Metaphysical Truth Research Articles

Teoria da Argumentação para a concepção do Direito como integridade de Dworkin: Uma impossibilidade?

The article aims to verify the possibility of an argumentation theory within the framework of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity. The research is based on a literature re-view based on the analysis of the epistemological contradiction between the current theories of legal argumentation and the theory of Law as Integrity, based on Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ronald Dworkin. We conclude that, despite this contradiction, a theory of argu-mentation is possible within Dworkin’s theory, as long as the logic of developing a previous and methodical path to reach a metaphysical truth is overcome. Without illusions or relativism, we propose the acceptance of Law as Integrity, founded on hermeneutic bases, as an alternative for the strengthening of an argumentative process within the scope of a Democratic State of Law.

With the Eyes of an Artificial Angel: Benjamin and Adorno Reading Kafka

Abstract Adorno and Benjamin’s common intellectual project has been labeled, by Adorno, an Inverse Theology. This re-translation of theology into it’s metaphysical truth contents can be only fully comprehended by taking into account their position towards the work of art. In this article, I locate the place where the categorical framework of “inverse theology” is displayed in a most complete manner in the discussion of Kafka’s prose and extrapolate the outline of an Inverse theology from Adorno and Benjamin’s readings of some of his most famous texts.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO FORCE THE SECRET INTO THE TIME? MAWLĀNA’S UNDERSTANDING OF TIME IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF MATHNAWĪ

Time is one of the most essential truths that is at the centre of human life and that human beings contact with. It has always been the subject of the thought both because various dimensions it includes, because it is perceived differently in different situations, and with its ambivalence that prompt people to think about it intensely. For this reason, a wide range of literature has emerged over time. In sūfī sources, time is generally mentioned within the framework of the term ibn al-waqt (the son of time). In this study, Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī’s understanding of time was discussed in focus of his book Mathnawī. The couplets in Mawlānā’s Mathnawī related wit time have been determined and his teaching has been compared with the classical sources of sufism and the time view of Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabī, one of the founders of sūfī thought. Mawlānā handles time in the framework of three main categories. The first of these is the transcendental understanding of time, which is not subject to division such as past and future, the second is horizontal/ linear/chronological time, and the third is the timeless dimension experienced by ibn al-waqt reaching the position of abu'l-waqt (father of time) by evolving and getting rid of the time. Mawlānā also mentions on the extent to which divine secrets and metaphysical truths can be expressed in the context of chronological time. According to him, it is impossible for such information to be fully expressed in horizontal time, that is, “the secret cannot be forced into time”. The determination of Mawlānā’s views on time has great importance in terms of revealing the time approach of mystical thought and tradition. Keywords: Sūfism, Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī, Mathnawī, Ibn al-waqt/The son of time.

Précis of The Metaphysics of Truth

ABSTRACT In this précis, I give a short overview of my book. The Metaphysics of Truth, focusing on the two main aims of the book: (i) developing a pluralist metaphysical framework incorporating both truth and existence; (ii) arguing for the importance of thinking about the nature of truth in response to deflationary and primitivist approaches.

Метафизический смысл критики ориентализма в трудах Рене Генона

This article is devoted to the critical arguments against orientalism put forward by the French mystic Réne Guénon (1886–1951) in his three books: A General Introduction to the Study of Hindu Teachings (1921), East and West (1924), Man and His Realization according to Vedanta (1925), and in the paper Eastern Metaphysics (1925). These arguments have rarely attracted the attention of researchers, and yet they occupy an important place in the methodology of Génon's justification of his “true metaphysics” which is one more attempt to return to man his proper human existence, broken in the modern world into different forms – Eastern and Western civilizations. The two types of civilizations are in a state of ruinous confrontation all the time. In the introduction of the article, Guénon’s anti-orientalist ideas are correlated with the criticism of orientalism by E. Said (1935–2003), which had a great influence on Oriental studies of the second half of the twentieth century. The main part touches on the cultural context of the esotericist’s ideological search, and it marks the source of his metaphysics in the idea of contrasting Modernity and Tradition. Guénon criticizes the widespread belittling of traditional Eastern cultures by the Western people, and the “dogmas” of civilization, progress and the existence of only one type of humanity moving along the steps of the only possible progress based on reason and rational sciences. For the thinker, the understanding of culture as the progress is flawed, and Western civilization is not a model for the other civilizations, but it is an anomaly of development. As long as the Westerners in general, and the Orientalist scientists, in particular, who study the East with prejudice, without the desire to reach a genuine understanding of the meanings of Tradition as a form of integral metaphysical knowledge, do not get rid of their “dogmas”, the confrontation between East and West will persist. Guénon often finds his critical arguments in the works of professional orientalists (Eugène Burnouf, Max Müller) and philosophers (G.W. Leibniz). He demonstrates the mistakes they made which destroy the foundations of the orientalist approach.

The article is devoted to the work of the famous scholar, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor S.I. Dudnik, Head of the Department of the History of Philosophy and Director of the Institute of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University. The most important provisions of his concept of the history of political thought, the formation of Russian statehood, the principles of constitutionalism

The article explores the basic concepts of the Russian worldview in the historiosophical context and the comparison of this phenomenon with other national types of thinking. The reasons for the crisis fall of European civilization are described. It is noted that one of the main reasons for that tragic phenomenon was the fact that Europe has completely abandoned its Christian roots. The authors insist that historically there was a formation of the personality of a new European, which came because of the destruction of the former heroic type. The article also describes in detail the Russian worldview, its patriotic, collective, irrational and religious nature. It is noted that the Russian is characterized by a metaphysical movement of the spirit, which is especially fully revealed in tragic periods of national history. The authors believe that for the Russian type of worldview is important the process of correlation with metaphysical truth. The authors emphasize that for a modern European, the Russian worldview is mysterious and dangerous, because it correlates with the forgotten Christian truths. In conclusion, the authors suggested that Russia asks Europe existential questions: about the personalization of truth in history, about peace and war, and carries its own unique worldview, which is intuitive, deeply religious and hierarchical.

Nathan J. Chambers. Reconsidering Creation Ex Nihilo in Genesis 1

Nathan J. Chambers. <i>Reconsidering Creation Ex Nihilo in Genesis 1</i>

The metaphysics of truth: anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism

ABSTRACT Two central themes of Douglas Edwards’s The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards’s grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions.

In defence of the villain: Edwards on deflationism and pluralism

ABSTRACT In The Metaphysics of Truth, Doug Edwards offers a sustained case against deflationism about truth and in favour of his preferred pluralist theory of truth. Here, I take up three of the main components of that case. The first is Edwards' account of the distinctive metaphysical commitments of deflationism. His views about this issue have changed over the past few years, and I detail these changes as well as a concern for the views that he develops in the book. Second, I take up the argument that Edwards offers for thinking that deflationism is, in a certain sense, internally unstable. I explain why this argument is inconclusive, outlining three responses to it on behalf of the deflationist. Third, I consider Edwards' novel argument for truth pluralism, which acts as an indirect argument against deflationism. After sorting out some interpretive nuances related to the use of definite descriptions in this argument, I show how the deflationist can resist it. Having responded to Edwards' critique of deflationism, I close by briefly explaining why I take the methodology of deflationism to be especially promising, insofar as it underscores the significance of empirically-informed inquiry about truth.

The Relation of Metaphysics to the Secondary Object of Revelation, and the Analogy of Being as the Metaphysical Framework for Sacra Doctrina

The Relation of Metaphysics to the Secondary Object of Revelation, and the Analogy of Being as the Metaphysical Framework for Sacra Doctrina Steven A. Long In this essay I will try to pursue several objects that are essentially related, but rarely treated together systematically. First, I will consider the secondary object of revelation—that which is required for the intelligibility of revelation—as necessarily including not only historical and logical, but metaphysical truth. Some of these truths are medicinally revealed in Scripture although they are natural truths, for as Thomas writes in Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: “The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature and perfection the perfectible.” I will start by referring to former Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith prefect then-Cardinal Ratzinger’s Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei,1 a commentary on the profession of faith issued by the CDF on June 29, 1998. I will also point out the Church’s consecration of certain natural metaphysical principles in her teaching, principles that are not merely contingent concepts or placeholders but whose own density of natural intelligibility is vital for the intelligibility of the doctrine of the faith. I also here address St. Thomas’s teaching [End Page 485] regarding the necessarily essential role of metaphysics within sacra doctrina or theology. Secondly, I will offer remarks regarding St. Thomas’s development in his work of the metaphysical framework for sacra doctrina in his teaching of the analogy of being as the foundation for the analogy of creature to God—an account never renounced by him but expressed later in different language the reasons for which he indicates. Failure to observe the reasons he provides for the shift in his language has actually led several authors in the twentieth century2 to hold that Thomas radically altered his account of analogy, or else to hold that he does not have such an account. But to the contrary, I will argue that he holds one formal account that universally structures his theology. Thirdly, I will address Thomas’s account of the imago dei in the human creature, illustrating the essential importance of the analogy of being within Catholic theology for understanding this teaching. Fourthly and finally, I will conclude with observations regarding the challenging analysis of a contemporary theologian of great intelligence and probity—my distinguished, insightful, and learned colleague Father Guy Mansini, O.S.B.—who has argued that valid reasoning for the existence of God is something of nature that seemingly owing to the effects of original sin is only possible for man following upon revelation and pari passu with infused theological faith and sanctifying grace.3 Without providing the [End Page 486] full consideration and response this challenging consideration merits, I will argue that this judgment seems deeply problematic for the intelligibility of revelation and the Church’s discourse with the world; that it seems unduly to constrict the dignity of the imago dei in man—the principle which is the created foundation for all later perfections in grace and glory; and that the metaphysical intelligibility of being itself may be seen as a sign of the transcendence of the image of God in man. All these points highlight the crucial role of metaphysical truth in relation to revelation, doctrine, and theology. The Secondary Object of Revelation In the CDF’s Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei, then-Cardinal Ratzinger observed the distinction in Church teaching between that which is formally revealed, and that which is required for the intelligibility of the reception and promulgation of revelation.4 Regarding that which is formally revealed the document begins by quoting the profession of faith that it is commenting upon: The first paragraph states: “With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to...

Chancy Causation in Tort Law

Abstract Chancy causation is where the cause of an event can only be attributed probabilistically. Contrary to the understanding popular in legal theory, scientific fact plays only a minimal role in chancy causation cases. As a matter of metaphysics, factual inquiry can only determine whether an event has a tendency to cause an outcome. Yet tort doctrine requires that the plaintiff prove a counterfactual: that but for the event, the outcome would not have occurred. Understanding that in chancy causation cases proving the counterfactual is impossible is the first step towards a discussion of what really ought to matter in chancy causation cases: whether imposing liability is normatively desirable. Methodologically, the Essay builds on scholarship about the metaphysics of causation as a first step to understanding this legal concept. If it is true that causation cannot be pinned down deterministically, as chancy causation cannot, then what determines factual causation? The answer is policy. I call this approach “pragmatic” because it evaluates the use of an idea rather than claims regarding its metaphysical truth. But there is a metaphysical piece here as well. We only get to the point of applying a pragmatic analysis by understanding something about the metaphysics of causation.

Augustine of Hippo: Advocate of Scriptural Metaphor

This article investigates Augustine’s evolving views on metaphor in his commentaries on the creation narrative. He contends that certain metaphysical truths, including God and his creation, are ineffable and can only be understood metaphorically. Therefore, he thinks that metaphors are crucial in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and he spends a great deal of effort explaining this to his readers. In his early work De Genesi contra Manichaeos, he adheres to the classical view, in which metaphors have a fixed meaning that can easily be rendered using a literal expression. This is a useful method to refute the Manichean claims, but it stands at odds with the idea that the things that these metaphors describe are beyond words. Later, in De Genesi ad Litteram, he comes up with a novel approach to metaphor. Here, he leaves a great deal of interpretational freedom to the reader. He points out that certain expressions are metaphors, and that individual expressions are part of a larger metaphorical concept, without restricting their meaning. Augustine’s approach shares similarities with the modern metaphor theories laid out by Max Black, as well as by George Lakoff &amp; Mark Johnson, which may not have been as innovative as once thought.

On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics

Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social groups. In this note, I introduce a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics, and argue that there are no 'fundamental metaphysical truths‘ (as Greenwood conceives of them) at all. If there is one thing that should not persist here, it is absolute metaphysics.

The 'Wordsworth-Spinoza Link' and Ethics: Motivating the Wordsworthian Moral

Marjorie Levinson has established a link between Spinoza's philosophy and Wordsworth's poetry, focussing specifically on the two authors' shared metaphysics. In this paper I will follow the chain of Levinson's link and show that Spinoza and Wordsworth share an ethics, too. Spinoza's is an ethics of perspective; his primary prescription is to hold a perspective which acknowledges the metaphysical truth of the interconnectedness of all things for the sake of one's mental health. After grounding Wordsworth's well-known prescriptions of communion with nature in a metaphysics of monistic Nature (as Spinoza suggests), we will be in possession of vocabulary with which to describe a much deeper version of the Wordsworthian moral than has hitherto been familiar. Importantly, though we arrive at our description of the Wordsworthian moral by following Spinoza, it remains markedly Wordsworthian and is a novel particularization of Spinoza's general ethical suggestion.

The Prosthetic Imagination: A History of the Novel as Artificial Life. Peter Boxall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xi+411.

<i>The Prosthetic Imagination: A History of the Novel as Artificial Life</i>. Peter Boxall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xi+411.

When Homer ceased laughing

Since the very beginning of its proliferation, the Homeric epic has been subject to various ways of interpretation and modes of understanding. Particular attention has been paid to those passages from Homeric poems in which the gods commit obscene, absurd, or comical actions. In the opinion of critics of Iliad and Odyssey, such myths were not worthy of the appropriate faith in the Greek gods. Therefore, my article focuses on the third, “comical” group of these Homeric grey areas, and deals with the following questions: how and why did Homer’s comical passages move from a discourse of the ridiculous and the funny to a discourse of the serious by means of philosophical interpretation over the centuries? I will try to uncover the general principles and conditions of that hermeneutical mechanism which made it possible to translate Homer’s comical plots from the language of Olympic “domestic” nonsense into the language of the most important physical, ethical, and metaphysical truths. To achieve this task, my article will conditionally distinguish two ways of transition from the comical to the serious: the first, which was carried out in ancient allegorism, was to directly produce a translation, and to declare that the “superficial” meaning of the myth is false, and its deep level is true. The second way – ancient symbolism – was to turn the comical into the serious through the immediate translation of comical myths into the religious discourse of the sacred, which did not imply a stark contrast between the comical and the serious but, on the contrary, harmonized them.

The Vagueness of Clarity: Metaphysical and Epistemic Truth Claims in the Empirical Study of Mindfulness Practices

The Vagueness of Clarity: Metaphysical and Epistemic Truth Claims in the Empirical Study of Mindfulness Practices

Whitehead and the Pittsburgh School: Preempting the Problem of Intentionality

Whitehead and the Pittsburgh School: Preempting the Problem of Intentionality

The Reformation of Philosophy ed. by Marius Timmann Mjaaland

Reviewed by: The Reformation of Philosophy ed. by Marius Timmann Mjaaland Mark Mattes The Reformation of Philosophy. Edited by Marius Timmann Mjaaland. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2020. viii + 279 pp. These eighteen essays present the results of the Sixth Nordic Conference for Philosophy of Religion held in Oslo in 2017. Their goal is to assess the impact of the Reformation on philosophy. Questions raised include: how did the Reformation re-situate philosophy? Was the Reformation in some sense a philosophical event? Strangely, the majority of thinkers tend to leapfrog from Luther, if he is examined at all, to German Idealism (Kant, Hegel, Schelling), Existentialism (Kierkegaard or Nietzsche), various schools of twentieth-century [End Page 362] phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger), and postmodern thinkers (Derrida, Agamben, Badiou, and others). The theme is subdivided into four subthemes: (1) Re-Formation of Philosophy in Christianity and Islam, (2) Philosophy in the Wake of the Reformation, (3) Reformation, Phenomenology and Metaphysics, and (4) Critique, Protest and Reform. Many of the essays are fairly abstract and assume a working knowledge of current trends in philosophy. That said, those aware of the divergent schools in philosophy will find value in this book for assessing medium theory, communication theory, aesthetics, metaphysics, and hermeneutics in light of Luther in whom are “traces” of modern concepts. Editor Mjaaland sees many of the “deep structures” of modern philosophy as pre-figured in Luther. Some highlights include the following. Philipp Stoellger interprets Luther’s legacy for philosophy in light of medium theory. In this light, the Reformation is a “re-formatting” of religion and faith through the medium of the justifying word as well as other media by which God is self-revealing (43). Safet Bektovic, a Muslim scholar, follows the thinking of medieval Muslim mystic Ibn Arabi, who, similar to Luther’s notion of a “hidden God” (masks of God or larva dei), claims that Allah uses “signs” that reveal aspects of his presence while veiling his essence. Mjaaland shows how the destructive aspect of the theology of the cross, its crucifying of spiritual pride, impacted Heidegger and Kant who both use a notion of destruction to overthrow metaphysics. Ultimately, for Kant, however, the notion of God is problematic because it can neither be presupposed in experience nor proved, given that it is beyond sense experience. Stian Grøgaard appropriates the thinking of F. W. J. Schelling as a counter both to Kierkegaard’s skepticism of metaphysics and Hegel’s “speculative philosophy of Spirit” with an “a priori empiricism” which allows the logic of experience to permeate pure thought. Like Luther, the critique of philosophy is itself philosophical. Jayne Svennungsson also appeals to Schelling as a voice affirming Jewish experience in the face of German Idealism’s anti-Semitism. She notes that Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig developed this further with a messianic vision that (ironically) challenges the nationalist [End Page 363] idea of one people as superior to all others, and makes this vision the vocation of the Jews. Jan-Olav Henriksen describes Nietzsche’s appreciation for Luther’s translation of the German Bible but otherwise develops Nietzsche’s wholesale rejection of Luther’s view of grace. Countering Protestant ambivalence towards aesthetics, Dorthe Jørgensen seeks an aesthetic which presents, and does not just represent, metaphysical truths. She appeals to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartner and Kant to help in this quest and sees them as offering such an aesthetic based on dialogue with God. With respect to the traditional Lutheran doctrine of election, Atle Søvik defends the Book of Concord: “saying that people are sinners who should convert and presenting the grace of the gospel can be understood as a way that God creates faith . . . Thus blaming people for not having faith and God creating faith are two sides of the same event. They are not two contradictory events, but the same event” (238). This is a book by academics for academics. Perhaps an essay devoted to Luther as Nominalist would ground the material more in the Reformation legacy and serve as a frame of reference for the other essays. This book should be consulted only if one is invested in a specific theme or figure discussed in one of the...

НАЗАД К ЛИНГВИСТИЧЕСКОМУ ПОВОРОТУ? ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РАЗВИТИЯ АНАЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ ГЛАЗАМИ П. М. С. ХАКЕРА И Т. УИЛЬЯМСОНА

The article is concerned with two opposite views on the future of analytic philosophy, as presented by P.M.S. Hacker and T. Williamson. According to the first, conservative, the best prospect is the preservation of methodological attitudes of the linguistic turn. Sharing such point of view P.M.S. Hacker is convinced that analytic philosophers should completely abandon the establishing metaphysical truths and limit themselves to research of the verbal level of thinking. According to the second, more progressive, methodological attitudes of the linguistic turn should be discarded, and the radical ban on metaphysics should be rethought. T. Williamson is favoring that kind of revision. In the opinion of the author of the article, both points of view interpret the history of analytic philosophy in a simplified manner, ignoring the inevitability of the conflict between the two primordial “super tasks” of that tradition: on the one hand, the eradication of speculative-metaphysical philosophizing, on the other, putting it on a scientific track. Consideration of analytical philosophy in the context of the truth of only one of those lines obstructs a correct assessment of its prospects.