Trade Reporting And Compliance Engine Research Articles

Bond Market Transparency and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

ABSTRACT Utilizing the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) setting as an exogenous shock to bond market transparency, we find that improved bond market transparency leads to lower crash risk in the stock market, consistent with increased information spillover from the bond market into the stock market. Results from the Path analysis suggest that bond market transparency affects stock price crash risk not only directly, but also indirectly through its effects on management guidance, analyst forecasts, and media reports. We also find that the mitigation effect of bond market transparency on stock price crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher default risk bonds, lower institutional stock ownership, and more opaque financial reporting. Overall, our findings suggest that increased bond market transparency following TRACE generates a positive externality in reducing crash risk in the stock market. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; G24.

Computing corporate bond returns: a word (or two) of caution

AbstractWe offer several suggestions for researchers using corporate bond return data. First, despite clear instructions from older papers (e.g., Bessembinder et al., The Review of Financial Studies 22:4219–4258, 2009) about ways to compute credit excess returns, a lot of recent research simply subtracts a Treasury Bill return. We show that this imprecision is likely to contaminate inferences, as the rate component of returns is negatively correlated to the spread component. This is a problem for all research looking at corporate bond returns, especially time series analysis and safer corporate bonds (e.g., investment grade). We provide a simple approach using Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) data to remove the interest rate component of corporate bond returns. Second, we note significant differences in the coverage of corporate bonds across the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) platform and typical corporate bond indices. We provide some simple rules for researchers who are using TRACE to select a subset of bonds closest to those contained inside corporate bond indices used by institutional investors. Third, we note differential quality in the prices and hence returns between TRACE and typical corporate bond indices. Corporate bond returns provided by corporate bond indices (i) correctly estimate credit excess returns, (ii) are synchronous for the entire set of bonds, allowing for consistent cross-sectional comparability, and (iii) suffer less from stale pricing issues. Due to these coverage and data quality issues, researchers should try, where possible, to source return data from multiple sources to ensure the robustness of their results.

Trading and liquidity in the catastrophe bond market

AbstractWe provide first insights into secondary market trading, liquidity determinants, and the liquidity premium of catastrophe bonds. Based on transaction data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), we find that cat bonds are traded less frequently during the hurricane season and more often close to maturity. Trading activity indicates that the market is dominated by brokers without a proprietary inventory. Liquidity is high in periods of high trading activity in the overall market and for bonds with low default risk or close to maturity, which results from lower order processing costs. Finally, using realized bid–ask spreads as a liquidity measure, we find that on average, 21% of the observable yield spread on the cat bond market is attributable to the liquidity premium, with a magnitude of up to 141 bps for high‐risk bonds.

Price Discovery in the U.S. Treasury Cash Market: On Principal Trading Firms and Dealers

We explore the following question: does the trading activity of registered dealers on Treasury interdealer broker (IDB) platforms differ from that of principal trading firms (PTF), and if so, how and to what effect on market liquidity? To do so, we use a novel dataset that combines Treasury cash transaction reports from FINRA’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) and publicly available limit order book data from BrokerTec. We find that trades conducted in a limit order book setting have high permanent price impact when a PTF is the passive party, playing the role of liquidity provider. Conversely, we find that dealer trades have higher price impact when the dealer is the aggressive party, playing the role of liquidity taker. Trades in which multiple firms (whether dealers or PTFs) participate on one or both sides, however, have relatively low price impact. We interpret these results in light of theoretical models suggesting that traders with only a “small” informational advantage prefer to use (passive) limit orders, while traders with a comparatively large informational advantage prefer to use (aggressive) market orders. We also analyze the events that occurred in Treasury markets in March 2020, during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The default and liquidity premia of corporate bonds: evidence from the trade reporting and compliance engine

ABSTRACT This study combines information in the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), the most extensive bond database, with other fixed income data sets in order to quantify the default and liquidity premia in a reduced form framework at the bond level. The results show that the default premium is two to three times as large as the liquidity premium, and the liquidity term structure is not decreasing in the time to maturity.

Principal Trading Firm Activity in Treasury Cash Markets

This FEDS Note aims to share insights on Treasury cash transactions reported in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)'s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). Following earlier joint FEDS Notes and Liberty Street Economics blog posts that examined aggregate trading volume in the Treasury cash market across venues and security types, this post sheds light on the trading activity of Principal Trade Firms (PTFs) and other market participants that are not registered broker-dealer members of FINRA.

Fixed Income Market Structure: Treasuries vs. Agency MBS

This FEDS Note analyzes the structure of the agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market through the lens of the TRACE Treasury data initiative, which is a significant component of a broader inter-agency effort to enhance understanding and transparency of the Treasury securities market. As in several previous FEDS Notes describing the Treasury cash market structure, this note uses transactions reported to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)'s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to examine aggregate trading volumes in the agency MBS market across venues, security types and participants. We show how agency MBS provide a useful counterfactual to cash Treasuries when analyzing the evolution of Treasury cash market structure and its implications for liquidity. We provide evidence that the participation of Principal Trading Firms (PTFs) in Treasury markets has caused the overall volume of intermediation to rise there, particularly in the interdealer broker (IDB) venue. We also find that, relative to Treasury markets, intermediation in the agency MBS market is concentrated among fewer firms, and in particular the primary dealers, suggesting that PTF participation in Treasury markets has diversified intermediation in the IDB venue across a larger number of firms.

Unlocking the Treasury Market through TRACE

This joint FEDS Note and Liberty Street Economics blog post from staff at the Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank of New York aims to share initial insights on the Treasury cash transactions data reported to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)'s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).

IMPACT OF NEW DEBT OFFERINGS ON EXISTING CORPORATE BONDHOLDERS

AbstractCorporate bondholders may be concerned about the value of their bonds when the firm issues more bonds. Using bond data from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) from 2005 to 2017, we study the impact of new bond issues and relative maturity on the price of existing bonds. We find negative and significant average abnormal returns for existing bonds over a three‐day event window. Consistent with the adverse consequences of relative maturity of the new issuance, existing bond market returns are more strongly negative when the newly issued bonds mature before existing bonds. A funded debt covenant attenuates the negative return.

Liquidity Risk and Corporate Risk-Taking

We construct a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of liquidity risk, in the secondary corporate debt market, on corporate risk-taking preferences. Using closed-form solutions, our model shows that equity holders choose to adopt high-risk projects upon the arrival of illiquidity shocks. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker fundamentals. Empirically, we confirm the positive relationship between liquidity risk and corporate risk-taking. We also document that the impact of liquidity risk on corporate risk-taking preferences is more pronounced for smaller firms and firms with lower profits and higher rollover risk. In addition, we use the introduction of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) as a natural exogenous liquidity shock and find a decrease of firms’ risk-taking preferences after the TRACE is implemented. Our findings shed light on the managerial behavior literature, which shows that the frictions of the secondary bond market have a real impact on firms’ risk-taking behaviors.

A causal link between bond liquidity and stock returns

I investigate the causal relationship between bond liquidity and stock returns. An improvement in bond liquidity can positively impact stock returns by reducing funding costs and improving profitability. To investigate this effect, I construct a natural experiment around the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). I find a 2.2% cumulative average abnormal equity return for firms that appeared in TRACE on the first dissemination date (July 1, 2002). Moreover, average abnormal returns are significantly related to the improvement in bond liquidity, the probability of informed trading, leverage, growth opportunities, and propensity to access corporate debt.

Transparency and Liquidity in the Structured Product Market

We use a unique data set from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to study liquidity effects in the U.S. structured product market. Our main contribution is the analysis of the relation between accuracy in measuring liquidity and the level of detail of the trading data employed. We find evidence that, in general, liquidity measures that use dealer-specific information can be efficiently proxied by means of measures that use less detailed information. However, when the level of trading activity in individual securities or overall market activity is low, measures based on more detailed trading data permit a more precise assessment of liquidity. These results provide us with a better understanding of the information contained in disseminated OTC trading data, in general.

Do You See What I See? Transparency and Bond Issuing Costs

Using the staggered implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) as a natural experiment, we show that bonds issued in a transparent environment receive higher prices (or equivalently pay lower yield spreads to benchmark US treasury bonds) relative to control bonds issued in the opaque, pre-TRACE environment. The yield spread on a typical pre-TRACE issuance of 132bps falls by 12bps following implementation of TRACE. We do not detect a significant effect on underpricing or fees and expenses paid in the issuing process. The main driver of the reduction in the cost of capital for bond issuers is the mitigation of information asymmetry rather than improved liquidity in the secondary market.

Informed trading around acquisitions: Evidence from corporate bonds

This paper examines the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds prior to takeover announcements. We find significant pre-announcement trading activities and price movements in target bonds, in directions consistent with the nature of pending information. Improved transparency in the bond markets achieved by the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system reduces the incidence of informed trading. Further, there is some weak evidence that dealers affiliated with merger and acquisition advisors sell in anticipation of negative news, pointing to a possible channel of information leakage. Such negative news seems to be incorporated into bond prices no slower than into the target stocks.

Does Bond Liquidity Affect Equity Returns

I investigate the causal relationship between bond liquidity and stock returns. An improvement in bond liquidity can positively impact stock returns by decreasing the cost of capital and improving profitability. To investigate this effect, I construct a natural experiment around the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). I find a 2.2% cumulative average abnormal equity return for firms that appeared in TRACE on the first dissemination date (July 1, 2002). Moreover, average abnormal returns are significantly related to the improvement in bond liquidity and probability of informed trading in the cross-section.

Liquidity, Transparency and Disclosure in the Securitized Product Market

We use a unique data set from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to study liquidity effects in the US structured product market. Our main contribution is the analysis of the relation between the accuracy in measuring liquidity and the potential degree of disclosure. We provide evidence that transaction cost measures that use dealer-specific information can be efficiently proxied by measures that use less detailed information. In addition, we analyze liquidity, in general, and show that securities that are mainly institutionally traded, guaranteed by a federal authority, or have low credit risk, tend to be more liquid.

Corporate Bond Liquidity and Determinants of Credit Spread Changes

This paper reexamines determinants of changes in the corporate bond yield spread, using transaction-based data on prices of US corporate bonds from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) over the period 2002-2009. We identify a new liquidity measure that has a significant and robust power in explaining corporate bond spread changes and more importantly that outperforms the existing corporate bond liquidity measures. We also show that the explanatory power of liquidity is actually reduced in the crisis period once credit risk is controlled for.

Selected FINRA notices and disciplinary actions, October‐December 2011

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to provide summaries of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regulatory notices and disciplinary actions issued in October, November, and December 2011.Design/methodology/approachThe paper provides Regulatory Notice 11‐49, October 2011, Advertising Regulation; Regulatory Notice 11‐52, November 2011, Senior Designations; Regulatory Notice 11‐54, November 2011, Branch Office Inspections; and the description of one disciplinary action in which a firm was sanctioned and an individual fined.FindingsNotice 11‐49: to inform firms of recent developments regarding the application of rules governing communications with the public, FINRA is proving guidance to firms on communication with the public regarding exchange‐traded products, treasury inflation‐protected securities (TIPS), use of “FINRA” in firm trademarks, and identification of related prior filings when submitting new filings for review. Notice 11‐52: FINRA reminds firms of their supervisory obligations regarding the use of certifications and designations that imply expertise, certification, training or specialty in advising senior investors. Notice 11‐54: FINRA and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations provide broker‐dealer firms with information on developing effective policies and procedures for branch office inspections and remind firms of supervisory requirements under FINRA's supervision rule and notes common deficiencies and strong compliance practices. Trade Reporting Notice on TRACE Reporting Issues: FINRA answers selected member firm detailed questions on reporting issues related to The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), the vehicle developed by FINRA to facilitate the mandatory reporting of over the counter secondary market transactions in eligible fixed income securities. All broker/dealers who are FINRA member firms have an obligation to report transactions in corporate bonds to TRACE under an SEC approved set of rules.Originality/valueThese are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends.

New Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Spread Changes

This paper reexamines determinants of changes in the corporate bond yield spread, using transaction-based data on prices of US corporate bonds from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) over the period 2002-2009. We identify a new liquidity measure that has a significant and robust power in explaining corporate bond spread changes and more importantly that outperforms the existing corporate bond liquidity measures. We also show that once credit risk is controlled for, the explanatory power of liquidity is actually reduced in the crisis period, especially for financial firms. On the other hand, we find that the impact of credit risk variables increases substantially for both industrial and financial firms in the periods of crisis. Still, credit risk and liquidity variables together can explain only 35-40% of credit spread changes. As such, the puzzle documented by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) is still a puzzle.

Missing the marks? Dispersion in corporate bond valuations across mutual funds

We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporate bonds by different mutual funds. Such dispersion is related to bond-specific characteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) could have contributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample period, though other factors most likely played roles. Further tests reveal marking patterns to be consistent with returns smoothing behavior by managers. Funds with ambiguous marking policies and those holding “hard-to-mark” bonds appear more prone to smooth reported returns. From a regulatory perspective, we see little downside to requiring funds to explicitly state their marking standards.