Treatment Of Foreign Investors Research Articles

EU-China Economic Relations in the Early 21st Century

The European Union (EU) and China are two of the most influential and complex economies globally. The current state of their relationship is marked by a growing trade deficit for the EU with China, along with increasing Chinese investments in Europe's energy, technology, and infrastructure sectors. The EU has expressed dissatisfaction with China's treatment of foreign investors, limited market access for European companies, and government subsidization of domestic companies. Additionally, the EU has raised concerns about China's human rights record and its policies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. The partnership is expected to remain a key focus for the EU's economic outlook as both sides balance economic potential with geopolitical and security considerations. This report aims to identify and explain the primary issues, key areas for improvement, and mutual interests between the EU and China, while also proposing potential solutions to enhance their economic and trade relations. Informative articles, relevant papers, textbooks, and other sources support the discussion. Although the analysis is subjective, a quantitative methodology is also employed. The discussion presents a common interface and provides recommendations for enhancing financial relations, increasing exchange, financial and security relations, participating in and benefiting from two-way engagement, and enhancing EU-China relations.

Fencing off Silicon Valley: Cross-border venture capital and technology spillovers

The treatment of foreign investors is a contentious topic in U.S. entrepreneurship policy. We model a setting where foreign corporate investments in Silicon Valley may allow U.S. entrepreneurs to pursue technologies that they could not otherwise, but may also lead to knowledge spillovers. We show that despite the benefits from such inbound investments for U.S. firms, it may be optimal for the U.S. government to raise their costs to deter these investments. Using as comprehensive as possible a sample of investments by foreign corporate investors in U.S. start-ups, we find evidence consistent with the presence of knowledge spillovers to foreign investors.

Fencing Off Silicon Valley: Cross-Border Venture Capital and Technology Spillovers

The treatment of foreign investors has been a contentious topic in U.S. entrepreneurship policy in recent years. This paper examines foreign corporate investments in Silicon Valley from a theoretical and empirical perspective. We model a setting where such funding may allow U.S. entrepreneurs to pursue technologies that they could not otherwise, but may also lead to spillovers to the overseas firm providing the financing and the nation where it is based. We show that despite the benefits from such inbound investments for U.S. firms, it may be optimal for the U.S. government to raise their costs to deter investments. Using as comprehensive as possible a sample of investments by non-U.S. corporate investors in U.S. start-ups between 1976 and 2015, we find evidence consistent with the presence of knowledge spill-overs to foreign investors.

The Justification of Privilege in International Investment Law: Preferential Treatment of Foreign Investors as a Problem of Legitimacy

Abstract A fundamental feature of international investment law is that it only applies to foreign investment. This has historical reasons and is connected to deep-rooted principles of international law. It has also been a historical cause of controversy because it requires states to treat foreign investors better than they treat their own nationals. This article shows how the international minimum standard for treatment of foreigners nevertheless developed in a dialogue with such a concern for equality. The article argues that the way in which international investment law has developed in recent years into an effective remedial mechanism that can be invoked by individual foreign investors against host states ignores this historical lesson and now poses a particular challenge to its legitimacy. It privileges foreign investors as a select group worthy of more effective legal protection than ordinarily provided under municipal law, challenging the ideal of equality before the law as a basic constitutional value. The article discusses possible justifications of such privilege, arguing that only a more traditional international minimum standard rationale provides a convincing justification of special treatment of foreign investment. This has important implications for the reform of the current investment regime, suggesting that it should be redesigned to adopt a more supplementary role and deferential attitude to domestic law and courts – for example, through a requirement to exhaust local remedies.

Fencing Off Silicon Valley: Cross-Border Venture Capital and Technology Spillovers

The treatment of foreign investors is a contentious topic in U.S. entrepreneurship policy. We model a setting where foreign corporate investments in Silicon Valley may allow U.S. entrepreneurs to pursue technologies that they could not otherwise, but may also lead to knowledge spillovers. We show that despite the benefits from such inbound investments for U.S. firms, it may be optimal for the U.S. government to raise their costs to deter investments. Using as comprehensive as possible a sample of investments by foreign corporate investors in U.S. startups, we find evidence consistent with the presence of knowledge spillovers to foreign investors.

FLESHING OUT THE PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT

This article aims to analyse the jurisprudence developed by international courts and tribunals with regard to the standard of treatment of foreign investors, with particular focus on issues concerning expropriation. In doing so, it will analyse some of the standard-setting decisions and far-reaching implications of: the Iran-US Claims Tribunals, the International Court of Justice and the ICSID. It will also examine the recent trend in jurisprudence on the so-called regulatory takings of foreign investment. It will explore: (a) how the decisions of international courts and tribunals have ‘fleshed out’ the principles of the law of foreign investment on, inter alia, the definition of expropriation and nationalisation and determination of the quantum of compensation; (b) how the frontiers of expropriation have been extended to cover regulatory takings

Treatment of Foreign Investments during Armed Conflicts: The Regimes

Treatment of Foreign Investments during Armed Conflicts: The Regimes

What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?

AbstractThe treatment of foreign investment has become the most controversial issue in global governance. At the center of the controversy lies the mechanism of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which allows private firms legal recourse against governments if government interference has degraded their investment. Using newly released data covering 742 investment disputes, I assess some of the central claims about ISDS. I argue that the regime has indeed undergone an important shift: a majority of claims today deal not with direct takings by low-rule-of-law countries, but with regulation in democratic states. Such “indirect expropriation” claims have seen a precipitous decrease in their odds of legal success over the past twenty years. They are also far less likely to result in early settlement. These parallel trends may be a result of a rise in strategic litigation by investors whose aim is not only to obtain compensation but also to deter governments' regulatory ambitions.

The Bilcon NAFTA Tribunal: A Clash of Investor Protection and Sustainability-Based Environmental Assessments

This article considers the implications of a March, 2015 ruling of a tribunal struck under the Chapter 11 investor protection provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The majority of the tribunal found that Canada violated Articles 1102 and 1105 of NAFTA when the federal and provincial governments refused to approve a basalt quarry in Digby County (Whites Point Quarry), Nova Scotia following an environmental assessment carried out by way of a joint panel review. The article starts with an overview of the environmental assessment process carried out for the Whites Point Quarry, followed by a summary of the findings of the NAFTA tribunal. The ruling and its implications are then assessed, followed by a review of the investor protection provisions of the recently concluded trade agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA) to consider whether CETA’s investor protection process is likely to encounter similar challenges, particularly when considering the fair treatment of foreign investors in sustainability focused environmental assessment processes.

Does the International Investment Regime Induce Frivolous Litigation?

The treatment of foreign investment has become the most controversial issue in global governance. At the centre of the controversy lies the mechanism of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which allows private firms legal recourse against governments, if government interference has degraded their investment. Using newly released data covering 696 investment disputes, I assess some of the central claims about ISDS. I argue that the regime has indeed undergone a major shift: a majority of claims deal not with direct takings by low rule of law countries, but with regulation in democratic states. The result of this shift towards indirect expropriation affects firms’ incentives: claimants may gain even when they lose a challenge, if litigation can deter governments’ regulatory ambitions. The result, as I show, is an increase in the number of cases, accompanied by a precipitous decrease in their legal merit. Investors bringing indirect expropriation claims also appear far less likely to settle, and more likely to publicize the dispute, consistently with theoretical expectations.

Development of Rule-Based Investment Protection Provisions in Mega-FTAs: A Manifestation or a Negation from Customary International Law Principles?

Customary international law affirms the obligation of the host state to protect foreign investors by according the minimum standard of treatment of foreign investors. These become well-established principles of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security in foreign investment law. Led by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), investment protection provisions are heavily negotiated in modern FTAs. The jurisprudence of investment protection in early FTAs, namely NAFTA, relied on principles of customary international law as the texts of agreements did not contain definitions or exemplification to the principles. A number of mega-FTAs, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) bring about changes in the minimum standard of treatment of foreign investors. In contrast to a principle-led approach, the minimum standard of treatment terms are more clearly defined in recent mega-FTAs. The fair and equitable treatment term in the TPP, for example, includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world. The proposed TTIP provides that a breach of the fair and equitable include a targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief. The paper proposes that there has clearly been a shift in the minimum standard of treatment clause from the principle-based approach to the rule-based approach in recent mega-FTAs. On the one hand, the rule-based provisions in the new mega-FTAs could limit the scope of ordinary principles of customary international law and negate from a long-held jurisprudence in foreign investment law. On the other, the rule-based provisions could manifest the intention of parties to be bound by obligations provided by agreements and limit the expansive view of tribunals in applying the principle.

Comparing the Function of National Treatment in WTO & International Investment Law

National treatment is a basic component of both investment treaties and WTO Law. It guarantees a minimum standard of treatment of foreign investments in like circumstances and like products vis-a-vis their domestic counterparts. The focus of this essay will be to illustrate the point that whereas national treatment clauses in WTO law and in international investment law are aimed at ensuring non-discrimination based on the nationality of the subject matter, there are fundamental differences which are incapable of being infused from one regime to another.

10.5937/zrpfns48-6733 = Legitimate expectations as an element of the fair and equitable standard of treatment of foreign investments in arbitral practice

Fair and equitable standard of treatment of foreign investments represents an integral part of all modern international agreements on protection and encouragement of foreign investments. The key element of its contents, according to arbitral practice, is an obligation of the host state to provide the investor with the treatment in accordance with basic expectations that he or she had at the time of the investment with regard to economical and legal conditions in the host state. The paper analyzes the most important awards of arbitral tribunals dealing with legitimate expectations of the investor as a part of the fair and equitable treatment standard. A considerable attention is dedicated to identifying the behavior of the host state capable of creating legitimate expectation which enjoy legal protection as well as to detecting the requirements for the development of reasonable expectations.

Democratizing Investment Laws: Ensuring ‘Minimum Standards’ for Host States

The ad hoc development of international investment law has resulted in catering to the needs of capital exporting states. However, owing to the weaker bargaining power of the then newly independent capital importing states, no comparable internationally recognized standards of minimum protection of national interests from foreign firms could be formulated, even though such firms today are known to have a profound impact on local economies because of the extensive protection and power they yield through lopsided BITs and other general customary standards of treatment of foreign investment. This paper is therefore an attempt to develop and advocate a new ‘national minimum standard of protection’ in investment law that focuses particularly on the rights of the host states to regulate their economies and to protect their nationals on the basis of a social contract between the State and the individual.

Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, the Global Financial Crisis and International Economic Law

Economists and political scientists have begun to isolate the causes and implications of the spread of the global financial crisis in late 2008. Critical attention-often accompanied by strident disagreement-has also focused on the efficacy of various domestic plans implemented in response to the crisis. International economic lawyers have started to explore the legal implications of these developments. Our analysis offers a contribution by examining whether and how certain aspects of international economic law might act as a credible constraint on state tendencies toward domestic preference when formalizing emergency responses to the crisis. We begin by offering a typology of emergency measures implemented to date. We then assess whether particular international economic law rules can target the nuanced forms of protectionism embedded in those responses. We survey both treaty commitments on trading relations (especially under the World Trade Organization) and the treatment of foreign investors. We argue that international investment law is, in the short term due to legal and extra-legal factors, more likely than any other area of international economic law to give rise to initiation of legal action and examine the most probable substantive norms likely to be violated.

"Regulatory Space" in the Treatment of Foreign Investment in Ethiopian Investment Laws

Investment is, without doubt, one of the primary engines of growth in all economies.1 Though foreign investment could contribute its share in the process of extricating developing countries (including least-developed countries) from their vicious circle of abject poverty, the international community has thus far failed, in spite of several attempts, to strike a deal at the multilateral level to give effective legal protection to foreign investment. To reduce the implications of this legal gap at the international level, however, countries started concluding bilateral investment promotion and protection treaties (commonly called “BITs”).2 This resulted in the proliferation of BITs as the main instruments of promotion and comprehensive legal protection of foreign investment. By the end of 2004 the total number of BITs concluded was about 2,392 among which about 35% were concluded between developing countries.3 This indisputably makes BITs the main sources of international law on foreign investment.

Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens, Fair and Equitable Treatment of Foreign Investors, Customary International Law and the Diallo Case before the International Court of Justice

Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens, Fair and Equitable Treatment of Foreign Investors, Customary International Law and the Diallo Case before the International Court of Justice

MIGA & its Operation (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency)

Considering the need to strengthen international cooperation for economic development to foster the contributing to such development of foreign investment in general end private foreign investment in particular: Recognizing that the flow of foreign investment to developing countries would be facilitated and further encouraged by alleviating concerns related to non-commercial risks.Desiring to enhance the flow to developing countries of capital and technology for productive purposes under conditions consistent with their development needs, policies and objectives on the basis of fair and stable standards for the treatment of foreign investment: The Multilateral In vestment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was established as the smallest and youngest member of the World Bank Group in 1988 to improve people‘s lives and reduce poverty. MIGA contributes to development by offering political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors and tenders, and by helping developing countries attract and retain private investment. MLGA’s creation was in direct response to the debt crisis of 1980 s, and the subsequent realization among political Leaders that sustainable economic growth in many developing and transitional countries required the stimulation of private enterprise and flow of foreign capital for this to happen, The creation of such an agency was discussed in many international fora, particularly the World Bank.Many investors and Lenders needed comfort their respective investments would be protected against certain types of political risks. MIGA’s establishment was an attempt to address shortcomings in the investment insurance (guarantee) industry, and provide a risk mitigation service that was not readily available elsewhere. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) has played an essential role in the provision of political risk insurance during its existence. On October 11, 1985, after formal approval by the Executive Directors of the World Bank, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution opening the MIGA Convention for signature.As previously stated, MIGA began operations in 1988.Since its birth, MIGA matured as an effective institution in assisting the developmental goals of lesser-developed countries by facilitating capital investment by developed nations into emerging economies.

How to improve the developmental impact of foreign direct investment: A review

Most economists would probably agree that it is not sufficient for developing countries to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Even for host countries with high attractiveness to FDI, the challenge remains to ensure that FDI fosters economic development, e.g., by inducing technological and managerial spillovers, generating additional employment and income opportunities, and alleviating world-market integration. However, the consensus hardly goes further than this. It continues to be highly controversial what, if anything, host-country governments can and should do to improve the developmental impact of FDI in Third World economies. Two recent UNCTAD publications on the theme "FDI policies for development" do not provide ready-made solutions for policymakers in developing countries. Nevertheless, the detailed assessment of contentious FDI policies offers valuable insights. This refers especially to the World Investment Report 2003 which, in addition to the regular part on recent FDI trends, focuses on the developmental dimension of bi-, pluri-, and multilateral investment agreements (UNCTAD 2003a: Part 2). The report discusses eight key issues: the definition of investment, national treatment of foreign investors, nationalization and expropriation, dispute settlement mechanisms, performance requirements, FDI incentives, technology transfers, and competition policy. As concerns performance requirements, UNCTAD (2003a) draws on a concurrent publication offering detailed evidence from selected host countries (UNCTAD 2003b). Country studies on the incidence

The Vestey Cattle Enterprise and the Regime of Juan Vicente Gómez, 1908–1935

This article seeks to expand our understanding of the dynamics of the Gómez regime and of its treatment of foreign investment by examining its relationship with a large British enterprise engaged in ranching and frozen meat exports. The company and the regime established mutually beneficial relationships during the First World War, but when the tighter market conditions of the post-war period obliged the company to restrict its purchases of cattle from Gómez, he forced the company to end its exports. The regime's treatment of the Vestey enterprise thus offers a vivid contrast to its treatment of foreign oil companies.