intersubjective and, as such, compatible with those social norms that cultivate mutual recognition and dialogue. Unlike political theorists like Arendt, however, who restrict the use of judgment to the public sphere, Austen identi�es the domestic sphere to be a crucial venue for exercising this faculty. In Sense and Sensibility the domestic sphere becomes an important part of "the social," understood by Austen as the venue of intersubjective relations in addition to norms and conventions. Her reinscription, in particular, of the drawing room as a conversational space in which intersubjective agreement can be generated opens up a reading of her work as friendly to a central insight of feminist public-sphere theory-the idea that the dualism of public and private spheres withholds value from participation in public spaces that are not recognizably political spaces but that bear on the achievement of progressive political goals.