Truce Negotiations Research Articles

The Issue of Dating the Reign of King Vakhtang Gorgasali

In historiography, we encounter several different versions regarding the dating of the death of Vakhtang Gorgasali: 502-505, 490/491, 523, 532 (which is not shared and long-forgotten) and ours - 531. All the versions of Vakhtang Gorgasali’s death mentioned above, except for 531, fail to establish a chronological order and provide a proper explanation for the main developments described in The Life of Vakhtang. One of the milestones of the king’s life is his participation, alongside a large Persian coalition force, in the war against Byzantines. This war took place when Vakhtang was still a young man. Which Persian-Byzantine war could it have been, considering the complete absence of military conflict between Persia and Byzantium from 442 to 502? As for the Persian-Byzantine war of 502-507, it is worth noting that its commencement, progress, and the truce negotiations strangely coincide with the events that are narrated in The Life of Vakhtang. An explanation for this and many other important issues can be found if we accept the chronology of Vakhtang's life and reign offered by us.

Before Gustavus Adolphus captured Riga: Jan Siciński’s expedition to Estonia in 1618. A political and military case study

ABSTRACT This article examines Jan Siciński’s expedition to Estonia in 1618, which was the last battle before Gustavus Adolphus captured Riga in 1621. The expedition took place during the war between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, one of the significant conflicts in the period from 1600 to 1660. The battles were fought on today’s Estonia and Latvia territories. This article answers several questions: What was the significance of the battles for the armistice talks in 1618? What place does the expedition play in the conflict between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden? Finally, were these encounters groundbreaking in this war?

„Dziennik Poznański” i „Kurier Poznański” wobec kwestii polskiej granicy wschodniej w czasie rokowań preliminaryjnych w Rydze (21 września – 12 października 1920 r.)

The article presents the attitudes of the two most important Poznań newspapers to the problem of shaping the Polish eastern border during the truce negotiations with Bolshevik Russia in Riga at the turn of September and October 1920. Both newspapers, despite representing different political orientations (democratic-national and conservative), supported the so-called “incorporation programme”, the implementation of which left a massive Polish population behind the eastern border. The author of the article tries to answer the question of why the newspapers, always defending the cohesion and the whole of the Polish nation, acted differently in the case of Poles left in Riga on the Bolshevik side of the border.

The Politics of Negotiating with Gangs. The Case of El Salvador

This paper explores the dynamics of negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the street gangs, called maras. The paper argues that state negotiations with criminal groups can occur when organized crime is a significant part of the social and political order. This tacit order allows a great deal of coordination between and within criminal organizations and the focus of negotiations from the state's point of view is limited to the management of violence, not the dismantling of gangs' territorial control. This article draws on seventeen in‐depth interviews with middle‐level gang leaders, government officials, and participants of the truce negotiations from 2012 to 2016; it also relies on public information published by Salvadoran journalists and government sources about the truce.

Ireland’s Decade of Conflict, 1913-23 (III)

Ireland’s Decade of Conflict, 1913-23 (III) Sean Brophy The Anglo-Irish War (1919-21) In the British general election of 1918, Sinn Féin, vigorously opposing the extension of military conscription to Ireland, won a huge majority of the seats in the south. They withdrew from Westminster and established an Irish parliament – or Dáil – in Dublin, essentially ignoring Britain and proceeding to govern themselves. The British administration remained in place, as did the army and the national police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary. All the conditions for anAnglo-Irish war existed as, by means of political agitation and violence, Sinn Féin and the IRAproceeded to render the country ungovernable. The Irish government, through its armed wing, the IRA, fought a guerrilla war from 1919 to the middle of 1921. Through the IRA’s activities and the reactions and reprisals of the British military, and the auxiliary police they drafted in (the so-called ‘Black and Tans’and Auxiliaries), the loss of life and destruction to property was huge. Both sides fought to a standstill, neither one yielding on the principle of whether Ireland was to become a thirty-two county republic or a dominion of the British Empire, with home rule under the crown and no coercion of Ulster to become part of a united country. Westminster passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, giving home rule along the lines of the original 1914 measure to two parliaments, one in Dublin for twenty-six counties, the other in Belfast for the six counties of Ulster, thus partitioning the country. King George V opened the Belfast parliament at Stormont Castle in 1921. Sinn Féin declared the act illegal and refused to accept a Dublin parliament on such lines: they had their own freely-elected parliament of a thirty-two county Irish republic, their own army and its supporters. In July 1921, representatives of the Dáil were invited to London to agree a truce and the basis on which negotiations for home rule could proceed. Following in the footsteps of successive British governments, since Robert Peel faced Daniel O’Connell in the early nineteenth century, Lloyd George was unequivocal: no settlement would be acceptable that threatened the integrity of the British Empire and fidelity to the crown or that coerced Ulster. Studies • volume 106 • number 421 95 Ireland’s Decade of Conflict, 1913-23 (III) These principles would be defended by total war. De Valera tried to teach Lloyd George the same lessons of Irish-British history as Daniel O’Connell had done when he wrote to Queen Victoria in 1843, with no greater success. He argued that the British Empire was finished and that it was in British interests to have it transform itself into an association of former British colonies, including the United States of America. Ireland would join such an association and accept the king as the head of those associated states. But, for his interlocutor, this was too big an imaginative leap and too formidable a task. Even so, the truce held and subsequent negotiations culminated in a treaty agreement in December 1921. De Valera himself did not attend the negotiations. Was he reserving the right, as head of state, to decide on the treaty before it was signed? He knew from his truce negotiations with Lloyd George that conceding a thirty-two county republic was impossible for the British and that dominion status was all that could be achieved. Did he position himself to not be identified with the failure to vindicate the republic and thus secure his political base in Ireland? Did the negotiators discourage him from participating because they knew they could not get agreement with the British if he were present? Civil War (1922-23) The plenipotentiaries of the Dáil, led by Arthur Griffith, signed the treaty without De Valera’s presence or approval. In the Dáil, where the debates revealed the rancour between deputies on either side, it was passed by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-seven. In the general election that followed, the protreaty party won a majority of seats and claimed the support of the people and their acceptance of...

The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944 by Michael Neiberg

the prospect of an Allied victory became more obvious, the gap between rhetoric and reality also grew wider. The much-vaunted project of creating a new national community, for example, faltered except in the area of persecuting minorities. By actively promoting a long tradition of anti-Semitism in France, Vichy came under ever-increasing pressure to help implement the final solution. Similarly, corporatism was more illusion than reality because the inevitable centralization and bureaucratization necessary for Vichy to remain in control contradicted the selfgoverning and decentralizing principles of corporatism. Chapters 7 and 8 look at “realism,” another one of those overdetermined portmanteaux with little chance to be realized. On the one hand, “realism” drew on traditional values to inspire a restoration of “real” France; on the other, “realism ” suggests compromise and acceptance of growing powerlessness under occupation . Other reforms, for example, family policy, were hardly original since pro-natalist policies predated the war. However, laws outlawing abortion, making it punishable by death, represented something radically new. Otherwise, Vichy’s view of women was predictably traditional but unrealistic in light of the many hardships of occupation. The National Revolution failed not only because of internal divisions and contradictions but because it depended on German victory in the war for success, forever rendering it unacceptably “un-French.” Lackerstein’s thorough, well-researched, and frequently brilliant analysis of Vichy breaks new ground in understanding the unsuccessful attempt by a French puppet government to carry out a “national revolution” to restore France to its former glory. St. Norbert College (WI) Tom Conner NEIBERG, MICHAEL. The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944. New York: Basic, 2012. ISBN 978-0-465-02399-8. Pp. xxxii + 298. $28.99. This is a well-written, detailed, and readable narrative of the complex events of the liberation of Paris in the last two weeks of August 1944. The advantage of Neiberg’s approach—focusing specifically on the liberation—is that it provides a perspective not often seen. The liberation of Paris is treated in most books as an “endpoint” of sorts in the allied armies’ drive eastward following the Normandy breakout, or simply as a part, albeit a major one, of a wider story of the occupation and resistance through the entirety of 1940–44. The particular framing of Neiberg’s study allows him to explore the detailed interactions between résistants within the city, allied military and political forces without, and the German occupiers , in a way that less-targeted works do not fully allow. Broad issues such as the Normandy operations, the conditions of the occupation, and the evolution of the resistance from its earliest days are treated as integral contextual foundations to the history of the liberation. For example, Neiberg’s introduction provides an overview of the occupation preceding the allied landings in Normandy, including the events that led to the rise of the resistance, as well as an overview of the different powers and factions involved. Additionally, the first four chapters explore events occurring between 6 June and 15 August, and their impact on individuals and groups who would play major roles in the liberation of the city. Neiberg discusses the hopes, anxieties, and increased hardships for Parisians during this timeframe, the leaders in the resistance and French politics, the attitudes of Axis Reviews 1279 and Allied leadership toward the capital, general Choltitz’s reputation as a “smasher of cities,” and his orders to destroy Paris. All of these elements are vital in understanding the mechanics of the city’s liberation. It is in the second half of the book, where the liberation proper is narrated, that Neiberg shows how the previously contextualized elements intertwine to form the tapestry of military and political maneuvers that would bring about Paris’s freedom. Examining these events in periods of two to four days, Neiberg takes the reader from the seizure of the Préfecture de police by the résistants to the entry of Leclerc’s Second Armored Division, Choltitz’s surrender, and de Gaulle’s arrival and establishment of a provisional government. All the while, the reader is immersed in the politics and tactics of truce negotiations and manipulations, the advantages and disadvantages...

Le second souffle suivi du Diable gardien by Philippe Pozzo di Borgo

and Allied leadership toward the capital, general Choltitz’s reputation as a “smasher of cities,” and his orders to destroy Paris. All of these elements are vital in understanding the mechanics of the city’s liberation. It is in the second half of the book, where the liberation proper is narrated, that Neiberg shows how the previously contextualized elements intertwine to form the tapestry of military and political maneuvers that would bring about Paris’s freedom. Examining these events in periods of two to four days, Neiberg takes the reader from the seizure of the Préfecture de police by the résistants to the entry of Leclerc’s Second Armored Division, Choltitz’s surrender, and de Gaulle’s arrival and establishment of a provisional government. All the while, the reader is immersed in the politics and tactics of truce negotiations and manipulations, the advantages and disadvantages of urban insurgents fighting better-equipped regular troops, and the clandestine efforts of both the résistants and Choltitz to contact Allied commanders outside the city. The book is well researched, with a substantial portion of the information coming from the memoirs and journals of individuals who witnessed or participated in the events (though one quibble is that a bibliography, rather than just the citation of sources in the notes, would be useful to some readers). Neiberg’s narrative is balanced, exploring the concerns and motivations of all the parties involved in the liberation, and highlighting the political, military, and material intricacies inherent to the stances and actions they took. The author provides extensive detail in his discussion without pedantry. While accessible to anyone with rudimentary knowledge of the Second World War, the book also offers enough substance to satisfy those with a scholarly understanding of the conflict as well. Ohio University Christopher Coski POZZO DI BORGO, PHILIPPE. Le second souffle suivi du Diable gardien. Paris: Bayard, 2011. ISBN 978-2-227-48337. Pp. 279. 14,90 a. The author purports to give the ‘true story’ behind the wildly successful French film, Intouchables, and is, in fact, the person upon whom one of the lead characters in the film is based, Pozzo di Borgo. Perhaps the book’s most striking element is Pozzo’s broad and deep education, going beyond his managerial capabilities . Le second souffle has been reprinted in this volume, along with Le diable gardien, a title that instantly gives a clearer picture of Abdel. The book counters what some view as the film’s ‘primitive racism’ since Abdel claims that he feels respected for the first time, and Philippe entrusts his life to Abdel. The criticism that emotion hides the total absence of thought is disproved by Philippe’s poetic descriptions, references to artists, composers, writers, and the philosophical questions he poses. In the film, Abdel is played by Omar Sy, who superbly develops the character of the diable gardien. The film’s publicity states that Abdel saved Philippe’s life, and the book fleshes out and supports this claim. Abdel, the crazy driver who loves to speed in the streets of Paris and trick the cops (le système D), brings laughter into Philippe’s life. The film’s opening scene gives viewers a glimpse of one such maneuver, of which there are numerous examples in the book. The récit claims to fill in the ten years since Le second souffle, although curious readers could be frustrated by huge gaps in the writer`s personal life—his meeting and marriage to Lalla Khadija and the birth of their daughter, Widjane, for 1280 FRENCH REVIEW 86.6 instance, who are only briefly mentioned. Reading this honest and transparent account of the existence of a quadriplegic is a rare experience, and Francophiles may recall an earlier memoir, Le scaphandre et le papillon by Jean-Dominique Beauby. The book by Pozzo invites the reader into the feelings of the tétraplégique at a deeper and more personal level. His honesty in discussing his depression and suicide attempt lends a degree of credibility to the narrative. The delirium and hallucinations induced by his medications furnish scenes both frightening and bizarre, while increasing our empathy for Pozzo. The extensive care provided for...

The Armistice Talks between Israel and Jordan, 1949: The View from Rhodes

The article examines the armistice talks between Israel and Jordan (March–April 1949) from the perspective of the UN mediator, Ralph Bunche, who coordinated them. The period described was stormy and complex: at its start, Israel took control of the southern Negev. Later, the two countries conducted formal talks in Rhodes, under Bunche's watchful eye, in parallel to informal negotiations, without UN involvement, in Jordan. The article, based to a large extent on Bunche's unpublished diary, explains why Bunche, who maintained rigorous control of all of the other armistice talks, behaved differently in this case, giving his post factum seal of approval to the Israeli takeover of the southern Negev and allowing Israel to pressure Abdullah to hand over the Triangle. The thesis is that Bunche, who could have put an end to the talks by resigning, or drawn the US into the crisis (as he did in the other rounds of negotiations), recognized the complexity of the relations between Israel and Abdullah and chose to act in a way that would prevent a new eruption of hostilities. In effect he was protecting Abdullah, who would have been likely to lose the West Bank to Israel in another round of fighting.

Performance and Activism: Grassroots Discourse After the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992 (review)

Reviewed by: Performance and Activism: Grassroots Discourse After the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992 Hillary Miller Performance and Activism: Grassroots Discourse After the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992. By Kamran Afary. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009; pp. 262. When all of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers charged in the brutal beating of Rodney King were exonerated with a "not guilty" verdict in April 1992, protests enveloped the city, leaving behind a toll of fifty dead, 2,000 injured, and damages nearing $1 billion (4). In Performance and Activism, Kamran Afary explores the performative aspects of these protests, emphasizing the voices of activists who struggled to transform unrest into social change. As a reporter for a local radio station in Los Angeles during the 1990s, Afary saw firsthand how their calls for justice and revolutionary, democratic social change dissipated behind the mainstream media's coverage of interethnic violence. Making extensive use of interviews and other archival materials, Afary recovers the "rhetorical arsenals" of these activists to illustrate the methods by which they developed new counter-public spaces and counter-narratives (161). In his introduction, Afary provides the rationale for his distinctly interdisciplinary methodology, which employs critical race theory, cultural studies, media studies, urban studies, and performance studies. This variety of theoretical lenses adds depth and texture to the frozen, still-life tableaux of the riots that have dominated the narratives of this period in Los Angeles's history. He reviews literature related to the uprising, as well as theories of postmodernism and the global city, acknowledging prominent sociologists who have taken this sprawling city as their subject (for example, Theodor Adorno, Mike Davis, and Saskia Sassen). Using the lens of performance to examine multiple public spheres, Afary argues that grassroots organizations, such as gang truce collectives and court-watch groups, developed new forms of cultural expression that created what political theorist Nancy Fraser refers to as "subaltern counterpublics," in contrast to the notion of a single public sphere. In these spaces, Afary explains, people from subaltern groups can "enact their identities and speak in their own voices relatively (but never totally) freely from forces of domination" (28). His second chapter, "Toward a Historical Political Economy of Los Angeles," tethers theories of cultural production to political economy, reading the rebellion in terms of both its ideological function in public discourse and its relation to the larger criminal-justice system. It also lends specificity to his profile of the city—particularly its shifting demographics, mass immigration, and economic growth—and lays the foundation for his later shift to the "local" (specifically, the Watts and Compton areas). After providing his theoretical grounding and sociological framework, Afary focuses on the gang truce movement in chapters 3 and 4. Although it was often misinterpreted by members of the LAPD as threatening, the gang truce movement offered what Afary, following anthropologist Victor Turner, refers to as "healing rituals." One example was the organization of "gang truce parties," a new form of urban festivity "comprised of a series of rich improvisatory rituals and ceremonies that symbolized a community's willingness to deal with rapidly changing political situations" (73). Gang truce negotiations "grew into a multifaceted movement throughout the 1990s, where performances and creative presentations of the self became even more pronounced" (89). These "creative presentations of the self" included the public telling of stories by former gang members, the emergence of new graffiti celebrating the truce, the wearing of clothing that symbolized friendship among gangs, and the playing of music once identified with rival gangs. In chapter 5, Afary focuses on organizations like the LA4+ Committee and Mothers Reclaiming Our Children (or Mothers ROC), composed of mothers, sisters, aunts, grandmothers, and their supporters. These women monitored the judicial system in order to "build a movement that would offer their sons a chance for exoneration or a more equitable sentence" (122). Members educated themselves about the legal process, attended court sessions, and mentored friends and relatives of the men on trial. Afary claims that, in their seemingly simple acts of watching trials and collaborating with lawyers, they established a counter-public space, creating "one of the most successful grassroots responses to the injustices of the court system...

Abduction of civilians during the Korean War: analysis of abductee lists and armistice talks

Abstract Since the preceding Roh Moo-hyun government, the move toward a new peace regime has become more evident. However, the question of the Korean War civilian abductees remains noticeably absent from any talks or agreement. In as much as the North Korean authorities deny any large-scale abduction of civilians, this research aims to prove North Korea's complicity in these abductions and also explain their purpose. Accordingly, this study analyzes the trends of the abductions by examining the number of abductees by region, the timing of the abductions, the abduction agents, the process of the abductions, the occupations of the abductees, and the expected value of the abductees. As a result, it can be proven that the civilian abductions were undertaken as an important and integral part of the North Korean war policy. Furthermore, this research points out the mistakes in policy and bargaining tactics committed by the UN side during the armistice talks. Finally, when considering the non-observance of the e...

North Korea and the Northern Limit Line

IntroductionWhen negotiators concluded the Korean War armistice in July 1953 bring an end the hostilities on the peninsula, one of the important dimensions of the agreeU.S. ment was delineating a border between the two Koreas. On land, this division was the military demarcation line (MDL) that is surrounded on both sides by a 2.5-milewide demilitarized (DMZ). Despite efforts specify sea borders, the armistice was silent on a maritime demarcation line. To address this issue, the United Nations Command (UNC) unilaterally declared a maritime border called the Northern Limit Line (NLL) separate opposing naval forces. Since that time, the NLL has been a source of contention, erupting into an armed clash in 1999 and again in 2002 when North and South Korean forces fought in the West Sea (Yellow Sea). Despite efforts solve the dispute, there has been little progress and the disagreement over the NLL remains a serious flashpoint for conflict between North and South Korea.If the issue ever went before an international tribunal for resolution, international law is probably in North Korea's favor; the court would likely move the line south but not as far as the DPRK wishes. However, this will not happen so long as North Korea remains a security threat the South; Seoul will not allow the matter be taken before a court. This article argues that the NLL will have a chance of being changed only through a political process that will not happen until the tension level and security concerns in the region decrease. North Korea will need promote a more stable security environment by moderating its sometimes provocative behavior while also continuing demonstrate its opposition the NLL. The remainder of this paper will address the origin of the NLL and the history of dispute, North Korea's interests in altering the line, and, finally, recommendations for how North Korea might proceed address the dispute.History of the Northern Limit LineThe Northern Limit Line was drawn at the end of the Korean War as a maritime boundary between the two Koreas in the West Sea. During armistice talks, negotiators settled on a land border, the MDL, and granted the UNC the rights five small islands on the west coast of Korea.1 Despite lying off the North Korean coast, the islands were under UNC control at the time of the armistice. However, negotiators could not agree on a maritime boundary due disagreements over the extent of North Korea's territorial sea. Moreover, South Korean President Syngman Rhee had made known his displeasure with the armistice and pledged continue the fight if given the opportunity.2 To ensure naval forces and fishing boats did not spark a renewal of the conflict, on August 30, 1953, the UNC promulgated the NLL. The line was drawn approximately mid-channel between the Ongjin Peninsula and the five islands under UNC/ROK control. For the next 20 years, little was said between the two Koreas regarding the NLL, and North Korea did not lodge any formal protests regarding the line.North Korea appears have made its first formal protest of the NLL in 1973, at the 346th Military Armistice Commission meeting where the DPRK representative proclaimed that the five islands under UNC/ROK control as specified in the armistice are in DPRK territorial waters. In addition, transit and from these islands would require North Korean permission.3 However, Pyongyang did not challenge ROK control of the five islands. In 1977, North Korea proclaimed two additional maritime zones: its 200-nautical-mile economic exclusion (EEZ)4 and a 50-nautical-mile military boundary zone. The designation of a military boundary was unusual and not in keeping with international law. According DPRK authorities, the purpose of the military was to reliably safeguard the economic sea zone and defend militarily the national interests and sovereignty of the country.5 The DPRK announcement also stated that within this and the sky above, foreign military vessels and planes are prohibited, and any civilian ships, excluding fishing boats, must obtain approval before entering the zone. …

Dating the manuscript of De Jure Praedae (1604–1608): What watermarks, foliation and quire divisions can tell us about Hugo Grotius’ development as a natural rights and natural law theorist

Following the manuscript's discovery in 1864, scholars have widely assumed that De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) was written by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) in the period 1604–1606. Yet the conventional dating fails to consider the materiality of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library. By analyzing paper supplies, this article throws new light on the date and manner of the manuscript's composition. The watermarks in the paper, the quire divisions and foliation are considered in combination with relevant textual evidence, such as manuscript references to historical events and any allusions to Ms. BPL 917 in Grotius’ letters and other archival sources. This approach has yielded unforeseen results. Yes, Grotius wrote out the original text in 1604/05, as a fair copy of a previously existing work. Yet he did not stop there. Entire folio-pages were crossed out in Ms. BPL 917 and new ones inserted in the following sequence: - in, or shortly before, January 1607, Grotius deleted f. 63v and 67r and inserted f. 64–66 - between January 1607 and Nov–Dec. 1608, he deleted f. 7v, 19r, 38v, and 43r-v and inserted f. 8–9, 18, and 39–42 - in November–December 1608, he deleted f. 119r–122r and inserted f. 117–118. These revisions were a direct response to the challenges faced by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in this period. Its growing empire in Southeast Asia was under threat from the peace and truce negotiations between the States General and Philip III of Spain and Portugal. Grotius’ revisions of Ms. BPL 917, along with chapter twelve's appearance as Mare Liberum in April 1609, justified the continuation of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies, the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) notwithstanding. Grotius’ rights and contract theories made it perfectly acceptable to conclude a peace or truce in (Western) Europe, yet persist in colonial warfare beyond the Line (i.e. the Tropic of Cancer). In this respect – the (implicit) differentiation between ‘the West and the rest’ in international relations – Grotius’ legacy is still with us today.

Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972 (review)

Reviewed by: Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972 Charles W. Hayford (bio) Yafeng Xia . Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. xv, 328 pp. 4 maps, chronology. Hardcover $45.00, ISBN 978-0-253-34758-9. A respected diplomatic historian declared that if "diplomacy" is "the process of negotiation and dialogue by which states in a system conduct their relations," then "it can be said that the United States had no meaningful diplomacy with Communist adversaries through long stretches of the Cold War."1 Xia Yafeng disagrees. This deeply researched and clearly organized monograph argues that communication between the governments of the United States and the People's Republic was continual, though perhaps "negotiation" might be a slight exaggeration and often "dialogue" was only the exchange of rebarbative monologues. Xia tells a story of intrigue, subterfuge, frustration, courage, and massive hypocrisy. But he shows "how the two sides eventually came to grips with mutual differences and slowly but surely learned to engage each other productively" (p. 4). Xia analyzes the structural shifts in balance of power as perceived on either side but insists that diplomacy—that is, the process of personal negotiation—in the end made a difference. He optimistically concludes that "self-learning and mutual learning" led to the diplomatic coup in 1972. Disaster was, indeed, avoided, but success still seems, in the famous words of Wellington after his victory at Waterloo, "a damn close run thing." Before coming to the United States for doctoral training, Xia was a diplomat in the Chinese Foreign Service, serving in Washington from 1995 to 1998. Being an insider, although of junior rank, gave him access to gossip, extensive interviews, and, even more important, a certain feel for how the flow of events inside China's "diplomatic establishment" interacted with international politics and domestic issues. Xia made knowledgeable use of recently opened archives in China (others are still closed), copious memoirs, semi-official biographies, compilations of documents, and scholarly studies in Chinese and English. The first question is how the friends in the anti-Japanese war became enemies in the Cold War. While Xia does not buy the argument that there was a "lost chance" for continued friendly relations, he is also careful to show that there was no inevitability that hostility would reach the level that it did. New China would "lean to one side," said Zhou Enlai, but suggested that American policy would determine just how far the lean would go. The State Department hoped to split the new regime into pro- and anti-Soviet factions. Zhou refused the bait, as the American position was based on a condescending and much resented assumption that China was a weak and supplicant nation. [End Page 435] The disastrous Korean armistice talks were followed by the creation of a "special channel" through the embassies in Poland, which lasted through the 1960s. Several chapters detail the period of mutual hostility and self-sabotage in which neither side acted in its own rational self-interest. Nonetheless, as the relative power of the two nations began to shift, mid-level diplomats on either side began to develop a cohesive set of insights and skills. Each side was forced to think clearly and to distinguish what it wanted, what it needed, and what it would settle for. This was often a matter of fanmian jiaocai, "learning from negative example," bringing to mind the American State Department apothegm "Good judgment is usually the result of experience. And experience is frequently the result of bad judgment." By the mid 1960s, the stage was set and the curtains parted on a new act. The story moves briskly without losing sight of the structural analysis of the international situation. Xia's Chinese sources provide fresh force and nuance to the familiar story. He reasserts that in the early 1960s Kennedy and Johnson were working toward a normalization that was delayed first by Kennedy's assassination, then by Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War, and finally by the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. One can observe that perhaps it was just as...

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations

The outbreak of the Korean War caused the U.S.A. to become determined in excluding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the signing of which is hoped to be hastened by winning the Korean War. Before the signing of the treaty, the U.S.A. intentionally delayed the Korean truce negotiations in order to prevent the PRC from attending the San Francisco Peace Conference. After the signing, the U.S.A. preferred an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea, whereas the Soviet Union and the PRC, bogged down in the Far East by the terms of the treaty, were determined to take a hard-line stance, hoping that the U.S.A. would become tied down and drained on the Korean battlefield. Thus, there was a subtle relationship between the treaty and the negotiations in the context of the Cold War.

Erasing the Corporate Sovereign Inter-Textuality and an Alternative Explanation for the Publication of Hugo Grotius'Mare Liberum(1609)

There is no generally accepted explanation as to whyMare Liberum, orThe Free Sea, was written. The most common view is that the Text was a propaganda instrument designed to improve the position of the United Provinces during the truce negotiations with Spain from 1606–08. Central to Grotius' strategy was his reliance upon Iberian Scholastics as a means of providing a series of irrefutable propositions to the Spaniards.

1607 POSTER Cancer patients' informational needs about sexuality related issues

Following the manuscript's discovery in 1864, scholars have widely assumed that De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) was written by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) in the period 1604–1606. Yet the conventional dating fails to consider the materiality of Ms. BPL 917 in Leiden University Library. By analyzing paper supplies, this article throws new light on the date and manner of the manuscript's composition. The watermarks in the paper, the quire divisions and foliation are considered in combination with relevant textual evidence, such as manuscript references to historical events and any allusions to Ms. BPL 917 in Grotius’ letters and other archival sources. This approach has yielded unforeseen results. Yes, Grotius wrote out the original text in 1604/05, as a fair copy of a previously existing work. Yet he did not stop there. Entire folio-pages were crossed out in Ms. BPL 917 and new ones inserted in the following sequence:-in, or shortly before, January 1607, Grotius deleted f. 63v and 67r and inserted f. 64–66-between January 1607 and Nov–Dec. 1608, he deleted f. 7v, 19r, 38v, and 43r-v and inserted f. 8–9, 18, and 39–42-in November–December 1608, he deleted f. 119r–122r and inserted f. 117–118.These revisions were a direct response to the challenges faced by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in this period. Its growing empire in Southeast Asia was under threat from the peace and truce negotiations between the States General and Philip III of Spain and Portugal. Grotius’ revisions of Ms. BPL 917, along with chapter twelve's appearance as Mare Liberum in April 1609, justified the continuation of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies, the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) notwithstanding. Grotius’ rights and contract theories made it perfectly acceptable to conclude a peace or truce in (Western) Europe, yet persist in colonial warfare beyond the Line (i.e. the Tropic of Cancer). In this respect – the (implicit) differentiation between ‘the West and the rest’ in international relations – Grotius’ legacy is still with us today.

Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (review)

The Korean conflict was a pivotal event in China's modern military History, constituting an important experience for the newly formed People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), not only as a test case for this fledgling service but also in the later development of Chinese air power. Xiaoming Zhang fills the gaps in the history of this conflict by basing his research on recently declassified Chinese and Russian archival materials and interviews with Chinese participants in the air war over Korea. Zhang's findings challenge conventional wisdom as he compares kill ratios and performance by all sides involved in the war, addresses how air power affected Beijing's decision to intervene, and touches on ground operations and truce negotiations during the conflict. Zhang also offers considerable materials on the training of Chinese aviators and the Soviet role in that training, on Soviet and Chinese air operations in Korea, and on diplomatic exchanges over Soviet military assistance to China.

Mao's Generals Remember Korea. Translated and edited by Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millet, and Bin Yu. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001. xiv, 328 pp. $39–95 (cloth).

Fifty years after the Korean conflict, what is a forgotten war for some Americans is an aching memory for China. With over a million casualties out of the three million soldiers sent into battle, that war looms as large for the People's Republic of China (PRC) - barely a year old when North Korea invaded the South - as World War II does for most other countries. It was the first international war fought by the Chinese Communist regime to halt counterrevolution; it was also a war that the Chinese fully expected to win, by virtue of not only superiority of numbers but also their soldiers' superior quality. This book presents a mosaic of memoirs by key Chinese military commanders from that war, drawing not only on their personal papers but also on still-classified archives and on Chinese-language sources unavailable in English. It offers an uncensored, behind-the-scenes story of the Communist campaign, from the decision to intervene through the truce negotiations, that discloses new information on such facets of the war as strategy and tactics, use of propaganda, and mobilization of the Chinese population. It also reveals the generals' concerns about the possible use of nuclear force and the alleged use of biological and chemical weapons by the United States. The book contains a wealth of new materials on the Chinese intervention, including combat operations, logistics, political control, field command, and communications. Among those whose recollections are recorded, then-acting Chief of Staff Nie Rongzhen reveals how party leadership decided on intervention, Commander in Chief Peng Dehuai provides personal accounts of major battles and communications with Mao, and General Yang Dezhi shares secrets of Chinese military strategy and tactics, discussing how the army orchestrated each battle to contend with the better equipped UN forces. The volume also features an updated short history of the PRC's conduct of the war based on Chinese sources, plus rare photos from Chinese archives that put readers behind the lines from the Chinese side. Mao's Generals Remember Korea demonstrates that the PRC continues to draw military, diplomatic, and strategic lessons from the war it fought fifty years ago with the world's most powerful military force. It offers valuable insight into the Chinese way of war and the military mind of Mao that will be a rich resource for Asian and military scholars.

Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953.

This book examines the Korean War, the paradigm of America's conflicts with communism. He argues that, like so many wars, the Korean War was fought broadly along the lines of the war before, World War II. It shows, however, that the consequences of this error were limited by the State Department. The book examines the roles, leadership, personalities and prejudices of five key commanders - President Harry S. Truman, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew B. Ridgway, General Mark W. Clark and Admiral C. Turner Joy. It goes on to look at the crucial issues that confronted them during the conflict: Truman's decision to commit US forces to war without congressional approval; MacArthur's pressure for an assault on Inchon; and the decision to open truce negotiations. The book analyzes the ground-level results and long-term consequences of command decisions, and explores the course the war might have taken had certain crucial decisions been taken differently.

Foreign intervention in Korea

Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1. Policy for the Independence of Korea. 1. NAPKO Project. 2. Trusteeship Plan. 3. The 38th Parallel Decision. 2. Intervention of Occupation Troops. 1. Joint Occupation by the American and Soviet Forces. 2. Two Different Approaches. 3. Formation of Separate States and Withdrawal of Occupation Troops. 1. Failure of Negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union. The First Joint Commission. The Second Joint Commission. 2. Establishment of Separate Governments. 3. Withdrawal of the Occupation Troops. 4. Outbreak of the Korean War. 1. North Korean Perspective. 2. South Korean Perspective. 5. Intervention of American and British Forces in the Korean War. 1. American Decision and Internationalisation of the War. 2. British Decision. 6. Co-operation and Competition among the British Commonwealth States. 1. Decision of the Commonwealth Countries to send Troops to Korea. 2. Formation of the Commonwealth Division. 7. Peace Initiative, Rollback Policy and Chinese Intervention. 1. Failure of Peace Initiative: India and Britain. 2. Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel: UN Forces. 3. March to the Yalu and Chinese Intervention. 8. Anglo-American Disputes. 1. Buffer Zone Proposal: Britain. 2. Attlee-Truman Summit Meetings. 3. The Condemnatory Resolution of the United States. 9. Road to the Armistice. 1. Stabilisation of the Front and Dismissal of MacArthur. 2. Armistice Talks and Warning Statement. 3. The POW Issue. 10. Conclusion of the Armistice and New US Commitment. 1. Progress of the Negotiations and South Korean Resistance. 2. Conclusion of the Armistice and the Joint Policy Declaration. 3. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and United States. Conclusion. Bibliography. Index.