Unconscious Rules Research Articles

The moral grammar of marriage rules

Abstract According to theories of “moral grammar,” judgments of what is wrong or right – like judgments of what is ungrammatical or grammatical – are guided by implicit, often unconscious rules. An ideal test case for exploring the parallels between moral rules and language rules is the moral regulation of mating in relation to kinship. Here I argue that combinatorial variation in both kin terminologies and marriage rules results from the operation of a grammar faculty, which juggles tradeoffs between conflicting constraints according to the principles of “Optimality Theory.” This works to produce kinship grammars, input-output systems that map some kin types onto others via mergers and reductions. This in turn can yield marriage rules. If a kin type maps onto a close consanguine, this corresponds to a marriage proscription. If a kin type maps onto a close affine, this corresponds to a marriage prescription/preference. I analyze both elementary structures of kinship (where cross kin are prescribed spouses, and parallel kin are proscribed; e.g. Dravidian southern India) and complex structures (where kin are divided into an unmarriageable core and a marriageable periphery, and affines are sometimes tabooed because they are equated with close consanguines; e.g. Jane Austen’s England). Rather than treating social organization as the source of mental categories, this analysis starts with the machinery of categorization and shows how it spontaneously generates marriage rules. The result is an updating of structuralism in light of cognitive science: moral codes vary within limits set by fundamental structures of the human mind.

Certified Registered Nurse Anaesthetists’ and Critical Care Registered Nurses’ perception of knowledge/power in teamwork with Anaesthesiologists in Sweden: a mixed-method study

Efficient teamwork is crucial to provide optimal health care. This paper focuses on teamwork between Anaesthesiologists (ANES), Certified Registered Nurse Anaesthetists’ (CRNA) and Critical Care Registered Nurses (CCRN) working in challenging environments such as the intensive care unit (ICU) and the operating room (OR). Conflicts are common between physicians and nurses, negatively impacting teamwork. Social hierarchies based on professional status and power inequalities between nurses and physicians plays a vital role in influencing teamwork. Foucault was a famous thinker especially known for his reasoning regarding power/knowledge. A Foucauldian perspective was therefore incorporated into this paper and the overall aim was to explore CCRN/CRNA perception of knowledge/power in teamwork with ANES.Methods A mixed-method approach was applied in this study. Data was collected using a web-based questionnaire containing both closed-end and open-ended questions. A total of 289 CCRNs and CRNAs completed the questionnaire. Data analysis was then conducted through five stages as outlined by Onwuebugzie and Teddlie; analysing quantitative data in SPSS 27.0 and qualitative data with a directed content analysis, finally merging data together in ATLAS.ti v.23.Results The result reveals a dissonance between quantitative and qualitative data; quantitative data indicates a well-functioning interdisciplinary teamwork between CCRN/CRNA and ANES - qualitative data highlights that there are several barriers and inequalities between the two groups. Medicine was perceived as superior to nursing, which was reinforced by both social and organisational structures at the ICU and OR.Conclusion Unconscious rules underlying current power structures in the ICU and OR works in favour of the ANES and biomedical paradigm, supporting medical knowledge. To achieve a more equal power distribution between CCRN/CRNAs and ANES, the structural hierarchies between nursing and medicine needs to be addressed. A more equal power balance between the two disciplines can improve teamwork and thereby reduce patient mortality and improve patient outcomes.

Speaking and Hearing With an Accent

When we speak a second language, we tend to do so with an accent. An accent is a change of the sounds of the second language, often the result of the influence of the first language. For example, an English speaker might produce French with English “r” sounds. Accents result from more than just poor muscular coordination. Second-language speakers are drawing on the unconscious rules that they already know about their first language. This body of knowledge influences not only how people speak a second language but also how they hear it. If a Japanese speaker is not accurately producing a distinction between an “l” and “r” sound, it is likely that the same individual will have difficulty accurately hearing the difference between the two sounds. Ultimately, bilingualism is a natural state for the human brain, even when we are speaking or listening with an accent.

The Tacit Dimensions of Normative Rules

All rules are normative. Using Polanyi’s tacit integration, this article shows that all rules have tacit dimensions in their creation by recognition of regularities, application and modification, all of which cannot be made wholly explicit. J. Searle holds that some regular actions are not the following of unconscious rules, but ignores the fact that they have been tacitly formed by recognising of regularities. Tacitly known and practised rules are transmitted by apprentices observing the actions and judgements of masters, and then across generations by tradition. Thus knowledge and belief cannot be neither clearly distinguished nor separated. Justificatory, critical and foundational philosophies are to be replaced by a fiduciary and fallible one.

Changing the rules of the game

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to explore how neuro‐linguistic programming (NLP) can help organizations achieve dramatic culture shifts in a short space of time.Design/methodology/approachBased on the author's 17 years of experience in helping organizations change, the paper puts forward a theory that it is the unconscious rules within an organization's culture that prevent change strategies from succeeding. The paper proposes strategies based on NLP for more effective change, supported by case studies demonstrating how the theory can be applied.FindingsNLP‐based strategies help to uncover the unconscious rules and break them down to identifiable pieces on which to base strategies that will lead to real change.Originality/valueThe author shares a strategy and practical model for culture change that have been developed after many years of working with clients to deliver sustainable culture change initiatives that result in long‐term change.

Cultural differences in conceptual models of ride comfort for high‐speed trains

AbstractThis study focuses on an analysis of the difference in cultural experiences for similar services through analyzing the difference in conceptual models of ride comfort for passengers of KTX (Korea Train eXpress) and TGV (Train a Grand Vitesse). These trains operate with identical platforms; KTX was introduced by K‐TGV (Korea‐TGV) based on TGV (French high‐speed train). For the conceptual models of ride comfort, this study surveyed 200 KTX passengers on the Seoul‐‐Busan line (duration: 2 hours 30 minutes) and surveyed 150 France TGV passengers on the Paris‐‐Marseilles line (duration: 2 hours 40 minutes). The conceptual models of ride comfort were analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM). In the results of the study, though there were differences in cultural environment (e.g., physical environment, body size, etc.) and cultural mentality (e.g., preference, unconscious rule, etc.), the models of ride comfort for both countries shared similar critical factors. However, there were significant differences in loading values of ride comfort for these critical factors. In particular, there were differences of 1.5 to 2 times between the two models regarding the subfactors seat factor and human fatigue factor. In conclusion, this study elicits that experience factor is the most influential on ride comfort, and cultural factors are applied as essential variables in ride comfort improvement. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The literary curriculum and the denial of backgrounds

Abstract The literary seeks make curriculum space legible. This requires denying that knowledge has that cannot be made legible. Worse still, the attempt make knowledge legible undermines that which can reasonably be described, and leaves it, if not unusable, then deficient. The difficulty facing those who are concerned with preserving an emphasis on backgrounds that cannot be made foreground is that the notion of background evades easy discussion. There are several reasons for this. One is the fact that we--in particular, speakers of English-feel the force of a disposition that urges us name things and attribute a kind of ownership them. Prologue In an essay on Christmas during wintertime, Chesterton observed that the boy who enjoys all seasons enjoys no season. Please take a moment think about this statement. Does it have a ring of truth for you? If it does, if you have a feeling for why it is true, then you have a feeling for what this paper is about. One could express the same sort of truth by saying: the school that makes every teacher a principal has no principal; or, the university that appoints every lecturer a professor, has no professors. To apprehend the truth of these statements is be aware of a background that attends each; a background that is at first imperceptible, but that is nonetheless vital. To enjoy involves more than to take a delight in, which is what appears in my dictionary. If one enjoys too many things, one ceases enjoy. There is a necessary component of distinction that accompanies the word enjoy as a kind of atmosphere; but it is difficult put one's finger on quite what this distinction is. The dictionary does not give the full story. There is a connecting background that the dictionary writers either did not notice, or, if they did, felt it beyond their capacity make it legible in the way required. (1) Unless a teacher has been reading Harry Potter a class, it is highly unlikely she would ever consider the possibility that the students might suddenly become large, spherical, inflated beings, rise the ceiling, and hover there like Chinese paper lanterns. Now, does the teacher--whose imagination has not been stimulated in this way--hold a belief, or an expectation, or an assumption, that this will not happen? No. She holds no view whatever on the matter, not even an unconscious belief. However, if such an event were happen, she would be surprised. can this be? These sorts of states of mind--I cannot call them beliefs, or any other name that I know of--are what Searle (1983, p. 142) calls 'fishy' because they are too fundamental qualify as beliefs, even as unconscious beliefs. Does an experienced teacher follow rules which guide her professional practice? Experienced people know they do not; and independent investigation confirms this (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). does she know what do, then? Does she perhaps follow unconscious rules; that is, formerly conscious rules that have now become unconscious? No. The reason is: experienced teachers are working in a highly complex environment that constantly requires dealing with novel situations. Accordingly, if they used rules, they would also need a new set of rules tell them which of the rules apply in a novel situation. This leads an infinite regress. How do ever interpret a writes the scientist and philosopher Polanyi (1946, p. 44), By another rule? There can be only a finite number of tiers of rules so that such a regression would soon be exhausted. So, how do they perform so competently in so many novel situations? Such teachers use what l call improvisational gestalts. When exercising a skill, Polanyi (1969, p. 160) argues, we literally dwell in the innumerable muscular acts. Furthermore, he argues that something similar occurs in all tacit knowing, which he sees as a part of all knowing: since all understanding is tacit knowing, all understanding is achieved by indwelling (p. …

Rule Following and the Background

In his work on language John Searle favors an Austinian approach that emphasizes the speech act as the basic unit of meaning and communication, and which sees speaking a language as engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. He couples this with a strident opposition to cognitivist approaches that posit unconscious rule following as the causal basis of linguistic competence. In place of unconscious rule following Searle posits what he calls the Background, comprised of nonintentional (nonrepresentational) mental phenomena. I argue that these two aspects of his philosophy of language cannot be reconciled. In order to preserve his view of language as a rule-governed activity, he must embrace the cognitivist idea of unconscious rule following. Finally, I try to show how such an accommodation would be far less traumatic to Searle’s philosophical system than it might otherwise seem.

Does the SOC theory avoid unconscious rule use?

There are striking similarities between Perruchet & Vinter's SOC theory and the theories that they claim to be in opposition to. First, both kinds of theory lead to the induction of knowledge of complex patterns in the environment that serve the function of rules. Second, both involve unconscious mental processes of induction resulting in at least some conscious knowledge.

Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle

AbstractSearle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.

Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems

AbstractA number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal, namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances (or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning. We examine the evidence for implicit learning derived from subliminal learning, conditioning, artificial grammar learning, instrumental learning, and reaction times in sequence learning. We conclude that unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily established in any of these areas. The assumption that learning in some of these tasks (e.g., artificial grammar learning) is predominantly based on rule abstraction is questionable. When subjects cannot report the “implicitly learned” rules that govern stimulus selection, this is often because their knowledge consists of instances or fragments of the training stimuli rather than rules. In contrast to the distinction between conscious and unconscious learning, the distinction between instance and rule learning is a sound and meaningful way of taxonomizing human learning. We discuss various computational models of these two forms of learning.

Objectivity and ideology in the human sciences

This paper is a gloss on section 6 of chapter four of Michel Foucault's The Archeology of Knowledge and on some of his essays on knowledge and power. 1 The title contains an ambiguity: there are two related and distinct senses of "objectivity". In the first sense it is opposed to subjectivity. An assertion or a view is then said to be objective to the extent that the truth value or meaning of what it asserts does not vary with who asserts it, or with the situation or time in which it is asserted. That entails, for example, that whatever tenses and demonstrative or personal pronouns occur in the assertion must be straightforwardly eliminable in favor of dates and proper names. That scientific knowledge at least approaches this sort of objectivity may be its most fundamental principle. This principle is at once the most obvious and the most profound mark by which science is distinguished from ordinary or personal knowledge, which is always subjective and deeply rooted in its context. From this difference flow others. Scientific knowledge is theoretical, its normal form is the written theory. It is deductively closed, organised by explicit rules, and, when correct, free of contradiction. Personal knowledge, on the other hand, is typically neither theoretical nor written, and should it be cast in written form that is more likely to be narrative than theoretical. Personal knowledge, as the plentiful recent literature on belief makes evident, is neither deductively closed nor consistent. 2 It cherishes and administers its contradictions, as science could never do. Much of its organization follows unconscious rules. The second sense of objectivity is metaphysical. This is objectivity in the sense of object-hood, or object-ness. The question of objectivity in the human sciences is then the question of the ontology of these sciences, of the natures and sources of their objects. This is not quite the question how the empirical objects of those sciences come into being; how men, societies, money, families, states, and so on come into being. These are more properly questions of the subject sciences in their historical forms than questions about their constitution or foundation. The question of objectivity is rather one of those typically philosophical questions, apparently idle and pointless, and of little concern to the sciences themselves. It is a question about the categories in terms of which the human sciences organize their subject matter. Why is it that economists think in terms of the market, psychologists in terms of stimulus and response, political theorists in terms of sovereignty, anthropologists in terms of kinship systems? Within the subject sciences themselves questions like these are uninteresting. The existence of the market is the most pervasive and banal of economic facts; it should be evident to anyone that kinship systems are fundamental in social organization, and so on. A science does not occupy itself with the justification of its own categories. Nor is this an error. It is not as if the scientist somehow goes wrong in not raising the question of the nature of the objects he investigates, It is inherent in the virtuous dogmatism of scientific inquiry, as distinguished from other sorts of inquiry, that it takes its objects as given and obvious. If "objectivity" is ambiguous, "ideology" is that and is also vague. Two overlapping sorts of ideology are of concern here. One of these consists of the values and motivations of individual researchers. The relations of these to the conduct of scientific inquiry are of considerable importance for the salient reason that different researchers may have different values and motivations. Should methodology, procedure, or the results of scientific investigation be in part determined by these values, then the outcome might vary depending upon who conducts the experiment, and the impersonal objectivity of science would not be assured. A second sort of ideology, which may in some cases coincide with the first sort, is institutional and is usually associated with Marxist critiques of science. The economic and political functions of science in a given society are the major ideological influences of this sort.

On the utility of procedural rules: conditions of the use of rules in the production of operation sequences

Abstract Through a series of experiments we sought to find the conditions of identification and application of a four-level system of hierarchic rules. These rules were used to organize patterns of digits, which were copied (by our 49 subjects) from a visual display on to paper. We varied instructions in the rule system, tasks (rule application vs transfer by heart), load on the working memory, and number of repetitions of the digit transfer task. The procedure applied by the subjects was a mixture of memorization of grouped digits and rule application. The mixture depended on the ratio of costs and benefits of rule application. We found an efficient unconscious rule application existed, relieving working memory. The most extensive rule application was found with a combination of instruction on the rules and transfer by memorization. The applied model of rule hierarchy and its acquisition was determined by behavioral economy. The unconscious rule application could be systematically promoted.