Tradition Of Virtue Ethics Research Articles

What Good Are We Seeking? Child Soldiers and Thick Ethical Concepts

In this paper, I show how a virtue ethics approach to child soldiering is centered on thick ethical concepts that seek to capture in a descriptively and evaluatively rich way how child soldiering affects children’s moral character development and their relationships with others. Virtue ethics thus provides a new perspective that departs from the standard ethical approach, which focuses largely on thin questions of the rights and responsibilities of children in war. The virtue ethics tradition reorients us toward a deeper concern for children’s moral good and thus provides an important and underexplored approach for thinking about child soldiers from an interdisciplinary perspective.

“And I Believe in Signs”: Soviet Secularity and Islamic Tradition in Kyrgyzstan

AbstractIn Central Asia, the Soviet state had destroyed most Islamic institutions by the late 1930s, which gradually alienated millions of Soviet Muslims from the basics of Islamic theology and key Islamic practices of virtue cultivation, including the five daily prayers (namaz), Islamic ethics of dressing (like covering certain parts of the body), and certain lifestyle prescriptions (such as the avoidance of alcohol, gambling, and premarital sex). As a result, mainstream Islam in Central Asia came to revolve around the main Islamic life-cycle rites (i.e., male circumcision, the marriage ceremony, and funeral prayer) and occasional practices of uttering blessings, reciting short Qur’anic verses for the souls of the deceased, and visiting shrines, among others. Although more than thirty years have passed since the fall of the USSR, this non-observant form of Islam remains widespread in the region. Inquiring into the conceptual and affective aspects of Soviet forced secularization in Central Asia, I make two interrelated interventions into secularism studies and the anthropology of Islam. First, I theorize Soviet secularism through attending to the modern state’s aspiration to transcend and transform the particularities of lived traditions, which reveals significant overlaps between communist and liberal modes of statecraft and subject formation. Second, reflecting on a non-observant form of Islam in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, I ask: what remains of a tradition of virtue ethics when its modes of abstract reasoning and virtue cultivation have all but vanished?

Proposing an Islamic virtue ethics beyond the situationist debates

ABSTRACT I begin the first part by showing how situationism should make us question traditional understandings of virtues as intrinsic dispositions. I concentrate specifically on situationist experiments related to mood. I then introduce Islamic virtue ethics and the dawa movement. In parts two and three I examine ethnography of the dawa movement to explore how they deal with worries about the influence of mood on their virtue. In part two I show how they train their habits in very traditional virtue ethics ways in order to be more resilient when faced with virtue-diminishing affective situations. In part three I show how the situation, rather than hindering practitioners, is recruited into helping these women achieve piety. I conclude, in part four, by showing the dawa movement's creative use of the Islamic veil as a way to help these women deal with the objection that one cannot avoid all bad situations. Going beyond social psychological experiments, I examine two methodological sources not found in situationist debates. First, I argue for ethnography as an empirical method through which to study virtue. I draw on ethnography of the Islamic women's dawa movement. Secondly, the work in the philosophy of mind on ‘affective scaffolding’.

‘Good Sport’: Different Dimensions and Their Constitutive Properties From the Ontological and Moral Point of View

Abstract This paper deals with the question “What is Good Sport?”. It aims to enrich previous discussions of the issue by offering a systematic and comprehensive account of good sport, which is missing in the existing literature. The topic is analysed from the ontological and moral point of view. This project builds primarily on moral realism with an emphasis on objective moral values (Spaemann), traditional virtue ethics (Plato, Aristotle) as applied in sport (Pisk, Feezell), and the conceptions of relevant modern philosophers concerned with the ontology of sport (Suits, Fraleigh, Kretchmar, Butcher, Schneider, Jirásek, and others). I maintain that good sport involves various dimensions that need to be distinguished in order to analyse the concept properly. These are good sport as an activity, as an attitude, as an environment (culture), and as fandom. The primary task of this paper is to describe the most relevant properties of good sport in the first three dimensions, indicate their authors/supporters in the tradition of the philosophy of sport, and offer reasons why these properties are constitutive of good sport. I do not aim to analyse each property in detail, but to outline the general framework of good sport. The final classification of properties is analysed in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. I draw mainly from philosophy of sport literature written in English and from key figures in the tradition.

Technology, Virtue and the Good Life: Between Production and Consumption


 
 
 This paper explores recent developments in the virtue ethics approach to human flourishing in technological societies. I discuss the merits of virtue ethics in a broader context of various philosophies of technology. I propose that a distinction can be made between two broad approaches to the question of the good life and technology: the production approach that focuses on the roles technologies could and do play in production for the elimination of various forms of labour and the consumption approach that focuses on the role of technology in everyday social settings and interactions outside the workplace. Finding that the virtue ethics approach currently remains almost exclusively focused on consumption, I conclude the article with a suggestion for how virtue theory can be advanced beyond consumption using the resources of the same virtue ethics tradition.
 
 

Malleable character: organizational behavior meets virtue ethics and situationism

This paper introduces a body of research on Organizational Behavior and Industrial/Organizational Psychology (OB/IO) that expands the range of empirical evidence relevant to the ongoing character-situation debate. This body of research, mostly neglected by moral philosophers, provides important insights to move the debate forward. First, the OB/IO scholarship provides empirical evidence to show that social environments like organizations have significant power to shape the character traits of their members. This scholarship also describes some of the mechanisms through which this process of reshaping character takes place. Second, the character-situation debate has narrowly focused on situational influences that affect behavior episodically and haphazardly. The OB/IO research, however, highlights the importance of distinguishing such situational influences from influences that, like organizational influences, shape our character traits because they are continuous and coordinated. Third, the OB/IO literature suggests that most individuals display character traits that, while local to the organization, can be consistent across situations. This puts pressure on the accounts of character proposed by traditional virtue ethics and situationism and provides empirical support to interactionist models based on cognitive-affective processing system theories of personality (CAPS). Finally, the OB/IO literature raises important challenges to the possibility of achieving virtue, provides valuable and untapped resources to cultivate character, and suggests new avenues of normative and empirical research.

The Matter of Virtue: Women's Ethical Action from Chaucer to Shakespeare

The Matter of Virtue: Women's Ethical Action from Chaucer to Shakespeare

Can Robotic AI Systems Be Virtuous and Why Does This Matter?

The growing use of social robots in times of isolation refocuses ethical concerns for Human–Robot Interaction and its implications for social, emotional, and moral life. In this article we raise a virtue-ethics-based concern regarding deployment of social robots relying on deep learning AI and ask whether they may be endowed with ethical virtue, enabling us to speak of “virtuous robotic AI systems”. In answering this question, we argue that AI systems cannot genuinely be virtuous but can only behave in a virtuous way. To that end, we start from the philosophical understanding of the nature of virtue in the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition, which we take to imply the ability to perform (1) the right actions (2) with the right feelings and (3) in the right way. We discuss each of the three requirements and conclude that AI is unable to satisfy any of them. Furthermore, we relate our claims to current research in machine ethics, technology ethics, and Human–Robot Interaction, discussing various implications, such as the possibility to develop Autonomous Artificial Moral Agents in a virtue ethics framework.

The Book of Proverbs and Virtue Ethics: Integrating the Biblical and Philosophical Traditions. By Arthur Jan Keefer

While the resources of the virtue tradition inform explorations of Proverbs’ moral vision, recent ethical investigations of Proverbs suggest that virtue ethics alone cannot deliver the ‘goods’ of adequate moral understanding of the document. Socratic and Aristotelian brands of virtue ethics may serve as valuable heuristic guides that reveal aspects of Proverbs’ moral vision. The document’s complex moral discourse, however, cannot be reduced to either species of the virtue tradition. Arthur Keefer’s monograph clarifies why this is the case. Moving beyond general comparisons between Proverbs and different streams of the virtue tradition, Keefer attends to historical, conceptual, and theological factors that framed and funded the moral visions articulated by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Proverbs. Attention to these contextual factors illuminates the ethical concepts and aims of each, facilitating a constructive dialogue. And this dialogue reveals that, while Proverbs participates in and contributes to the virtue tradition, it represents a tradition of virtue ethics in its own right.

A personalist approach to business ethics: New perspectives for virtue ethics and servant leadership

AbstractThis article has a twofold purpose: first, it explores how Leonardo Polo's personalist anthropology enriches and enhances neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics and second, it highlights how this specific personalist approach brings new perspectives to servant leadership. The recently revived neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition finds that MacIntyre's scholarship significantly contributes to virtue ethics in business—particularly his conception of practices, institutions, and internal/external goods. However, we argue that some of his latest insights about the virtues of acknowledged dependence and human vulnerability remain underdeveloped because of the underlying anthropology that neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics relies on. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Polo's transcendental anthropology as a possible foundation of a personalist approach that enriches virtue ethics. To do so, we address how transcendental anthropology can enrich two central aspects of virtue ethics, namely (1) the understanding of human beings and their flourishing and (2) the relationship of virtue to praxis and human work. Finally, to address the practical implications for business leadership and work that can derive from assuming transcendental anthropology, we address how servant leadership acquires a new perspective in light of this personalism and its logic of gift, highlighting interpersonal self‐giving as a way of service.

Análise de Escalas e Medidas de Virtudes Morais: Uma Revisão Sistemática

ABSTRACT Objective: to investigate how scales for the concept of moral virtues are constructed and measured, in studies associated with business ethics and the tradition of virtue ethics. Methods: a systematic literature review was conducted to select empirical articles on moral virtues that design or apply scales. Based on search, selection, and analysis criteria, five databases were consulted, and 37 papers were selected, with subsequent analysis of the scales development and measurement procedure (items, sample, factor analysis) and emerging factors. Results: the study gathers scales of multiple moral virtues (19) and of specific virtues (18), showing limitations in the generation of items, and in the item-sample proportion in some scales, as well as theoretical contributions in leadership and relationship strengthening, making a theoretical and methodological discussion in the light of the assumptions of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Conclusions: the article intends to contribute to a better understanding of moral virtues in management, by discussing the scales from the unity of virtues and the phronesis-moral virtues connection, with implications for human behavior and business ethics. Procedures are recommended for future qualitative and quantitative studies in new research contexts.

Charakter (Character)

The lexeme Charakter denotes the set of innate or acquired dispositions that make an individual or a nation distinctive, determine its behaviour, and give it psychological and moral strength. Charakter plays a central role in Goethe’s moral psychology and his ethical thought in general, as well as in his thinking on culture. His psychological and ethical thought is notoriously hard to classify or to align with the main traditions of European thought. His concern with Charakter could be said to belong to the broad classical tradition of virtue ethics, in the sense that Goethe placed moral character at the heart of ethics. However, in contrast to the classical tradition of virtue ethics, which holds that both the rational and the non-rational parts of humans contribute to a virtuous character, and that virtues can be conceptualized clearly, Goethe resists the claims of reason on our moral character. His early writings on culture and the drama Egmont have a Rousseauian flavour: Charakter represents a natural force that is endangered by civilization. After the French Revolution and in opposition to the emergence of liberalism, Goethe came to see Charakter as a political resource that was superior to political rationality. In his most sustained engagements with philosophical ethics—his essays on Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1805) and Isaac Newton (1810)—Goethe argues, in deliberate opposition to Kant, that natural Charakter has at least as much ethical force as reason and that naturalistic descriptions of human behaviour are at least as valid as moral ones. Moreover, Charakter has the advantage of leading us by a more direct and reliable route to morally good outcomes. In this sense, it can be said without risk of exaggeration that Charakter displaces rationality in Goethe’s ethical thought.

In Search of Buddhist Virtue: A Case for a Pluralist-Gradualist Moral Philosophy

Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness (sati) and loving-kindness (metta) to faith (saddhā) and wisdom (paññā). Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: (1) the components of ethical conduct (sīla), (2) the 37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā), and (3) the wholesome (kusala) or beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (cetasika). I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well (eudaimonia) in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory.

Disability and the Complexity of Choice in the Ethics of Abortion and Voluntary Euthanasia

Abstract In the polarized debates about abortion and voluntary euthanasia, disability advocates, who normally align with left-wing social forces, have tended to side with conservative and religious voices in expressing concerns about the impact of technological and sociopolitical developments on disabled futures. This paper draws on the social model of disability and the virtue ethics tradition to explain the alignment between the religious and disability perspectives, and the theory of transformative choice to highlight the limits and biases of the pro-choice logic. Yet, it also recognizes the inherent contradiction of disabled advocates taking a paternalistic position against the personal agency of women and people facing terminal illnesses. A disability perspective serves the discussion of abortion and euthanasia as an encouragement to work together for the building of a society that enables people with diverse disabilities to exist and flourish, and helps pregnant women, people facing disabling and terminal illnesses, and politicians and social influencers to make informed choices.

THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL VIEW

<span lang="EN-US">Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics</span>

Northeast Asian Modern Martial Arts: An Embodied Synthesis of Virtue Ethics and Deontology

Moral philosophy has been dominated by three traditions: virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. This paper challenges two common assumptions behind these ethical outlooks: their place of origin (the West) and their location of ethical conduct (the mind). Grounded in the broader comparative philosophical perspective, the paper draws on the Asian martial arts to advance the argument for the ‘moral philosophy of the body’. Asian martial arts can thus be conceived of as a synthesized moral tradition of virtue ethics and deontology, and this synthesis is arrived at through embodied practices rather than rational contemplation.

The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.

Reclaiming Dialogical Humanism

ABSTRACT In face of the danger that contemporary anti-humanisms might feed xenophobia, racism, and neo-fascist nationalisms, the ethical significance of shared humanity is worth affirming. Such affirmations need not displace more particular identities and loyalties, so long as these take forms capable of mutual respect and recognition. Late 18th- and early nineteenth-century German reflection on Bildung can be fruitfully engaged toward this task. With deep roots in earlier Christian humanism and the Aristotelian virtue-ethical tradition, the Bildung tradition assumed the political task of forming persons capable of taking an active role in defining the terms of their lives in community. At the same time, this tradition was also complicit in the advancement of white racism and colonialist empire. Why draw water from these poisoned wells? Because we move forward only through open-eyed critique of the past, through naming the injustices and silencings woven through past imaginings of the universally human.

Virtue Ethics for Responsible Innovation

Governments and companies are increasingly promoting and organizing Responsible Innovation. It is, however, unclear how the seemingly incompatible demands for responsibility, which is associated with care and caution, can be harmonized with demands for innovation, which is associated with risk-taking and speed. We turn to the tradition of virtue ethics and argue that it can be a strong accomplice to Responsible Innovation by focussing on the agential side of innovation. Virtue ethics offers an adequate response to the epistemic and moral complexity in innovation and encourages moral behaviour. We enumerate a number of virtues that people involved in Responsible Innovation would need to cultivate both related to responsibility, such as justice, anticipation, civility and inclusion, and virtues related to innovation, such as courage, dedication, curiosity and creativity. We put forward practical wisdom (phronesis) as a key virtue to regulate relevant virtues and to deal with the tension between responsibility and innovation. Practical wisdom helps an agent to find an appropriate mean in exercising and expressing the other virtues—where the mean is relative to the specific context of action and the role and abilities of the agent.

The ethos of business students

AbstractBusiness schools are the “nurseries” of the corporate world. This article offers an empirical analysis of the business student ethos on the basis of research conducted at three Dutch universities. A theoretical framework in the tradition of virtue ethics and dubbed “moral ethology” is used to identify the values business schools convey to their students. The central research question is: What types of ethos do Dutch business students have? Forty‐three undergraduate students participated in Q‐methodological research, a mixed qualitative–quantitative small‐sample method. Five different types of ethos were generated: Do‐Good Managers, Market Managers, Searching Managers, Balancing Managers, and Radical Market Managers. Some general characteristics that apply to all the types of ethos were identified, such as the search for efficiency. It is argued that business schools should pay much more attention to the values that are endorsed in both life and business and should help students to address situations in which values are neglected.