Sender Type Research Articles

Signaling through Bayesian persuasion

This paper examines the conditions under which separating outcomes occur in informed persuasion, that is, in Bayesian persuasion settings in which the sender is privately informed about the payoff-relevant state prior to committing to an experiment. We consider a setting with finite payoff-relevant states and sender payoffs that are continuous and monotonic in the receiver’s posterior beliefs. The paper finds that if full disclosure of the payoff-relevant state reduces the sender’s expected payoff under any common prior (i.e., if the sender’s payoff function is outer concave), then single-crossing properties arise such that the high sender type can separate from the low type by choosing more informative experiments. This single-crossing condition leads to the selection of “least costly” separating equilibria by the D1 criterion, i.e., the sender’s choice of experiment signals his type. Further, separating equilibria are characterized by simple constrained maximization problems.

What makes green persuasion effective? Evidence from a community-financed sanitation program in Indonesia

Understanding when and where face-to-face communication affects pro-environmental decisions is important for policymakers. We study a data set collected in a solicitation project intended to increase participation in a community-financed waste collection program in Indonesia. Two types of messages are developed and randomly assigned to 748 households. In addition, solicitors are randomly assigned to a control group or one of two treatment groups, and these groups are shuffled further midway through the project. These two orthogonal randomizations allow us to assess the impact of a combination of messages, solicitors and households. We find that the “help the children” message increases the probability of participation for households with a young child. Solicitor personality is associated with immediate participation but becomes nonsignificant after three months. Furthermore, a household is more likely to participate if a solicitor knows the respondent personally. These results suggest that, at least in the short term, important factors in encouraging behavioral changes include not only the contents of messages but also the type of sender of such messages. This paper highlights the possible impact of targeting and content-sender-receiver matching when persuasive communication is used as an environmental policy instrument.

Marketing Automation: How to Effectively Lead the Advertising Promotion for Social Reconstruction in Hotels

With many outdated hotels in urgent need of refurbishment in China, chain hotel groups are under mounting pressure to expand their market share by strengthening advertising performance. This study aims to explore the effects of sender types and anonymous clues on advertising exposure as well as the impacts of the above factors and content narratives on service conversion (e.g., link clicks) for hotel franchise promotion. In addition to increasing exposure action, use of the AA-IDA model can effectively increase the possibility of hotel advertising conversion. Two experiments were employed to examine the impacts of advertising design factors on exposure and conversion rates of hotel franchise promotion. A behavioral experiment and a field experiment were carried out to examine the critical effect of advertising design factors on advertising exposure and conversion. The Wald tests for parameters show that the effect of anonymity on advertising conversion was significant (β = 0.479, p < 0.01). Objective content narratives had a significant positive impact on advertising conversion (β = 0.594, p < 0.01). Furthermore, The ANOVA results show that hoteliers in groups with different design elements applied had significant differences in post-conversion service usage (F = 33.809, p < 0.001). The AA-IDA model provides a new framework for future hotel franchise promotion research. Additionally, the important design factors of promotional ads and their reorganization (e.g., sender types, anonymous clues, and content narratives) had a significant impact on the view action and conversion action.

#CoronaVirus and public health: the role of social media in sharing health information

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine how factual information and misinformation are being shared on Twitter by identifying types of social media users who initiate the information diffusion process.Design/methodology/approach This study used a mixed methodology approach to analyze tweets with COVID-19-related hashtags. First, a social network analysis was conducted to identify social media users who initiate the information diffusion process, followed by a quantitative content analysis of tweets by users with more than 5K retweets to identify what COVID-19 claims, factual information, misinformation and disinformation was shared on Twitter.Findings Results found very little misinformation and disinformation distributed widely. While health experts and journalists shared factual COVID-19-related information, they were not receiving optimum engagement. Tweets by citizens focusing on personal experience or opinions received more retweets and likes compared to any other sender type. Similarly, celebrities received more replies than any other sender type.Practical implications This study helps medical experts and government agencies understand the type of COVID-19 content and communication being shared on social media for population health purposes.Originality/value This study offers insight into how social media users engage with COVID-19-related information on Twitter and offers a typology of categories of information shared about the pandemic.Peer review The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/OIR-03-2021-0143/.

The Role of Social Media in Raising Public Health Awareness during the Pandemic COVID-19: An International Comparative Study

The main objective of this research is to investigate the role of social media campaigns (the type of social media platform, type of message, and message source sender) in raising public health awareness and behavioral change during (COVID-19) as a global pandemic across national selected countries (Poland and Jordan). The research utilizes a quantitative method with an exploratory and descriptive design to accumulate the initial data from a research survey given to the respondents from Jordan and Poland. A total of 1149 web questionnaires were collected from respondents in the two countries (Poland 531 and Jordan 618). In addition, multiple regression analysis was used to test the study hypotheses. The findings showed positive relationships between the components of a social media campaign, public health awareness, and behavioral change during (COVID-19) in the two countries at the same time. However, the preferred type of social media platforms, the message types and type of source sender significantly differ among the respondents due to their countries. This is the first study that examines the role of social media campaigns (the type of social media platform, type of message and message source sender) in public health awareness and behavioral change during (COVID-19) as a global pandemic in across national selected countries (Poland and Jordan).

Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure

Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. Our theory-driven laboratory experiment investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve information transmission. We find that vagueness is profitably deployed by senders to fool those receivers that lack strategic sophistication. Imposing precise disclosure leads to more easily interpretable messages, but results in fewer sender types disclosing at all. Since non-disclosure also systematically misleads naive receivers, the welfare implications of imposing precision are not obvious. However, our model and experiment show that information transmission and the welfare of naive receivers are improved by policies that impose precision. Our results speak to the rules governing firms’ disclosure of quality-relevant information, the disclosure of research findings, and testimonies in a court of law.

Consequences of Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art and Paths Forward

Abstract What determines the consequences of economic sanctions? Is there a common explanation for these consequences? This article provides a comprehensive review of the fragmented literature focusing on the consequences of sanctions. We critically discuss the complex relationships between types of sanctions and sanction senders and their targets, as well as the structural factors that account for the specific consequences of different sanction cases. A discussion on the thematic, methodological, and theoretical shortcomings of the existing literature on sanction consequences follows. We argue that a “common approach” to sanction consequences research should be framed within the framework of international interdependence. We also present several nascent trends and propose new directions for sanction researchers and other disciplines.

Persuasion with costly precision

We study a sender’s optimal choice of precision when he selects from a class of random signals to persuade a receiver to accept his request, with higher costs associated with higher precision. The receiver observes both the precision and a random realization of the signal. We consider two situations: commitment, where the sender chooses the precision of his signal before observing any private information; and discretion, where the sender privately observes favourable or unfavourable information before choosing precision. We show that, under commitment, a positive level of precision is possible only when receiver is ex-ante neutral or slightly pessimistic about the sender. Under discretion, as long as the receiver is not convinced ex ante that he should accept the sender, there exists a unique plausible equilibrium, in which each type of sender’s payoff is independent of how pessimistic the receiver is about the sender. We then analyze optimal persuasion by comparing the sender’s payoff from discretion and that from commitment. We demonstrate that the more reluctant the receiver is to accept the sender, the more likely the sender prefers discretion to commitment. Finally, we show that whenever the sender prefers commitment to discretion, the receiver prefers the opposite.

Designing a Competitive Monotone Signaling Equilibrium

A decision maker (DM) determines a set of reactions that receivers can choose before senders and receivers move in a generalized competitive signaling model with two-sided matching. The DM's optimal design of the unique stronger monotone signaling equilibrium (unique D1 equilibrium) is equivalent to the choice problem of two threshold sender types, one for market entry and the other for pooling on the top. Our analysis sheds light on the impacts of a trade-off between matching efficiency and signaling costs, the relative heterogeneity of receiver types to sender types, and the productivity of the sender's action on optimal equilibrium designing.

Travel Blog as an ESL Teaching Tool

Current stage of ICT development necessitates the improvement of teaching tools, skills, and learning outcomes. The article discusses bright educational prospects of travel blogging for students of English as a second language (ESL). The authors suggest a short theoretical overview of research into travel blogosphere’s educational opportunities, while discussing a classification of travel blogs according to the type of sender vs receiver communication. On a wide and modern textual material the article considers such prominent features of travel storytelling as polysemantic vocabulary, compact meaning representation, strategies to present cultural information and verbal creativity which can be of true interest for students of B2 level and above. The readers can also learn about a few forms of activity with travel stories which are individual special sampling with some specific focus (pun, irony, creative instances of word building), presentation of foreign culture by means of English, project work for a small group of enthusiasts, sampling stories by country, by area or by activity, and presenting one concise story to the classroom, as their own post or a paper brochure.

Evasion of guilt in expert advice

We develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is guilt-averse toward the receiver. The sender’s cost of sending a particular message is endogenous, depending on the receiver’s beliefs induced by this message rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such preferences lead to the endogenous emergence of evasive communication in that the sender types who prefer not to reveal their information to the receiver pool with uninformed types rather than with types observing different information. As a result, the receiver may prefer an equilibrium with a smaller amount of messages used on the equilibrium path. Besides, dealing with an ex ante less informed sender can be beneficial to the receiver, while the sender himself may want to commit to a smaller ex ante likelihood of being informed.

Facts or stories? How to use social media for cervical cancer prevention: A multi-method study of the effects of sender type and content type on increased message sharing

Social media has become a valuable tool for disseminating cancer prevention information. However, the design of messages for achieving wide dissemination remains poorly understood. We conducted a multi-method study to identify the effects of sender type (individuals or organizations) and content type (personal experiences or factual information) on promoting the spread of cervical cancer prevention messages over social media. First, we used observational Twitter data to examine correlations between sender type and content type with retweet activity. Then, to confirm the causal impact of message properties, we constructed 900 experimental tweets according to a 2 (sender type) by 2 (content type) factorial design and tested their probabilities of being shared in an online platform. A total of 782 female participants were randomly assigned to 87 independent 9-person online groups and each received a unique message feed of 100 tweets drawn from the 4 experimental cells over 5 days. We conducted both tweet-level and group-level analyses to examine the causal effects of tweet properties on influencing sharing behaviors. Personal experience tweets and organizational senders were associated with more retweets. However, the experimental study revealed that informational tweets were shared significantly more (19%, 95% CI: 11 to 27) than personal experience tweets; and organizational senders were shared significantly more (10%, 95% CI: 3 to 18) than individual senders. While rare personal experience messages can achieve large success, they are generally unsuccessful; however, there is a reproducible causal effect of messages that use organizational senders and factual information for achieving greater peer-to-peer dissemination.

Communication with evidence in the lab

We study a class of sender–receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.

Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information

We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only if ordinary separation occurs in the other state. Pooling is possible and can go along with ordinary separation in one state.

An efficient cryptographic scheme for text message protection

Interchange of information is increasing very rapidly. Transferring any information on internet arises with the biggest issue that is security. Cryptography plays an important role in achieving security. For any type of business our primary focus is mainly on the security of information for that we require a robust and unbreakable process that provides great safety. This project is concerned with the development of a secure messaging system based on cryptographic algorithm that is which is more faster, better immune to attacks, more complex, easy to encrypt. This is well featured and provides encryption/decryption that can protect message from unauthorized access. we proposed an algorithm, which uses triple keys for encryption and decryption of text to secure the information. This application is well featured and provides security that can protect message from unauthorized access. To send a message, a sender types and encrypts a text message using Three Keys algorithm with a key selected from keylist .The encrypted message is stored in database and receiver’s inbox serial number of key .The receiver, after logging into account ,selects key value and then decrypts with key to see the original message

Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games

Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments. Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver's off-path beliefs based on "type compatibility" and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection.

Costless Signaling with Costly Signals

We study signaling environments with two features that are common in practice: first, complete-information bliss points are heterogeneous across different types of senders; second, receivers observe many choices by each sender, rather than a single decision. We prove that, ironically, a sufficiently large increase in the weight attached to signaling costs allows senders to signal their true types at arbitrarily low overall cost. As an application, it follows that, when senders take a sufficient number of observable actions, their private information is revealed almost costlessly. Instead of becoming ubiquitous, costly signaling becomes essentially irrelevant.

Characteristics of a Breast Pathology Consultation Practice.

- Intradepartmental consultation is a routine practice commonly used for new diagnoses. Expert interinstitutional case review provides insight into particularly challenging cases. - To investigate the practice of breast pathology consultation at a large tertiary care center. - We reviewed breast pathology cases sent for private consultation and internal cases reviewed by multiple pathologists at a tertiary center. Requisitions and reports were evaluated for diagnostic reason for consultation, rate of multiple pathologist review at the tertiary center, use of immunohistochemistry, and, for private consultation cases, type of sender and concordance with the outside diagnosis. - In the 985 private consultation cases, the most frequent reasons for review were borderline atypia (292 of 878; 33.3%), papillary lesion classification (151 of 878; 17.2%), evaluating invasion (123 of 878; 14%), subtyping carcinoma (75 of 878; 8.5%), and spindle cell (67 of 878; 7.6%) and fibroepithelial (65 of 878; 7.4%) lesion classification. Of 4981 consecutive internal cases, 358 (7.2%) were reviewed, most frequently for borderline atypia (90 of 358; 25.1%), subtyping carcinoma (63 of 358; 17.6%), staging/prognostic features (59 of 358; 16.5%), fibroepithelial lesion classification (45 of 358; 12.6%), evaluating invasion (37 of 358; 10.3%), and papillary (20 of 358; 5.6%) and spindle cell (18 of 358; 5.0%) lesion classification. Of all internal cases, those with a final diagnosis of atypia had a significantly higher rate of review (58 of 241; 24.1%) than those with benign (119 of 2933; 4.1%) or carcinoma (182 of 1807; 10.1%) diagnoses. Immunohistochemistry aided in diagnosis of 39.7% (391 of 985) and 21.2% (76 of 359) of consultation and internally reviewed cases, respectively. - This study confirms areas of breast pathology that represent diagnostic challenge and supports that pathologists are appropriately using expert consultation.

Cheap Talk with Strategic Substitutability

In the classic Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic communication between an informed Sender and uninformed Receiver, perfect information transmission is never achieved as an equilibrium outcome. I present a modified version of the CS cheap talk game with the following two innovations: (i) both players take actions, and (ii) actions are strategic substitutes. In contrast to the CS setup, the modified game can facilitate perfect information revelation. I characterize the conditions under which a full information revelation equilibrium exists. When these conditions are violated, only partial revelation equilibria exist. Under partial revelation, the Sender reveals information up to a threshold state and pools beyond this threshold, resulting in some loss of information. Welfare analysis suggests that partial revelation equilibria with a higher threshold pareto dominate those with lower thresholds. Crucially, a higher threshold equilibrium is also interim efficient – every Sender type at least weakly prefers this over a lower threshold equilibrium.

Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender

This paper introduces private sender information in a game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to characterize the set of equilibria selected by the D1 criterion. These equilibria are either separating (i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver) or fully disclosing (i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payoff-relevant state). Which of these two cases occurs is determined by the optimality properties of fully disclosing signals. If full disclosure is optimal for all sender types, then the equilibrium is fully disclosing. Otherwise, the equilibrium is fully separating, and incentive compatibility requires the sender to use signals that are strictly more informative than the ones that would be used under symmetric information. Therefore, when full disclosure is suboptimal, the sender incurs a cost in comparison to the symmetric information case, whereas the receiver benefits from better information.