Turkey 's European Union Accession Research Articles

‘Do as We Say, Not as We Do’: EU to Turkey on Roma/Gypsy Integration

For many centuries, Roma/Gypsy people have been an oppressed and stateless minority. Until 1989 most Roma/Gypsy people resided in the former Central and Eastern European communist countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Roma/Gypsy became one of the communities that were regarded as a scapegoat for post-Communist society's ills. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, Roma/Gypsy communities were not welcomed in the West and much of the persecution they endured in the East they saw repeated in the West. The European Union (EU) has sought to place Human Rights as a focal point of its approach in all matters including the issue of Roma/Gypsy communities. Since 2007, Romania and Bulgaria, two states with large numbers of Roma/Gypsy, have become members of the EU. In the last few years France (and Italy) have been cautioned on their expulsion of Roma/Gypsy people. Not only have these actions contravened the European Union charter on Human Rights, but just as seriously, France and Italy have actually expelled citizens who are members of another European Member State because they were Roma/Gypsies. Turkey, on the other hand, as the home of one of the oldest and largest Roma/Gypsy settlements, had for long periods of time subjected Roma/Gypsy people to a life of social and economic disadvantage. Recently this has changed, ironically as part of Turkey's EU accession process. The aim of this article is to explore and compare the actions of European member States (France and Italy primarily) on the question of Roma/Gypsy integration with their integration in future EU accession states such as Turkey. The EU's moral high ground with regard to minorities seems to be ruined by the deplorable behaviour of some of its member states on the question of Roma/Gypsies while Turkey, which has an uneven record on human rights violations, has shown greater, although contradictory concern for the fate of the Roma/Gypsies.

Attitudinal Ambivalence towards Turkey's EU Membership

AbstractThis article takes a comparative political behaviour approach to examine the multifaceted nature of Turkey's European Union (EU) membership bid from the perspective of the EU citizens. We propose a multidimensional explanation for EU citizens' attitude towards Turkey's membership by referring to the political psychology literature on attitudinal ambivalence. We examine whether EU citizens simultaneously hold multiple and conflicting considerations on Turkey's EU accession bid, and whether this ambivalence has attitudinal consequences. To that end, we use the Eurobarometer 66.1 data set to analyze the EU public attitudes on various aspects of possible Turkish EU membership. The findings show that the EU citizens maintain ambivalent views about Turkish membership across three domain pairs: economy–security, immigration–security and population–culture. The significant impact of these ambivalence domains on increasing support for Turkey's membership to the EU is further discussed in the article.

Turkey and the West: Bargaining for Realignment

As the only Muslim majority secular country in its region with a pro-western democracy, Turkey is pivotal to western interests in the Middle East. However, Turkey's European Union accession negotiations are currently at a deadlock, and disparity between Turkey and the West is increasing on many critical issues. Despite its liberal market orientation, a more socially conservative Turkey is causing apprehension to its western partners. Turkey has started to drift eastward, while the West seeks to consolidate ties and establish common values. This paper offers an agent-based game theoretic model to assess the policy trade-offs that might align Turkey's interests more closely with those of its potential western partners and to determine where the impetus will come from to revive the enthusiasm of both Turkey and the EU for further integration.

Disappointment or New Strength: Exploring the Declining EU Support Among Turkish Students, Academics and Party Members

Is the decline of Turkish public support for the European Union (EU) membership better explained by a disappointment about the EU approach to Turkey or by the new self-confidence of the country? This question is relevant because frustration about the accession process could be overcome with more positive signals from the EU. However, if the second factor plays a significant role, this would be an indicator for an enduring alienation between Turks and the EU. This article presents the results of an exploratory study based on an online survey and personal interviews. For one-third of the 618 respondents to the survey, the most important reason for waning EU support is the new strength of Turkey as a rising regional power. In contrast, the interviewed parliamentarians and local party officials consider Turkey's proactive foreign policy approach in its Eastern neighborhood as a complementary and not alternative strategy to Turkey's EU accession.

A threat called Turkey: Perceived religious threat and support for EU entry of Croatia, Switzerland and Turkey

European Union (EU) enlargement evokes strong opposition among its citizens. Meanwhile, EU citizens’ opinions are likely to become increasingly important in determining the future of the European project. Countries aspiring to EU membership must therefore take public opinion in the EU into consideration. What determines public support for EU entry? A factor that has been ignored in the relevant literature is perceived threat posed by a candidate country's religion. On the basis of data derived from a voter survey fielded in the Netherlands (N=1394), we show that perceived religious threat is not very relevant for public support for EU access of Croatia or Switzerland. It is, by contrast, a major predictor of opposition to Turkish entrance to the EU. In the Turkish case, religious threat overshadows all other factors suggested in the literature except for immigration threat. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for Turkey's EU accession bid, and that of other Muslim countries.

EU–Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor

This article analyses the impact of EU–Russian relations on Turkey's role as a corridor for the transit of energy supplies to Europe. While the European Union (EU) has inherent leverage in its collective purchase of most Russian gas exports, market power has shifted in Russia's favour. Russian efforts to build new pipelines and widen downstream access have stimulated EU interest in diversifying energy imports and transit routes. In this sense, the EU has recognised Turkey's potential value as a secure and independent route for importing non-Russian energy supplies, which may in turn have an impact on Turkey's EU accession process.

From the Myth of European Union Accession to Disillusion: Implications for Religious and Ethnic Politicization in Turkey

At the present time, there are no clear outcomes in Turkey's European Union (EU) accession process. By the end of the two years following the rise of the pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the government in 2002, Turkey's accession process entered into a stalemate. Potent political opposition to the Turkish candidacy in Europe has escalated, despite a staunch Turkish political commitment since 1999 to meet the Copenhagen Criteria for admission. In this article, we argue that Turkey's EU accession process has contributed to opening political spaces for Islamism and ethno-nationalism in the country, ironically producing societal and political forces undermining Turkish membership. We inquire first into the practical reasons obstructing Turkey's membership to the Union and second into the societal and political implications of the continuation of the bleak possibility of EU membership for Turkey. As far as the latter is considered, our focus is limited to an analysis of the politicization and institutionalization of the ethnic and Islamist politics in Turkey within the process of democracy. By the end of the two years following the rise of the pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the Turkish government in 2002, Turkey's European Union accession process had entered into a stalemate. Paradoxically, the Islamists, who had broken away from the traditionally Islamist oriented Virtue Party (FP) and founded the AKP, became the self-proclaimed conservative democrats of Turkey and fervent supporters of EU membership. The reason for this enthusiasm was strategic and two-fold: On the one hand, the AKP pragmatically drew upon the discourses of human rights and democracy, which constituted the main premises of the EU accession requirements, against the secular state establishment for a political opening to legitimately maneuver in. On the other, the party used its successfully constructed pro-EU face to gather support from different sectors of the society, crosscutting class and ideological divisions. Hence, it garnered support among provincial capitalists, small bourgeoisie, urbanized and rural poor, left intelligentsia, as well as the high society of the business world, and emerged as the new center-right political party - analogous to what the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) had previously been. Nevertheless, while the AKP's liberal policies remained mainly in terms of extensive privatization of the public sector and a commitment to an IMF-led marketization, it failed to pass the test on issues such as freedom of expression, representation, transparency, accountability, and social equity ..However,theseshortcomingshave,by. byHowever, these shortcomings have, by and large, been ignored by a majority of the press and intelligentsia that faced one form or another of pressure, and/or collaborated out of mutual interest. Undeniably, Turkey's EU candidacy has been diplomatically troubling for the EU since the official negotiations began in December 2004. Political opposition to the Turkish candidacy in Europe has escalated, despite a staunch political commitment by Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. 1 Indeed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed the attitude shared by many European leaders when she recently expressed doubts about the viability of Turkish membership in the EU. 2 French President Nicolas Sarkozy is another ardent opponent of Turkey's accession. The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, also declared that any EU enlargement after the membership of Bulgaria and Romania would need to wait until all constitutional and structural issues within the EU had been worked out. 3 It is not surprising then that the EU suspended talks with Turkey in December 2006 on eight policy chapters - among them, the conflict between Turkey and the Greek-majority government of Cyprus. 4 In Turkey, the pro-PKK (Partiya Karkeren-I Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers Party)/ pro-Kurdish groups, including the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP, recently renamed the Democratic Society Party or DTP) are among those that experienced one of the highest levels of frustration with the EU accession process. …

A Difficult Transition to a New Relationship: Britain and Cyprus in the European Union

This article examines the relationship between Britain and Cyprus after the latter joined the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004.It argues that the difficulties that emerged were in part a product of the ill feeling that developed at the time of the April 2004 referendum on a UN peace plan. However, it was also shaped by British attempts to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and ease Turkey's EU accession process. These tensions were particularly noticeable throughout 2005, when several attempts at rapprochement between London and Nicosia foundered. However, it now appears as if London and Nicosia have adapted to the new relationship. Although areas of tension still exist, it appears as if they will be at a lower level of intensity than was the case in the immediate aftermath of accession.

Turkey's EU accession as a question of nation brand image

Despite the significance of politics and public diplomacy for nation brands, there is little research on the topic. The study seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating Turkey's European Union (EU) accession, which seems endangered by negative public opinion in other EU member states, as a case to understand how nation brand images can influence a given course of action in international politics. Specifically, through an exploratory qualitative research, the content of Turkey's nation brand image, its antecedents, and potential consequences within the political context of the country's accession negotiation are explored. The findings suggest that Turkey, at the moment, does not appear to be a well-run nation brand. Not only do the poor results indicate room for improvement, but also the management of Turkey in all relevant nation brand dimensions does not seem promising with regard to a successful EU application process. Furthermore, the analysis point to a truly complicated positioning dilemma for Turkey's nation brand and the challenge of accomplishing an integrated nation brand management. The paper concludes by outlining policy and research implications.

Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey's European Union Accession

AbstractThis article observes a transformation in the largely essentializing, decontextualized form of identity politics that long defined political cosmology in Turkey, now in the process of negotiating accession to the European Union (EU). Accordingly, identity politics – not only the bread and butter of both Kurdish nationalism and Islamism, but also a justification for exhortations towards a limited, authoritarian democracy by Kemalists, the major power holders – is receding in favour of a civic, non-divisive political culture enabled by the EU anchorage. In danger of losing the longstanding centre–periphery configuration in an enhanced, participatory democracy and, concomitant with it, the periphery clientelism created by the waning identity politics, Kemalist nationalists, Islamists and Kurdish separatists appear to have stopped squabbling among themselves and joined forces against Turkey's EU bid.