Turnout Inequality Research Articles

Political Inequality

Inequality in political participation and influence has strongly increased in recent decades, breeding economic inequality. In this review, we focus on three aspects of political inequality: the increasing concentration of both political and charitable donations, the growing gap in descriptive representation, and the persistent lack of substantive representation. Based on the existing literature as well as on novel evidence, we relate these aspects to the recent widening of turnout inequality. We then examine novel forms of participation—e.g., the rise of small donors in the United States—and the efficiency of policies aimed at improving representation. Finally, we discuss new avenues for research.

Engineering Democracy: Electoral Rules and Turnout Inequality

The issue of unequal electoral turnout poses serious concerns for both the overall health of democratic politics, and the extent to which certain groups exert an unequal influence on the political process. This article explores the relationship between electoral rules such as: compulsory voting, electoral system proportionality, and voter registration with voter inequality in terms of age, income and education. This is examined using cross-national survey data and cross-level interactions between electoral institutions and socio-demographic variables. The final dataset is based on waves 2–4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and contains information on 133,000 individuals, within 45 countries, between 2001 and 2016. The results indicate that compulsory voting is associated with a significant reduction in turnout inequalities, while the effects of proportionality and voter registration are somewhat more mixed.

The Indifferent Rich: An Uneasy Relationship between Turnout Inequality and Tax Avoidance

The Indifferent Rich: An Uneasy Relationship between Turnout Inequality and Tax Avoidance

Does the monetary cost of abstaining increase turnout? Causal evidence from Peru

We study the elasticity of turnout on the size of the monetary fines that governments impose on those who fail to vote. We leverage a discontinuity in the size of monetary fines in Peru, where voters in districts above an arbitrary cutoff in poverty rates face higher fines for not voting relative to voters who reside in districts below the cutoff. Using individual-level data on millions of voters for every regional and national election between 2010 and 2016, we find that turnout increases slightly in districts with higher fines—an effect of roughly one percent. This modest effect is similar across socioeconomic groups and elections. Our results highlight a challenge that governments face in designing the sanctions in compulsory voting systems: how to increase turnout without disproportionally hurting the poor or raising turnout inequality.

Voter turnout and abstention pricing: quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of a marginal increase in the monetary enforcement of compulsory voting

ABSTRACT In political science literature, it is often argued that compulsory voting can serve as a remedy against turnout inequality and thereby contribute to more egalitarian societies. However, the literature neglects differences between compulsory voting systems, and most studies consider the obligation to vote as a dichotomous variable. As a result, relatively little is known about the causal effects of particular stimuli and features of compulsory voting. By exploiting quasi-experimental conditions from direct-democratic decision-making in Switzerland, this research assesses the degree to which abstention fines account for a citizen’s willingness to vote under a compulsory voting context. The findings reveal that a marginal increase in monetary sanctions for voter-abstention leads temporally to a sizeable increase in turnout. However, it does not necessarily contribute to the expression of preferences by those traditionally underrepresented in direct-democratic decision-making since a third of those motivated to vote by the threat of a heavier fine will cast an empty or invalid ballot. The effect on turnout is further found to be moderated by income.

Making Unequal Democracy Work? The Effects of Income on Voter Turnout in Northern Italy

AbstractIn many democracies, voter turnout is higher among the rich than the poor. But do changes in income lead to changes in electoral participation? We address this question with unique administrative data matching a decade of individual tax records with voter rolls in a large municipality in northern Italy. We document several important findings. First, levels of income and turnout both dropped disproportionately among relatively poor citizens following the Great Recession. Second, we show that within‐individual changes in income have an effect on participation, which is modest on average due to diminishing returns, but can be consequential among the poor. Third, we find that declining turnout of voters facing economic insecurity has exacerbated the income skew in participation, suggesting that income inequality and turnout inequality may reinforce each other. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results, set in a context with strong civic traditions and low barriers to voting.

All-mail voting in Colorado increases turnout and reduces turnout inequality

The COVID-19 crisis has generated interest in all-mail voting (AMV) as a potential policy solution for avoiding in-person elections. However, the quality of AMV implementation has varied greatly across states, leading to mixed results in previous research. We exploit the understudied 2014 implementation of AMV in Colorado to estimate the effect on turnout for all registered voters, along with age, racial, education, income and wealth, and occupational subgroups. Using large voter file data and a difference-in-differences design within individuals, we find a positive overall turnout effect of approximately 8 percentage points—translating into an additional 900,000 ballots being cast between 2014 and 2018. Effects are significantly larger among lower-propensity voting groups, such as young people, blue-collar workers, voters with less educational attainment, and voters of color. The results suggest that researchers and policymakers should look to Colorado's AMV approach as an effective model for boosting aggregate turnout and reducing voting disparities across subgroups.

Inequality, policy polarization and the income gap in turnout

Previous research into the relationship between income inequality and turnout inequality has produced mixed results, as consensus is lacking whether inequality reduces turnout for all income groups, low-income earners, or no one. Therefore, this paper builds on this literature by introducing supply-side logic, through the first individual-level test of the impact that income inequality (moderated by policy manifesto positions) has on turnout. It does so through multilevel logistic regressions utilizing mixed effects, on a sample of 30 advanced democracies in 102 elections from 1996 to 2016. It finds that higher levels of income inequality significantly reduce turnout and widen the turnout gap between rich and poor. However, it also finds that when party systems are more polarized, low-income earners are mobilized the greatest extent coupled with higher inequality, resulting in a significantly reduced income gap in turnout. The findings magnify the negative impacts income inequality can exert on political behavior and contribute to the study of policy offerings as a key moderating mechanism in the relationship.

Inclusive voting practices: lessons for theory, praxis, and the future research agenda

ABSTRACTInclusive voting practices have been defined in this special issue to refer to policy instruments which can reduce turnout inequality between groups and mitigate other inequalities within the electoral process. This concluding article reflects on the lessons learnt from the empirical studies about (a) how citizens come to be excluded at the ballot box; (b) which electoral processes are effective at bringing about greater inclusion; (c) what the wider effects of inclusive voting practices are; and (d) why such policies instruments not undertaken by the state. It argues that there are major lessons for the theorizing of democracy, as well as policy and practice in elections worldwide.

Introduction: the case for inclusive voting practices

ABSTRACTThe voter turnout gap has plagued many elections around the world, with differential levels of participation between groups having the potential to effect election results and policy outcomes. Despite this, there has been little empirical or normative theorization of the interventions that can be used redress the turnout gap and other inequalities within the electoral process. This article defines the concept of inclusive voting practices to refer to policy instruments which can reduce turnout inequality between groups and mitigate other inequalities within the electoral process. This is anchored in a strategic-relational theory of structure, agency and political change. Different state responses are conceptualized and the normative case for an interventionist rather than repressive or laissez-faire approaches is set out. A research agenda is set out which is taken up in subsequent articles in this special issue.

Election Turnout Inequality - Insights from Administrative Registers

Using matched administrative election data from Norway, we document gender-specific turnout rates by a range of socio-economic outcomes as well as family relationships and immigrant status. High social rank is consistently associated with higher turnout: we find significant turnout gradients for education, occupational prestige, income, wealth, and parental economic resources during childhood. Turnout among spouses, parents and children, as well as siblings and cousins, are highly correlated, showing strong influences of family factors. Immigrant turnout falls far below that of natives of similar age, even many years after arrival. Turnout among children of immigrants is more similar to that of natives, indicating political integration across but not within generations. Election turnout inequality implies that voters differ from the electorate at large along a number of socio-economic dimensions; we find that such misalignment is similar to that observed in the US.

Increasingly unequal turnout in Eastern European new democracies: Communist and transitional legacies versus new institutions

Unequal turnout, namely that educated citizens are more likely to vote, has been a long-standing pre-occupation of scholars of political participation and has been shown to exist across established democracies in varying degrees. Using pooled cross-sectional individual level data covering the period from 1990 to 2007 across 12 post-communist new democracies, this paper examines the applicability of existing explanations for unequal turnout in the Eastern European context. The paper shows that while voting procedures explain some cross-national variation in unequal turnout, turnout inequality is likewise shaped over time by processes related to the transition from communism, primarily the fading of initial excitement with democratic elections. The mechanism of learning among mature voters rather than generational replacement dominates the latter process.

When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World

The conventional wisdom that the poor are less likely to vote than the rich is based upon research on voting behavior in advanced industrialized countries. However, in some places, the relationship between turnout and socioeconomic status is reversed. We argue that the potential tax exposure of the rich explains the positive relationship between income and voting in some places and not others. Where the rich anticipate taxation, they have a greater incentive to participate in politics, and politicians are more likely to use fiscal policy to gain support. We explore two factors affecting the tax exposure of the rich—the political salience of redistribution in party politics and the state's extractive capacity. Using survey data from developed and developing countries, we demonstrate that the rich turn out to vote at higher rates when the political preferences of the rich and poor diverge and where bureaucratic capacity is high.

When Do the Rich Vote Less than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality Across the World

The conventional wisdom that the poor are less likely to vote than the rich is based upon research on voting behavior in advanced industrialized countries. However, in some places the relationship between turnout and socioeconomic status is reversed. We argue that the potential tax exposure of the rich explains the positive relationship between income and voting in some places and not others. Where the rich anticipate taxation, they have a greater incentive to participate in politics and politicians are more likely to use fiscal policy to gain support. We explore two factors affecting the tax exposure of the rich – the political salience of redistribution in party politics and the state’s extractive capacity. Using survey data from developed and developing countries, we demonstrate that the rich turn out to vote at higher rates when the political preferences of the rich and poor diverge and where bureaucratic capacity is high.

Turnout Matters: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia

Despite extensive research on voting, there is little evidence connecting turnout to tangible outcomes. Would election results and public policy be different if everyone voted? The adoption of compulsory voting in Australia provides a rare opportunity to address this question. First, I collect two novel data sources to assess the extent of turnout inequality in Australia before compulsory voting. Overwhelmingly, wealthy citizens voted more than their working class counterparts. Next, exploiting the differential adoption of compulsory voting across states, I find that the policy increased voter turnout by 24 percentage points which in turn increased the vote shares and seat shares of the Labor Party by 7 to 10 percentage points. Finally, comparing across OECD countries, I find that Australia’s adoption of compulsory voting significantly increased turnout and pension spending at the national level. Results suggest that democracies with voluntary voting do not represent the preferences of all citizens. Instead, increased voter turnout can dramatically alter election outcomes and resulting public policies.

Understanding unequal turnout: Education and voting in comparative perspective

Well-educated citizens vote more frequently than the poorly educated in some countries, including the USA. However, in many countries, no such differences are observed. One classical explanation of the presence or absence of this inequality in voting is that the strength of left-wing forces sharpens or reduces it. An alternative explanation is that some institutional arrangements and contextual features disproportionately affect the voter participation of some individuals depending on their resources, thus shaping turnout inequality. These theories are tested using multilevel modeling with data from 28 advanced industrial democracies. Compulsory voting reduces inequalities because under this system quasi-universal turnout is achieved. In addition, the poorly educated vote more frequently when the voting procedure is easy and when there are few political parties, thus reducing turnout inequality. However, strong left-wing parties and trade unions are not associated with more equal turnout.

ELECTION-DAY REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT INEQUALITY

Many researchers blame voter registration requirements for inequalities in turnout rates across various groups in U.S. society. The number of states with election-day registration (EDR) of voters doubled between the 1990 and 1994 elections, providing a unique opportunity to examine its impact on turnout inequality across demographic groups. The adoption of EDR is found to be associated with large and significant improvements in the turnout rates of young persons relative to older persons, and of recent movers relative to nonmovers. Turnout inequality by income class also declines with EDR adoption, but not by a significant amount in multivariate tests. The adoption of EDR does not improve equality of representation across educational levels.