Triple Entente Research Articles

From “Decisive Hostility” to “Cordial Agreement”: “The Times” on the Evolution of Britain’s Image in Russian Press at the Beginning of the 20th Century

The article deals with the reflection of the image of Britain in the analytical reviews of “The Times” newspaper on the pages of the Russian periodical press at the beginning of the 20th century.
 The study covers the period from the turn of the 19th–20th centuries until 1907, when the relations between Russia and Britain transitioned from extreme tension and rivalry in different regions of the world to an alliance within the Triple Entente. At this time, the press became truly massive and exerted a stronger influence than ever on the development of international relations. One of the leading English newspapers, “The Times”, took a largely pro-government stance and reflected the official position on foreign policy issues. It regularly reviewed the publications in the Russian press concerning Anglo-Russian relationship or British politics in general.
 As a result of the analysis of “The Times” reviews, it is possible to show the significance of the British political image, the dynamics of public opinion in the Russian Empire regarding a possible confrontation or Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The Russian press formed among readers a certain perception of Britain in the context of the Anglo-Boer War, the events in the Far East, the process of resolving contradictions, and the conclusion of the 1907 agreement, while the English press reflected on this image. The transformation of rhetoric in the press happened as rapidly as the changes in relations between the two powers.

Polityczne konteksty twórczości Tadeusza Micińskiego. Sprawa polska a Rosja w dobie Wielkiej Wojny

The general purpose of the article is to show Tadeusz Miciński’s attitude to Polish – Russian relations during the First World War, with a particular emphasis on Polish independence issues. After a detailed analysis of Miciński’s literary and journalistic works from that period, the evolution of his views is identified in this range. The article shows that his favorable attitude towards Russia in the first two years of the war resulted from his belief that the tsar`s empire was able to guarantee Polish autonomy. Miciński shared the idea of a Slavic community to defeat the German enemy. He put his faith in the feasibility of Russian promises included in the statement of Grand Duke Nikolay from 1914. Moreover, Miciński relied on the Triple Entente of the UK, France and Russia, which was supposed to be the guarantor of defeating the Central Powers, and above all, Germany. Additionally, there is a description of Miciński’s attitude to post-revolutionary Russia, his hope for the democratization of the country and later disappointment that was caused by the Bolshevik coup. Miciński warned his compatriots of succumbing to ideas spread by Lenin. It has been shown that Miciński, in his views, was always a supporter of independent Poland over party divisions

GEORGIA IN THE PLANS OF GERMANY AND ITS ALLIES AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE WORLD WAR I (MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE TRANSCAUCASUS FRONT)

Nugzar zosidze
 E-mail: n.zosidze@bsu.edu.ge
 Associate Professor, Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University 
 Batumi, Georgia
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2613-3365
 
 Abstract. In the early twentieth century, two large opposing hostile coalitions have formed in Europe: Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.
 The Triple Alliance initially included: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. After the start of the World War I, the latter withdrew from the bloc, but Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria joined it, thus forming the Quadruple Alliance. The countries included in it demanded a "place under the sun" and assumed to take the colonies from the Entente countries through war. 
 The core of the "Entente" consisted of the world's largest colonial empires of that time - Great Britain, France and Russia. It was between these two imperialist groups that the World War I of 1914-1918 broke out, involving thirty-eight states from different continents. 
 The war was imperialistic, unjust and conquering on both sides, resulting in the deaths and maiming of millions of people, destruction and extermination on a grand scale.
 Germany and its allies had significant plans for Transcaucasia and the expulsion of Russia from there. This unity of these interests largely led to the Ottoman Empire joining the Alliance, following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. After the Revolution, three leaders distinctively stood out in the political life of the Ottoman Empire: Enver Pasha, Military Minister and and de facto dictator of the Ottoman Empire; Talaat Pasha, Minister of Internal Affairs; and Ahmed Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine. Those three were obviously prone to Germanophilism. 
 Young Turks, in their attempts to find ways for quickly reorganizing their army defeated in the Balkan wars, looked at Germany with hope. That is why they happily met Germany's proposal to send a military mission to the Ottoman empire, which was received. On 8 October 1913, an agreement was signed between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which gave the Sanders military mission extensive rights (M.Larcher, La guerre Turque dans la guerre mondiale: 609-610).
 The German military mission undertook considerable work in the Ottoman Empire prior to the war. The members of the mission had responsible positions in the local general staff, border corps and fortifications. The history of the period in question became especially relevant from the beginning of the 50s of the twentieth century. However, many details and features of these liasons have not yet been fully investigated, comprehensively studied and scientifically substantiated.

From War Crimes to Crimes against Humanity and Genocide: Turkish Responsibility after World War I

On 24 May 1915, the Triple Entente powers of Britain, France, and Russia issued a joint declaration that qualified the massacres, imprisonments and violence inflicted on the peaceful Armenian population as “crimes against humanity and civilization.” The concept of crimes against humanity was further developed and explained by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (hereinafter: Commission), which was formed during the Paris Peace Conference to investigate violations of the laws and customs of war and prosecute war criminals. This article traces the evolution of discussions held within the Commission regarding the atrocities committed by the Ottoman Turkish government against its Armenian population, which technically fell outside the jurisdiction of the crimes specified in these talks, as the atrocities were committed not against the population of a belligerent state but, rather, against their own nationals. These discussions played a major part in the development of international criminal law; particularly of the concept of crimes against humanity. The Armenian Memorandum and the list of perpetrators of the Armenian atrocities were also presented to the Commission, which (together with other data and information collected) identified the crimes committed against the Armenian population by the Ottoman authorities, thus defining the concept of crimes against humanity and the acts that fell within its scope. Although post-World War I efforts for justice are generally assessed as a failed effort, crimes against humanity first materialized as a term in international law during this period and its development was based on the Armenian atrocities, which provided a critical basis for the International Military Tribunal's later convictions and contributed to the concept's evolution into its present-day significance.

Entente versus Alliance: When Should States Be Friends but Not Allies?

ABSTRACT When faced with a common threat, states have various alignment choices. Formal alliances offer explicit military obligations of support. Others, such as the Triple Entente that preceded World War I, are more ambiguous understandings. These entente-like alignments make no formal pledges of armed support in the event of hostilities. However, they do not entirely rule out military support either. Why might states embrace this form of strategic ambiguity over firm alliance commitments? Our formal explication addresses this question via the prism of collective action. Our modeling efforts, combined with historical precedents, suggest that an entente might be a more effective alignment choice than a formal alliance for states to balance against powerful threats. An entente permits states to strike the middle ground between entrapment and deterrence. The strategic ambiguity inherent in these two seemingly self-contradictory goals of an entente is a key component of its success as an alignment strategy, especially when external threats are large. However, asymmetry in strength between two states can result in divergent preferences between alliance and entente.

Maritime Front on the Basque Coast, a Battlefield in the Rear of the Great War: U-Boats and Espionage

This article aims to analyse how World War One became a total war which eventually involved neutral countries, particularly Spain. Although officially neutral, Spain became an espionage nest in which foreign agents cooperated with local sympathizers. The Allies and its collaborators tried to secure maritime supplies, while the Central Powers’ spies mainly aided and provided information to U-Boots, so that they could torpedo any cargos sailing towards France or Great Britain. Spies acted throughout Spain with particular intensive activity on the Basque Coast. In addition to extensive national and foreign trade in the Gulf of Biscay, Basque industry became a significant supplier of the Triple Entente. Nonetheless, the local population hoped that neutrality could spare them, and were shocked by being unexpectedly drawn into submarine warfare after 1916. Civilians tried to minimise the effects of torpedoing by helping local war casualties. Additionally, local sailors participated in the war too, by rescuing torpedoed seamen or themselves fleeing from German attacks in the open sea.

Position of the Russian periodical press at the beginning of the 20th century estimated by «The Times»

At the turn of the XIX–XX centuries periodical press is becoming more and more popular. Its influence on public opinion, the course of domestic political processes and even the development of international relations is increasing. The press becomes an instrument of state policy in the formation of positive, friendly or negative, hostile images of the allies and rivals. At the same time, the content of national newspapers and magazines is under close attention not only of the domestic audience, but also of the foreign ones. Thus, the leading British newspaper «The Times» regularly analyzes the publications of foreign periodicals, including Russian. In this regard, the general assessment given by «The Times» to the position of the Russian press, the impact of censorship restrictions on it, its representativeness as a mirror of public opinion and a translator of the government position becomes interesting. The article concludes that the Russian press was carefully read in Britain. «The Times» was quick to note the Anglophobia or the opposite friendly disposition of Russian newspapers. At the same time, the Russian press was considered biased, tendentious, not reflecting an objective picture of public opinion. The attitude of «The Times» is changing as the British image transforms in Russian periodicals. The change in rhetoric from hostile to allied occurs in the periodicals of both countries during the Anglo-Russian rapprochement and the formation of the Triple Entente.

A ENTRADA DOS EUA NA PRIMEIRA GUERRA MUNDIAL: A VISÃO DO JORNAL GERMANÓFILO O DIA, DE FLORIANÓPOLIS

Background: During the First World War (1914-198), a fraction of the Brazilian press was composed of German supporters, causing a conflict of interest with later Brazilian support for the Allies. Aim: The objective of this work was to analyze the coverage developed by the local newspaper “O Dia” of the entrance of the USA in the first world war...Methods: A bibliographical research was carried out in the archives of the newspaper “O Dia” and some books referring to the press and the period of the “First World War”. Results and Discussion: Some of the main telegrams and columns published in the main source, the periodical “O Dia”, organ of the republican party of Santa Catarina, from Florianópolis, brought imprecise news about the conflict, the newspaper maintained a clear Germanophile stance. However, it emphasized the North American importance, political, economic, and military, for the world. The newspaper reproduced news from agencies based in major US cities and gradually informed the US position in the conflict, emphasizing the diplomatic break with Germany and the entry into the war, which was decisive for the outcome of the conflict. In addition, it kept specific columns daily, with telegrams and news informing how the US positioned itself in the period of neutrality and how it acted in international relations and on the battlefronts. The organizational structure of the newspaper was chaotic by the standards of today, all types of news were included on the same page, without the presence of a structure of sections, which would facilitate the connection of related topics. However, the newspaper “O Dia” allocated relevant space to issues related to the “First World War” and the role of the USA, which went from being suppliers of inputs and technology to decisive protagonists in the conflict and the peace conferences. Conclusions: The newspaper "O Dia" has always maintained a favorable german position, even when it reported on the Triple Entente initiatives, since the beginning of the war, it highlighted content favorable to Germany.

Great Game Thinking: The British Foreign Office and Revolutionary Russia

While the revolution of October 1917 may have ushered a new regime into Moscow, many within the British government continued to view Russia through the lens of the Great Game. For decades, the Great Game had defined relations between the two countries, and while the Anglo-Russian Convention and the Triple Entente had created the illusion of friendship, this was simply a marriage of convenience. Thus, when revolution and civil war broke out in Russia, men such as Lord George Curzon rushed at the opportunity to try to seize the upper hand and win the game. Unfortunately for Curzon, times had changed and countries such as Persia were no longer happy to be mere pawns in a game.

The Role Played by Africans in the British War Effort in Abercorn District, Northern Rhodesia during the First World War

The First World War broke out on 28 July 1914 as a European war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.1 African colonies soon joined the fighting on the side of their respective colonial masters. It was in this context that Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) entered the war on the side of imperial Britain against Germany. In Northern Rhodesia, the war was confined to the most northerly region bordering German East Africa (Tanzania), particularly in Abercorn (Mbala) district. The British were faced with a crucial situation in the district that they incorporated the local Africans to fight the Germans. As such, the indigenous people’s land in Abercorn became a battlefield. While existing studies have focussed on the part played by African porters during the First World War, scholars have largely overlooked the role played by African combatants, food suppliers, spies, and postal runners on the warfront. Thus, the article attempts to bring to the fore various roles played by Africans in Abercorn during this Great War. In this manner, the article demonstrates how the local people in Abercorn played a decisive role in determining the Allied victory by 25 November 1918 in the district in particular and in Northern Rhodesia and German East Africa in general.

Allied Cooperation in Europe on the Eve of World War I

The article puts forward an opinion that the current crisis of world order requires reverting to discovering the reasons of World War I. The author states that in 1914, a majority of decision-makers believed they had a dominant strategy; thus, the policy they followed was the best, irrespective of another party’s actions. The complicated task of clarifying the concerns and intentions of others as well as predicting the aggravation of the situation as a result of their actions was not taken into account. The quest for minimising responsibility and increasing comfort while taking bellicose measures hindered the realisation of the fact that a more cautious strategy was a safer option. The military and political alliances, including the Entente Cordiale (the Triple Entente) and the Triple Alliance (after Italy’s withdrawal, the Central Powers), the defence purposes enshrined in secret agreements notwithstanding, were established for waging wars but not for maintaining peace by mutual containment. Fragile arrangements between the two alliances did not allow them to prevent opponents or partners from unleashing the war and subsequently halt hostilities after the failure of a range of envisaged strategic operations. The states continuously threatened each other with their actions, and repeated attempts to create the impression of a threat of aggression, although without any intention to use military force, undermined international stability. The efforts of European leaders constituted a diplomatic game, as the parties bluffed and sought to play trump cards they never had. The initial stakes, particularly colonial and territorial claims of actors, were negligible as compared with the incommensurably higher payback – the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, German, and Ottoman empires, and the two totalitarian revolutions in the 20th-century Europe, Russian (Bolshevist) and German (Nazi). The author concludes that it was not allied obligations that prompted states to choose a certain side; rather, each country’s government decided to join the war on their own, guided by spurious ‘national interests’. Keywords: World War I, Entente, military and political alliances, Europe, 20th century.

The Korean Policy of Japan and the Response of Korean Society to the Establishment of the 1907 System in East Asia

The Russo-Japanese War (1904), which broke out during the confrontation between Russia and Japan on the Korean Peninsula, resulted in the reorganization of the powers, In Europe, a confrontational system was established, represented by a ‘Triple Entente’ and ‘Dreibund’. In that extension, Japan became a major partner in the ‘Triple Entente’. As a result, the 1907 system centered on Japan was established before and after the second International Peace Conference in East Asia. In this situation, Emperor Kojong dispatched Yi Sang-sul, Yi Jun, Yi Wi-jong and Hulbert as special envoys to the Hague Peace Conference(1907). At that time, the Japanese government was aware of Korea s move to send a special envoy to Hague in advance. However, Japan did not try to prevent Emperor Kojong from sending them, nor did watch their activities without direct restraint in Hague. There were three important political intentions here. First, Japan intended to secure her right to protect Korea in the international community. Second, Japan intended to show off to the international community, that it had the ability to rule her colonies the same as other Western powers, allowing for open anti-Japanese activities by Korean envoys. Third, Japan intended to further strengthen its dominance over Korean with this case. The dispatch of special envoys to the Hague Peace Conference(1907) was the last attempt planned by Kojong as the Emperor of the Korean Empire to maintain Korea s independence. In response, the Korean community had little expectation for the Hague Peace Conference(1907) at that time. Howerever, the special envoys’ activities were enough to draw attention. However, Korean society did not give any positive meaning to their activities. As a result of the anti-Japanese activities of Korea. Japan has been strongly pressing the Korean government to increase its influence by pressing it hard. Indeed, Faced with the fact that Japan was forced to confront Kojong with the dispatch of a special envoy to The Hague. the Korean society denied the direct relationship between Kojong Emperor and the envoys.

Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis

ABSTRACTDuring the July Crisis, the United Kingdom was put under strong pressure from Russia and the latter's ally, France, to declare it would fight alongside them. Britain had made the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 1907. The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George Buchanan, was the key figure in diplomatic communication between Britain and Russia at this time and his performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Some analysts believe he genuinely sought to restrain Russia from war, but was undermined by his own government, who too easily accepted St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. But others feel Buchanan's reports of Russian mobilisation were ill-informed and unhelpful to the government in London. This article examines Buchanan's performance, arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not deserve some of the criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Triple Entente was a priority for him and, after about 28 July, once it became clear that European war could not be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia's war preparations, appearing more interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in providing an accurate analysis of events.

L'Italia e il primo conflitto globale, 1914-1918

L'Italia e il primo conflitto globale, 1914-1918

The Reception of British Painting at the Venice Biennali, 1895–1914

The opening of the Venice Biennale in 1895 provided an unprecedented occasion to bring international art to the Italian public. It thus enabled intellectuals, art critics and the wider public to see and judge national productions side by side. This paper proposes to look at the way biases developed along with the Biennale – in relation to the peculiar political situation in Europe. By looking at articles written by leading Italian art critics on newspapers and magazines such as Emporium, Fanfulla della Domenica, Il Marzocco or Illustrazione italiana, the paper will show that art often served as a pretext for a political analysis which ultimately pointed to the rising conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

The Crowe Memorandum, the Rebalance to Asia, and Sino-US Relations

ABSTRACTMany contemporary academics and policy analysts have revisited the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914 to predict what may await China and the United States in the twenty-first century. However, few, if indeed any, have specified in what sense this comparison can be made. This paper attempts to fill this gap with a detailed analysis of the strategic parallels between the Anglo-German rivalry then and the China–US competition now through the lens of the Crowe Memorandum. The author argues that the basic parallel between the rise of Germany and the rise of China lies in the challenges they posed or pose to the dominant maritime power and system leader – Great Britain then and the United States today. This parallel also explains the similarity between the Triple Entente initiated by Great Britain prior to 1914 and the Rebalance to Asia launched by the United States in 2011. Furthermore, as in the case of the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914, the most crucial problem underlying the mounting China–US competition in recent years has been America’s deepening apprehension about the development of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and naval capabilities. This development, from the US perspective, is threatening to deprive the US of its most crucial instrument to influence the strategic equilibrium on the East Asian littorals. Based on the lessons of the Anglo-German rivalry prior to 1914, the essay also examines the potential for mitigating, if not eliminating, the mounting competition and misgivings between China and the United States.

Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in international relations, by Andrei P Tsygankov

Andrei P Tsygankov Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in international relations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. xii + 3l7pp., $107.95 (cloth) ISBN 978-1-1070-2552-3Since the Soviet Union's collapse there has been much disagreement among scholars about Russian foreign policy. Russia is often labelled as non-cooperative or irrational in relations with the West, even as anti-Western. How can we explain and understand Russia's behaviour toward the West? Using a social-constructivist approach, Andrei Tsygankov, a professor at San Francisco State University and author of a number of works on Russia's international relations, proposes a novel interpretation of Russian foreign policy: the concept of honour best explains Russia's actions toward the West over the past 200 years.Tsygankov's study is organized into four parts. In Part I, the most important section of the book from a theoretical perspective, the author presents an explicitly developed theory of Russian-Western relations. Europe and the West, Tsygankov argues, created the meaningful environment in which Russia's rulers defended their visions of national honor and interests (51). The Russian myth of honour, rooted in Eastern Christianity, is a distinctive concept of spiritual freedom and the ideal of a strong and socially protective state (28). These aspects of the Russian myth of honour have operated differently across history. During the Tsarist period, the Russian conception of honour was embedded in Orthodox Christianity, autocracy, and support for Orthodox and Slavic peoples abroad. With the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, communist ideology took the place of religion; the autocratic state and support for the Orthodox and Slavic peoples abroad were replaced respectively by Communist Party rule and by a commitment to Communist regimes. Post-Soviet Russia, the author contends, is in the process of defining a new ideological framework, one that includes Russian civilization, a strong state, and support for Russian and pro-Russian communities (34). Tsygankov advances three distinct patterns of Russian behaviour toward the West based on the idea of honour: cooperation, defensive reaction, and assertiveness. In each case, policy choice is influenced by a combination of Western recognition (or nonrecognition) of Russian interests, honour, and perceived domestic strength.In the subsequent three parts of the book, the author tests his theoretical framework by applying the concept of honour to 10 historical case studies of Russian-Western interaction. Tsygankov groups the case studies thematically around his three distinct patterns of behaviour-cooperation, defensiveness, and assertiveness-and each is compared to realist explanations. In Part II, which comprises four case studies of Russia's cooperation with the West (the Holy Alliance, 1815-1853; the Triple Entente, 1907-1917; collective security, 1933-1939; and the War on Terror, 2001-2005), Tsygankov observes how Western states accepted Russian interests, and Russia in turn, guided by its honour-based commitment, collaborated with them. Part III examines cases where the West did not accept Russian interests, and Russia, again bound by a sense of honour, turned to a defensive foreign policy (the Recueillement, 1856-1871; peaceful coexistence, 1921-1939; containing NATO expansion, 1995-2000). …

The Short Term Origins of World War I

Over the course of the beginning of the 20th century, it seems that the short terms origins of the First World War were caused by the mutual fear which existed between the opposing blocks of Europe. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary and Germany seem to have isolated themselves by French antagonism because of the Franco-Prussian War and British antagonism because of the Naval Race and Russia because of the conflicting spheres of influence in the Balkans between Russia and Austria-Hungary. As time went by, the Western powers became more intent on war rather than loosing face. After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Russia was determined to no be humiliated again while France was supplying money to Russia for the building of a railway. Germany and Austria-Hungary therefore felt threatened as they realized they were encircled by hostile powers and that they would be forced to fight a war on two fronts. This incited Germany to opt for an increase in army expenditures in 1912 when the second Moroccan Crisis demonstrated the solidity of the Triple Entente. Germany army expansion subsequently triggered the army expansion of the other nations. By 1914, Germany believed that war was inevitable and that a preventive war was necessary to weaken Germany’s enemies into accepting Germany’s place as a world power. Therefore, when the Archduke was assassinated, the nations of Europe were not reluctant to go to war.

Shaw and Bertrand Russell versus Gilbert Murray on Britain's Entry into World War I

Shaw and Bertrand Russell versus Gilbert Murray on Britain's Entry into World War I

Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: honor in international relations

1. Introduction Part I. Theory: 2. Honor in international relations 3. The Russian state and its honor 4. Russia's relations with the West Part II. Honor and Cooperation: 5. The Holy Alliance, 1815-53 6. The Triple Entente, 1907-17 7. The collective security, 1933-9 8. The war with terrorism, 2001-5 Part III. Honor and Defensiveness: 9. The Recueillement, 1856-71 10. The peaceful coexistence, 1921-39 11. Containing NATO expansion, 1995-2000 Part IV. Honor and Assertiveness: 12. The Crimean War, 1853-6 13. The early Cold War, 1946-9 14. The Russia-Georgia War, August 2008 15. Conclusion Bibliography.