Trait Self-knowledge Research Articles

Memories of me, memories of we: Trait self-knowledge, prototypical norms, and autobiographical memories

ABSTRACT To more fully understand the complex relationship between self-knowledge and significant autobiographical memories, two studies examined the degree to which agency and communion orientations were consistently represented across self-views and autobiographical memories, and measured the strength of these relationships in relation to prototypical thematic norms in autobiographical recall. Participants completed measures assessing agentic trait and communal trait self-knowledge in the laboratory and later wrote descriptions of six significant autobiographical memories. Results of two studies indicated that agentic trait and communal trait self-knowledge were positively associated with thematic content across memories; however, these associations were more pronounced for events in which the themes were consistent with prototypical thematic tendencies. The roles of trait self-knowledge, prototypical norms, and temporal aspects of the self-concept on significant autobiographical memories were discussed.

Do People Know What They’re Like in the Moment?

Knowing yourself requires knowing not only what you are like in general (trait self-knowledge) but also how your personality fluctuates from moment to moment (state self-knowledge). We examined this latter form of self-knowledge. Participants (248 people; 2,938 observations) wore the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), an unobtrusive audio recorder, and completed experience-sampling self-reports of their personality states four times each day for 1 week. We estimated state self-knowledge by comparing self-reported personality states with consensual observer ratings of personality states coded from the EAR files, which formed the criterion for what participants were “actually” like in the moment. People had self-insight into their momentary extraversion, conscientiousness, and likely neuroticism, suggesting that people can accurately detect fluctuations in some aspects of their personality. However, the evidence for self-insight was weaker for agreeableness. This apparent self-ignorance may be partly responsible for interpersonal problems and for blind spots in trait self-knowledge.

Identity in schizophrenia: A study of trait self-knowledge

Identity results from interlock of two systems which are a set of abstracted representations about oneself and a phenomenological self. Literature highlights identity disturbance in schizophrenia that affects each of both systems. In the same vein, the present study investigates the stability and the quality of traits self-knowledge, a component of abstracted representations of self, in schizophrenia patients. Sixty-eight patients with schizophrenia and 68 healthy control subjects completed a short version of a personality scale (LABEL). This scale is composed of two versions (A and B), each comprising 50 adjectives that correspond to synonymous adjectives in the alternate list. Participants indicated how these adjectives described themselves and completed both versions of the scale on two separate occasions, one month apart. The findings showed that schizophrenic patients presented an unstable identity and change in identity quality compared with healthy subjects. However, this identity disturbance was weaker than expected. These results are discussed in a part of autobiographical memory disturbances in schizophrenia, illness duration and the decompensation stage.

Facets of Self in Schizophrenia

Disturbance of self is a core feature of schizophrenia. In this article, we argue that a nuanced appreciation of self is necessary to understand the relation between the self and its disruption. After discussing evidence for the fractionation of self into several functionally independent yet normally interacting systems of knowledge, we focus on a specific self-system: trait self-knowledge. This system has proven robust in the presence of a host of cognitive and neural impairments rendering other systems of self dysfunctional. Little, however, is known about how this system is affected by schizophrenia. Our findings indicate that, in accord with previous investigations demonstrating the resilience of trait self-knowledge, schizophrenic patients maintain both highly reliable and moderately accurate trait self-knowledge.

Klein and Loftus's model of trait self-knowledge: the importance of familiarizing oneself with the foundational research prior to reading about its neuropsychological applications

This article has two goals. First, I want to respond to concerns voiced by Ruby (2013). Since these concerns are not limited to Ruby, they provide an opportunity to address the issues she raises for a broad audience of neuroscientists. Second, and related to my first goal, I want to alert investigators who are familiar only with our neuropsychological investigations of self-knowledge to our earlier work on model construction. A familiarity with this foundational research can help avert concerns and issues likely to arise if one is aware only of neuropsychological extensions of our work.

Memory and Self-knowledge in Young Adults with ADHD

Memory for items encoded self-referentially was examined in college students with Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In Study 1, memory was assessed using the standard self-reference effect (SRE) paradigm—which requires participants to access semantic trait self-knowledge to perform self-referential encoding (e.g., Klein, 2004). ADHD and control groups produced virtually identical SRE profiles: (a) better recall following self-referential encoding than following either semantic or structural encoding; and (b) greater-than-chance clustering in recall of words encoded self-referentially. In Study 2 the self-referential task was altered—its performance required access to personal events in episodic memory (e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989). The ADHD group differed from controls in two ways: (a) they recalled significantly fewer words in the self-referential condition; and (b) their clustering of words encoded self-referentially failed to exceed chance levels. These results suggest the ADHD participants have less well-organized personal narratives than do persons without ADHD, a finding with relevance for memory and planning difficulties documented in people with ADHD.

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

This paper explores the question of what the self is by reviewing research conducted with both normal and neuropsychological participants. Findings converge on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than some previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. In the process of reviewing neuropsychological findings, an unexpected result emerges: trait self-knowledge appears unusually robust with respect to neural and cognitive damage that render other aspects of self-knowledge dysfunctional in varying degrees.

Reflections on the Self: A Case Study of a Prosopagnosic Patient

We examined the ability of a patient suffering from Prosopagnosia—an impairment of face recognition following neurological damage—to draw accurate trait inferences from faces of persons he knows but fails to recognize. Although not reliably greater than chance when judging the faces of well-known others, his trait ratings achieved considerable accuracy when the face judged was his. We examine several explanations designed to account for this dissociation without having to invoke preferential activation of trait self-knowledge, but each is found lacking. We conclude that self-knowledge can be activated by presentation of face cues even in the absence of overt identification. Implications of these findings for mirror self-recognition as a means of detecting the onset of self-knowledge are discussed.

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: Commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.

Preserved Knowledge of Self in a Case of Alzheimer's Dementia

We report the case of K. R., an individual with Alzheimer's dementia. Although K. R. has difficulty retrieving even mundane facts about the world, she has accurate knowledge of her own personality. But the self she knows is out-of-date. K. R.'s inability to update her trait self-knowledge stands in contrast to other neuropsychological cases in which individuals can acquire and update their fund of personality knowledge despite impairments to semantic and episodic memory. Results add to the growing body of literature suggesting that semantic memory contains a subsystem devoted to the acquisition and representation of trait self-knowledge.

Trait as default: extraversion, subjective well-being, and the distinction between neutral and positive events.

On the basis of prior work suggesting that trait self-knowledge serves a "fill-in" function when event-specific information is missing (M.D. Robinson & G. L. Clore, 2002a), we sought to demonstrate that extraversion is a more reliable predictor of subjective well-being (SWB) judgments among certain individuals than among others. Four studies involving a total of 260 participants revealed that the extraversion-SWB relation was relatively weaker among those quick to appreciate the distinction between neutral and positive events in a choice reaction-time task; by contrast, it was stronger among those slow to recognize this distinction. The findings suggest that extraversion scales measure (among other things) beliefs about SWB that differentially contribute to judgments among those less capable of making evaluative distinctions at encoding.

The Role of Episodic and Semantic Memory in the Development of Trait Self-Knowledge

Research by Klein and Loftus (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993a, 1993c) has suggested that the development of trait self-knowledge follows a particular sequence. When people have performed relatively few trait-relevant behaviors, their trait knowledge is represented episodically; but as their trait-relevant behaviors increase, they begin to abstract trait knowledge from behavioral episodes and represent it in semantic form. The present research updates this model by showing that even when trait-relevant experience is low, semantic knowledge of one's traits is available and it can serve as the basis for trait self-judgments.

Self-knowledge of an amnesic patient: Toward a neuropsychology of personality and social psychology.

The authors present the case of W.J., who, as a result of a head injury, temporarily lost access to her episodic memory. W.J. was asked both during her amnesia and following its resolution to make trait judgments about herself. Because her responses when she could access episodic memories were consistent with her responses when she could not, the authors conclude that the loss of episodic memory did not greatly affect the availability of her trait self-knowledge. The authors discuss how neuropsychological evidence can contribute to theorizing about personality and social processes.

The Role of Summary and Specific Behavioral Memories in Trait Judgments about the Self

In a recent series of studies, Klein and Loftus and their colleagues have shown that trait judgments about the self are uninfluenced by the prior retrieval of trait-relevant behavioral memories. In this article, two types of behavioral memories are distinguished-specific and summary. A study is reported that, in contrast to the authors' earlier studies examining the effect of specific behavioral memories, shows that retrieval of summary behavioral memories does affect subsequent judgments of a trait's self-descriptiveness. The implications of the distinction between spears and summary behavioral memories for models of trait self-knowledge are discussed.