Underinformative Sentences Research Articles

Slowdowns in scalar implicature processing: Isolating the intention-reading costs in the Bott & Noveck task

An underinformative sentence, such as Some cats are mammals, is trivially true with a semantic (some and perhaps all) reading of the quantifier and false with a pragmatic (some but not all) one, with the latter reliably resulting in longer response times than the former in a truth evaluation task (Bott & Noveck, 2004). Most analyses attribute these prolonged reaction times, or costs, to the steps associated with the derivation of the scalar implicature. In the present work we investigate, across three experiments, whether such slowdowns can be attributed (at least partly) to the participant's need to adjust to the speaker's informative intention. In Experiment 1, we designed a web-based version of Bott & Noveck's (2004) laboratory task that would most reliably provide its classic results. In Experiment 2 we found that over the course of an experimental session, participants' pragmatic responses to underinformative sentences are initially reliably long and ultimately comparable to response times of logical interpretations to the same sentences. Such results cannot readily be explained by assuming that implicature derivation is a consistent source of processing effort. In Experiment 3, we further tested our account by examining how response times change as a function of the number of people said to produce the critical utterances. When participants are introduced (via a photo and description) to a single ‘speaker’, the results are similar to those found in Experiment 2. However, when they are introduced to two ‘speakers’, with the second ‘speaker’ appearing midway (after five encounters with underinformative items), we found a significant uptick in pragmatic response latencies to the underinformative item right after participants' meet their second speaker (i.e. at their sixth encounter with an underinformative item). Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting that at least part of the cost typically attributed to the derivation of a scalar implicature is actually a consequence of how participants think about the informative intentions of the person producing the underinformative sentences.

Chinese comprehenders' interpretation of underinformativeness in L1 and L2 accented speech narratives.

Second language (L2) speakers with foreign accents are well-known to face disadvantages in terms of language processing; however, recent research has demonstrated possible social benefits for foreign-accented L2 speakers. While previous research has focused on the ways in which first language (L1) speakers of English comprehend L2 speech, the present article contributes to this line of research by exploring the ways in which comprehenders from a different culture and linguistic background perceive L2 speech narratives. This study investigates this issue by exploring how comprehenders with Mandarin Chinese as the first language interpret underinformative utterances containing scalar and ad hoc implicature in L1, accent-free L2, and foreign-accented L2 speech narratives. The sentence judgment task with a guise design used written sentences rather than oral utterances as stimuli in order to isolate the role of intelligibility factors. The results indicate that foreign accent confers social benefits on L2 speakers in that their omission of information in communication is tolerated and they are viewed as more likely to possess positive attributes. More importantly, we find that the bilingual characteristics of Chinese participants, as well as the different linguistic complexity of deriving scalar and ad hoc implicature, affect Chinese participants' explanations of underinformative sentences of L2 speakers. This study contributes to our understanding of L2 language processing.

What second-language speakers can tell us about pragmatic processing.

Upon hearing the phrase Some cats meow, a listener might pragmatically infer that ‘Some but not all cats meow’. This is known as a scalar implicature and it often arises when a speaker produces a weak linguistic expression instead of a stronger one. Several L2 studies claim that pragmatic inferences are generated by default and their comprehension presents no challenges to L2 learners. However, the evidence obtained from these studies largely stems from offline-based tasks that provide limited information about how scalar implicatures are processed. This study investigated scalar implicature processing among L2 speakers of English and the degree to which differences in L2 proficiency and Theory of Mind abilities would modulate pragmatic responding. The experiment used an online sentence verification paradigm that required participants to judge, among multiple control items, the veracity of under-informative sentences, such as Some cats are mammals, and to respond as quickly as possible. A true response to this item is indicative of a logical some and perhaps all reading and a false response to a pragmatic some but not all reading. Our results showed evidence that scalar inferences are not generated by default. The answer linked to the pragmatic reading some but not all took significantly longer to make relative to the answer that relies on the logical interpretation some and perhaps all. This processing slowdown was also significantly larger among participants with lower English proficiency. Further exploratory analyses of participants’ Theory of Mind, as measured by the Social Skill subscale in the Autism Spectrum Quotient, revealed that socially inclined participants are more likely than the socially disinclined to derive a scalar inference. These results together provide new empirical insights into how L2 learners process scalar implicatures and thus implications for processing theories in experimental pragmatics and second language acquisition.

Scalar implicature is not a default process: An ERP study of the scalar implicature processing under the effect of focus factor

This study explored the processing mechanism of scalar implicatures under different focus conditions by the picture-sentence verification paradigm. Through the guidance of different types of incorrect sentences, scalar terms were controlled to adjust whether they were at the focus position and divided the focused and non-focused conditions. The behavioural results showed that when the content of the picture was “all squares have…”, more participants under the focused condition could judge that the underinformative sentence “some squares have…” was not appropriate. Moreover, according to whether participants could stably determine that the underinformative sentences were inappropriate, they were divided into pragmatic and semantic responders. The ERP results showed that pragmatic responders evoked a P200 effect, an N400 effect and a sustained negativity effect according to the scalar terms, and a P200 effect and a sustained positivity effect according to the sentence-final words. In contrast, semantic responders did not elicit any ERP effect. These results indicate that the generation of scalar implicatures is not completely determined by the scalar terms and that the focus factor plays an important role in the scalar implicatures inference.

Memory Load Effect in the Real-Time Processing of Scalar Implicatures.

This study examines effects of memory load on the processing of scalar implicature via a dual-task paradigm using reading span and self-paced reading. Results indicate that participants showed online sensitivity to underinformative sentences (e.g., Some birds have wings and beaks) at the end of the sentence. This online sensitivity disappeared when participants were under increased memory load. Moreover, participants in the memory-load condition did not show sensitivity to semantically false sentences (e.g., All books have pictures and drawings). These results pose important conceptual and methodological questions of (1) whether the processing cost associated with scalar implicatures can be attributed to general proposition evaluation rather than scalar implicature derivation per se (Bale et al. in Semant Linguist Theory 20:525-543, 2010), and (2) to what degree memory load affects implicature computation only. I conclude with a discussion of these two issues for future research.

Pragmatics and social meaning: Understanding under-informativeness in native and non-native speakers

Foreign-accented non-native speakers sometimes face negative biases compared to native speakers. Here we report an advantage in how comprehenders process the speech of non-native compared to native speakers. In a series of four experiments, we find that under-informative sentences are interpreted differently when attributed to non-native compared to native speakers. Specifically, under-informativeness is more likely to be attributed to inability (rather than unwillingness) to say more in non-native as compared to native speakers. This asymmetry has implications for learning: under-informative teachers are more likely to be given a second chance in case they are non-native speakers of the language (presumably because their prior under-informativeness is less likely to be intentional). Our results suggest strong effects of non-native speech on social-pragmatic inferences. Because these effects emerge for written stimuli, they support theories that stress the role of expectations on non-native comprehension, even in the absence of experience with foreign accents. Finally, our data bear on pragmatic theories of how speaker identity affects language comprehension and show how such theories offer an integrated framework for explaining how non-native language can lead to (sometimes unexpected) social meanings.

Sins of omission are more likely to be forgiven in non-native speakers

Utterances produced by foreign-accented speakers are often judged as less credible, more vague, and more difficult to understand compared to those produced by native speakers. Some theoretical accounts argue that listeners have different expectations about the speech of non-native speakers. Other accounts argue that non-native speech is processed differently to the extent that a foreign accent taxes intelligibility and introduces additional processing load. Here we test the role of expectations for the processing of native vs. non-native speech in written texts where accents cannot be directly perceived (and thus affect processing load). In Experiment 1, native comprehenders gave higher ratings to the meaning of under-informative sentences (“Some people have noses with two nostrils”) when they believed that the sentences were produced by non-native compared to native speakers. This difference was larger the more likely individual participants were to interpret under-informative sentences pragmatically (as opposed to logically). In Experiment 2, the tendency to forgive sins of information omission was shown to depend on the presumed L2 proficiency of non-native speakers. Experiment 3 replicated and extended the major finding. Since intelligibility of the sentences was identical across types of speakers, these findings provide support for the role of expectations for non-native speech comprehension, as well as for broader models of language processing that argue for a role of speaker identity.

The Understanding of Scalar Implicatures in Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder: Dichotomized Responses to Violations of Informativeness.

This study investigated the understanding of underinformative sentences like “Some elephants have trunks” by children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The scalar term ‘some’ can be interpreted pragmatically, ‘Not all elephants have trunks,’ or logically, ‘Some and possibly all elephants have trunks.’ Literature indicates that adults with ASD show no real difficulty in interpreting scalar implicatures, i.e., they often interpret them pragmatically, as controls do. This contrasts with the traditional claim of difficulties of people with ASD in other pragmatic domains, and is more in line with the idea that pragmatic problems are not universal. The aim of this study was to: (a) gain insight in the ability of children with ASD to derive scalar implicatures, and (b) do this by assessing not only sensitivity to underinformativeness, but also different degrees of tolerance to violations of informativeness. We employed a classic statement-evaluation task, presenting optimal, logical false, and underinformative utterances. In Experiment 1, children had to express their judgment on a binary option ‘I agree’ vs. ‘I disagree.’ In Experiment 2, a ternary middle answer option ‘I agree a bit’ was also available. Sixty-six Flemish-speaking 10-year-old children were tested: 22 children with ASD, an IQ-matched group, and an age-matched group. In the binary judgment task, the ASD group gave more pragmatic answers than the other groups, which was significant in the mixed effects logistic regression analysis, although not in the non-parametric analysis. In the ternary judgment task, the children with ASD showed a dichotomized attitude toward the speaker’s meaning, by tending to either fully agree or fully disagree with underinformative statements, in contrast with TD children, who preferred the middle option. Remarkably, the IQ-matched group exhibited the same pattern of results as the ASD group. Thanks to a fine-grained measure such as the ternary judgment task, this study highlighted a neglected aspect of the pragmatic profile of ASD, whose struggle with social communication seems to affect also the domain of informativeness. We discuss the implications of the dichotomized reaction toward violations of informativeness in terms of the potential role of ASD and of cognitive and verbal abilities.

Investigating scalar implicatures in a truth-value judgement task: evidence from event-related brain potentials

It is considered underinformative to say Some As are B when it is known that all As are B. Such underinformative sentences receive divergent truth-value judgements: whereas so-called logical responders evaluate them to be true, pragmatic responders reject them as false. In a sentence-picture verification experiment, we found that the split in the behavioural responses correlates with the difference in the event-related potentials (ERP) signal (N400 and P600) recorded for underinformative and for unambiguously true or false sentences with some. However, the ERP patterns for sentences with all are similar for both groups. In contrast to previous findings, the effect is independent of the subjects' autistic spectrum quotients. Assuming that the N400 amplitude is inversely correlated with the expected probability of the critical word we argue that the observed between-group difference in the ERP pattern can be explained by the hypothesis that ‘logicians’ and ‘pragmatists’ use distinct verification strategies in evaluating sentences with the quantifier some.

Some Differences in Some: Examining Variability in the Interpretation of Scalars Using Latent Class Analysis.

The present study investigated people’s understanding of underinformative sentences like ‘Some oaks are trees’. Specifically, the scalar term ‘some’ can be interpreted pragmatically, Not all oaks are trees, or logically, some and possibly all oaks are trees. The aim of this study was to capture the interindividual variability in the interpretation of such sentences. In two experiments, participants provided truth value judgments for 20 underinformative sentences on which a latent class analysis was performed. The results revealed three latent classes: a consistent pragmatic group, a consistent logical group and an inconsistent group. Furthermore, we examined whether this interindividual variability could be explained by text characteristics, response times, cognitive abilities and personality traits. The results showed that only participants’ response times to the underinformative sentences could predict class membership. Specifically, the slower participants responded, the more likely they were to interpret underinformative sentences consistently pragmatic or inconsistent instead of consistently logical.

L2 AND DEAF LEARNERS’ KNOWLEDGE OF NUMERICALLY QUANTIFIED ENGLISH SENTENCES

This study assessed knowledge of numerically quantified English sentences in two learner populations—second language (L2) learners and deaf learners—whose acquisition of English occurs under conditions of restricted access to the target language input. Under the experimental test conditions, interlanguage parallels were predicted to arise from acquisitional pressures imposed by derivational economy on universal grammar (UG)–guided semantic interpretation. The results of a task in which participants matched sentences to multiple discourse depictions confirmed the predicted parallels. However, in matching underinformative sentences to depicted contexts, the L2 and deaf learner groups overactivated discourse-pragmatic knowledge. The restriction of indefinite noun phrases to singleton indefinites and the cancellation of scalar implicatures rendered sentences more informative in underinformative contexts, producing incorrect—although principled—interpretations. These results inform English acquisition at the interface of semantics and discourse pragmatics and provide further support that economy pressures yield L2 learner and deaf learner interlanguage parallels as observed, for instance, in learners’ interpretative knowledge of universally quantified English sentences.

Children's acceptance of underinformative sentences: The case of some as a determiner

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some, if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all/some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some/all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier.

Pragmatic Inferences in High-Functioning Adults with Autism and Asperger Syndrome

Although people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) often have severe problems with pragmatic aspects of language, little is known about their pragmatic reasoning. We carried out a behavioral study on high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (n = 11) and Asperger syndrome (n = 17) and matched controls (n = 28) to investigate whether they are capable of deriving scalar implicatures, which are generally considered to be pragmatic inferences. Participants were presented with underinformative sentences like "Some sparrows are birds". This sentence is logically true, but pragmatically inappropriate if the scalar implicature "Not all sparrows are birds" is derived. The present findings indicate that the combined ASD group was just as likely as controls to derive scalar implicatures, yet there was a difference between participants with autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome, suggesting a potential differentiation between these disorders in pragmatic reasoning. Moreover, our results suggest that verbal intelligence is a constraint for task performance in autistic disorder but not in Asperger syndrome.

When People Are More Logical Under Cognitive Load

The present study introduces dual task methodology to test opposing psychological processing predictions concerning the nature of implicatures in pragmatic theories. Implicatures routinely arise in human communication when hearers interpret utterances pragmatically and go beyond the logical meaning of the terms. The neo-Gricean view (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures are generated automatically whereas relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. Participants were presented a sentence verification task with underinformative sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures like Some oaks are trees. Depending on the nature of the interpretation of Some (logical or pragmatic) the sentence is judged true or false. Executive cognitive resources were experimentally burdened by the concurrent memorization of complex dot patterns during the interpretation process. Results showed that participants made more logical and fewer pragmatic interpretations under load. Findings provide direct support for the relevance theory view.

Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time course of scalar inferences

When Tarzan asks Jane Do you like my friends? and Jane answers Some of them, her underinformative reply implicates Not all of them. This scalar inference arises when a less-than-maximally informative utterance implies the denial of a more informative proposition. Default Inference accounts (e.g., Levinson, 1983, 2000) argue that this inference is linked to lexical items (e.g., some) and is generated automatically and largely independently of context. Alternatively, Relevance theory ( Sperber & Wilson, 1985/1995) treats such inferences as contextual and as arriving effortfully with deeper processing of utterances. We compare these accounts in four experiments that employ a sentence verification paradigm. We focus on underinformative sentences, such as Some elephants are mammals, because these are false with a scalar inference and true without it. Experiment 1 shows that participants are less accurate and take significantly longer to answer correctly when instructions call for a Some but not all interpretation rather than a Some and possibly all interpretation. Experiment 2, which modified the paradigm of Experiment 1 so that correct responses to both interpretations resulted in the same overt response, reports results that confirm those of the first Experiment. Experiment 3, which imposed no interpretations, reveals that those who employed a Some but not all reading to the underinformative items took longest to respond. Experiment 4 shows that the rate of scalar inferences increased as permitted response time did. These results argue against a Neo-Gricean account and in favor of Relevance theory.

Characterizing the time course of an implicature: An evoked potentials study

This work employs Evoked Potential techniques as 19 participants are confronted with sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures, like in Some elephants have trunks. Such an Underinformative utterance is of interest to pragmatists because it can be considered to have two different truth values. It can be considered true when taken at face value but false if one were to treat Some with the implicature Not All. Two accounts of implicature production are compared. The neo-Gricean approach (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures intrude automatically on the semantics of a term like Some. Relevance Theory ( Sperber & Wilson, 1985/1996) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. In this experiment, the participants are presented with 25 Underinformative sentences along with 25 sentences that are Patently True (e.g. Some houses have bricks) and 25 that are Patently False (e.g. Some crows have radios). As reported in an earlier study ( Noveck, 2001), Underinformative sentences prompt strong individual differences. Seven participants here responded true to all (or nearly all) of the Underinformative sentences and the remaining 12 responded false to all (or nearly all) of them. The present study showed that those who responded false to the Underinformative sentences took significantly longer to do so that those who responded true. The ERP data indicate that: (a) the Patently True and Patently False sentences prompt steeper N400’s—indicating greater semantic integration—than the Underinformative sentences and that (b) regardless of one’s ultimate response to the Underinformative sentences, the N400’s were remarkably flat, indicating no particular reaction to these sentences. Collectively, the data are taken to show that implicatures are part of a late-arriving, effort-demanding decision process.