Trust In Testimony Research Articles

Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction

Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified “all”, specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%–100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, Mage = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01–5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified “all” claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.

Exploring information use in children's decision-making: Base-rate neglect and trust in testimony.

Classic literature in judgment and decision-making shows that when testimony information conflicts with base-rates, adults typically underuse base-rate information and rely heavily on testimony (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Lyon & Slovic, 1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Although children can use base-rates (Denison, Konopczynski, Garcia, & Xu, 2006; Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010) and testimony (Koenig & Harris, 2005) separately in their inferences, whether they show a similar tendency toward weighing testimony more heavily is unknown. Four- and 5-year-old children were asked to guess the color of a dog's collar, drawn from a group of 10 dogs (e.g., 8 blue: 2 yellow). Children were also presented with testimony about the dog's collar that was from either a previously accurate or inaccurate witness. In Experiment 1 (N = 120), children were presented with only base-rate or testimony information. They relied on base-rates at above chance levels and relied on testimony at rates that approximately matched the witness's previous accuracy. In Experiment 2 (N = 160), when base-rates and testimony were presented together and conflicted, a majority of children endorsed the color consistent with the accurate witness's testimony, neglecting base-rates. However, when presented with the inaccurate witness's testimony, children were more likely to endorse the color indicated by the base-rates. Children appear to rely on the testimony of an accurate but fallible witness, revealing that a tendency to neglect base-rates in favor of testimony emerges early in development, yet they remain sensitive to the witness's accuracy when presented with multiple sources of information. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Supplemental Material for Exploring Information Use in Children’s Decision-Making: Base-Rate Neglect and Trust in Testimony

Supplemental Material for Exploring Information Use in Children’s Decision-Making: Base-Rate Neglect and Trust in Testimony

Children's Selective Trust in Promises.

There has been extensive research into the development of selective trust in testimony, but little is known about the development of selective trust in promises. The present research investigates children's (N=264) selective trust in others' promises to help. In Study 1, 6-year-olds selectively trusted speakers who had previously kept a promise. In Study 2, 5-year-olds displayed selective trust for speakers who had previously kept a prosocial promise (promise to help). In Study 3, 5-year-olds trusted a speaker, who kept a prosocial promise, over a helper. These data suggest that from the age of 5 children show selective trust in others' promises using prosociality, promise keeping, or both to inform their judgments.

Deliberative democracy and the problem of tacit knowledge

This article defends deliberative democracy against the problem of tacit knowledge. It has been argued that deliberative democracy gives a privileged position to linguistic communication and therefore excludes tacit forms of knowledge which cannot be expressed propositionally. This article shows how the exclusion of such knowledge presents important challenges to both proceduralist and epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy, and how it has been taken by some to favour markets over democratic institutions. After pointing to the limitations of market alternatives, deliberative democracy is defended by arguing that tacit knowledge can be brought into deliberation through the mechanism of trust in testimony. By trusting the testimony of a speaker, deliberators are able to act on knowledge even without it being explicitly expressed. The article then goes on to discuss the implications of this defence for deliberative theory, and particularly, the forms of reason which deliberative democrats must see as legitimate.

Early testimonial learning: monitoring speech acts and speakers.

Testimony provides children with a rich source of knowledge about the world and the people in it. However, testimony is not guaranteed to be veridical, and speakers vary greatly in both knowledge and intent. In this chapter, we argue that children encounter two primary types of conflicts when learning from speakers: conflicts of knowledge and conflicts of interest. We review recent research on children's selective trust in testimony and propose two distinct mechanisms supporting early epistemic vigilance in response to the conflicts associated with speakers. The first section of the chapter focuses on the mechanism of coherence checking, which occurs during the process of message comprehension and facilitates children's comparison of information communicated through testimony to their prior knowledge, alerting them to inaccurate, inconsistent, irrational, and implausible messages. The second section focuses on source-monitoring processes. When children lack relevant prior knowledge with which to evaluate testimonial messages, they monitor speakers themselves for evidence of competence and morality, attending to cues such as confidence, consensus, access to information, prosocial and antisocial behavior, and group membership.

The Roles of Intuition and Informants’ Expertise in Children's Epistemic Trust

This study examined how children's intuitions and informants' expertise influence children's trust in informants' claims. Three- to 8-year-olds (N=192) watched videos in which experts (animal/biology experts or artifact/physics experts) made either intuitively plausible or counterintuitive claims about obscure animals or artifacts. Claims fell either within or beyond experts' domains of expertise. Children of all ages were more trusting of claims made by informants with relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, expertise. Children also showed greater acceptance of intuitive rather than counterintuitive claims, a differentiation that increased with age as they developed firmer intuitions about what can ordinarily happen. In summary, children's trust in testimony depends on whether informants have the relevant expertise as well as on children's own developing intuitions.

Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind Knowledge Influences Whom They Trust About Others’ Theories of Mind

Two experiments examined whether particular aspects of social-cognitive knowledge predicted how preschoolers would treat informants who displayed a more or less developed understanding of that knowledge. In Experiment 1, children's own success on false-belief measures correlated with the extent to which they endorsed information generated by a confederate with a more developed sense of false belief over a confederate with a less developed sense of false belief. In Experiment 2, preschoolers were assessed for whether they possessed a more action-based or mental state-based understanding of pretense. They were then presented with informants who displayed each kind of knowledge. Children's own knowledge again correlated with which informant they believed was a reliable source of knowledge about novel pretend actions. These results not only extend findings in the “trust in testimony” literature beyond word learning, but also potentially reveal another mechanism by which children learn from others—they might trust others’ information about a specific piece of knowledge based on examination of their own knowledge of that domain.

Informants' Traits Weigh Heavily in Young Children's Trust in Testimony and in Their Epistemic Inferences

Informants' Traits Weigh Heavily in Young Children's Trust in Testimony and in Their Epistemic Inferences

Knowing better: The role of prior knowledge and culture in trust in testimony.

This article examined the ability of young children to adapt their trust in testimony in relation to the strength of their prior knowledge across 2 cultures and 2 age groups. Kindergartners and second graders in the United States and Hong Kong (N = 128) viewed pictures of objects and made category judgments about each object: first, in the presence of a teacher who provided labels that conflicted with their prior knowledge, and again, in a pedagogical scenario, when told they were passing the information on to younger learners in the teacher's absence. Results showed that children endorsed more conflicting labels when they had weak (as opposed to strong) prior knowledge about the objects. This effect of knowledge strength was robust across cultures and stronger in the older children. Surprisingly, relative to their Chinese peers, American kindergartners were more willing to endorse conflicting labels when they had strong prior knowledge about the objects. Findings are discussed with respect to the ways in which children are socialized to learn from others across the early primary school years in these 2 very different cultures.

Informants' Traits Weigh Heavily in Young Children's Trust in Testimony and in Their Epistemic Inferences

This study examined how informants' traits affect how children seek information, trust testimony, and make inferences about informants' knowledge. Eighty-one 3- to 6-year-olds and 26 adults completed tasks where they requested and endorsed information provided by one of two informants with conflicting traits (e.g., honesty vs. dishonesty). Participants also completed tasks where they simultaneously considered informants' traits and visual access to information when inferring their knowledge and trusting their testimony. Children and adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. Moreover, these traits influenced the knowledge that young children attributed to informants. Children younger than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked access to relevant information.

Entitled to Trust? Philosophical Frameworks and Evidence from Children

Abstract How do children acquire beliefs from testimony? In this chapter, we discuss children's trust in testimony, their sensitivity to and use of defeaters, and their appeals to positive reasons for trusting what other people tell them. Empirical evidence shows that, from an early age, children have a tendency to trust testimony. However, this tendency to trust is accompanied by sensitivity to cues that suggest unreliability, including inaccuracy of the message and characteristics of the speaker. Not only are children sensitive to evidence of unreliability, but they are also sensitive to the positive reasons a speaker may have for the reliability of their testimony. This evidence is discussed in relation to reductivist and non-reductivist viewpoints.

Simple Games of Information Transmission

Abstract Communication is an inherently strategic matter. This paper introduces simple game theoretic models of information transmission to identify different forms of uncertainty which may pose a problem of trust in testimony. Strategic analysis suggests discriminating between trust in integrity, trust in competence, trust in (the will to invest) effort and trust in honesty. Whereas uncertainty about the sender's honesty or integrity may directly influence a rational receiver's readiness to rely on sender's statements, neither uncertainty about the competence of a sender nor uncertainty about his willingness to invest effort has any direct impact on rational reliance on its own. In this regard, trust in honesty and trust in integrity appear to be more basic than trust in competence or effort.

THE EPISTEMIC AND MORAL ROLE OF TESTIMONY1

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to provide a critical‐productive appreciation of witness testimony that avoids the false and crooked dichotomies that pervade contemporary philosophy of history and historical theory. My specific, pragmatist approach combines the recent accounts of Hayden White about “witness literature” with the “generative‐performative” consideration of testimony by Martin Kusch. The purpose is to appreciate, in a non‐foundationalist way, the epistemic and moral role of testimony in the constitution of the representation of the recent past. To achieve this I examine the assumed epistemic and political privilege of the testimonies of survivors of state terrorism from the recent past, and I draw on insights of three of the most relevant survivor witnesses: Primo Levi, Victor Klemperer, and Pilar Calveiro. The essay tries to avoid both an epistemic and a moral posture based on something like “the privileged victim's perspective,” and instead approaches the specific analysis of production and circulation of witness discourse in terms of its contribution to the constitution of the past. That is, it recommends that one look at witness testimony not as an attempt to return to the past but as an action in the present. The result in so doing is to follow some recent results discussed in the new epistemology of witness testimony, which insist that: first, trust in testimony is an irreducible function of the acceptance of knowledge (this means that testimonies should not be treated as secondary sources of knowledge or as parasitical on experience and reason); and second, the production‐circulation of testimonies does not function only in the context of justification but is also legitimately constitutive of knowledge.

Trust in testimony about strangers: Young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger’s personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children’s use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.

The Basis of Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources?

ABSTRACTWhat is the nature of children's trust in testimony? Is it based primarily on evidential correlations between statements and facts, as stated by Hume, or does it derive from an interest in the trustworthiness of particular speakers? In this essay, we explore these questions in an effort to understand the developmental course and cognitive bases of children's extensive reliance on testimony. Recent work shows that, from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular informants, differentiate between those who make true and false claims and keep that differential accuracy in mind when evaluating new information from these people. We argue that this selective trust is likely to involve the mentalistic appraisal of speakers rather than surface generalizations of their behavior. Finally, we review the significance of children's deference to adult authority on issues of naming and categorization. In addition to challenging a purely inductive account of trust, these and other findings reflect a potentially rich set of tools brought by children to the task of learning from people's testimony.

Trust in Testimony: The Institutional Embeddedness of Holocaust Survivor Narratives

What makes testimony trustworthy? Based on fieldwork at a Holocaust museum, we argue that testimonies are trustworthy that because they make implicit and explicit truth claims. We argue that confidence is formed by interdependent institutions that vouch for these claims, as well as institutions that produce other cultural objects with comparable meaning, such as museums and films. These claims of truth exist in the testimony act in itself, as well as in explicit claims of truth made by the testifiers. Holocaust testimonies make explicit truth claims through assertions of institutionally legitimated information, personal experiences, and societal remembrance. After considering the creation of trust in testimony, we discuss how it can be generalized to the courtroom.

The Basis of Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources?

What is the nature of children’s trust in testimony? Is it based primarily on evidential correlations between statements and facts, as stated by Hume, or does it derive from an interest in the trustworthiness of particular speakers? In this essay, we explore these questions in an effort to understand the developmental course and cognitive bases of children’s extensive reliance on testimony. Recent work shows that, from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular informants, differentiate between those who make true and false claims and keep that differential accuracy in mind when evaluating new information from these people. We argue that this selective trust is likely to involve the mentalistic appraisal of speakers rather than surface generalizations of their behavior. Finally, we review the significance of children’s deference to adult authority on issues of naming and categorization. In addition to challenging a purely inductive account of trust, these and other findings reflect a potentially rich set of tools brought by children to the task of learning from people’s testimony.

A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs

AbstractThis paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people's truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony.

Trust in Testimony: Children's Use of True and False Statements

The extent to which young children monitor and use the truth of assertions to gauge the reliability of subsequent testimony was examined. Three- and 4-year-old children were presented with two informants, an accurate labeler and an inaccurate labeler. They were then invited to learn names for novel objects from these informants. The children correctly monitored and identified the informants on the basis of the truth of their prior labeling. Furthermore, children who explicitly identified the unreliable or reliable informant across two tasks went on to demonstrate selective trust in the novel information provided by the previously reliable informant. Children who did not consistently identify the unreliable or reliable informant proved indiscriminate.