Two-round Elections Research Articles

Strategic voting in two-round elections: confirming the learning hypothesis in the Czech presidential elections of 2013–2023?

ABSTRACT This paper explores whether strategic voting can also be identified in two-round electoral systems. We use aggregate data at the level of Czechia’s 206 microregions to assess the incidence of strategic voting in the Czech presidential elections using two-round elections between 2013 and 2023. We find the following evidence of a considerable rise of strategic voting in the 2023 presidential election: (1) rise of support for the two strongest candidates nationally, as well as at the level of individual microregions; (2) decline of strategic failure and sincere voting indicated by shifting values of the second-first loser ratio; (3) increased electoral competition approaching strong competitive two-party dominance as shown by Nagayama diagrams. These results point to the importance of the ‘learning hypothesis’ that strategic voting in new democracies tends to increase as voters (but also political elites) become more experienced with the electoral process. Furthermore, while we present a case study of a Czech presidential election, we also make an important contribution to the literature on strategic voting. Therefore, a theoretical contribution of this study also lies in its effort to apply the Duvergerian logic to a very different context of presidential elections in which electoral competition is highly personalised.

Understanding vote transfers in two-round elections without resorting to declared data. The contribution of ecological inference, consolidated with factual information from a case study of the 2014 municipal elections in Montpellier

In electoral sociology, the analysis of vote transfers has traditionally depended on individual data obtained from surveys. Because such data suffer from a significant amount of declaration and memory bias, replacing them with the electoral statistics available down to polling station level may be advantageous. Recent developments in models of ecological inference allow us to use these aggregated data to establish estimates of vote transfers while minimising the risk of ecological error. Nonetheless, the reliability of ecological inference models for estimating vote transfers has thus far received little attention in the form of empirical evaluations. The purpose of the present article is to cast light on this blind spot by analysing a model for predicting electoral volatility in a two-round election, namely the municipal election held in Montpellier in 2014. What makes this approach original is its use of observed information – the proportion of non-voters in both rounds – first to compare this data with the estimates produced by the model and then to integrate it as a modelling parameter to measure its impact on estimated vote allocation. This analysis reveals that the initial model's results are relatively reliable regarding the known parameter, although they slightly overestimate its amplitude and underestimate its variability. The model that integrates information regarding the proportion of consistent non-voters yields estimates close to those obtained using the “raw” model. In terms of interpretative capacity, the value added by integrating this additional information is, therefore, slight. However, integrating the information does make it possible to establish narrower density intervals, reducing the uncertainty associated with the interpretation of the other parameters, particularly proportions associated with candidates who received few votes in the first round.

Two-Round Selection-Based Bit Flipping Decoding Algorithm for LDPC Codes

This paper presents a novel iterative reliability-based bit flipping (BF) algorithm for decoding low-density parity-check codes. The new decoder is a single BF algorithm called two-round selection -based bit flipping. It introduces the idea of a two-round selection of the flipped bit, based successively on hard and soft received channel values. In the first stage, a set of unreliable bits is identified, and then a second selection is used, to pick out among them the bit to flip. In the second round of selection, the initial belief about received signals, contributes efficiently to selecting the best candidate bit. We demonstrate through simulations over the binary-input additive white Gaussian noise channel and the Rayleigh fading channel that the proposed algorithm exhibits better decoding performance when compared with some well-known soft decision BF algorithms. A complexity analysis of the proposal and a comparison to other BF decoders are also presented.

Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Candidates' placements in polls and past elections can be powerful coordination devices for parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first in the first round are more likely to stay in the race and win than those who placed second. These effects are even larger for ranking second versus third, and also present for third versus fourth. They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the bandwagon effect of wanting to vote for the winner. We find similar results across 19 other countries. (JEL D72, D83, D91, K16)

When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil

Electoral rules determine how voters’ preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races. (JEL D72, H41, H75, I21, I28, O15, O17)

Does the number of candidates increase turnout? Causal evidence from two-round elections

A long-lasting question in comparative politics is whether the number of candidates/parties increases turnout. Existing observational studies on the topic find mixed results. We thus apply a regression discontinuity design to data 13,910 legislative and cantonal electoral districts in France since 1978. In the two-round system used in these elections, the candidates who pass a certain vote threshold in the first round can participate in the second round. We use this discontinuity to estimate the causal effect of having a third candidate in the second round: it increases turnout by 3.5% points and the share of valid votes by 7.3% points. We confirm these findings with survey data from the 2012 legislative election. Further, we investigate the mechanism and find evidence supporting the alienation theory, according to which individuals whose preferences do not resonate with the preferences of any of the candidates are likely to abstain.

Information-Theoretic Optimal Radar Waveform Selection With Multi-Sensor Cooperation for LPI Purpose

For the complex battlefield electromagnetic environment, low probability of interception (LPI) performance has become an indispensable ability for modern radars. Waveform selection is one of the most fundamental and effective technical approaches to achieve the LPI performance of radar. However, the existing LPI waveforms are often optimized by some incomplete or weak performance representation metrics of radar or passive intercept devices (PIDs), which leads to a poor LPI performance of the designed waveform. From the perspective of information flow, this paper reformulated the processes of radar target tracking and the interception and identification of PIDs. For simplifing the LPI waveform selection optimization model, the interception and identification performance optimization criterions of PIDs are well-integrated into a comprehensive metric, which is measured by Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Combining it with the radar tracking performance metric which is measured by the mutual information, an LPI waveform selection optimization model is established, which gives full consideration to both radar and PIDs performance. And, a two-round selection method is proposed to solve the optimization model. In addition, a multi-sensor cooperative tracking mechanism based on the accumulated tracking error constraint is designed for radar radiation control. The optimal waveform selection in the framework of multi-sensor cooperative tracking can improve the LPI performance of radar in both the waveform domain and the energy domain. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the performance optimization metrics of radar and PIDs, and the superiority and feasibility of the designed waveform selection method in the multi-sensor cooperative target tracking performance and LPI performance.

A Many-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm Based on a Two-Round Selection Strategy.

Balancing population diversity and convergence is critical for evolutionary algorithms to solve many-objective optimization problems (MaOPs). In this paper, a two-round environmental selection strategy is proposed to pursue good tradeoff between population diversity and convergence for many-objective evolutionary algorithms (MaOEAs). Particularly, in the first round, the solutions with small neighborhood density are picked out to form a candidate pool, where the neighborhood density of a solution is calculated based on a novel adaptive position transformation strategy. In the second round, the best solution in terms of convergence is selected from the candidate pool and inserted into the next generation. The procedure is repeated until a new population is generated. The two-round selection strategy is embedded into an MaOEA framework and the resulting algorithm, namely, 2REA, is compared with eight state-of-the-art MaOEAs on various benchmark MaOPs. The experimental results show that 2REA is very competitive with the compared MaOEAs and the two-round selection strategy works well on balancing population diversity and convergence.

Voter Beliefs and Strategic Voting in Two-Round Elections

How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where thirteen candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Furthermore, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.

A multi-agent system to predict the outcome of a two-round election

Abstract Here, an agent-based model is developed to forecast the outcome of a three-party election in a two-round voting system. The vote of each agent is determined from four variables related to economic indicators, quality of public services, ethical conduct of the current administration, and political profile of the voting population. In addition, each agent can be influenced by the opinion of the nearest neighbors. Numerical simulations are performed to investigate how these variables affect the elected candidate. The proposed model is also used to reproduce the presidential elections held in Brazil in 2010 and in Uruguay in 2019.

Behavior of budget expenditures during the election period: an analysis in panel data in the Brazilian municipalities

Objective: From the political budget cycle (PDC) lens, we investigated the behavior of committed expenditures, investment spending and borrowing in the electoral period, in Brazilian municipalities with a population of 50,000 or more, in the period 2000-2016, comprising 353 clusters and 6001 observations. It was also investigated whether these municipalities meet the legal requirements on the use of budget resources in an election year. The study was motivated by the lack of consensus in the literature on the subject in question.
 Methodology: Four research hypotheses were built to assist in achieving the proposed objectives. Data were collected from IBGE, TSE and STN websites. Data were analyzed using the balanced panel data method, grouped by municipality and region, with Tobit regression application and Hausman, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange and F de Chow robustness tests. This method covered confidence with the interval of 99%, 77%, 79% and 84% explaining behavior between the variables.
 Results: The results show that there were no changes in expenditure committed before, during and after the election period, regardless of party equality and two-round election, unlike the results of some studies. As for spending on investments and borrowing in the election period, the study suggests an average increase of 9% and 68% respectively, and this is more intense when there is party equality between municipal and state governments, especially in the process of reelection. Regarding compliance with legal requirements on the use of budgetary resources in an election year, the study indicates that local governments do not comply with regulatory requirements.
 Contributions of the study: contributes to the specific literature, because it presents robust results on the lack of consensus on the subject in question, as well as for future research involving municipalities with smaller population and comparison between regions and countries.

Análisis del sistema de elección presidencial en el Perú

This paper analyzes the current system of presidential elections in Peru, adopted by the1979 Political Constitution and kept by the 1993 Political Constitution. It highlights that the establishment of the presidential system through an absolute majority of votes two-round election has affected democracy, preventing its from developing based on the values of social capital. Presidentialism has become personalism, leading to the Parliament losing power and affecting the stability of political parties.

The ‘invention’ of FIFA history: João Havelange’s election to FIFA presidency as a historic event

ABSTRACTIn 1974, the Brazilian sports official João Havelange was elected FIFA’s president in a two-round election, defeating the incumbent Stanley Rous. The upset, often attributed to a successful alliance with Asia, the Middle East and Africa, what at the time was referred to as the Third World – surprised observers everywhere. Here, the election can be analysed as a historically relevant event of social significance. It can be thought of as a political window by means of which the international dynamic of a specific moment in the Cold War can be perceived, especially the limitations and potentialities of the agency available to periphery countries at that time. In this article, I intend to discuss the narratives that forged the history of FIFA, which take this political ‘event’ as a key in the institution’s own historical transformation. The sources analysed will be mainly FIFA official histories, such as the FIFA News, FIFA historical books and movies about the history of FIFA.

Does the Number of Candidates Increase Turnout? Causal Evidence From Two-Round Elections

We estimate the causal effect of the number of candidates on turnout in applying a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to data from 13,974 legislative and cantonal electoral districts in France since 1978. In the two-round system used in these elections, the candidates who pass a certain vote threshold in the first round can participate in the second round. We use this discontinuity in qualifying to compare districts in which the third candidate falls just above and below this threshold. We find that an additional candidate increases turnout by 4.1% points and the share of valid votes by 7.7% points. Further, we look into the mechanism and find evidence supporting the alienation theory, according to which turnout increases the most when the third candidate is from a different ideology than the two first. We also confirm this finding with an analysis of individual-level survey data from the 2012 legislative election.

An Empirical Model for Prediction of Residual Stress Based on Grinding Forces

Residual stress has a significant influence on mechanical strength of a manufactured part and is considered to be related with process parameters and grinding signals. This paper investigates the relationship between residual stress and forces in the grinding of maraging steel 3J33. Features in time and frequency domains are extracted from tangential and normal grinding forces via various signal processing techniques. A two-round selection based on the statistical criterion is proposed to choose the best features that are related to the residual stress in the surface layer. The selected features are combined linearly in order to develop an empirical regression model that is capable of predicting residual stress well. The predicted residual stress values are compared with those measured from the experiment performed under different process parameters, and the result shows a favorable agreement quantitatively.

Democratic presidential elections and human rights: does a runoff round reduce repression?

ABSTRACTWhile theory suggests that democratic presidential elections should have a positive effect on human rights practices, the literature’s findings have thus far been mixed. Can differentiating between different types of presidential elections help to explain the literature’s contrasting results? This study estimates an ordered probit model to analyse a data set of 227 elections that occur in 54 presidential democracies from 1982 to 2011. Unlike presidential elections by plurality rule, runoff elections require a majority. I argue that in order to obtain a majority, presidential runoff elections favour candidates willing to form diverse cabinets with players more likely to be willing to veto repressive policies. Consistent with this argument, I find that in comparison to single-round presidential elections, after two-round presidential elections states are more likely to experience an increase in government respect for human rights and less likely to experience a decrease in government respect for human rights.

Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

One prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two-round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses ex-post measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: A one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.68 percentage points, which corresponds to 1 6 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors like electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race.

Strategic voting in the second round of a two-round system: The 2014 French municipal elections

We examine strategic voting in the second round of the 2014 French municipal elections. We focus on the 96 cities where the number of lists remained constant (three, four, or five) in the two rounds, and we examine the evolution of the vote for these 329 lists from the first to the second round. We show that support for the top two lists (in the first round) systematically increases in the second round at the expense of the other lists. The second list makes as much progress as the first list, ruling out a bandwagon effect. Strategic desertion of the non-viable lists is more pronounced when the distance from the second list is high, and there is close competition between the top two lists. This suggests that voters in these cities behave in a second round of a two-round election as they do under FPTP, provided that there are many candidates/parties and that the second round is held under plurality.

Local candidates and voter mobilization: Evidence from historical two-round elections in Norway

What effect do candidates with local ties have on voter turnout and party support? A considerable challenge within the existing literature on the personal vote, including that part which derives from local ties, is disentangling it from the party vote using observational data. We exploit the unique institutional context of Norway’s historical two-round system, and data measured at the municipality level, to evaluate the mobilizational impact of voter attachment to parties versus (local) candidates. Under this system, entry into the second round was unrestricted, with the number and identity of candidates determined by elite coordination decisions. In municipalities where coordination at the district level between rounds resulted in the withdrawal of a candidate with local ties, we document a strong negative effect on both turnout and party support, which highlights the value of the personal vote for mobilization, and the potential trade-offs that confront parties and coalitions in nomination decisions.

Electoral Coordination, the Personal Vote, and Voter Mobilization in Two-Round Elections

Electoral Coordination, the Personal Vote, and Voter Mobilization in Two-Round Elections