Truth Judgments Research Articles

Motivational Internalism and Disinterestedness

Abstract According to the most important objection to the existence of moral beauty, true judgements of moral beauty are not possible as moral judgements require being motivated to act in line with the moral judgement made, and judgements of beauty require not being motivated to act in any way. Here, I clarify the argument underlying the objection and demonstrate that it does not show that moral beauty does not exist. I present two responses: namely, that the beauty of moral beauty does not lie in the moral goodness per se (the ‘adjacent properties’ response), and that only a dispositional motivation to act is required for the moral judgements that are typically made as part of judgements of moral beauty, whereas aesthetic judgements only rule out state motivations to act (the ‘equivocation of motivation required’ response). In addressing the objection, I show how moral beauty is consistent with disinterestedness, and so should be accepted more widely; also clarifying where the beauty in moral beauty resides, and how the moral–aesthetic distinction should be drawn.

Prejudice and True Judgement Prejudgment and Final Verdict against 18th Century Traditional Morality. A study of Tom Jones from the Perspective of Gadamer’s Hermeneutics

Prejudice and True Judgement Prejudgment and Final Verdict against 18th Century Traditional Morality. A study of Tom Jones from the Perspective of Gadamer’s Hermeneutics

Trump, Twitter, and truth judgments: The effects of “disputed” tags and political knowledge on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation

Trump, Twitter, and truth judgments: The effects of “disputed” tags and political knowledge on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation

The political (a)symmetry of metacognitive insight into detecting misinformation.

Political misinformation poses a major threat to democracies worldwide, often inciting intense disputes between opposing political groups. Despite its central role for informed electorates and political decision making, little is known about how aware people are of whether they are right or wrong when distinguishing accurate political information from falsehood. Here, we investigate people's metacognitive insight into their own ability to detect political misinformation. We use data from a unique longitudinal study spanning 12 waves over 6 months that surveyed a representative U.S. sample (N = 1,191) on the most widely circulating political (mis)information online. Harnessing signal detection theory methods to model metacognition, we found that people from both the political left and the political right were aware of how well they distinguished accurate political information from falsehood across all news. However, this metacognitive insight was considerably lower for Republicans and conservatives-than for Democrats and liberals-when the information in question challenged their ideological commitments. That is, given their level of knowledge, Republicans' and conservatives' confidence was less likely to reflect the correctness of their truth judgments for true and false political statements that were at odds with their political views. These results reveal the intricate and systematic ways in which political preferences are linked to the accuracy with which people assess their own truth discernment. More broadly, by identifying a specific political asymmetry-for discordant relative to concordant news-our findings highlight the role of metacognition in perpetuating and exacerbating ideological divides. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Conspiracy theories and the epistemic power of narratives

ABSTRACT We often turn to comforting stories to distract ourselves from emotionally painful truths. This paper explores a dark side of this tendency. I argue that the way false conspiracy theories are disseminated often involves packaging them as part of narratives that offer comforting alternatives to ugly truths. Furthermore, I argue that the way these narratives arouse and resolve our emotions can be part of what causes people to believe conspiracy theories. This account helps to bring out some general implications about the power of narratives for misleading people into believing misinformation: I argue that narratives can cause intuitive judgments of truth that are especially difficult to dispel through critical reflection. I also sketch some practical implications for how the media can better frame their reports about both conspiracy theories and factual narratives.

The Chief Business of the True Judges in Hume’s Standard of Taste

Abstract In his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume identifies two standards of taste: the general rules of art and the joint verdict of true judges. From this the following questions arise: Why did Hume present two standards? And, how should we understand the relation between them? We must first get a firmer grasp on each of the standards that Hume presents. Hence, this paper has two main goals. The first is to understand the general rules of art in the light of Hume’s philosophical method, which is consonant with Newtonian methods of analysis and synthesis. The second is to provide a new interpretation of what Hume takes to be the joint verdict of true judges. In my interpretation, the joint verdict of true judges constitutes the standard of taste, not because their verdicts converge, but because their verdicts encompass blameless differences. With this new foundation for understanding the two standards, I will present my own reading of the relation between them.

Lie–truth judgments: adaptive lie detector account and truth-default theory compared and contrasted

Abstract Two contemporary theoretical perspectives explain when and how people make lie–truth judgments. The adaptive lie detector account (ALIED) and truth-default theory (TDT) are described, compared, and contrasted. ALIED and TDT come from different scholarly traditions and propose very different processes and mechanisms, yet they converge on many behavioral predictions. Both views presume adaptive processes. ALIED presumes that humans are adaptive by using available information while TDT presumes that the adaptive value of efficient communication outweighs the value of real-time deception detection. ALIED proposes a Bayesian reasoning approach to lie–truth judgments that weighs information based on its perceived diagnosticity, making no distinction in the processes between reaching a lie and truth judgment. TDT alternatively proposes that the passive presumption of the truth is the default, and the presence of triggers is required to reach a lie judgment. Suggestions for future research are provided.

The rebirth of metaphysics and relevance of dialectics

At the new turn of historical development, it is necessary to turn to the understanding of dialectics and the newest forms of metaphysics, recognizing the objective dialectic of the material world, which is reflected in the subjective dialectic of concepts. For Aristotle's formal logic, there are true judgments and false judgments, and if we take the law of the excluded third, then even stricter: either yes or no. However, the metaphysical way of understanding reaches a limit beyond which it becomes limited and entangled in contradictions, since it deals with objects as unchangeable. Sophistry was revived recently in the third millennium, because capitalism needs it in the context of the digital transformation of the state and the current controversy over the new world War reveals a lot of techniques of sophistic thinking. Formal logic works fine in the conditions of everyday practical relations of people however, knowledge of dialectical logic is required to solve the global problems of our time.

The illusory certainty: Information repetition and impressions of truth enhance subjective confidence in validity judgments independently of the factual truth

People not only judge repeatedly perceived information as more likely being true (the so-called truth effect) they also tend to be more confident after judging the validity of repeated information. These phenomena are assumed to be caused by a higher subjective feeling of ease (i.e., fluency) when processing repeated (vs. new) information. Based on the suggestion that a higher number of coherent mental activations is promoting a fluency experience, we argue that besides repetition an already existing information network, that is (nonspecific) prior knowledge, can enhance fluency. Following this argumentation, information repetition as well as the act of judging incoming information as being true (vs. false) should feed into subjective confidence – independently of the factual truth (when judging under uncertainty). To test this, we reanalyzed two published data sets and conducted a new study. In total, participants (N = 247) gave 29,490 truth judgments and corresponding ratings of subjective confidence while attending two judgement phases (i.e., 10 min and 1 week after the exposure phase in each experiment). Results showed that (a) repetition (in 3 of 3 data sets) and (b) impressions of truth (in 2 of 3 data sets) were systematically related to higher subjective confidence. Moreover, we found (c) a significant positive interaction between repetition and impressions of truth after both intervals in all data sets. Our analyses further underline the moderating effect of time: Influences of repetition significantly decreased with increasing time interval. Notably, the factual truth did not systematically affect any of the above reported effects.

Deciphering Deception: How Different Rhetoric of AI Language Impacts Users’ Sense of Truth in LLMs

Users are increasingly exposed to AI-generated language, presenting potential deception and communication risks. This study delved into the rhetorical aspect of AI-generated language influencing users’ truth discernment. We conducted a user study comparing three levels of rhetorical presence and four persuasive rhetorical elements, using interviews to understand users’ truth-detection methods. Results showed that outputs with fewer rhetorical elements posed challenges for users in distinguishing truth from false, while those with more rhetoric often misled users into false truths. Users’ AI expectations influenced truth judgments, with responses meeting expectations perceived as more truthful. Casual, human-like responses were often deemed false, while technical, precise AI responses were preferred. This research emphasizes that rhetorical elements of AI language can significantly bias individuals regardless of a statement’s actual truth. For enhanced transparency in human-AI communication, it is advisable for AI designs to thoughtfully integrate rhetorical elements and establish guiding principles aimed at minimizing the potential for deceptive responses.

The scientific approach of Religious Studies

Religious studies originated and developed alongside the other sciences, becoming gradually independent from theology, as a result of the Enlightenment. Explaining historical facts without judgment of truth or veracity, scholars have to adopt a methodic, sceptic attitude, comparing only in order to fill gaps in our historical sources.

Equivalence framing and its effects on truth judgments: evidence from China

Recent research based on samples from Western countries has shown that the framing of information influences judgments of its truth, with negative framed statements perceived as more credible than formally equivalent positive framed statements. However, these findings may not apply to all Chinese residents because of China’s unique news contexts that adhere to positive reporting and a collectivist culture. Although the equivalence framing also affects people’s judgment of the truth of the information in China, it differs from people in Western countries. Chinese people believe statements with positive framed statements are more credible than statements with formally equivalent negative frames. They are more likely to associate positive information with news and show no obvious reactance to the persuasive intention perceived from positive framed statements. In addition, exposure to information from non-official media is changing this particular outcome, and people with frequent access to non-official media show similar responses to those in the West along these paths.

Detecting deception in computer-mediated communication: the role of popularity information across media types

PurposeWith the widespread use of online communications, users are extremely vulnerable to a myriad of deception attempts. This study aims to extend the literature on deception in computer-mediated communication by investigating whether the manner in which popularity information (PI) is presented and media richness affects users’ judgments.Design/methodology/approachThis study developed a randomized, within and 2 × 3 between-subject experimental design. This study analyzed the main effects of PI and media richness on the imitation magnitude of veracity judges and the effect of the interaction between PI and media richness on the imitation magnitude of veracity judges.FindingsThe manner in which PI is presented to people affects their tendency to imitate others. Media richness also has a main effect; text-only messages resulted in greater imitation magnitude than those viewed in full audiovisual format. The findings showed an interaction effect between PI and media richness.Originality/valueThe findings of this study contribute to the information systems literature by introducing the notion of herd behavior to judgments of truthfulness and deception. Also, the medium over which PI was presented significantly impacted the magnitude of imitation tendency: PI delivered through text-only medium led to a greater extent of imitation than when delivered in full audiovisual format. This suggests that media richness alters the degree of imitating others’ decisions such that the leaner the medium, the greater the expected extent of imitation.

The relevance of syntactic complexity for truth judgments: A registered report

Fluency theories predict higher truth judgments for easily processed statements. We investigated two factors relevant for processing fluency: repetition and syntactic complexity. In three online experiments, we manipulated syntactic complexity by creating simple and complex versions of trivia statements. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect. However, syntactic complexity did not affect truth judgments although complex statements were processed slower than simple statements. This null effect is surprising given that both studies had high statistical power and varied in the relative salience of syntactic complexity. Experiment 3 provides a preregistered test of the discounting explanation by using improved trivia statements of equal length and by manipulating the salience of complexity in a randomized design. As predicted by fluency theories, simple statements were more likely judged as true than complex ones, while this effect was small and not moderated by the salience of complexity.

Assessor discomfort and failure to fail in clinical performance assessments

BackgroundAssessment of trainee performance in the workplace is critical to ensuring high standards of clinical care. However, some supervisors find the task to be challenging, and may feel unable to deliver their true judgement on a trainee’s performance. They may ‘keep MUM’ (that is, keep mum about undesirable messages) and fail to fail an underperforming trainee. In this study, we explore the effect of discomfort on assessors.MethodsUsing a survey method, supervisors of trainees in the Australasian College of Dermatologists were asked to self-report experiences of discomfort in various aspects of trainee workplace assessment and for their engagement in MUM behaviours including failure to fail.ResultsSixty-one responses were received from 135 eligible assessors. 12.5% of assessors self-reported they had failed to fail a trainee and 18% admitted they had grade inflated a trainee’s score on a clinical performance assessment in the previous 12-month period. Assessors who reported higher levels of discomfort in the clinical performance assessment context were significantly more likely to report previously failing to fail a trainee. The study did not reveal significant associations with assessor demographics and self-reports of discomfort or MUM behaviours.ConclusionsThis study reveals the impact of assessor discomfort on the accuracy of assessment information and feedback to trainees, including as a contributing factor to the failure to fail phenomenon. Addressing assessor experience of discomfort offers one opportunity to impact on the complex and multifactorial issue that failure to fail represents.

People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others)

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

You won't believe it! Truth judgments for clickbait headlines benefit (but less so) from prior exposure

AbstractIn two high‐powered experiments, we investigated how prior exposure to statements presented in a clickbait format increases the perceived truth of their content. In Experiment 1 (N = 241), we hypothesized and found that prior exposure increased the proportion of “true” judgments for both non‐clickbait and clickbait content, but with a reduced effect of prior exposure for statements originally presented in a clickbait format. In Experiment 2 (N = 291), turning to continuous ratings, we found higher truth ratings for repeated than new clickbait statements, even when repetition evidently originated from prior exposure to clickbait statements. The present findings suggest that exposure to clickbait headlines can increase their content's truth judgments despite their overall lack of credibility, although to a lesser extent than for more regular statements. The present research additionally supports an implausibility account rather than a source memory account of the truth effect with clickbait statements.

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

College students give true judgment routinely, logicians can infer modal inferences, i.e., inferences that concern three alethic modalities; necessary (⸧), possible (◊), and impossible (⟢) from the premises that are logically consistent and incompatible. To achieve the desired results, logicians have intermingled alethic modalities with logical consistency and incompatibility, i.e., necessary consistent, impossible incompatible, possible consistent, or possible incompatible, and write them in classical modal logic as ⸧C (necessary consistent), ◊C (possible consistent) or ◊I (possibly incompatible) and ⟢I (impossible incompatible). M paradigm [Modality, Mental logic theory (MLT), and Mental model theory (MMT)] have been built to enlighten this truth logic. The basic idea of this study is to examine the theory; how do students judge whether two or more different propositions are possible? and, whether their judgment is true. Truth logic is used to construct some principles that help to justify the above theory. First, inferences have either ◊C/ ◊I or ⸧C but assertions are consistent. Second, each ◊C/ ◊I inference and premise is evaluated for both single and double model assertions, and they have consistency (i.e., ⸧C/◊C) and incompatibility (i.e., ◊I or ⟢I). As logicians have predicted, students mostly endorse inferences as ◊C/ ◊I rather than ⸧C and the ⟢I rate is higher in multi-model assertions. Syllogistic logical reasoning with conditionals (if, then...), conjunctions (and), disjunctions (or), and quantifiers “all” and “some” have been used in the M paradigm to evaluate predictions. Moreover, a computational program and experimental studies have strongly supported the all given principles and predictions.

Truth by repetition … Without repetition: Testing the effect of instructed repetition on truth judgments.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this "truth effect" is processing fluency: Processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N = 684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 and 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people's judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.