Unconscious Inference Research Articles

Shared Perception Is Different From Individual Perception: A New Look on Context Dependency

Human perception is based on unconscious inference, where sensory input integrates with prior information. This phenomenon, known as context dependency, helps in facing the uncertainty of the external world with predictions built upon previous experience. On the other hand, human perceptual processes are inherently shaped by social interactions. However, how the mechanisms of context dependency are affected is to date unknown. If using previous experience - priors - is beneficial in individual settings, it could represent a problem in social scenarios where other agents might not have the same priors, causing a perceptual misalignment on the shared environment. The present study addresses this question. We studied context dependency in an interactive setting with a humanoid robot iCub that acted as a stimuli demonstrator. Participants reproduced the lengths shown by the robot in two conditions: one with iCub behaving socially and another with iCub acting as a mechanical arm. The different behavior of the robot significantly affected the use of prior in perception. Moreover, the social robot positively impacted perceptual performances by enhancing accuracy and reducing participants overall perceptual errors. Finally, the observed phenomenon has been modelled following a Bayesian approach to deepen and explore a new concept of shared perception.

In-channel cancellation: A model of early auditory processing.

A model of early auditory processing is proposed in which each peripheral channel is processed by a delay-and-subtract cancellation filter, tuned independently for each channel with a criterion of minimum power. For a channel dominated by a pure tone or a resolved partial of a complex tone, the optimal delay is its period. For a channel responding to harmonically related partials, the optimal delay is their common fundamental period. Each peripheral channel is thus split into two subchannels-one that is cancellation-filtered and the other that is not. Perception can involve either or both, depending on the task. The model is illustrated by applying it to the masking asymmetry between pure tones and narrowband noise: a noise target masked by a tone is more easily detectable than a tone target masked by noise. The model is one of a wider class of models, monaural or binaural, that cancel irrelevant stimulus dimensions to attain invariance to competing sources. Similar to occlusion in the visual domain, cancellation yields sensory evidence that is incomplete, thus requiring Bayesian inference of an internal model of the world along the lines of Helmholtz's doctrine of unconscious inference.

Can an algorithm become delusional? Evaluating ontological commitments and methodology of computational psychiatry

AbstractThe computational approach to psychiatric disorders, including delusions, promises explanation and treatment. Here, we argue that an information processing approach might be misleading to understand psychopathology and requires further refinement. We explore the claim of computational psychiatry being a bridge between phenomenology and physiology while focussing on the ontological commitments and corresponding methodology computational psychiatry is based on. Interconnecting ontological claims and methodological practices, the paper illustrates the structure of theory-building and testing in computational psychiatry.First, we will explain the ontological commitments computational psychiatry is grounded in, theBayesian Brain hypothesis(BBH) of unconscious inference, paired with normative deontic approaches applied to gauge psychopathology. We then turn to the steps taken in empirical paradigms, from definitions, which are used as starting points, to the operationalisation and isolation of cognitive processes and hypothesis testing based on algorithmic models, to consecutive interpretations regarding the aetiology of psychiatric disorders. We outline how experimental paradigms in computational psychiatry are specifically designed to confirm aberrations in assumed inferential processes, which are thought of as being the underlyingcore invariant features.We will illustrate a gap between the ontological commitments of computational psychiatry and the operationalisation and testing of the cognition assumed to be relevant for psychopathology. This conceptual gap is of utmost importance when designing computational paradigms and may impede a crisp understanding of the approach. Lastly, in evaluating the conceptual gap, it becomes apparent that the information processing formalism used in computational psychiatry is still grounded in rational cognitive psychology.

Метафорическое соотнесение как механизм мышления

This article proposes an interpretation of the metaphorical correlation (MC) as a mechanism of thinking aimed at the search for, and development of, a thinking strategy, set down and conveyed by language, that will be most ef­fective in the given cultural and historical context. The MC mechanism is de­fined as a process by which some characteristics of an object (those selected by thinking) interact and some others are suppressed, with a chance at later actualisation. As a result, awareness of the self as an existentially non-static system bearing with it ‘the world as an accepted sense’ makes it possible to re­think the connection between language, thinking and perception. Here, a prob­lem assuming a special prominence is attaining the obviousness and veracity (a primary cohesion of experience) by possessing which cognising agents con­struct a reality for themselves. The article considers Gustav Gerber’s ideas and Hermann von Helmholtz’s definition of perception as ‘unconscious inference’, as well as Immanuel Kant’s assertion about the ‘logical tact’ lying ‘in the ob­scurity of the mind’. Metaphorical correlation is shown to be able to act as a mechanism of a sui generis intuitive logic, which marks the starting point of cognitive reflection and paves the way for linguistic reality. Metaphorical correlation is a mechanism of abstraction and conceptualisation that deter­mines the angles of cognitive reflection. The author concludes that if thinking is to be viewed as a calculus of the best possible strategy for interpreting expe­rience (this vision is reflected in language, ever illuminating the substantive aspects of an object that are existentially important for a native speaker), the MC mechanism, which is immanently intrinsic to thinking processes, makes it possible to ‘calculate’ a thinking strategy whose adaptive value lies in the pos­sibility of explicating the elements of experience for which there is a com­pelling existential need and inhibition of those whose explication is not requi­site at the moment.

Unconscious inferences in perception in early experimental psychology: From Wundt to Peirce.

What are unconscious inferences in psychology? This article investigates their journey from the early philosophical psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) to the experimental psychology of the American pragmatist Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). Peirce's reception of Wundt's early works situates him in an international web of 19th-century experimental psychologists and its reconstruction opens new perspectives on the relation between philosophy, psychology, and epistemology. Moreover, this reception testifies to a heretofore overlooked strand of influence of Wundt on North American experimental psychology. The notion of unconscious inferences, of which Hermann von Helmholtz is usually considered the chief exponent, becomes the backbone of Peirce's theory of perception mostly because of the affinity between Wundt's early philosophy of mind and Peirce's logic-mediated approach to psychology.

Larger capacity for unconscious versus conscious episodic memory

Episodic memory is the memory for experienced events. A peak competence of episodic memory is the mental combination of events to infer commonalities. Inferring commonalities may proceed with and without consciousness of events. Yet what distinguishes conscious from unconscious inference? This question inspired nine experiments that featured strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips presented for unconscious and conscious inference. Each clip featured a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding place. Five animals crossed the scene one-by-one consecutively. One animal trajectory represented one event. The animals moved through the hiding place, where they might linger or not. The participants' task was to observe the animals' entrances and exits to maintain a mental record of which animals hid simultaneously. We manipulated information load to explore capacity limits. Memory of inferences was tested immediately, 3.5 or 6min following encoding. The participants retrieved inferences well when encoding was conscious. When encoding was unconscious, the participants needed to respond intuitively. Only habitually intuitive decision makers exhibited a significant delayed retrieval of inferences drawn unconsciously. Their unconscious retrieval performance did not drop significantly with increasing information load, while conscious retrieval performance dropped significantly. A working memory network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious inference and correlated with retrieval success. An episodic retrieval network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious retrieval of inferences and correlated with retrieval success. Only conscious encoding/retrieval recruited additional brain regions outside these networks. Hence, levels of consciousness influenced the memories' behavioral impact, memory capacity, and the neural representational code.

Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion

According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject to the illusion of phenomenal consciousness consists in having this disposition. I explain our ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness (Chalmers 2018)—that our sensory states bear phenomenal properties that are qualitatively like something with which we are directly acquainted that is ineffable, atomic, intrinsic (non-relational), private, and non-physical. I also address the illusion meta-problem (Kammerer 2019a), which is to explain why illusionism seems especially counterintuitive.

How to Resolve Comte\u2019s Challenge: The Answer of Cognitive Neuroscience and the Neo-Aristotelian Alternative

Comte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte’s challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholtz on unconscious inferences and argued that we can resolve Comte’s problem by reformulating it in terms of the brain. Since the brain consists of different parts having different functions, it is possible that some parts are involved in observing (they unconsciously process information) while other parts integrate the received information resulting in conscious experiences to which we have access. Dehaene’s answer is criticized and the alternative neo-Aristotelian resolution of Comte’s challenge is discussed. Explanations of blindsight are used to illustrate the differences between the two responses to Comte’s challenge.

A Sensorimotor Numerosity System.

Incoming sensory input provides information for the planning and execution of actions, which yield motor outcomes that are themselves sensory inputs. One dimension where action and perception strongly interact is numerosity perception. Many non-human animals can estimate approximately the number of external elements as well as their own actions, and neurons have been identified that respond to both. Recent psychophysical adaptation studies on humans also provide evidence for neural mechanisms responding to both the number of externally generated events and self-produced actions. Here we advance the idea that these strong connections may arise from dedicated sensorimotor mechanisms in the brain, part of a more generalized system interfacing action with the processing of other quantitative magnitudes such as space and time.

Sustained representation of perspectival shape

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such "unconscious inference": When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain an elliptical appearance even when we know it's circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional "coins," and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn't be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape "out there," and their perspectival shape "from here."

Auditory Perceptual History Is Propagated through Alpha Oscillations.

SummaryPerception is a proactive, “predictive” process, in which the brain relies, at least in part, on accumulated experience to make best guesses about the world to test against sensory data, updating the guesses as new experience is acquired. Using novel behavioral methods, the present study demonstrates the role of alpha rhythms in communicating past perceptual experience. Participants were required to discriminate the ear of origin of brief sinusoidal tones that were presented monaurally at random times within a burst of uncorrelated dichotic white noise masks. Performance was not constant but varied with delay after noise onset in an oscillatory manner at about 9 Hz (alpha rhythm). Importantly, oscillations occurred only for trials preceded by a target tone to the same ear, either on the previous trial or two trials back. These results suggest that communication of perceptual history generates neural oscillations within specific perceptual circuits, strongly implicating behavioral oscillations in predictive perception and with formation of working memory.

From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience

Science and art have long recognized that perceptual experience depends on the involvement of the experiencer. In art history, this idea is captured by Ernst Gombrich’s ‘beholder’s share’. In neuroscience, it traces to Helmholtz’s concept of ‘perception as inference’, which is enjoying renewed prominence in the guise of ‘prediction error minimization’ (PEM) or the ‘Bayesian brain’. The shared idea is that our perceptual experience – whether of the world, of ourselves, or of an artwork – depends on the active ‘top-down’ interpretation of sensory input. Perception becomes a generative act, in which perceptual, cognitive, affective, and sociocultural expectations conspire to shape the brain’s ‘best guess’ of the causes of sensory signals. In this article, I explore the parallels between the Bayesian brain and the beholders’ share, illustrated, somewhat informally, with examples from Impressionist, Expressionist, and Cubist art. By connecting phenomenological insights from these traditions with the cognitive neuroscience of predictive perception, I outline a reciprocal relationship in which art reveals phenomenological targets for neurocognitive accounts of subjectivity, while the concepts of predictive perception may in turn help make mechanistic sense of the beholder’s share. This is not standard neuroaesthetics – the attempt to discover the brain basis of aesthetic experience – nor is it any kind of neuro-fangled ‘theory of art’. It is instead an examination of one way in which art and brain science can be equal partners in revealing deep truths about human experience.

Passive motion and active inference: Commentary on “Muscleless motor synergies and actions without movements: From motor neuroscience to cognitive robotics” by Vishwanathan Mohan, Ajaz Bhat and Pietro Morasso

Mohan et al offer an exhaustive and compelling survey of different paradigms for understanding an embodied exchange with the world. They describe a new way of looking at motor control that has emerged over the past years, – a view that resolves many issues with previous (optimal motor control) formulations. Pleasingly, this new way of looking at things picks up on historical themes that date back to the 19th century. For example, notions of synergy formation and the equilibrium point hypothesis, re-emerge with a new simplicity and explanatory power, when one takes a holistic and enactive view of embodied behaviour. Indeed, one might trace the ideas explored in Mohan et al back to foundational notions enshrined in ideomotor theory and Helmholtz's notion of unconscious inference. This new way of looking at things is centred on the notion of a forward or generative model that plays the functional role of a “plastic configurable internal representation of the body (body schema) as a critical link enabling the seamless continuum between motor control and imagery.” Mohan et al.

Noumenal power: concept and explanation

Does ‘noumenal power’ adequately represent ‘the real and general phenomenon of power,’ as the capacity to secure the compliance of others? Does it include what is relevantly similar and exclude what is not? Forst’s concept is, appropriately, interagentive, but errs in insisting that power is intentionally ‘exercised’ thereby excluding countless ways in which compliance can be otherwise secured. Does ‘noumenal power’ offer the best explanation of how power functions? In claiming that it must involve the recognition of reasons to act differently than one otherwise would, it does not address the role of emotions, overstates the role of reasoning, and excludes various significant ways in which power bypasses conscious awareness: through unconscious intuitions and inferences and taken-for-granted cultural schemas, by occlusion, excluding thoughts from consideration, and by signaling, in ways that mimic reasons.

Multistable Perception and the Role of the Frontoparietal Cortex in Perceptual Inference.

A given pattern of optical stimulation can arise from countless possible real-world sources, creating a dilemma for vision: What in the world actually gives rise to the current pattern? This dilemma was pointed out centuries ago by the astronomer and mathematician Ibn Al-Haytham and was forcefully restated 150 years ago when von Helmholtz characterized perception as unconscious inference. To buttress his contention, von Helmholtz cited multistable perception: recurring changes in perception despite unchanging sensory input. Recent neuroscientific studies have exploited multistable perception to identify brain areas uniquely activated in association with these perceptual changes, but the specific roles of those activations remain controversial. This article provides an overview of theoretical models of multistable perception, a review of recent neuroimaging and brain stimulation studies focused on mechanisms associated with these perceptual changes, and a synthesis of available evidence within the context of current notions about Bayesian inference that find their historical roots in von Helmholtz's work.

The most reasonable explanation of "the dress": Implicit assumptions about illumination.

Millions of Internet users around the world challenged science by asking why a certain photo of a dress led different observers to have surprisingly different judgments about the color of the dress. The reason this particular photo produces so diverse a variety of judgments presumably is that the photo allows a variety of interpretations about the illumination of the dress. The most obvious explanation from color science should be that observers have different implicit assumptions about the illumination in the photo. We show that the perceived color of the dress is negatively correlated with the assumed illumination along the daylight locus. Moreover, by manipulating the observers' assumptions prior to seeing the photo, we can steer how observers will see the colors of the dress. These findings confirm the idea that the perceived colors of the dress depend on the assumptions about the illumination. The phenomenon illustrates the power of unconscious inferences and implicit assumptions in perception.

Conscience, rêves et inférence : le théâtre cartésien revisité

Consciousness, Dreams, and Inference : The Cartesian Theatre Revisited. This paper considers the Cartesian theatre as a metaphor for the virtual reality models that the brain uses to make inferences about the world. This treatment derives from our attempts to understand dreaming and waking consciousness in terms of free energy minimization. The idea here is that the Cartesian theatre is not observed by an internal (homuncular) audience but furnishes a theatre in which fictive narratives and fantasies can be rehearsed and tested against sensory evidence. We suppose the brain is driven by the imperative to infer the causes of its sensory samples ; in much the same way as scientists are compelled to test hypotheses about experimental data. This recapitulates Helmholtz’s notion of unconscious inference and Gregory’s treatment of perception as hypothesis testing. However, we take this further and consider the active on our virtual reality. The ensuing picture of consciousness (or active inference) resolves a number of seemingly hard problems in consciousness research and is internally consistent with current thinking in systems neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology. In this formalism, there is a dualism that distinguishes between the (conscious) process of inference and the (material) process that entails inference. This separation is reflected by the distinction between beliefs (probability distributions over hidden world states or res cogitans) and the physical brain states (sufficient statistics or res extensa) that encode them. This formal approach allows us to appeal to simple but fundamental theorems in information theory and statistical thermodynamics that dissolve some of the mysterious aspects of consciousness.

The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal–environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

Application of Non-Kolmogorovian Probability and Quantum Adaptive Dynamics to Unconscious Inference in Visual Perception Process

Recently a novel quantum information formalism — quantum adaptive dynamics — was developed and applied to modelling of information processing by bio-systems including cognitive phenomena: from molecular biology (glucose-lactose metabolism for E.coli bacteria, epigenetic evolution) to cognition, psychology. From the foundational point of view quantum adaptive dynamics describes mutual adapting of the information states of two interacting systems (physical or biological) as well as adapting of co-observations performed by the systems. In this paper we apply this formalism to model unconscious inference: the process of transition from sensation to perception. The paper combines theory and experiment. Statistical data collected in an experimental study on recognition of a particular ambiguous figure, the Schröder stairs, support the viability of the quantum(-like) model of unconscious inference including modelling of biases generated by rotation-contexts. From the probabilistic point of view, we study (for concrete experimental data) the problem of contextuality of probability, its dependence on experimental contexts. Mathematically contextuality leads to non-Komogorovness: probability distributions generated by various rotation contexts cannot be treated in the Kolmogorovian framework. At the same time they can be embedded in a “big Kolmogorov space” as conditional probabilities. However, such a Kolmogorov space has too complex structure and the operational quantum formalism in the form of quantum adaptive dynamics simplifies the modelling essentially.

Competition between Cognitive Control and Encapsulated, Unconscious Inferences: Are Aha-Experiences Special?

Competition between Cognitive Control and Encapsulated, Unconscious Inferences: Are Aha-Experiences Special?