Across its neighbourhood and in policy areas as diverse as security, trade, energy, and migration, Turkish foreign policy has fundamentally transformed since the end of the Cold War. In some cases, such as Turkish policies in the Balkans or in the field of trade and migration, the change has been incremental. In other areas, such as in the Middle East and in the realm of security policy, the shift has been more abrupt and visible. But the transformation of Turkey's neighbourhood policies is undeniable. This article recounts the major transformations in Turkey's regional policies over the last decade, to Turkey's north and south, and across policy areas such as trade, visas, and security. It highlights the principal achievements as well as the pending challenges and flashpoints. The purpose of this account to assess European perceptions of, and reactions to, Turkey's neighbourhood policies, with an eye to drawing out the implications for Turkey's tortured accession path to the European Union.Turkey's strategic significance has traditionally been among the key determinants of its relationship with the EU. Over the decades, Turkey has been hailed in Europe, the US, and in Turkey itself as a bridge, a buffer, and a model state in its region. These perceptions have profoundly affected its relationship with the EU.1 In view of this, this article assesses how Turkey's regional activism in the 2ist century has been perceived in Europe and how such perceptions have affected Turkey's EU accession path.TURKErS REGIONAL POLICIES: SUCCESSES, FAILURES AND FLASHPOINTSExternal and internal drivers of Turkey's regional policiesThe transformation in Turkey's foreign policy can be read as a mix of external geopolitical as well as internal political, economic, and societal changes. Externally, the end of the Cold War, the ensuing 1990-91 Gulf War, the 2003 war in Iraq, and the 2011 Arab Spring have induced Turkey to engage more actively in its neighbourhood, both to the north and south.2 To the north, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia immersed Turkey in the geopolitical dynamics of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and central Asia, largely in concert with the United States and Europe. Turkey's participation in NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the repositioning of Turkey as an energy hub, manifested first by the US drive to realize the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and since then by Turkey's prominence in competing pipeline projects (from Nabucco to South Stream) are testimony to this fact.3 To the south, whereas the 1990-91 Gulf War triggered a renewed emphasis on Turkish-American strategic cooperation, it also ushered in Turkish assertiveness in the Middle East, which manifested itself through heightened tensions with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.4 The 2003 war in Iraq unleashed an opposing set of dynamics between Turkey and its southern neighbours, inducing greater cooperation between Turkey and the Arab Middle East as well as Iran.5Since then, and particularly in light of the Arab Spring in 2011, the nature of Turkey's cooperative ties with its southern neighbours has been partly revised. The Arab Spring has revealed the inherent tension between the normative and realpolitik dimensions of Turkish foreign policy. When norms have dovetailed with interests, Turkey has been forthright in its support for democracy. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was the first western leader to call for Hosni Mubarak's resignation in a televised speech on al Jazeera in February 2011, and President Abdullah GuI was the first head of state to meet with the Egyptian supreme council in Egypt soon thereafter. In Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey was unambiguously on the side of democracy. As the Arab Spring progressed, realpolitik came to the fore. In Libya, Turkey was initially opposed to NATO's intervention to enforce a no-fly zone, participated exclusively in the humanitarian dimension of the ensuing intervention, and continued to pursue diplomatic efforts to propose a negotiated ceasefire between Muammar Gaddafi and the rebels. …
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