UN High-Level Panel Research Articles

Conflicting Interests, Competing Perspectives and Policy Incoherence: COVID-19 Highlights the Significance of the UN High-Level Panel Report on Access to Medicines

Conflicting Interests, Competing Perspectives and Policy Incoherence: COVID-19 Highlights the Significance of the UN High-Level Panel Report on Access to Medicines

Validation of the UNICEF fiscal diagnostic tool for SDGs 6.1 and 6.2 in East and Southern Africa using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP)

Abstract The UN High Level Panel on Water notes that a total annual capital expenditure (CAPEX) of $114 billion of $129 billion is required globally to meet the safe drinking water and sanitation targets 1 and 2 of Sustainable Development Goal 6 (SDG 6). Annual operation and maintenance expenditure (OPEX) will increase, averaging $129 billion by 2030. In Sub-Saharan Africa, $36 billion is required and UNICEF estimates $15 billion is required to meet these targets in 21 countries in East and Southern Africa. Currently, only 15% of the financial investments in the sector are accounted for, which falls significantly short of delivering SDG 6. Consequently, innovative finance tools that maximise taxes, tariffs and transfers (3ts) are required to mobilise finances for the region's sector. This paper presents a diagnostic methodology for identifying bankable and blended finance projects in East and Southern Africa's water and sanitation sector. Potential projects were identified in Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Findings from applying the AHP (analytical hierarchy process) analysis recommend the use of the decision-making tool for prioritisation and selection of water and sanitation projects in the context of multiple projects requiring blended finance. The methods are applicable to other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa to enhance project pipelines whose collective cost and revenue mitigate investment risk.

Disregarding reservoirs of disease vectors: A surveillance paradox in Africa.

Disregarding reservoirs of disease vectors: A surveillance paradox in Africa.

United Nations Stabilization Operations: Chapter Seven and a Half

The UN Security Council has in recent years included the term ‘stabilization’ in the name of the operations deployed to Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Central African Republic. But, are they stabilization operations? Although the concept has become increasingly popular in the UN context, it seems to denote everything from robust military action to early peacebuilding activities, and for this reason the UN high-level independent panel on peace operations in 2015 recommended to avoid the concept until it was further clarified. To contribute to this clarification, the article follows two main lines of inquiry—first it unpacks the different meanings of stabilization in UN peace operations by drawing upon the experiences of current UN stabilization missions such as MONUSCO in the DRC and MINUSMA in Mali. Based on this inquiry, it argues that what we are witnessing is cognitive slippage—where a broad range of unrelated activities are gathered under the same concept as a discursive tool to get financial and political support from Western partners. Second, the article ventures on to examine how the center of gravity of international interventions has moved on to a prevalence of ad-hoc coalitions undertaking counterterrorism operations, and what impact this has on UN peace operations, and in particular the understanding of stabilization in these. It argues that these missions could be termed Chapter seven and a half operations as they combine UN peace operations under Chapter VII mandates with the inclusion of regional ad hoc coalitions of the willing.

Focus: Tax avoidance hurts development – workers must fight back

10 | International Union Rights | 25/1 FOCUS | TAX AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS For decades, the development debate has been dominated by the story of foreign aid, and how it helps developing countries, especially in Africa, to eradicate poverty and improve their populations’ welfare. We have also been told that only by lowering taxes for foreign firms can we create development. But there is another story: that of illicit financial flows, and how they ensure developing countries lose more to rich countries then rich countries send in aid. The UN High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki estimated that between USD $30 billion and $60 billion is siphoned off annually from the Continent, according to a report released in 2015. These estimates are still fairly conservative: latest data suggests that could be as high as USD $80 billion. This is much more than Africa received in financial aid and foreign direct investment combined between 2003 and 20121. Trade unions and our civil society allies are working hard to tell the real story and make sure that developing countries, in Africa and across the world, can use all their resources to develop independently for the benefit of all. What is causing these outflows? What does this haemorrhage that specialists call ‘illicit financial flows (IFF)’ consist of? While there are proceeds from crime, money laundering and corruption, Thabo Mbeki concluded in 2015, ‘large commercial corporations are by far the biggest culprits of illicit outflows’, through dodgy tax policies that shift wealth offshore. Astonishingly, multinationals were responsible for over 65 percent of IFFs, well ahead of organised crime (30 percent) and corrupt practices (5 percent) Most of these flows occur when companies that are owned or controlled within the same group buy and sell to each other. Through the manipulation of the prices they ensure that profits are not made in the African country but instead in a tax haven where low taxes are paid. The problem is particularly pronounced in extractive industries, important for developing countries, which are dominated by large multinationals that control global value chains. They take advantage of their complex ownership structures and universal presence to manipulate quantities, prices - or both - but also to disguise the destinations and sources of their trade. Africa is full of examples. Zambia’s national data show that Switzerland is the top buyer of its copper, whereas Swiss trade statistics register no copper imports from the country at all. According to Nigerian authorities, the Netherlands is an important destination of its oil exports, but a substantial part of these sales does not appear in Dutch data. Timber production in Liberia and mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Africa tell similar stories. Illicit financial flows are not a recent phenomenon in Africa. It is estimated that the continent has lost over $1Trillion USD through capital flight since the 1970s2. But it is getting worse. In Africa, capital flight has tripled since 2001, making Africa a net creditor to the rest of the world. In total, the continent lost about USD $850 billion between 1970 and 2008, with Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa accounting for 55 percent of illicit financial flows over this period. Lowering taxes does not increase investment There are enormous pressures from foreign investors and foreign governments to extend further tax concessions such as tax holidays, tax-free zones, investment and tax treaties, and acceptance of corporate ownership structures that facilitate tax avoidance. Such concessions are often designed to favour foreign corporations over domestic firms, with little demonstrable benefit from increased investment. In 2010, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) conducted a business survey of 7000 companies in 19 subSaharan African countries. The results suggest that tax incentive packages ranked 11th out of 12 in importance for investment decisions; and this importance has fallen over time. But the damage to the economy of the outflow is real. Africa is the most vulnerable region in the world when illicit outflows are compared to GDP. The average annual GDP loss of 5.7 percent has an outsized impact on the continent, according to Washington based Think-tank Global Finance Integrity (GFI...

Focus: Tax avoidance hurts development – workers must fight back

10 | International Union Rights | 25/1 FOCUS | TAX AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS For decades, the development debate has been dominated by the story of foreign aid, and how it helps developing countries, especially in Africa, to eradicate poverty and improve their populations’ welfare. We have also been told that only by lowering taxes for foreign firms can we create development. But there is another story: that of illicit financial flows, and how they ensure developing countries lose more to rich countries then rich countries send in aid. The UN High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki estimated that between USD $30 billion and $60 billion is siphoned off annually from the Continent, according to a report released in 2015. These estimates are still fairly conservative: latest data suggests that could be as high as USD $80 billion. This is much more than Africa received in financial aid and foreign direct investment combined between 2003 and 20121. Trade unions and our civil society allies are working hard to tell the real story and make sure that developing countries, in Africa and across the world, can use all their resources to develop independently for the benefit of all. What is causing these outflows? What does this haemorrhage that specialists call ‘illicit financial flows (IFF)’ consist of? While there are proceeds from crime, money laundering and corruption, Thabo Mbeki concluded in 2015, ‘large commercial corporations are by far the biggest culprits of illicit outflows’, through dodgy tax policies that shift wealth offshore. Astonishingly, multinationals were responsible for over 65 percent of IFFs, well ahead of organised crime (30 percent) and corrupt practices (5 percent) Most of these flows occur when companies that are owned or controlled within the same group buy and sell to each other. Through the manipulation of the prices they ensure that profits are not made in the African country but instead in a tax haven where low taxes are paid. The problem is particularly pronounced in extractive industries, important for developing countries, which are dominated by large multinationals that control global value chains. They take advantage of their complex ownership structures and universal presence to manipulate quantities, prices - or both - but also to disguise the destinations and sources of their trade. Africa is full of examples. Zambia’s national data show that Switzerland is the top buyer of its copper, whereas Swiss trade statistics register no copper imports from the country at all. According to Nigerian authorities, the Netherlands is an important destination of its oil exports, but a substantial part of these sales does not appear in Dutch data. Timber production in Liberia and mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Africa tell similar stories. Illicit financial flows are not a recent phenomenon in Africa. It is estimated that the continent has lost over $1Trillion USD through capital flight since the 1970s2. But it is getting worse. In Africa, capital flight has tripled since 2001, making Africa a net creditor to the rest of the world. In total, the continent lost about USD $850 billion between 1970 and 2008, with Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa accounting for 55 percent of illicit financial flows over this period. Lowering taxes does not increase investment There are enormous pressures from foreign investors and foreign governments to extend further tax concessions such as tax holidays, tax-free zones, investment and tax treaties, and acceptance of corporate ownership structures that facilitate tax avoidance. Such concessions are often designed to favour foreign corporations over domestic firms, with little demonstrable benefit from increased investment. In 2010, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) conducted a business survey of 7000 companies in 19 subSaharan African countries. The results suggest that tax incentive packages ranked 11th out of 12 in importance for investment decisions; and this importance has fallen over time. But the damage to the economy of the outflow is real. Africa is the most vulnerable region in the world when illicit outflows are compared to GDP. The average annual GDP loss of 5.7 percent has an outsized impact on the continent, according to Washington based Think-tank Global Finance Integrity (GFI...

How Much Will a Data Revolution in Development Cost?

The UN High Level Panel has called for a data revolution. The world’s population should be counted, measured, weighed, and evaluated. This information should be collected, compiled, aggregated, and presented in such a form that it can usefully inform policy-makers and citizens in aggregated forms, and disaggregated according to region, village, gender, and population group. It is tempting to think that having more and better information will improve policy choices, but this is not automatic. Moreover, demanding more information may lead to a deteriorating supply of information if demand outstrips supply. This article therefore focuses on the cost of the data revolution rather than its possible benefits. The simple starting point is that data do have a cost. The cost of the data revolution will be considerable. The costs include the sheer financial cost of monitoring, but importantly extend to include the opportunity cost of competing demands on survey capacity. Particular indicators also influence behavior by skewing activities in favor of completing goals with quantifiable targets. More data are only better data if they contain meaningful information that clearly outweighs the opportunity cost related to its gathering. However, funding available for sustainable development goal (SDG) measurement is limited and there are also institutional capacity limits to be reckoned with. On 11 March 2016, the United Nations Statistical Commission’s Interagency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) agreed on 230 individual indicators to monitor the 17 goals and 169 targets. Because the final list of 230 indicators has been a moving target, the research for this article took as the starting point of what a reasonable level of measurement of the millennium development goals would have cost to raise a debate and to give a crude estimate over the cost of the introduction of the SDGs, with their exponential increased demand for data. This is done by bringing together and reconciles the existing information on the costs measurement as a reference for scholars concerned with SDG feasibility and operationalization.

Review of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People

Since its foundation in 1945, the United Nations has conducted an astonishing number of peace operations, commencing in Indonesia in 1948. To deal with the changing international security order, the organization has continuously adapted and transformed its approach to prevent violence, restore peace, and build sustainable security and development. But change has been slow. Despite some notable success stories, the UN's track record has not been grand. Too often the inappropriate behavior or ineffectiveness of peacekeepers has brought disgrace on the organization, while resistance to change from some member states as well as from within the various organs of the UN has hampered its agility and effectiveness. The relative global stability that prevailed during the Cold War (in spite of the possibility of nuclear Armageddon) has been replaced by an era of greater uncertainty between states and increased intrastate and transnational violence. Security actors do not necessarily respect geographic borders, international law, or the neutrality of the United Nations. The challenges facing peace operations have been exacerbated by the increased threat of terrorism and organized crime as well as the impact of environmental degradation on human security. Increasingly, peace missions are being deployed to help prevent conflict or maintain security in insecure environments where there may be no peace to keep. Yet, as the Secretary-General reminds us, peace operations are the most visible face of the United Nations, on which the organization's reputation depends: A profound uncertainty is emerging among our populations over the adequacy of global, regional and national institutions at a time when demands placed on them are greater than ever.... The limits of our engagement are reflected in United Nations peace operations, the most visible face of the Organization. (1) By 2015, with more than 120,000 military and civilian personnel serving in thirty-nine missions and a peacekeeping budget of $8.2 billion per year, the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)--titled Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People--provides a timely reminder of the importance of UN peace operations and the monumental challenges they face. The panel was established by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 31 October 2014, with the challenging task of assessing the state of peace operations and recommending corrective measures. Chaired by the distinguished Nobel Laureate and former president and prime minister of Timor-Leste, Jose Ramos Horta, it comprised an international group of fifteen experts. The panel delivered its report on 16 June 2015 (A/70/95-S/2015/446), and the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of its recommendations was delivered on 2 September 2015 (A/70/357-S/2015/682). The two documents warrant joint consideration. According to one of the panel experts, HIPPO's deliberations were influenced by three overarching political realities that limited the UN's ability to consolidate peace. (2) These realities could diffuse or negate many of the panel's practical recommendations for reform, as had been the case with previous reviews. These limitations are (1) governments and regional groupings do not fully entrust the UN with sensitive issues such as preventive diplomacy and the negotiation of internal conflicts, (2) UN forces are a pickup team that makes them inefficient in situations of active hostilities, and (3) the UN continues to be a relatively minor player in the field of international cooperation and it is fragmented among a multiplicity of autonomous agencies. It is useful to keep these caveats in mind when future assessments of the implementation of the panel's recommendations are made. Moreover, HIPPO was conducted simultaneously with two other major reviews that also need to be considered as part of the UN's ongoing reform agenda: the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture; and the High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security. …

A pill too hard to swallow: how the NHS is limiting access to high priced drugs

A joint investigation by The BMJ and Cambridge and Bath universities uncovers how NHS England tried to limit access to expensive new drugs for hepatitis C. Jonathan Gornall , Amanda...

Can lifelong learning be the post-2015 agenda for the Least Developed Countries?

This paper discusses what approaches to ‘lifelong learning’ should guide the post-2015 education agenda for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which refers to a group of 49 countries that are off-track in achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All goals. Reports prepared by major consultation groups such as the High Level Panel established by the United Nations and Global Thematic Consultation Group have proposed that ‘providing quality education and lifelong learning’ is an overarching post-2015 education agenda. It is an important breakthrough since ‘lifelong learning’ has been recommended; however, it is not clear what understanding(s) of lifelong learning has been articulated in those documents. How have those recommendations addressed the issues and challenges of the LDCs? In this paper, I review literature on lifelong learning and analyse major documents related to the post-2015 education agenda, especially the one prepared by UN High Level Panel. I conclude that unless the LDCs are given a leadership role for setting their goals—according to their contextual realities—the post-2015 millennium initiatives, such as ‘lifelong learning’ as a new educational agenda, will make no sense.

Millennium Development Goal 6: AIDS and the International Health Agenda

Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 6, ‘to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases’, is unique among the MDGs because it emerged in the context of unprecedented prior international mobilization, especially around HIV/AIDS, thus both reflecting and facilitating an expanding international health agenda. MDG 6 built on the idea of “health as development”, originally articulated at the 1978 conference on primary health at Alma-Ata, but was profoundly shaped by the political traction and fund-raising successes of AIDS activism and the international AIDS response. This underpinned the expansion of MDG 6 targets to include antiretroviral treatment, helped forge partnerships to reduce the prices of antiretroviral treatment and essential medicine, thereby contributing to MDG 8 (“building partnerships for development”) and, in high HIV-prevalence regions, also to MDGs 4 and 5 (maternal and child health). The UN High-Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda recommends setting country-level health targets to achieve healthcare for all. Targets can help citizens hold governments to account by providing a focus for mobilization and a yardstick to measure progress. The data collection and policy monitoring pioneered by UNAIDS, and the involvement and support for civil society organizations achieved through the AIDS response, must be continued for this broader health agenda to succeed.

3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability: transforming the world in an era of global change.

In May 2011, Nobel Laureates and experts on sustainability gathered in Stockholm for the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium to discuss the necessity and opportunities in a world transition to global sustainability. This special section of Ambio is based on three working papers that provided the scientific foundation for the symposium dialogue. The first paper Reconnecting to the Biosphere (Folke et al. 2011) calls for a shift in mind set, emphasizing that people shape the Earth System and are at the same time fundamentally dependent on the capacity of its biosphere to sustain our own development. Institutions and governance for building social-ecological resilience to deal with an interconnected and fluctuating global system becomes a central priority. The second paper The Anthropocene: From global change to planetary stewardship (Steffen et al. 2011) focuses on the great acceleration into a human dominated geological epoch, the Anthropocene, and on identifying the Earth’s safe operating space for societal development. The new era calls for planetary stewardship to fundamentally alter our relationship with the planet we inhabit. The third paper Tipping towards sustainability: Emerging pathways of transformation (Westley et al. 2011) explores links between agency, institutions and social-ecological innovation for navigating large-scale transformations towards global sustainability. What conditions are necessary to escape the current lock-in? Promising social and technical innovations creating planetary opportunities need to be connected to broad institutional resources and responses. We have also included The Stockholm Memorandum: Tipping the scales towards sustainability, which was developed at the symposium. The memorandum was signed by the Nobel Laureates and handed over to the UN High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, active in preparing the Rio +20 UN Conference, 2012. The memorandum makes clear that sustainability is not about saving the environment. It is our future as part of the biosphere that is at stake. The challenge is broader than climate; it is about global change. Humanity must now become active stewards of the entire Earth system to safeguard the future. The symposium provided a platform for science-policy dialogue, including a court case where Planet Earth put Humanity on trial with a court ruling by a Nobel Laureate Jury. The court case, talks and presentations are available at www.globalsymposium2011.org. The symposium also hosted a Nobel Laureate Choral Concert composed exclusively for this occasion and the Stockholm Dialogue on Global Sustainability—Seizing Planetary Opportunities, at The Royal Dramatic Theatre, with Nobel Laureates, scientists, policy makers, entrepreneurs and representatives from business, civil society and culture. The presence and engagement of HM King Carl XVI Gustaf and HRH Crown Princess Victoria are greatly acknowledged. The 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium was organized by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm University, Stockholm Environment Institute, Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics and Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research. We very much hope that you will be inspired reading this special section of Ambio.

Toward Effective Multilateralism: Why Bigger May Not Be Better

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements This article was adapted from a paper commissioned by the Stanley Foundation. Notes 1. See Brookings Institution, “Managing Global Insecurity,” www.brookings.edu/projects/mgi.aspx; Daniel Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007); G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National Security in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, September 27, 2006), http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns; Parag Khanna, Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008); Ruth Wedgwood, “Give the United Nations a Little Competition,” New York Times, December 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/05/opinion/05wedgewood.html?pagewanted=print. For Barack Obama's stated views, see “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007). 2. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 55–56. 3. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007), 163. 4. See Laurie Garrett, “The Challenge of Global Health,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007). 5. Michael Gerson, “The Despots’ Democracy,” Washington Post, May 28, 2008, p. A13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702556.html. For a good account of South Africa's “rogue” diplomacy see Pauline H. Baker and Princeton N. Lyman, “South Africa: From Beacon of Hope to Rogue Democracy,” Stanley Foundation Working Paper, December 2008, http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/South_Africa_Paper_Dec_2008.pdf. 6. See Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 7. See Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama, eds., East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 8. IMF, “IMF Member Quotas’ and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors,” April 9, 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. The GDP figures for Belgium and India are for 2008 and were sourced from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database. See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx. 9. Chris Giles and Ralph Atkins, “IMF Members Back Plans for Voting Reforms,” Financial Times, September 19, 2006, 8. 10. Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 11. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “News Conference by President Obama,” London, United Kingdom, April 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/news-conference-by-president-obama-4-02-09/. 12. See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1956). 13. Yoichi Funabashi, “Forget Bretton Woods II: the Role for U.S.–Japan–China Trilateralism,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 7–25, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Funabashi.pdf. 14. See “The G-20 Communique,” Brad Setser: Follow the Money Blog, Council on Foreign Relations, November 17, 2008, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/11/17/g-20-post-mortem/ (hereinafter Setser blog); “Statement from G-20 Summit,” New York Times, November 15, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-text.html. 15. See John Kirton and Lynn Robertson, “Is Isolation of Unpleasant Governments a Winning Strategy?” (paper presented at Berlin Roundtable Meeting on “The Role of the G-8 in an Endangered Global Economic and Political Climate,” Berlin, Germany, June 1–2, 2007). 16. See Martin Wolf, “What the G-2 Must Discuss Now that the G-20 is Over,” FT.com/Economists Forum blog, April 8, 2009, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/04/what-the-g2-must-discuss-now-the-g20-is-over/. 17. Brad Setser, “The Shape of Things to Come,” Finance and Development 46, no. 1 (March 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/03/setser.htm. 18. UN High Level Panel, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” December 2, 2004, http://www.wwan.cn/secureworld/. 19. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas WrightThomas Wright is the executive director of studies at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.

United Nations Secretary-General's High Level Panel on System Wide Coherence and the environment: incremental change or UN reform?

The UN High-Level Panel on System Wide Coherence is to explore how the United Nations system can work more coherently and effectively in the areas of environment, development and humanitarian assistance. Regarding environmental issues, the Panel has focused on: mainstreaming environment in development decision-making; the institutional framework for the UN system's environment activities; coherence in the UN's normative work in the field of environment. To inspire meaningful changes in the area of environment, the Panel should focus on making sustainable development an overarching principle of UN activities, clustering of multinational environmental agreements and significantly strengthening UNEP.

The High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Future Role of the United Nations Security Council

The UN High Level Panel Report, published in December, takes a comprehensive approach and is very frank in analysing the threats to international peace and security and their rootcauses. Its analysis and recommendations range from economic and social challenges to the use of force. This article discusses in particular the role and tasks that the High Level Panel envisages for the Security Council in light of the threats and challenges it identified. With the events of 11 September 2001 as the pivotal moment in history, the Panel nevertheless does not recommend or insist on fundamental changes of international legal paradigms, including in the (collective) use of force. The Panel's focus on reform of Security Council composition instead of the system that it operates neglects the problems with the latter and the impossibility of achieving the former.

Intervention, Prevention, and the “Responsibility to Protect”

Can do in the world? This seemingly innocuous question is in fact loaded. While there seems to be a broad, though not universal, as will be discussed later, consensus on defining as a foreign policy that promotes peace, order, and good government on a global scale, there is much more disagreement on the manner in which such objectives ought to be promoted. Debates on the kind of intervention best suited for have recently revolved over the preferred nature (military or political/developmental) and framework of intervention (NATO, ad-hoc coalitions, or the UN). These debates have been fuelled, in part, by provocative publications such as Andrew Cohen's While Slept, which argued forcefully that had lost its place in the by becoming a free-rider and practising foreign policy on the cheap. They also have been fuelled by the process leading to the release, in April 2005, of Canada's long-awaited international policy statement.In this article, I argue that the problem does not lie with the choice of instruments to pursue Canada's foreign policy but with inconsistencies in the definition of the broad objectives of this foreign policy. Canada's outlook on intervention remains particularly plagued by contradictions. Taking a longer-term perspective on intervention and drawing on the lessons of international involvement in post-conflict nation-building, I identify some of the areas of concern and propose a framework to think about how to reconcile Canada's divergent interests.The article starts by spelling out the connection between security and development, which is at the heart of the argument. I then go on to address the disconnect between security and development objectives in Canada's recent international engagements, as illustrated in The responsibility to protect, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in which played a much-touted role-and in the Martin government's international policy statement. the search for ways out of this quandary, I identify some of the tensions, if not outright contradictions, that pit the logic of intervention and that of prevention against one another. I finally conclude by suggesting a few guidelines to reconcile these contradictions in the framework of a coherent and integrated foreign policy.ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION: THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUSSecurity and development are two faces of the same coin. Socioeconomic marginalization and political exclusion often provide the breeding ground for violence. Development problems are in fact highlighted by the World Bank as an integral part of what Paul Collier labels the conflict trap. While poverty as such is not correlated with conflict, ceteris paribus the chances of civil war increase five-fold for countries that fall below the US$1000 per capita income threshold.1 This is also consonant with earlier findings that it may not be absolute poverty but extremely unequal distribution of wealth-resulting in political or economic marginalization-that creates fertile ground for internal conflicts.At the Canada in the world conference, then-American ambassador to Paul Cellucci reaffirmed that it was in the joint economic and security interest of the US and to help countries lift their people out of poverty. This attitude is echoed in several key documents including former UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agenda for and 1994 Agenda for development. More recently, the report of the UN high-level panel on threats, challenges and change recognized the need for better understanding of the intersection between development and security if the international community is to respond effectively to potential threats to collective peace and security. But nowhere is the relationship between freedom from fear and freedom from want better expressed than in UN secretary General Kofi Annan's recent report entitled In larger freedom: Towards development, security, and human rights for all, in which he states:Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other. …

Is Nuclear Terrorism a Threat to Canada's National Security?

In first nationally televised debate between President George Bush and Senator John Kerry in September 2004, moderator asked each candidate What is most serious to American national security? In rare agreement, Kerry and Bush both answered As president said: agree with my opponent that biggest facing country is weapons of mass destruction in hands of a terrorist network.In final weeks of presidential campaign, Vice President Dick Cheney made nuclear terrorism a centrepiece of his stump speech, arguing that the biggest we face now as a nation is possibility of terrorists ending up in middle of one of our cities with deadlier weapons than have ever been used against us... nuclear weapons able to threaten lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. According to Cheney, ultimate threat. For us to have a strategy that's capable of defeating that threat, you've got to get your mind around that concept.'It is unlikely that candidates for party leaders vying for position of prime minister in Canada would give a similar answer about greatest to their country's national security. The purpose of this article, nevertheless, is to present evidence for conclusion that nuclear terrorism is a very serious to Canada, as well as to US and world. Moreover, Canada has an opportunity to play a special role in combating this threat.This argument will be developed in four parts. First, I ask whether answer given by Bush and Kerry to question about single greatest threat is correct.Second, what about Canada? Is nuclear terrorism a serious to Canada's national well-being? My answer is yes, indeed a double-threat. Directly, Montreal or Toronto or Vancouver could be target of a nuclear terrorist bomb. Indirectly, terrorists transport their nuclear bomb (or material from which they make a bomb) through Canada to an American city, economic consequences for Canada could be substantial.The good news about issue of nuclear terrorism, as I claim in third section, is that it is preventable, indeed, it is ultimate preventable catastrophe.2 Success in preventing nuclear terrorist attacks on our cities will require a global undertaking well beyond current actions of key governments, an undertaking in which US and Canada share deep common interests.In fourth part, I observe that, in fact, Canadian government has recognized of nuclear terrorism and has taken a leadership role in addressing it. Canada, however, cannot remain on sidelines. Canada has experience and standing it takes to play a much more significant leadership role in defeating this spectre.THE SINGLE GREATEST THREATIn December 2004, UN high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change issued its report on threats to global community. Among a dozen global ills from AIDS and poverty to civil war and environmental degradation, panel gave pride of place to proliferation of nuclear weapons and specific of nuclear terrorism. In sober but stark terms it warned that a continuation of current trends risks a cascade of proliferation.3Al Qaeda remains a formidable enemy with clear nuclear ambitions. The former head of CIA's bin Laden task force, Michael Scheuer, provides instructive details about Osama bin Laderis success in acquiring a fatwa from a Saudi cleric that provided a religious justification to use nuclear weapons. Titled A treatise on legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels, and issued in May 2003, fatwa asserts that if a bomb that killed 10 million of them and burned as much of their land as they have burned Muslims' land were dropped on them, it would be permissible.4 The 9/11 commission report found that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. …

ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE ‘TERRORISM’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to define terrorism generically in international treaty law since the 1920s, from early conferences on the unification of criminal law to efforts in the League of Nations, the International Law Commission, and the UN General Assembly. While these sources do not carry great weight as evidence of customary law, they illustrate the recurring normative and political disputes surrounding definition and elucidate the basic features of an international prohibition and/or crime of terrorism, as perceived by different international actors. The recurrent attempts at definition indicate that the international community attaches considerable normative importance to it. Drafting of a UN Comprehensive Terrorism Convention continues in the Sixth Committee, and the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change advocated definition in treaty law in late 2004. Generic definition of terrorism can capture and stigmatize the political motives which distinguish terrorism from ordinary violent crime, or transnational organized crime for financial benefit. Following an historical pattern, agreement on the scope of any exceptions to a definition of terrorism remains the key obstacle, although much of the argument about exceptions is ideological, not substantive.

Reshaping Unilateral and Multilateral Use of Force: The Work of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

Reshaping Unilateral and Multilateral Use of Force: The Work of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change