Transmission Of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Research Articles

Role of Eyes and Eyes Protection Amidst SARS-CoV-2 Infection.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 pandemic has infected millions of people. The conjunctival epithelium is easily exposed to infectious droplets and body fluids making eyes a potential route and reservoir of the infection. The CD147 and ACE2 receptor has been demonstrated in ocular surface cells, which implies that these cells may facilitate as a portal of entry for transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2. Despite low viral load in tears and conjunctival swab, the negative RT-PCR results cannot exclude the possibility of the presence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in ocular secretions. Pathogens might be transported by constant tear flow through the lacrimal duct system to the respiratory tract causing infection. Eyes are unlikely to be the main transmission route, however, their role in the transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 cannot be overlooked. Therefore, proper eye protection should be instituted while attending Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 positive individuals, especially by health professionals.

Use of SARS-CoV-2-infected deceased organ donors: Should we always "just say no?"

In the context of a rapidly evolving pandemic, multiple organizations have released guidelines stating that all organs from potential deceased donors with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) infection should be deferred, including from otherwise medically eligible donors found to have mild or asymptomatic SARS‐CoV‐2 discovered on routine donor screening. In this article, we critically examine the available data on the risk of transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 through organ transplantation. The isolation of SARS‐CoV‐2 from nonlung clinical specimens, the detection of SARS‐CoV‐2 in autopsy specimens, previous experience with the related coronaviruses SARS‐CoV and MERS‐CoV, and the vast experience with other common RNA respiratory viruses are all addressed. Taken together, these data provide little evidence to suggest the presence of intact transmissible SARS‐CoV in organs that can potentially be transplanted, specifically liver and heart. Other considerations including ethical, financial, societal, and logistical concerns are also addressed. We conclude that, for selected patients with high waitlist mortality, transplant programs should consider accepting heart or liver transplants from deceased donors with SARS‐CoV‐2 infection.

Role of fomites in SARS transmission during the largest hospital outbreak in Hong Kong.

The epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) had a significant effect on global society in the early 2000s and the potential of its resurgence exists. Studies on the modes of transmission of SARS are limited though a number of outbreak studies have revealed the possible airborne route. To develop more specific and effective control strategies, we conducted a detailed mechanism-based investigation that explored the role of fomite transmission in the well-known Ward 8A outbreak. We considered three hypothetical transmission routes, i.e., the long-range airborne, fomite and combined routes, in 1,744 scenarios with combinations of some important parameters. A multi-agent model was used to predict the infection risk distributions of the three hypothetical routes. Model selection was carried out for different scenarios to compare the distributions of infection risk with that of the reported attack rates and select the hypotheses with the best fitness. Our results reveal that under the assumed conditions, the SARS coronavirus was most possible to have spread via the combined long-range airborne and fomite routes, and that the fomite route played a non-negligible role in the transmission.

Airborne exposure patterns from a passenger source in aircraft cabins

Airflow is a critical factor that influences air quality, airborne contaminant distribution, and disease transmission in commercial airliner cabins. The general aircraft-cabin air-contaminant transport effect model seeks to build exposure-spatial relationships between contaminant sources and receptors, quantify the uncertainty, and provide a platform for incorporation of data from a variety of studies. Knowledge of infection risk to flight crews and passengers is needed to form a coherent response to an unfolding epidemic, and infection risk may have an airborne pathogen exposure component. The general aircraft-cabin air-contaminant transport effect model was applied to datasets from the University of Illinois and Kansas State University and also to case study information from a flight with probable severe acute respiratory syndrome transmission. Data were fit to regression curves, where the dependent variable was contaminant concentration (normalized for source strength and ventilation rate), and the independent variable was distance between source and measurement locations. The data-driven model showed exposure to viable small droplets and post-evaporation nuclei at a source distance of several rows in a mock-up of a twin-aisle airliner with seven seats per row. Similar behavior was observed in tracer gas, particle experiments, and flight infection data for severe acute respiratory syndrome. The study supports the airborne pathway as part of the matrix of possible disease transmission modes in aircraft cabins.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): lessons learnt in Hong Kong.

Many healthcare workers were infected while looking after the SARS patients on the medical wards in 2003. The high infectivity of the SARS coronavirus with peak viral load on day 10 of illness when patients were ill, overcrowding of the old medical wards with low air changes/hr (ACH), and aerosol-generating procedures while resuscitating the patients were the major factors. Procedures reported to present an increased risk of SARS transmission include tracheal intubation, non-invasive ventilation, tracheotomy and manual ventilation before intubation whereas oxygen therapy and bed distance <1 m were also implicated. Studies based on laser visualization technique with smoke particles as smokers in the human patient simulator has shown that oxygen therapy via Hudson mask and nasal cannula could disperse exhaled air of patients to 0.4 and 1 m respectively whereas jet nebulizer could disperse exhaled air >0.8 m from the patient. Bigger isolation rooms with 16 ACH are more effective than smaller isolation rooms with 12 ACH in removing exhaled air and preventing room contamination but at the expense of more noise and electricity consumption. Non-invasive ventilation via face masks and single circuit can disperse exhaled air from 0.4 to 1 m. Both higher inspiratory pressures and use of whisper swivel device (to facilitate carbon dioxide removal) could increase the exhaled air leakage and isolation room contamination during on-invasive ventilation. Addition of a viral-bacterial filter during manual ventilation by bagging may reduce the exhaled air leakage forward and yet increase the sideway leakage. N95 mask was more effective than surgical mask in preventing expelled air leakage during patient's coughing but there was still significant sideway leakage to 15 cm. Clinicians should be aware of air leakage from the various face masks and adopt strict infection control measures during resuscitation of patients with severe respiratory infections. Carefully designed clinical trials are required to determine the optimal timing and dosage of any antiviral agents, convalescent plasma, and immuno-modulating agents in the treatment of the possibly immune-mediated lung injury in SARS and newly emerged infection such as the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.

Role of two-way airflow owing to temperature difference in severe acute respiratory syndrome transmission: revisiting the largest nosocomial severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in Hong Kong

By revisiting the air distribution and bioaerosol dispersion in Ward 8A where the largest nosocomial severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak occurred in Hong Kong in 2003, we found an interesting phenomenon. Although all the cubicles were in 'positive pressure' towards the corridor, the virus-containing bioaerosols generated from the index patient's cubicle were still transmitted to other cubicles, which cannot be explained in a traditional manner. A multi-zone model combining the two-way airflow effect was used to analyse this phenomenon. The multi-zone airflow model was evaluated by our experimental data. Comparing with the previous computational fluid dynamic simulation results, we found that the air exchange owing to the small temperature differences between cubicles played a major role in SARS transmission. Additionally, the validated multi-zone model combining the two-way airflow effect could simulate the pollutant transport with reasonable accuracy but much less computational time. A probable improvement in general ward design was also proposed.

Transmission of SARS in three Chinese hospitals

Summary Objective To quantify the transmissibility of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in hospitals in mainland China and to assess the effectiveness of control measures. Methods We report key epidemiological details of three major hospital outbreaks of SARS in mainland China, and estimate the evolution of the effective reproduction number in each of the three hospitals during the course of the outbreaks. Results The three successive hospital outbreaks infected 41, 99 and 91 people of whom 37%, 60% and 70% were hospital staff. These cases resulted in 33 deaths, five of which occurred in hospital staff. In a multivariate logistic regression, age and whether or not the case was a healthcare worker (HCW) were found to be significant predictors of mortality. The estimated effective reproduction numbers (95% CI) for the three epidemics peaked at 8 (5, 11), 9 (4, 14) and 12 (7, 17). In all three hospitals the epidemics were rapidly controlled, bringing the reproduction number below one within 25, 10 and 5 days respectively. Conclusions This work shows that in three major hospital epidemics in Beijing and Tianjin substantially higher rates of transmission were initially observed than those seen in the community. In all three cases the hospital epidemics were rapidly brought under control, with the time to successful control becoming shorter in each successive outbreak.

Theoretically estimated risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome transmission through blood transfusion during an epidemic in Shenzhen, Guangdong, China in 2003

Background Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly recognized infectious disease that caused an outbreak in south China in 2003. The cause of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus (CoV). The existence of asymptomatic seroconvertors and the detection of the SARS-CoV RNA in plasma during the course of infection all suggest that SARS could, as least theoretically, be transmitted by transfusion. An estimate of the risk of SARS transmission through blood transfusion will contribute to decisions concerning blood safety monitoring and may be useful in the design of strategies to decrease the risk of transfusion-transmitted infections. Study design and methods Case onset dates from the 2003 Shenzhen SARS epidemic and investigational results from Taiwan on viremia in humans are used to estimate the number of cases that were viremic throughout the epidemic. Estimates of the asymptomatic-to-clinically confirmed SARS-CoV infection ratio, the proportion of asymptomatic infections reported in a seroprevalence survey in Hongkong, and the population size of Shenzhen are used to infer the SARS-CoV transfusion–transmission risk. Statistical resampling methods are used. Results Based on data from Shenzhen, Hongkong and Taiwan, the maximum and mean risk (per million) of SARS-CoV transmission from donors in Shenzhen were estimated as 23.57 (95% CI: 6.83–47.69) and 14.11 (95% CI: 11.00–17.22), respectively. The estimated risk peaked on April 02, 2003. Conclusions Although there are currently no confirmed reports of the transmission of SARS-CoV from asymptomatic individuals, recent research data indicate that transfusion-transmitted SARS-CoV is at least theoretically possible. Although the risk is low, with its rapid spread of the disease, appearance of alarmingly high infectivity and high fatality rate, public health authorities need to consider strategies for blood donor recruitment and virus inactivation during an epidemic to further ensure blood safety.

Weather: driving force behind the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome in China?

Background: The association between weather and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) transmission in Beijing and Hong Kong in the 2003 epidemic was studied to examine the effect of weather on SARS transmission. Methods: Pearson’s correlation analyses and negative binomial regression analyses were used to quantify the correlations between the daily newly reported number of SARS cases and weather variables, using daily disease notification data and meteorological data from the two locations. Results: The results indicate that there were inverse association between the number of daily cases and maximum and/or minimum temperatures whereas air pressure was found to be positively associated with SARS transmission. Conclusion: The study suggests that weather might be a contributory factor in the 2003 SARS epidemic, in particular in the transmission among the community members.

Household transmission of SARS, 2003

In the 2003 outbreak in Toronto (in Ontario, Canada) of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), about 20% of cases resulted from household transmission. The purpose of our study was to determine characteristics associated with the transmission of SARS within households. A retrospective cohort of SARS-affected households was studied to determine risk factors for household transmission. Questionnaires addressed characteristics of the index case, the household and behaviours among household members. Potential risk factors for secondary transmission of infection were assessed in regression models appropriate to the outcome (secondary cases) and nonindependence of household members. The 74 households that participated included 18 secondary cases and 158 uninfected household members in addition to the 74 index cases. The household secondary attack rate was 10.2% (95% confidence interval [CI] 6.7%-23.5%). There was a linear association between the time the index patient spent at home after symptom onset and the secondary attack rate. Infected health care workers who were index cases had lower rates of household transmission. SARS transmission in households is complex and increases with the length of time an ill person spends at home. Risk of transmission was lower when the index case was a health care worker. Rapid case identification is the public health measure most useful in minimizing exposure in the home.

Effectiveness of handwashing in preventing SARS: a review

SummaryThis review examines the literature, including literature in Chinese, on the effectiveness of handwashing as an intervention against severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) transmission. Nine of 10 epidemiological studies reviewed showed that handwashing was protective against SARS when comparing infected cases and non‐infected controls in univariate analysis, but only in three studies was this result statistically significant in multivariate analysis. There is reason to believe that this is because most of the studies were too small. The evidence for the effectiveness of handwashing as a measure against SARS transmission in health care and community settings is suggestive, but not conclusive.

Pets in Voluntary Household Quarantine

Pets in Voluntary Household Quarantine

Environmental factors on the SARS epidemic: air temperature, passage of time and multiplicative effect of hospital infection

The study sought to identify factors involved in the emergence, prevention and elimination of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong during 11 March to 22 May 2003. A structured multiphase regression analysis was used to estimate the potential effects of weather, time and interaction effect of hospital infection. In days with a lower air temperature during the epidemic, the risk of increased daily incidence of SARS was 18.18-fold (95% confidence interval 5.6-58.8) higher than in days with a higher temperature. The total daily new cases might naturally decrease by an average of 2.8 patients for every 10 days during the epidemic. The multiplicative effect of infected hospital staff with patients in an intensive care unit (ICU) and the proportion of SARS patients in ICUs might respectively increase the risk of a larger SARS epidemic in the community. The provision of protective gear in hospitals was also a very important factor for the prevention of SARS infection. SARS transmission appeared to be dependent on seasonal temperature changes and the multiplicative effect of hospital infection. SARS also appeared to retreat naturally over time.

The Use of an Herbal Formula by Hospital Care Workers During the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Epidemic in Hong Kong to Prevent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Transmission, Relieve Influenza-Related Symptoms, and Improve Quality of Life: A Prospective Cohort Study

To investigate the efficacy of an herbal formula in the prevention of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) transmission among health care workers. The secondary objectives are to investigate quality of life (QOL) and symptomology changes among supplement users, and to evaluate the safety of this formula. Controlled clinical trial. Hong Kong during epidemic of SARS. Two cohorts of health care workers from 11 hospitals in Hong Kong, 1 using an herbal supplement for a 2-week period (n = 1063) and a control cohort comprising all other health care workers who did not receive the supplement (n = 36,111) were compared prospectively. Taking an herbal supplement for a 2-week period. SARS attack rates and changes in quality of life and influenza-like symptoms were also examined at three timepoints among herbal supplement users. None of the health care workers who used the supplement subsequently contracted SARS compared to 0.4% of the health care workers who did not use the supplement (p = 0.014). Improvements in influenza-like symptoms and quality of life measurements were also observed among herbal supplement users. Less than 2% reported minor adverse events. The results of this pilot study suggest that there is a good potential of using Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) supplements to prevent the spread of SARS.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly emerged infection that is caused by a previously unrecognized virus–a novel coronavirus designated as SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). From November 2002 to July 2003 the cumulative number of worldwide cases was >8000, with a mortality rate of close to 10%. The mortality has been higher in older patients and those with co-morbidities. SARS has been defined using clinical and epidemiological criteria and cases are considered laboratory-confirmed if SARS coronavirus is isolated, if antibody to SARS coronavirus is detected, or a polymerase chain reaction test by appropriate criteria is positive. At the time of writing (24 May 2004), no specific therapy has been recommended. A variety of treatments have been attempted, but there are no controlled data. Most patients have been treated throughout the illness with broad-spectrum antimicrobials, supplemental oxygen, intravenous fluids, and other supportive measures. Transmission of SARS is facilitated by close contact with patients with symptomatic infection. The majority of cases have been reported among healthcare providers and family members of SARS patients. Since SARS-CoV is contagious, measures for prevention center on avoidance of exposure, and infection control strategies for suspected cases and contacts. This includes standard precautions (hand hygiene), contact precautions (gowns, goggles, gloves) and airborne precautions (negative pressure rooms and high efficiency masks). In light of reports of new cases identified during the winter of 2003–4 in China, it seems possible that SARS will be an important cause of pneumonia in the future, and the screening of outpatients at risk for SARS may become part of the pneumonia evaluation.

Occupational Health Response to SARS

To the Editor: Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), an occupational disease risk for healthcare workers, warrants an occupational health response, as clearly described by Esswein et al. (1). Occupational health professionals played a role in the assessment of healthcare facilities in Taiwan and many other countries. For example, occupational health professionals were invited to perform audits in at least 2 hospitals in Singapore during the height of the crisis (2), and to conduct follow-up discussions with the hospital management. In addition to assessment of the industrial hygiene aspects, which included evaluating the ventilation modifications needed for effective infection control, temperature and humidity were significant factors affecting the use of protective gear in a tropical country like Singapore. The occupational health audits included site inspections and reviews of work processes of those areas where actual transmission of SARS had occurred and where triage of febrile patients was taking place. Other issues identified as requiring urgent attention were providing sufficient rest, shower, and changing facilities for staff, monitoring staff sickness absenteeism, and proactively managing staff mental health. Occupational health physicians subsequently served on hospital SARS debriefing committees that reviewed institutional shortcomings and recommended new measures for future outbreaks. An occupational health service unit headed by a trained occupational health physician was formed in 1 hospital. Other occupational groups, as well as healthcare workers, are also at potential risk. These groups may include the following: 1) food handlers, defined as persons who handle, kill, or sell food animals, and persons who prepare and serve food. (More than one third of the cases in China with onset of SARS before February 1, 2003, were in food handlers [3].); 2) public transportation workers and airline crew (4); and 3) laboratory workers handling samples or items contaminated with SARS-associated coronavirus (5). In Singapore, 2 taxi drivers were infected after ferrying SARS patients to healthcare facilities, and 1 Singapore Airlines cabin attendant came down with the infection after a flight with infected passengers on board. Occupationally acquired SARS infections have been documented in Singapore, Taiwan, and Beijing. Clearly, occupational health responses are needed in these occupational settings. The recognition of SARS as an occupational disease has broader implications. Depending on country legislation, persons who contract SARS while performing their work may be eligible for worker’s compensation. Employers would be obligated to provide a safe and healthy workplace for their employees.

Role of air distribution in SARS transmission during the largest nosocomial outbreak in Hong Kong

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is primarily transmitted by bio-aerosol droplets or direct personal contacts. This paper presents a detailed study of environmental evidence of possible airborne transmission in a hospital ward during the largest nosocomial SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in March 2003. Retrospective on-site inspections and measurements of the ventilation design and air distribution system were carried out on July 17, 2003. Limited on-site measurements of bio-aerosol dispersion were also carried out on July 22. Computational fluid dynamics simulations were performed to analyze the bio-aerosol dispersion in the hospital ward. We attempted to predict the air distribution during the time of measurement in July 2003 and the time of exposure in March 2003. The predicted bio-aerosol concentration distribution in the ward seemed to agree fairly well with the spatial infection pattern of SARS cases. Possible improvement to air distribution in the hospital ward was also considered. Our study revealed the need for the development of improved ventilation and air-conditioning systems in an isolation ward or a general hospital ward for infectious respiratory diseases. The outbreak in Ward 8A, which was in a general hospital and could house nearly 40 patients, demonstrated the cross-infection risks of respiratory infectious diseases in hospitals if a potential highly infectious patient was not identified and isolated. Our example simulation, which extended the SARS Busters' design for an isolation room to Ward 8A, demonstrated that there was room for improvement to minimize cross-infection in large general hospital wards.

Factors associated with transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome among health-care workers in Singapore.

Between 1 and 22 March 2003, a nosocomial outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred at the Communicable Disease Centre in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore, the national treatment and isolation facility for patients with SARS. A case-control study with 36 cases and 50 controls was conducted of factors associated with the transmission of SARS within the hospital. In univariate analysis, contact with respiratory secretions elevated the odds ratio to 6.9 (95 % CI 1.4-34.6, P= 0.02). Protection was conferred by hand washing (OR 0.06, 95% CI 0.007-0.5, P=0.03) and wearing of N95 masks (OR 0.1, 95% CI 0.03-0.4, P=0.001). Use of gloves and gowns had no effect. Multivariate analysis confirmed the strong role of contact with respiratory secretions (adjusted OR 21.8, 95 % CI 1.7 274.8, P=0.017). Both hand washing (adjusted OR 0.07, 95 % CI 0.008-0.66, P=0.02) and wearing of N95 masks (adjusted OR 0.1, 95% CI 0.02-0.86, P=0.04) remained strongly protective but gowns and gloves had no effect.

Public health measures to control the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto.

Toronto was the site of North America's largest outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). An understanding of the patterns of transmission and the effects on public health in relation to control measures that were taken will help health officials prepare for any future outbreaks. We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared. Toronto Public Health investigated 2132 potential cases of SARS, identified 23,103 contacts of SARS patients as requiring quarantine, and logged 316,615 calls on its SARS hotline. In Toronto, 225 residents met the case definition of SARS, and all but 3 travel-related cases were linked to the index patient, from Hong Kong. SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of Toronto's acute care hospitals. Unrecognized SARS among in-patients with underlying illness caused a resurgence, or a second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally controlled through active surveillance of hospitalized patients. In response to the control measures of Toronto Public Health, the number of persons who were exposed to SARS in nonhospital and nonhousehold settings dropped from 20 (13 percent) before the control measures were instituted (phase 1) to 0 afterward (phase 2). The number of patients who were exposed while in a hospital ward rose from 25 (17 percent) in phase 1 to 68 (88 percent) in phase 2, and the number exposed while in the intensive care unit dropped from 13 (9 percent) in phase 1 to 0 in phase 2. Community spread (the length of the chains of transmission outside of hospital settings) was significantly reduced in phase 2 of the outbreak (P<0.001). The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.

The Recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Epidemic – A Critical Review

Severe Acute Respiratory syndrome (SARS) took the world by storm in the later part of February 2003.It is a syndrome characterized by fever, cough, sore throat , shortness of breath and malaise which may deteriorate very rapidly to respiratory failure and death. The symptoms of SARS are quite similar to those of common cold, malaria and respiratory tract infections all of which are common in our environment. SARS, being a new disease, has as yet neither a definite diagnostic test nor treatment. With the international transmission of SARS first reported in March 2003, it became evident that one did not need to travel to contact the disease. Nigerians travel a lot and our fragile health care facilities may not be able to contain an outbreak of SARS. It is quite fortunate that the country's inadequate health care facilities did not have to face the challenge of a SARS outbreak. Despite this, it is important that necessary facilities be put in place in case of a sudden outbreak of SARS or similar epidemics in Nigeria. Key Words: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Epidemic, Review. Orient Journal of Medicine Vol.16(1) 2004: 26-32