Ulster Crisis Research Articles

Faith and fatherland? The Ancient Order of Hibernians, northern nationalism and the partition of Ireland

AbstractIn 1912, the Ancient Order of Hibernians (A.O.H.) had become the most significant nationalist organisation in Ulster, a powerful auxiliary to the Irish Parliamentary Party, and a key part of what unionists feared would be Rome rule in a self-governed Ireland. However, while the A.O.H. is crucial to understanding nationalist Ulster and the border question, its reputation for fraternal secrecy and the apparent suddenness of its decline after the Irish Party's 1918 collapse has often seen it elude sustained academic enquiry. This article provides the first examination of the order from the Ulster crisis to the early decades of partition, drawing on the records of its governing Board of Erin. Scrutinising the grassroots and the leadership, this article interrogates dissension among Hibernians, the suspension of divisions and defections to Sinn Féin as the order reconciled proposals for Ulster exclusion with its traditional appeal. While Hibernians often found themselves part of a three-cornered conflict in the violent 1920s, the order ultimately survived on both sides of the border with regional variation important in estimating decline. Its persistence, therefore, illustrates something of the lived experience of partition and highlights important threads of continuity in a period of political and social upheaval.

How Revolutionary Was the "Irish Revolution"?

How Revolutionary Was the "Irish Revolution"? Marc Mulholland (bio) "My Lords, for ten years … it is no exaggeration, it is the literal truth to say that there has been going on in Ireland a great revolution—social partly, political partly."1 So said Sir Charles Russell QC in 1889. He was addressing the special commission sitting in judgment on the Land War and the rise of the radical Parnellite nationalist party since 1879. We are now more likely, however, to think of the ten years between 1912 and 1923 as the "Irish Revolution." This way of thinking is relatively new. It is true that the language of revolution can be found in Irish history, particularly in the ambiguity of the militant separatist tradition. Until reorganization in 1873 there was no formal certainty whether the initials IRB indicated that this Irish brotherhood was "revolutionary" or "republican."2 "Revolutionary" was generally understood to signal a commitment to illegality, and in this regard the distance from "constitutional" nationalism could easily shrink, as episodes such as the 1879–82 Land War had shown.3 But while we can find self-identifying "revolutionaries" in modern Ireland, and revolutionism elided with militancy, can we claim as a revolution the period in which the independent Irish state was founded and Northern Ireland carved out? A couple of instant histories at the time did refer to the period as a revolution. Alison Phillips defined the collapse of British rule in most of Ireland as the local expression of an ongoing international "revolution," a generalized crisis of stable hierarchy and empires. For this reason he called his book The Revolution in Ireland rather than The [End Page 139] Irish Revolution.4 From a nationalist perspective we find a similarly ambiguous categorization of Ireland's experience as "revolution." William O'Brien, in his book The Irish Revolution and How It Came About, described the process in rather unrevolutionary terms: at once a militant backlash against home rule, and as its constitutional consummation.5 These descriptors of "revolution" did not stick in the years after Irish independence and partition. In general, no fixed term came to describe as a totality the series of episodes including the third Home Rule bill and "Ulster Crisis" of 1912–14, the 1913 Lock Out, the 1916 Easter Rising, the 1919–21 Anglo-Irish War, the 1920–22 Ulster Troubles, and the 1922–23 Irish Civil War. For a society that still remembered these episodes with all too sharp clarity, and not yet concerned with how to collectively label them in a "decade of centenaries," these were intertwined paternosters. When a blanket term was felt to be required, that old term "Irish Troubles" was often rolled out.6 Padraic Colum, in his 1959 celebration of Arthur Griffith, the founder of moderate Sinn Féin, argued that the "Irish Revolution affords … an admirable and somewhat neglected case history of a nationalist revolution in our modern Western world."7 He did not find very many willing to take up the term "nationalist revolution," however. In Cold War Ireland the milieu of conservative Fine Gael nationalism was unlikely to enthuse about revolution of any sort. The term used around the fiftieth-anniversary celebrations of 1916, stoutly ignored by Ulster unionists, was "The Irish Uprising" or, more neutrally, in 1969, "The Conflict."8 [End Page 140] Revolution as a descriptor appeared at the end of the 1960s in the context of a wave of national-liberation struggles in the global south. For Oliver MacDonagh, the revolutionary delusions of "halfcrazed millenarians" had to be yoked to the sober constitutionalism of Arthur Griffith's Sinn Féin to win independence.9 F.S.L. Lyons likewise depicted the merging of a separatist underground with moderates to achieve at least a "thwarted revolution."10 In 1971 C. Desmond Greaves used the term "Irish revolution" in his biography of the leftist anti-Treaty leader Liam Mellowes. Greaves characterized the period as an incomplete "national revolution." The political implication of this in the context of the Northern Ireland Troubles, escalating as he wrote, was obvious.11 George Dangerfield in his 1976 study of the period The Damnable Question also spoke of the "unfinished...

“No idle sightseers”: The Ulster Women’s Unionist Council and the Ulster Crisis (1912-1914)

This paper examines the role of the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council (UWUC) during the Ulster Crisis. When the UWUC was founded in 1911 dominant gender norms constituted the organization as an auxiliary of the male-dominated Ulster Unionist Council. However, within a year of its establishment the UWUC was the largest women’s political organization in Ireland. Yet the literature related to Ulster unionism and twentieth-century Irish politics and history has constituted the UWUC as a marginal Ulster unionist organization. This paper seeks to contribute to redressing this. It argues that the UWUC was not an “idle sightseer”, or passive observer, of the Ulster Crisis; rather it played a significant role during the Ulster Crisis and in constituting Ulster as a distinct and united polity.

‘Après la guerre’: John Redmond, the Irish Volunteers and Armed Constitutionalism, 1913–1915

Abstract The received narrative of the Ulster crisis relegates John Redmond to the role of bystander as parliamentary politics were sidelined by paramilitarism. Only the First World War, in this account, arrested the advance of armed force in Irish politics. This article seeks to disrupt this narrative by demonstrating that Redmondites were not untouched by the militarist turn which Ireland experienced in these years. Instead, home rulers developed an armed strategy of their own in response to the advent of militant extra-parliamentary politics. Having taken over the Irish Volunteers in spring 1914, Redmondites began to arm their supporters in defence of self-government. Separatists were scornful of these efforts, and it is true that Redmondites initially saw this activity primarily in political terms. But the outbreak of war persuaded Redmond that the eventual return of loyalist soldiers to Ireland at the end of the conflict could be decisive if the Ulster crisis resumed. Believing that nationalists needed to plan for this contingency, Ireland’s prime minister-in-waiting resolved to use the war to build a home rule army. Initially, pro-war nationalists hoped that this could be achieved through the Volunteers becoming a government-sponsored home guard, but War Office opposition forced Redmond to the conclusion that only British military service could ensure a sufficient force to secure the future of self-government. Though this strategy of armed constitutionalism had unravelled by Easter 1916, that it was attempted suggests that late Redmondism should not be conceived of only in terms of Redmond’s public rhetoric of orange and green reconciliation through common battlefield sacrifice.

The Ulster Crisis in Transnational Perspective: Ulster Unionism and America, 1912–14

The Ulster Crisis in Transnational Perspective:Ulster Unionism and America, 1912–14 Lindsey Flewelling (bio) “The Ulster breed has never known defeat,” proclaimed Andrew Long Horner, Member of Parliament for South Tyrone, at the second reading of the Home Rule bill in 1912. He expounded: We are scoffed at as a minority. We admit inferiority in numbers, but nothing else. In a miserable minority in former times, we yet changed the dynasty of this country. In a miserable minority our race played the most conspicuous part against the mad legislation of the British government that led to the foundation of the American republic. Take care where this mad legislation of yours today will lead you. We have done more as pioneers and colonists than any part of the United Kingdom. Do you think the men who are of our blood and race, controlling, as they do, the greatest interests in our colonies, will stand by and see you coerce us, your oldest colony, by force to leave the shelter of the imperial parliament and accept the government of men whose whole careers have been abuse and hatred of us and you?1 Through examples of historical and colonial influence Horner emphasized the power of the Ulster “race,” which he portrayed as “plain, blunt, practical people” responsible for the material welfare and industry of Ireland. He drew on their connections to the American colonial and revolutionary periods. Like the American colonists in the lead-up to the War of Independence, Horner asserted that the Ulster people faced “mad legislation” and coercion from the British government. The Home Rule legislation, forced upon Ulster, was a betrayal by the British—an instance of the British turning their most loyal subjects over to the domination of men who had abused and hated them. [End Page 118] In his speech Horner described the “secret, bitterly sectarian,” American-dominated Ancient Order of Hibernians as poised to rule in a new Irish parliament, imperiling the civil and religious liberties of Protestants and ravaging commerce and industry in Ireland. He emphasized the themes of liberty, coercion, betrayal, dangers from Irish nationalists, and the loyalty of Ulster unionists in order to lend legitimacy to his threats of violence and defiance of the British government policy of Home Rule. He avowed that people of Ulster descent abroad would come to the aid of unionists if called upon and would join in war with those already actively participating in armed drills. “We have close to 200,000 men enrolled in our unionist clubs,” he asserted. “Ordinary drilling is actively carrying on. … In two years’ time a passive resistance movement can readily be transformed to an active one, and this is your message of peace. I tell you it is a declaration of war.”2 From the time of Horner’s speech in 1912 to the passage of Home Rule in 1914, Ulster unionists’ threats of militancy intensified, pushing the United Kingdom to the brink of civil war. The crisis unfolded on the ground in Ulster with volunteers drilling and amassing arms in anticipation of defiance of Home Rule’s implementation. As Patricia Jalland, Gary Peatling, and others have shown, the crisis also played out in the high political realm, with the Liberals under the leadership of Prime Minister H. H. Asquith attempting to navigate a path to defuse the opposition of Edward Carson and the Ulster unionists while maintaining the support of John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP).3 British unionists, under the leadership of Andrew Bonar Law, threw their support behind the Ulstermen, [End Page 119] endorsing their threats of militancy and attempting to use the issue of Irish Home Rule to unite the Tory factions and return the party to office.4 In the sphere of popular politics Daniel Jackson has highlighted the ways in which unionist leaders orchestrated anti–Home Rule agitation so as to achieve high levels of support from the British public, particularly by drawing upon religious sentiments and British imperial patriotism.5 Ulster unionists were also attuned to the potential of support from the dominions, surrounded as they were by images of empire in every aspect of their daily lives in...

The Irish Parliamentary Party and the Third Home Rule Crisis, by James McConnel

How significant is the legacy that the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) left to the Irish Free State? Is there a democratic tradition which the Nationalists created and bequeathed to the ‘founding fathers’ of independent Ireland? One way to approach this question is to study how the IPP operated both at Westminster and in the constituencies—that is, how its MPs understood both their role as representatives in an imperial parliament and their vision for Ireland under Home Rule. This is the strategy adopted by James McConnel in this brilliant new analysis of the political elite who were preparing to run the country under devolved powers when the First World War and the Easter Rising changed forever the course of Irish history. The book consists of thirteen chapters grouped into four parts. Part I examines the MPs in their constituencies (including their readiness to serve local interests at Westminster), the way candidates were selected and the working of patronage. Part II is about the IPP’s ‘enemies’: significantly, under this rubric McConnel does not consider the Unionists, but the ‘enemies within’ nationalism, including the Fenians, Sinn Fein, and militant labour, which was behind the violent industrial actions, such as the one in Dublin in 1913. Part III looks at the social dynamics of the IPP when in London, including party behaviour and discipline in the House of Commons. Finally, Part IV is about ideas during the ‘long’ Home Rule crisis, from 1912 to 1916, focusing on the outlook of the IPP, including the way they imagined Ireland under self-government, the question of ‘loyalty’ and that of imperialism, the 1912 Ulster Crisis, the organisation of the Volunteers, and how all of these issues and attitudes were transformed by the Great War and the Easter Rising.

Seventeenth Century Ireland: The War of Religions

Seventeenth Century Irelandwas chosen by CHOICEfor the 1989-1990 Outstanding Academic Books and Nonprint Material (OABN) list. The OABN list includes only the top 10% of all books reviewed by CHOICE in 1989. Contents: Introduction; Identities and Allegiances, 1603-25; The Crown and the Catholics: Royal Government and Policy 1625-37; Fateful Ideologies: The Stuart Inheritance; Wentworth and the Ulster Crisis, 1638-9; On the Eve of Revolution, 1639-41; 1641: The Plot That Never Was; Insurrection and Confederation, 1641-4; In Search of a Settlement: Ormond, Rinuccini and Cromwell, 1645-53; Theology and the Politics of Sovereignty: Jansenist, Jesuit and Franciscan; Ideologies in Conflict, 1660-91; References; Bibliography; Index^R

Book Reviews: The Sources of Social Power Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Volume Two: The Nation-State and Violence, Nationalism and the State, The British State and the Ulster Crisis from Wilson to Thatcher, Sociological Theory, Religion and Collective Action, The Problem of Altruism, Subjectivity and Social Relations,

Book Reviews: The Sources of Social Power Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Volume Two: The Nation-State and Violence, Nationalism and the State, The British State and the Ulster Crisis from Wilson to Thatcher, Sociological Theory, Religion and Collective Action, The Problem of Altruism, Subjectivity and Social Relations,

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviews in this article:The Diary of Beatrice Webb. Edited by Norman & Jeanne Mackenzie Volume One 1873‐1892 Glitter Around and Darkness WithinVolume Two 1892‐1905 All The Good Things of LifeVolume Three 1905‐1924 The Power to Alter ThingsVolume Four The Wheel of LifeThe Last Dissenter: H. N. Brailsford and his World. By F. M. Leventhal.Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist. By Kenneth O. Morgan.Carrington: A Life and a Policy. By Patrick Cosgrave.The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences. Edited by Quentin Skinner.A Preface to Economic Democracy. By Robert A. Dahl.Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945–51. By Alec Cairncross.The New Select Committees: A Study of The 1979 Reforms. Edited by Gavin Drewry.Work and Inequality. BY Susan Lonsdale.Women's Rights at Work: Campaigns and Policy in Britain and the United States. BY Elizabeth M. Meehan.Reduntant Women. BY Angela Coyle.Beyond Employment: Household, Gender and Subsistence. Edited by Nanneke Redclift and Enzo Mingione.Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany, and Sweden. By Peter Gourevitch, Andrew Martin, George Ross, Stephen Borstein, Andrei Markovits, and Christopher Allen.Industrial Relations in Britain. Edited by George Sayers Bain.History and Heritage; The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System. By Alan Fox.The British State and The Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher. By Paul Bew & Henry Patterson.Ireland: A Positive Prosposal. By Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden.British Policy Towards Ireland 1921–1941. By Paul Canning.

Collins and de Valera : Friends or Foes ?

Although a life-long admirer of Eamon de Valera, Jack Lynch who succeeded Sean Lemass as leader of the Fianna Fail Party and Taoiseach (1966-1973 ; 1977-79), recognises that to a large extent de Valera and Collins shared the same views, philosophies and ideals. He deplores that the Collins/De Valera Pact was not given the chance it deserved, and questions Collins's attitude to the Treaty if he had known that sixty years later, such little progress would have been made in bringing the two parts of Ireland together. In a remarkable effort to rise above past bitterness the author claims that the only durable solution of Ireland's problems, be it the Ulster crisis or the current recession, will be based on the coming together of the people of the island in peace and reconciliation and the co-operation of all in the national interest.

Social Democrats and Northern Ireland, 1964-1970

The current stage of the Irish struggle for independence began in 1967 with a civil-rights campaign; less than two years later, in August 1969, British troops were sent into action, and a year later they were meeting armed resistance from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Conflict between the British government and the Catholic people of the North has been sustained ever since. The government responsible for sending in the troops was in the hands of the Labour party. The Ulster crisis confronted the Labour party with a classic dilemma: how to relate their reformist tradition to their commitment to the economic framework of capitalism and the imperial interests it generates. The fundamental contradiction of these aims and the consequent bankruptcy of the social democrats' reformism was clearly demonstrated as the crisis developed.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The Impact of the Ulster Crisis (1912–1914) on the British Labour Party

The British Parliamentary system has broken down in Ulster as it has broken down many times in Ireland in the past. In fact, many events in the current agonizing crisis of Northern Ireland suggest scenes from the past. The mutual hatreds of Catholics and Protestants seem unchanged from the seventeenth century world of Cromwell and William of Orange. The Orange Lodges of 1973 seem the same as those of 1795. William Craig's Ulster Vanguard is a conscious revival of Sir Edward Carson's Ulster Volunteers of 1912-1914. The Provisional I.R.A. in 1973 attempts to re-enact the history of the Irish Republican Army of Michael Collins in 1920 and 1921. One element from past Irish troubles, however, is fortunately lacking. This breakdown in Ireland, unlike all earlier breakdowns, has created no crisis in Britain. In the past, British Governments have been badly shaken by Irish troubles. This time, however, there is no battle over Ireland either within the British parties or between the British parties.It was dramatically different in the months between April, 1912, and August, 1914, the period of the battle over the Third Home Rule Bill and the starting point for this paper. This Ulster crisis brought Ireland to the brink of civil war, turned the Conservative Party into sponsors of rebellion, and produced something like a mutiny among the officers of a British Army unit. These events have been described in several books and in many chapters of political histories and biographies. Indeed, the Ulster crisis and the reactions of the Conservatives, Liberals, and Irish Nationalists have been amply studied. Only one group in the story has been neglected. With the exception of George Dangerfield in his Strange Death of Liberal England, writers on the Ulster crisis virtually ignore the Labour Party. This is easily understood. The battle over Home Rule which initiated the Ulster crisis of 1912-1914 was waged between the Liberal Government allied with the Irish Nationalists on one side and the Conservative Party with their Ulster Unionist wing on the other.