Types Of Expert Testimony Research Articles

Recovery of Future Medical Expenses for Novel Treatment

FUTURE medical expenses have always been an important component of personal injury jury awards. As medical technology advances, so do awards for future medical expenses. Advanced medical techniques are being utilized frequently, which are reflected in the escalation of future medical awards. For example, cosmetic surgeries and the use of increasingly advanced prosthetic devices have become frequent, and this has inevitably increased future medical expenses. Courts must determine whether there will be a limitation on future medical awards resulting from novel treatment. This article provides an overview of key themes that arise in a claim for future medical expenses, including: the standard for recovery, the defense's argument that future medical procedures are speculative, and the types of expert testimony that have proven most effective in claims for novel treatments. This article then addresses three types of novel treatment that have been the subject of recent litigation--experimental procedures, prostheses, and cosmetic surgery--and concludes by offering arguments that may be used by defense counsel in opposition to a claim for future medical expenses for novel treatments. Many of the strongest arguments against recovery of future medical expenses for novel treatments may be made in the pre-trial phase, and defense counsel should act early and aggressively to prevent recovery on unnecessary procedures. I. The Standards for the Recovery of Damages A. Future Medical Expenses Future medical expenses do not require the same degree of certainty as past medical expenses. (1) The amount of future medical expenses does need not to be established with mathematical certainty; (2) reasonable certainty is sufficient. (3) Claimants who require future medical attention resulting from wrongful conduct of others are generally entitled to recover future medical expenses. Recovery for future medical expenses often depends on the degree of proof and the type of evidence necessary. An award of future medical costs must be supported by competent evidence to guide the jury in arriving at a reasonable value for such expenses. (4) In many jurisdictions, awards must be supported by medical testimony establishing that the medical treatment is needed and the cost is appropriate. (5) Evidence of future medical expenses should only be considered by the jury if the testimony of an expert medical witness demonstrates that future medical expenses are certain to be incurred. (6) In some jurisdictions, such as Arizona, the judge has some discretion to determine whether the probability of such an expense is necessary. (7) B. State Standards for Future Medical Expenses Most jurisdictions have pattern jury instructions or other guidelines to establish the elements of damages for physical injuries sustained by a claimant. Recoverable damages for physical injuries may include: disfigurement, disability, loss of a normal life, increased risk of future harm, pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost earnings, and caretaking expenses. (8) For example, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following to recover future medical expenses in Illinois: (1) the necessity of the anticipated future treatment; (2) the reasonableness of the expected expense; (3) that the condition to be treated in the future was proximately caused by the tort at issue; and (4) the reasonable certainty that money will be expended for future medical treatment. (9) It would be improper to award damages for future medical expenses without evidence showing some degree of certainty that the claimant's treatment will continue into the future. Some commentators believe that the courts differ as to the degree of certainty required. (10) One could also conclude that the courts have utilized different language to describe the same standard. Some jurisdictions insist that an award for future medical expenses must be reasonably or more probable than not. …

Just World Beliefs, Expert Psychological Testimony, and Verdicts: A Mediational Model

This study assessed the role of expert testimony and just world beliefs (JWB) in decisions made in a sexually violent predator (SVP) trial. Three participant samples (student, juror, and community; total N = 534) completed items measuring JWB and watched a 1‐hour videotaped trial simulation that featured a psychologist offering different types of expert testimony in a SVP hearing. After the opening statements and at the end of the trial presentation, participants made commitment decisions and rated their confidence in their decision. They also rated the expert testimony on influence, credibility, scientificness, and confidence. Results indicated that favorable attitudes toward the expert mediated the relationship between JWB and commitment decisions. This relationship did not differ depending on type of expert testimony (clinical vs. actuarial) proffered. The legal and policy implications of the findings are discussed.

Educative Expert Testimony: A One-Two Punch Can Affect Jurors' Decisions

The present research examined whether different types of educative expert testimony can increase mock jurors' knowledge of problems associated with hearsay witnesses and decrease guilty verdicts. Studies 1 (N = 304 college students) and 2 (N = 196 college students) varied the length and types of expert testimony in a trial transcript. While all types of expert testimony did inform mock jurors' knowledge, guilty verdicts decreased when multiple problems with hearsay were presented. The length of the testimony had no effect on verdict. The results suggest that experts who present multiple problems with hearsay testimony are more likely to impact guilty decisions than is no expert or an expert who presents only one problem.

Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts

The national campaign against child abuse has changed the face of American evidence law during the past 30 years. The campaign has led to the relaxation of witness competency standards for alleged child victims, the recognition of new procedures for presenting child testimony such as the use of support persons, the creation of new hearsay exceptions, and the development of novel species of expert testimony. One of the most controversial new types of expert testimony is shaken baby syndrome. The proponents of the syndrome claim that the violent shaking of an infant by an adult can generate enough force to inflict fatal brain injuries on the infant even without impact. Many pediatricians and pathologists subscribe to this theory. However, many biolmechanical experts dispute the theory. To date, the vast majority of courts have admitted testimony based on the syndrome. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the available empirical data relevant to the question of the validity of the syndrome. The article concludes that this is one of the rare situations in which both sides' expert claims pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Supreme Court's leading decisions, Daubert and Kumho. Once a decision-maker posits the validation standard enunciated in Daubert, it is possible to have genuine battles of the experts. In this case, the syndrome opponents can point to relatively well designed experiments finding that even violent shaking by an adult cannot generate enough force to cause fatal injuries to the infant brain. However, syndrome opponents note that in a large number of cases in which infants suffered such fatal brain injuries, the infant's custodian admitted shaking without impact. It may be tempting to conclude that classical experimentation should always trump more anecdotal expert reasoning. However, that conclusion is indefensible as a matter of both statutory construction and epistemology.

Children, Sexual Abuse and Suggestibility: What Laypeople Think They Know and What the Literature Tells Us

This article summarizes the extensive research literature on laypeople's and jurors' beliefs about children's memory, suggestibility and responses to child sexual abuse. In particular, it discusses the extent and types of misconceptions held by laypeople/jurors, as well as the effects of age, education and gender on those misconceptions. The results from an analysis of mock jury studies where different types of expert testimony were presented are then considered in order to understand the types of expert testimony that would be admissible in courts in Australia, with a particular focus on the Uniform Evidence Act. As a result of this analysis, particular reform options are discussed and recommended in order to counter juror misconceptions in child sexual abuse trials.

Human Resources Management Comes of Age in the Courtroom: California Formally Enshrines the Importance of Human Resources Expert Testimony for Employment Litigation.

This article provides some background on testimony about human resources management practices in the courtroom. The author, a plaintiff's counsel, contends that a milestone was reached recently when the California Court of Appeal expressly accepted such testimony as relevant subject matter in an employment-related civil case. Prior to that in California, oftentimes human resources experts were limited in testimony, or altogether excluded, because testimony about personnel matters was considered junk science. The appellate court, however, also set some parameters on this type of expert testimony. The article provides further detail on some of the issues surrounding expert testimony in this field.

The impact of different types of expert scientific testimony on mock jurors’ liability verdicts

Participants in two experiments acted as jurors for a personal-injury case containing different types of expert testimony. In both experiments, the defendant was more likely to obtain a verdict in his favor when his expert presented anecdotal case histories than when the expert presented experimental data. Participants’ liability judgments were correlated with their perceptions of the experts’ credibility (experiments 1 and 2) and were moderated somewhat by their need for cognition and preference for numerical information (experiment 2). The results are discussed in terms of reasoning heuristics such as the base-rate fallacy.

Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury

This research examines the behavior of jurors as active information processors. Our experimental examination of the performance of the civil jury in response to a complex price-fixing case varies the information provided to jurors about the consequences of their damage award decisions (i.e., the treble damage rule) and the type of expert testimony (statistical models vs. concrete yardstick models). We find, consistent with a picture of the jury as active rather than passive, that jurors are more likely to follow judicial instructions when they are given explanations rather than bald admonitions. In addition, complex expert testimony neither overpowers the jurors nor is dismissed by them. The expert presenting a statistical model is viewed as having higher expertise but lower clarity; as a result the statistical expert and the expert presenting a more concrete model are not significantly different in their persuasiveness. Finally, in contrast to most research on the criminal jury, we find that deliberations do affect jury awards.

The self-defense defense and community sentiment.

It has been asserted (e.g., Gillespie, 1989) that the self-defense defense, with its objectivereasonable man standard, is unfairly biased against certain female defendants who kill a male and plead not guilty by reason of self-defense (NGRSD), and that jurors, who represent “community sentiment,” share that bias. Using three cases where a woman kills and pleads self-defense (a battered woman case, aGoetz-like subway case, and an alleged rape case), whereseriousness of the harm, equal or unequal force, retreat/escape possibility, imminence, and thepresence and type of expert testimony were varied, 269 mock jurors (students and adults) rendered verdicts and ratings. Broad but variable support for the NGRSD was found (e.g., 63%, 27%, and 23% NGRSD verdicts in the battered woman, subway, and rape cases, respectively), along with evidence that subjects use a wider context and, at times, a subjective perspective to decide culpability. Implications for a self-defense defense are suggested.

Social framework testimony in employment discrimination cases

AbstractThe use of social framework testimony by social psychologists in employment discrimination cases is expanding. After reviewing the legal background of this type of testimony, we describe its content and discuss an important Title VII case of sex discrimination where the testimony played a critical role. We also distinguish social framework testimony from other types of expert testimony by psychologists.

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample‐based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person‐based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye‐witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample‐based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person‐based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base‐rate information) of these findings are discussed.