Understanding Of Ignorance Research Articles

A Reassessment of Ignorance from the Perspective of the New Meanings of Rationality

In this article, we take a view of ignorance in relation to the new meaning of rationality, including the specific perspectives of limited rationality. We begin by suggesting that the problem of ignorance is far from the implied clarity of everyday expression, and there is a risk of inappropriate use of the concept. We show that not understanding what ignorance is, is part of ignorance, trying to avoid the situation of ignorance over ignorance. We propose a definition of ignorance by reference to the possible accessible and useful knowledge at a given time, suggesting that the understanding of ignorance is dependent on three variables: time, knowledge accessible at each moment of the present and utility. We analyze some asymmetries, including the one caused by the fact that we are often rigorous (but, nevertheless, interested) judges of others ignorance and very biased (that is, somewhat ignorant) about ourselves. We assess responsibility for our own ignorance by suggesting some limitations to the forms of ignorance for which we are responsible. We suggest that some variants of the unknown meet the definition of ignorance, and if we consider that most human decisions are made in conditions of information poverty, we can find that ignorance is frequently part of our cognitive strategies. Ignorance can be intentionally included in some of our cognitive strategies, one of which is provided by the principle of cognitive economics. The article can be one of the starting points for a set of recommendations on what can be ignored, what should and should not be ignored, when we are ignorant with no considerable effect and where/when we should not be

When the Light Goes Out: Ignorance and Multiplicity in Teaching and Learning

Purpose If education is the movement from dark to light, what does it mean for the light to go out? Following this question, this paper examines how conceptions of ignorance inform and are embedded in ideas of learning and pedagogy. Design/Approach/Methods Through historical and contemporary examples, I ask how an understanding of ignorance as absence frames some forms of teaching and learning, how ignorance might be understood differently, and how a different formulation of ignorance creates possibilities for imagining teaching and learning otherwise. Findings The framing of ignorance as absence articulates a distance between knowing and not knowing that defines what I call explicatory spacetime. This arrangement positions ignorance as a social problem and schooling as a solution aimed at closing the gap. I point to ways this framing persists today in research and practices that posit the acquisition of positive knowledge and the eradication of negative ignorance as a foremost educational responsibility. Originality/Value Engaging work across science and technology studies, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of education, I argue that alternative conceptions of ignorance often maintain associations with absence. Building from this scholarship, I ask how reframing ignorance through multiplicity, that is, within a field of possibility out of which a thing called knowledge can cohere, offers a different framework and pedagogical arrangements. Finally, I explore how reframing ignorance in a spacetime of multiplicity opens possibilities for understanding and enacting pedagogical encounters.

Intellectual virtue and its role in epistemology

An overview is presented of what I take to be (some main aspects of) the role of the intellectual virtues within the epistemological enterprise. Traditionally, the theory of knowledge has been thought to be central to the epistemological project, but since, as I explain, the intellectual virtues aren’t required for knowledge, this might suggest that they have only a marginal role to play in epistemological debates. I argue against this suggestion by showing how the intellectual virtues are in fact crucial to several core (and inter-related) epistemological topics, including the nature of inquiry, epistemic axiology and our understanding of ignorance.

Review: An Introduction to the Sociology of Ignorance: Essays on the Limits of Knowing

Ignorance is typically thought of as the absence or opposite of knowledge. In global societies that equate knowledge with power, ignorance is seen as a liability that can and should be overcome through increased education and access to information. In recent years, scholars from the social sciences, natural sciences and humanities have challenged this assumption, and have explored the ways in which ignorance can serve as a vital resource – perhaps the most vital resource – in social and political life. In this seminal volume, leading theorists of ignorance from anthropology, sociology and legal studies explore the productive role of ignorance in maintaining and destabilizing political regimes, entrenching corporate power, and shaping policy developments in climate science, global health, and global economic governance. From debates over death tolls during the war in Iraq, to the root causes of the global financial crisis, to poverty reduction strategies at the World Bank, contributors shed light on the unexpected ways that ignorance is actively harnessed by both the powerful and the marginalized in order to achieve different objectives. This eye-opening volume suggests that to understand power today, we must enrich our understanding of ignorance.

MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM: THE CASE OF SAYYID QUTB

This paper deals with the concept of Muslim Fundamentalism and places Sayyid Qutb within this broad context. The paper discusses two key concepts of Qutb’s fundamentalism, namely jihad (struggle) and jahilliyyah (ignorance). Qutb introduced a new understanding of ignorance, which originally referred to non-Muslims, but which for Qutb can also refer to those Muslims in government who do not live by the laws of God (Shari’ah). The paper also seeks to examine his last work, Milestones, which led to his death-sentence in 1960 by the Gamal abd al-Nasr regime of Egypt. There is no doubt that the impact of Qutb’s thought is still felt today, and some would even argue that he is the main inspiration for contemporary Islamic terrorism.

Ignorance versus False Belief: A Developmental Lag in Attribution of Epistemic States

HOGREFE, G.-JUERGEN; WIMMER, HEINZ; and PERNER, JOSEF. Ignorance versus False Belief: A Developmental Lag in Attribution of Epistemic States. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 567-582. 3-6-year-old children were either put into real-life situations or were read stories in which another person or story character was excluded from certain information. Their competence in attributing absence of knowledge (ignorance) was compared to their competence in attributing a false belief to the other. A marked difference between attributions was found. In a transitional stage at 3-4 years children were able to attribute ignorance but failed to attribute the resulting false belief. The same developmental gap for children about 2 years older was found between the attribution of secondorder ignorance and second-order false belief. Results are interpreted to show that children at a transitional stage find it difficult to represent the incompatible propositions describing the true state of affairs and the state of affairs falsely believed to be true by the other. Such a complexity is not involved in the understanding of ignorance where it has just to be represented that the other does not share the representation of the true state of affairs.