UN Climate Change Negotiations Research Articles

Too Little, Too Slow? Climate Adaptation at the United Nations Climate Change Negotiations Since the Adoption of the Paris Agreement

Adaptation to climate change has become a top priority of negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. However, most of the literature on global climate governance focuses on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. This article therefore proposes a framework for tracking negotiation outcomes on adaptation based on the four dimensions of the Adaptation Gap Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (planning, finance, implementation, and effectiveness) and on key governance functions outlined in the climate policy literature. By comparing the adaptation outcomes of the three most recent Conferences of the Parties (COP25 – COP27) with the baseline of adaptation provisions in the Paris Agreement and its rulebook, the extent and type of decisions on adaptation are assessed and the evolution of relevant agenda items is analysed. Decisions adopted since 2019 have concentrated on support and transparency while the Paris Agreement made greater use of signalling and rule-setting. The extent to which adaptation gaps identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can be reduced through decisions at UN climate change negotiations is influenced by the potential and limits of governing a context-specific subject matter at the global level. Reflecting about how adaptation can be facilitated through multiple governance functions will be vital for the development of an effective framework for the global goal on adaptation.

“Special Circumstances” and the Politics of Climate Vulnerability: African Agency in the UN Climate Change Negotiations

African countries are well recognised as being among the worst affected by the impacts of climate change. However, efforts to secure recognition of these “special circumstances” of African countries within the UN climate negotiations have been unsuccessful, despite this being a continental priority prior to and following adoption of the Paris Agreement. Such status is linked to global priorities for funding adaptation to climate change. This article explores why some other groups of developing countries have been successful in securing such recognition when African countries have not. It provides a historical institutionalist explanation of the path-dependent politics of such institutional recognition, emphasising the timing of when different groups have advanced vulnerability claims, which shapes the opposition that African countries have encountered in their efforts, as relative late-movers, to exercise agency. It highlights contestation surrounding what “vulnerability” to climate impacts means, and how this contestation has divided Global South solidarity.

Beyond delegation size: developing country negotiating capacity and NGO ‘support’ in international climate negotiations

Unequal negotiating capacity has been a longstanding concern for developing countries in multilateral environmental negotiations, affecting their fair and active participation in shaping outcomes. Questions over capacity have often been measured and answered through focusing on delegation size. This article argues that this approach is increasingly limited due to changing practices of non-state actor inclusion within state delegations to the UN climate change negotiations. More significantly, delegation size also obscures more subtle capacity-building efforts through specialized non-governmental organizations that have emerged to ‘support’ developing country delegations. Whilst existing research has analysed the diverse roles that NGOs play in international negotiations, NGOs whose main purpose is to provide negotiating support have been neglected and under-explored. This article addresses this neglect by presenting three brief case studies of such NGOs. It derives from these cases a typology of negotiating support NGOs to illustrate their variance in terms of the ‘range’ of issues supported and the ‘scale’ of support provided to developing countries, whilst providing directions for future research. It illustrates the ways in which NGOs also ‘perform’ diplomacy, and contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how developing countries negotiate in climate negotiations.

A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing

ABSTRACT Unilateral climate policies have been unable to achieve intended emissions reductions. We argue that international harmonization of climate policy beyond the Paris Agreement is the only way forward and that global carbon pricing, either through a tax or market, is the best available instrument to manage this. A foundation has already been laid, as current carbon pricing initiatives cover about 20% of global CO2 emissions. Since it limits free-riding by countries/jurisdictions, global carbon pricing is, in principle, behaviourally easier to negotiate than other instruments, such as emission targets or technical standards. To overcome political resistance, we propose a dynamic strategy consisting of two parallel tracks and five transition phases. The first track entails assembly of a carbon-pricing coalition that expands over time and exerts moral and economic pressure on non-members to join. The second track involves refocusing UN intergovernmental climate change negotiations on carbon pricing, potentially involving initially heterogeneous prices reflecting distinct income levels of countries, which then gradually converge. The dual tracks are designed to reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. The proposal results in a transition trajectory consisting of two interactive tracks and five phases, with specific attention to inequity within and among countries. We illustrate how such an approach could function with either a carbon tax or market. Key policy insights International harmonization of climate policies is required to achieve the deep cuts in emissions needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s 2°C or 1.5°C target. A focus on carbon pricing – either through taxation or emissions trading – has multiple strengths: it can be easily compared and harmonized among countries; it can be gradually strengthened over time; it moderates freeriding and fear of competitiveness losses; and it automatically generates revenues to compensate low-income households and countries. Formation of a carbon-pricing coalition would enable such a group to speak with a single, powerful voice at UN climate change conferences. It would put economic and moral pressure on non-members, stimulating them to join and show a constructive attitude in ongoing UN climate change negotiations.

“Youth is not a political position”: Exploring justice claims-making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations

Youth articulations of climate change injustice are experiencing an unprecedented moment in the spotlight as, inspired by Greta Thunberg, young people around the world take to the streets demanding justice for their generation in the face of climate emergency. Formal opportunities for youth voices to be heard in environmental governance are slim, although the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) offers a rare opportunity for youth to share their perspectives as one of nine civil society constituencies: YOUNGO. Recent research in Global Environmental Change has called for empirical exploration of justice claims-making by different stakeholders to develop understanding of how justice is conceptualised and negotiated in climate change governance spaces. To date, climate justice claims from youth have not been explored in the academic literature. This paper draws upon rich, ethnographic, longitudinal data on the evolution of justice claims made by a group of youth participants in the UNFCCC to contribute to this empirical gap. In our research, a UK-based case study organisation and long-established member of YOUNGO was studied between 2015 and 2018, including observation of their participation at the 21st, 22nd and 23rd Conferences of the Parties. We find that youth participants first articulated injustices based on perceived future risks to their generation but, over time, switched to solidarity claims about injustices experienced by other groups in the present. Whilst laudable, this impedes their mandate as representatives of younger generations. We also make three theoretical contributions to environmental justice theory. First we expand participation justice theory to both the visible structures of participation (procedural justice) and the informal rules and discourses shaping participation (representation justice). Second we demonstrate the importance of both external and self-recognition for the articulation of justice claims. Third we clarify the relationship between power and justice claim-making, proposing that we must look beneath what is articulated to shed light on the exercise of ideological power that shapes the framing and claiming of justice in environmental governance spaces.

The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris

ABSTRACTThe role of American leadership in the UN climate negotiations that produced the 2015 Paris Agreement is examined. First, United States (US) climate goals are identified. Then, utilizing unique survey data collected at eight UN climate summits between 2008 and 2015, the extent to which the US was recognized as a leader by potential followers is investigated. Finally, the extent to which US goals are reflected in negotiation outcomes is evaluated. Recognition of the US as a leader varied over time, peaking at the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Paris, reflecting US leadership in shaping the outcomes of both meetings. Although the results reveal a divided leadership landscape in which the US must compete for leadership with other actors, such as the European Union and China, US leadership was crucial to the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement.

The power of presidency in UN climate change negotiations: comparison between Denmark and Mexico

In December 2010, the 16th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ended with adopting Cancun Agreements as official decisions under the UN process. The international community determined the meeting a success. This was a substantial change compared to the previous year’s Copenhagen climate conference, which failed to reach consensus at the official level and thus having come under severe criticism as “diplomatic failure.” This article aims to explain the stark contrast between the two consecutive COP meetings and argues that the leadership style of the president of the conference is one important factor propelling negotiations forward. While the current literature scarcely addresses the role of the president, this article explores multiple variables that condition the president’s effectiveness in moving negotiations forward. This article concludes that the Mexican government successfully chaired the negotiations with excellent agenda management and process management capability, which the Danish government lacked. In particular, its transparent and embracing manner in handling subgroup meetings and the production of a single negotiation text facilitated trust among negotiators, which in turn made the parties tend to cooperate better. More importantly, the case study reveals that the Mexican government had a significant influence on given conditions of the negotiation process, such as the international environment surrounding the negotiation and the decision-making rules.

Competition gives way to cooperation: rethinking Sino-Indian relations in climate change negotiations

In global climate change politics, China and India have worked closely with each other, representing two big emitters from the developing world. This article reviews Sino-Indian cooperation during four UN climate change negotiations from 2009 to 2012. Their collaboration echoed the perception of neorealism in international relations (IR) studies that states will seek “external balancing” for maximizing national “relative gains”. China and India are expected to continue their cooperation on climate change issues when sharing the same structural position as big economies and big emitters, the same pressure in carbon emission reductions, and the same goal of improving living standards for their citizens. Encountering the devastating impacts of climate change and the deadlock in responsibility division in current global climate change governance, this work seeks to shed light on the evolving multilateral governance environment and its complex implications for Sino-Indian relations from an IR perspective.

Women’s representation in the UN climate change negotiations: a quantitative analysis of state delegations, 1995–2011

This paper examines which factors influence women’s descriptive representation in state delegations to the international climate change negotiations. Due to the gendered nature of climate change as an issue, it is important to study the representation of women in the negotiations and to examine its normative and functional implications. Theoretically, I propose to look at institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors as potential explanations for the variation in the proportion of women in state delegations across countries. I examine this variation by drawing on a dataset containing all member state delegations to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations from 1995 to 2011. The theoretical arguments are then tested on these data using a fractional probit model. This is the first comparative study of women’s descriptive representation in international environmental negotiations. It contributes to our understanding of the variation in women’s representation both over time and across countries. In particular, I find that women’s representation is higher in countries that enjoy a higher level of development and a higher degree of political gender equality. The effects of other institutional and socioeconomic factors such as the level of democracy or gender-equal development remain statistically insignificant. Cultural factors measured by regional proxies show that Eastern Europe and Latin America are positively and the Middle East negatively linked with women’s descriptive representation in delegations.

More equal than others? A comparative analysis of state and non-state perceptions of interest representation and decision-making in REDD+ negotiations

This paper provides a quantitative analysis of stakeholder perceptions regarding the governance of the UN climate change negotiations on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). Governance quality and legitimacy were evaluated by means of an online survey conducted in 2011, using a normative framework of principles, criteria and indicators. The paper concentrates on national-level stakeholders active in REDD+ in Nepal, and their perceptions of governance quality, with a discussion, given the focus of this special volume, that emphasizes inclusiveness, equality and resources (indicators of interest representation) and democracy, agreement and dispute settlement (indicators of decision-making). Respondents were selected from state (i.e. governmental) and non-state (i.e. civil society) interests from a range of sectors active in REDD+ at the national level. The results show that survey respondents generally found REDD+ to be inclusive, but did not consider that there was the necessary capacity, or resources, for meaningful participation. A concluding section reviews the framework applied, and comments on the nature of multi-stakeholder relations in contemporary global governance, and REDD+ specifically.

UN Security Council: playing a role in the international climate change regime?

In the context of a weakly enforced Kyoto Protocol, sluggish UN climate change negotiations and a closing window of opportunity to prevent the more cataclysmic scenarios of climate change, calls for the UN Security Council to play a role in international climate governance are becoming louder. The Security Council's political clout and wide enforcement powers make it a seemingly ideal antidote to the current negotiation inertia. But how realistic is it for the Security Council to play a role in curbing climate change? This paper examines the ambition and enforcement limitations of the current UN legal regime for climate change and analyses whether the Security Council could help fill the gaps. It argues that climate change can legitimately be seen as a security issue, and that it is legally feasible for the Security Council to act on it, even using its full range of powers. However, politically there are just a few options worth exploring at this stage. These include: monitoring and early warning of climate-related security threats; and helping to resolve disputes peacefully between blocks of states with regards to mitigation and adaptation ambition.

International Public Opinion on China’s Climate Change Policies

With the emergence of a global public sphere and the revolution of global media, international public opinion has gained an intrinsic importance for effective multilateral cooperation. Global governance initiatives are subject to international public opinion, and climate change is the single most important global governance issue of our time. Tackling climate change requires a fundamental transformation of the global economy, with an emphasis on sustainable development. Due to its political and economic weight, China can push forward UN climate change negotiations, and can do so without compromising its national development goals (China’s National Climate Change Programme, 2007). China’s national policies are beyond what is required from developing nations, but international public opinion often perceives a different message. This paper holds that a national branding strategy will help convey China’s current efforts, allowing a better understanding among nations in order to break the climate change negotiations deadlock. This research merged perception analysis and public opinion surveys with mass media qualitative and quantitative analysis to gain a full insight into what the international climate change decision-makers, opinion-leaders and general public think about China’s position at the UNFCCC negotiations. As seen in the findings of the present research, the climate of opinion is unfavorable to China. Overall, the results show that China is perceived as a negative influence in the negotiations. China’s climate change efforts are being overlooked by international public opinion. But the reason lies in China’s current discourse, where climate change and the environment are always downplayed by the right to develop (D’Hooghe, 2011). According to China’s 12th Five Year Plan, the new path for the country is marked by its commitment to achieve growth through low carbon development, with a strong focus on addressing climate change and energy challenges (Shealy & Dorian, 2007). The results of this study show that the positive intentions and actions of the Chinese government aren’t being accurately perceived by public opinion. The empirical findings in this study provide a new understanding of one specific part of the overall image that the world has about China. Whilst this study did not confirm unequivocally that international public opinion directly determines the outcomes of international negotiations and foreign policy, it did partially substantiate the concept that there’s a correlation between China’s public declarations and actions, the negotiators declarations to the press, press coverage in general, the attitude of experts towards China, and the attitudes and perceptions of uninformed public towards China. The study concludes that China requires a country rebranding strategy, and presents solid data as to which areas China has to tackle. This paper can be a working base for the national branding strategy, but by no means intends to be a complete evaluation of China’s brand.

The EU as a global leader? The Copenhagen and Cancún UN climate change negotiations

This article compares the degree to which the European Union (EU) managed to play a leadership role at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Copenhagen negotiations in December 2009 and the Cancún negotiations in December 2010. Our notion of leadership is composed of (a) direction (i.e. the degree to which an actor pushes towards a recognised collective purpose), and (b) goal-attainment (which is explained by three factors: coherence, the opportunity structure, and politicisation). The outcomes of the Copenhagen negotiations have been rather disappointing for the EU in terms of its substantial ambitions and leadership expectations. At Cancún, the Union had a firmer hold on the outcomes, but its goals have also been less ambitious compared to the Copenhagen negotiations.

The road to Durban and beyond: the progress of international climate change negotiations

Following a familiar pattern of UN climate change negotiations, the 2011 Durban conference of the parties (COP17) was concluded by sleep-deprived delegates well after its scheduled end, after crises and last-minute drama. Just what it might mean for the future was not immediately obvious to observers. Early reactions ranged from seeing yet another failure by governments to grasp the seriousness and urgency of climate change – ‘a disaster for us all’ – to much more positive assessments. The executive secretary of the UNFCCC (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), Christiana Figueres, described Durban as ‘without doubt … the most encompassing and furthest reaching conference in the history of the climate change negotiations’.

Climate Change and Trade--The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO

With limited progress in the UN climate change negotiations, the EU has been looking at ways to further reduce global CO2 emissions by extending the scope of its cap and trade system, most recently by including flights entering and leaving EU airspace. With the EU Aviation Directive entering into force on 1 January 2012, all airlines will need to hold permits to cover their CO2 emissions for flights operating in EU airspace. For instance, Singapore Airlines will be required to hold permits for CO2 emissions for its flights from Singapore to Frankfurt, which will include all CO2 emissions over Singapore, third countries, the high seas and EU airspace. As climate change is a global challenge, national and regional efforts to reduce CO2 emissions have an international impact by nature, particularly on trade. With the World Trade Organization (WTO) responsible for regulating world trade, this article analyses the consistency of the EU Aviation Directive with WTO rules. The EU's decision to include both non-EU and EU airlines under its cap and trade system is a response to the so-called carbon leakage and competitiveness issues that would have arisen if the scheme had been limited to EU airlines only. Carbon leakage arises when a carbon price leads domestic businesses to relocate to countries not pricing carbon or to increased imports of goods from countries not pricing carbon, resulting in no net reduction in global CO2 emissions. Competitiveness issues occur when a carbon price increases the price of domestically produced goods, causing consumers to substitute with cheaper imports from countries not pricing carbon, ultimately harming domestic industry and undermining support for these policies. With airlines providing an important international services trade, including CO2 emissions from aviation under the EU cap and trade system has important implications for international trade, particularly since air transport functions as an enabler of other forms of trade such as just-in-time manufacturing strategies, tourism, and business links. Despite the number of ways in which the Aviation Directive is in conflict with WTO rules, the article demonstrates that the type of WTO rules that the EU Aviation might violate are useful disciplines on how countries develop and apply climate change action that impedes international trade. Developing climate change measures consistently with WTO rules strikes an appropriate balance between giving WTO Members the policy space to take action to reduce CO2 emissions while maintaining an open and non-discriminatory trading system that supports economic growth and global welfare.

Insights from Durban to Doha

INTRODUCTION The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an international environmental treaty negotiated at the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the Earth Summit. Each year since 1995, the parties to the convention have met at the Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess approaches to climate change and related progress. Annual COP conferences rotate among the five UN regional groups; the African Group last year hosted COP 17 on 29 November 2011 in Durban, South Africa. At COP 17, The State of Qatar and the Republic of Korea from the Asian Group agreed to cooperate in order to host and encourage the success of the UN Climate Change Conference, COP 18/CMP 8 (the 18th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC, plus the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol), which will take place in Qatar from November 26 through December 7, 2012. The countries decided on a joint effort in preparing for the conference to globally promote and implement the green growth agenda. The Republic of Korea stands behind the green economy concept as a strategy to foster sustainable development and poverty eradication. One of the world’s main energy exporters, the State of Qatar expressed its eagerness to secure progress in the UN climate change negotiations and to support developing countries, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in adapting to the effects of climate change. Hosting the UN climate change negotiations this year makes Qatar the first OPEC nation to do so.

A new chapter in the UN climate change negotiations? First steps under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

This article discusses recent developments in the UN climate change negotiations in light of the Bonn Climate Change Conference in May 2012. It highlights the Bonn meeting as the first opportunity to assess the influence on the UNFCCC process of the Durban Package and the new Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. It argues that the main impression from the Bonn meeting is that the Durban outcome has indeed affected the dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations and holds potential for far-reaching changes. Provided that all goes well, the combination of new bodies and processes created in Cancun and Durban, the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC, and the likely public pressure following its release could open a new chapter in the UNFCCC process and lead to a more effective multilateral response to the climate change challenge. Still, the combination of a palpable rift within G-77/China and traditional divides between developed and developing countries on issues such as finance and technology means that the road ahead is likely to be a difficult one.

A new chapter in the UN climate change negotiations? First steps under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

This article discusses recent developments in the UN climate change negotiations in light of the Bonn Climate Change Conference in May 2012. It highlights the Bonn meeting as the first opportunity to assess the influence on the UNFCCC process of the Durban Package and the new Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. It argues that the main impression from the Bonn meeting is that the Durban outcome has indeed affected the dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations and holds potential for far-reaching changes. Provided that all goes well, the combination of new bodies and processes created in Cancun and Durban, the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC, and the likely public pressure following its release could open a new chapter in the UNFCCC process and lead to a more effective multilateral response to the climate change challenge. Still, the combination of a palpable rift within G-77/China and traditional divides between developed and developing countries on issues such as finance and technology means that the road ahead is likely to be a difficult one.

The rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations

This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system.

Dynamics of National Position in Climate Change Negotiations: An Analysis of Emission, Cost and Regime Support

There has been marked change in recent years in the positions taken by many nation states involved in climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While these changes in position track with shifting priorities of both developing and developed countries, a consensus on how a nation formulates its negotiation policy has not been reached, and therefore understanding these vicissitudes in global climate talks have thus far been difficult.Traditional approaches to explaining a nation’s position on climate change are often rooted in an interest-based methodological framework, such as Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta’s (S&V) well-known cost-benefit model. While the S&V approach offers valuable insight and an intellectual base from which to conduct further study, it fails, as this paper demonstrates, to stand the test of time. That is, a thorough review of the history on global climate change negotiation reveals inaccuracies in the S&V model, particularly with regard to one of its primary variables – ecological vulnerability – which is difficult to measure and the model itself is fails to accurately account for processes of change in strategy formation. In light of these shortcomings, this paper offers an alternative analytical framework to better understand how a nation formulates its climate change negotiation policy and strategy.To this end, a four variable matrix – patterns A, B, C, and D – is developed which keys off of two central inputs affecting climate change negotiations: emission and cost. Emission, a nation’s share of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) portfolio, is representative of a country’s responsibility to actively engage with the global community on climate change. Cost can be understood as the expense incurred by a country that seeks to reduce its GHG emissions, and thus is a means of gauging the rational attractiveness for it to do so. When taken together and viewed under the four variable matrix developed in this paper, one is able to better understand the fundamental features influencing a country’s position on climate change negotiations. In order to analyze changes in national position, the variables of emission and cost are taken alongside a third factor – national support for climate change negotiation regime. This variable explores the motivation and impetus underlying a country’s decision to recalibrate its negotiation strategy, and incorporates such influences as national interest and political factors. In order to test the model formulated in this paper, a case study on China’s position and transition in UN climate change negotiations is undertaken. Major catalysts, stemming from national interests and political factors, are examined as explanatory factors influencing China’s gradual movement from a passive to active attitude toward climate change negotiation regime. This change, exemplified by its increased support for the UNFCCC, is born out in the four variable matrix introduced in this paper.