What led to the calamitous drop in Iran's oil revenues in January 1977? Politics, religion, culture, and economics have been identified as factors contributing to the collapse of Iran's monarchy in 1979. But until now scholars have been unable to access documents could shed light on the inner workings of the relationship between senior US officials and the Shah of Iran, whom Henry Kissinger lauded as that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and one whose understanding of the world enhanced our own.1 The declassification of the papers of Brent Scowcroft, who worked in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, marks a significant milestone in our understanding of the origins of the Iranian Revolution. They reveal in 1976 the US and Saudi Arabia colluded to force down oil prices, inadvertently triggering a financial crisis destabilized Iran's economy and weakened the Shah's hold on power. In the first nine days of January 1977, Iran's economy was battered by unusual turbulence in international oil markets. Hundreds of millions of dollars in anticipated revenue were erased by a sudden and precipitous drop in daily oil exports, while total oil production plunged 38% over the previous month.2 Financial hemorrhaging forced the Shah's government to rewrite its budget, cancel new spending projects, freeze foreign aid programs, and take out a $500 million emergency loan from US and European banks.3 The immediate cause of Iran's fiscal crisis was Saudi Arabia's bold decision to challenge an increase in oil prices agreed to by the rest of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at a December 1976 meeting in Doha, Qatar. The Saudi Oil Minister, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, had announced his government would offset the impact of the price hike by selling more of its own petroleum at a reduced price.4 Yamani's threat to flood the market with cheap oil never came about, but OPEC's two-tiered pricing system remained in effect for six months and dealt Iranian finances a grievous blow. The Shah's chief economists later confirmed the government had never considered the possibility of a steep drop in oil prices and production.5 It had overestimated oil revenues never materialized and spent money it would now never see. But worse was to come. The government's attempt to restore fiscal order only compounded the crisis. Its harsh deflationary budget led to high unemployment and social unrest helped create a classic prerevolutionary situation.6 The Shah's personal reaction to the Saudi action was telling. Muhammad Reza Pahlavi had been counting on higher oil prices to buttress Iran's anemic economy - and strengthen his hand - while he embarked on a highly risky course of political liberalization at home. We're broke, he despaired on January 2, 1977. Everything seems doomed to grind to a standstill, and meanwhile many of the programs we had planned must be postponed ... It's going to be very tough.7 This year, 2008, marks the 30th anniversary of the outbreak of unrest in Iran flared into revolution and ultimately led to the collapse of the ancien regime, the royal family's flight into exile, and the United States' loss of Iran as a strategic partner in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. While much scholarly focus has been on the internal political, cultural, economic, and social origins of the revolution, the role of state finances - and oil revenues in particular - in precipitating the catastrophe has received far less attention. The Iranian Revolution shares similarities with two other great revolutions: France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. All three upheavals were preceded by fiscal crises.8 In Iran's case the dramatic revenue fluctuations of 1977 were acknowledged and duly noted at the time by Tehran-based foreign correspondents.9 But the underlying rationale for Saudi Arabia's decision to torpedo the December 1976 OPEC oil price increase, and particularly the Ford Administration's role in fateful decision, has not been explained until now. …