Tournament Incentives Research Articles

Follow the gaze: How social attention shapes gendered trading choices

We explore how visual attention differentially impacts the trading behavior of men and women. In the laboratory, eye-tracking technology measures information gaze during a sequential trading game in which participants are asked to buy or sell an asset. Before making a decision, traders receive information on the trading decisions of other participants (others' decisions) and the redemption value of the asset (private information). Research documents that women, compared to men, pay more attention to social cues. In this study, women are more attention-driven when making financial decisions, as compared to men. We conclude that attentional priority is a cognitive mechanism that can account for the increased tendency of women, compared to men, to follow the social cues of others with disparate information and tournament incentives.

Do CEOs' Industry Tournament Incentives Affect Stock Liquidity?

ABSTRACTResearch Question/IssueWe examine the relationship between CEOs' industry tournament incentives (CITI) and stock liquidity in the United States. We also examine if the effect of CITI on stock liquidity varies depending on the information‐asymmetry and corporate governance mechanisms.Research Findings/InsightsWe find that firms with stronger CITI are associated with greater stock liquidity. Exploiting the enforceability of executive noncompetition agreements across the states in the United States as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that firms headquartered in states that introduce these agreements on average experience lower stock liquidity, suggesting a causal relation. We also find that the effect of CITI on stock liquidity is stronger among firms with severe information‐asymmetry problems, but weaker among firms with strong governance mechanisms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe extend research that examines the impacts of CEO industry tournament incentives on corporate outcomes and strategies. Our paper shows that CEO industry tournament incentives matter for stock liquidity. Our paper contributes to a large literature on the roles of CEO styles and behaviors in shaping corporate policies.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur findings have several practical implications for investors, policymakers, and financial analysts. For example, our findings can help investors better understand how CEOs' compensation‐based incentives impact stock liquidity. Similarly, policymakers can use our findings to design policies that encourage CEOs to act in the best interest of their shareholders and promote market efficiency.

Asymmetric Naïveté: Beliefs About Self-Control

Do individuals anticipate time inconsistency in others? This paper jointly investigates beliefs about one’s own and others’ present bias. In an online laboratory experiment, participants engaged in a real-effort task display little awareness of their own present bias but anticipate present bias in others. Structurally, I estimate a present bias parameter [Formula: see text] of 0.82. Participants perceive others’ [Formula: see text] to be 0.87, indicating substantial sophistication, contrasted with 1.03 for themselves, indicating full naïveté. At the individual level, asymmetric naïveté correlates with overoptimism regarding one’s own versus others’ task enjoyment and time availability. The wedge in beliefs about present bias can inform equilibrium outcomes in a number of collaborative, competitive, and hierarchical settings, including teams in the workplace, management practices such as deadlines and tournament incentive schemes, and household consumption decisions. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the Laboratory for Economic Applications and Policy (Harvard University); Pershing Square Venture Fund for Research on the Foundations of Human Behavior (Harvard University); Harvard Business School (PhD Research Budget); and the Russell Sage Foundation (Small Research Grant) is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01780 .

Subordinate executives’ horizon and cash holdings

This study investigates whether internal governance stemming from subordinate executives' employment horizons affects corporate cash holdings. Consistent with the idea that key subordinate executives provide checks and balances within a firm and affect corporate decisions, we find cash holdings increase with subordinate executives' horizon, supporting the precautionary motive for the former. Controlling for alternative explanations, the positive association between internal governance and cash holdings is hardly affected by the agency motive, tournament incentives between CEO and subordinate executives or confidence level of executives. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of subordinate executives' horizon and cash holdings and are not driven by endogeneity issues. The analysis of cash sources documents that firms with longer subordinate executives’ horizon save a higher proportion of cash proceed through reduced dividend payouts and equity issuance, rather than debt. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how diverse agents with different employment horizons in the top management team influences the liquidity policy of the firm.

Industry tournament incentives and debt contracting

Industry tournament incentives and debt contracting

Industry tournament incentives and acquisition performance

This paper examines the effect of industry tournament incentives on acquisition performance. Using the pay gap between a firm's CEO and the highest-paid CEO in the same industry as the measure of industry tournament incentives, we find that deals led by CEOs with higher industry tournament incentives experience higher abnormal announcement returns. This positive relation between industry tournament incentives and acquisition returns is more pronounced when CEOs have greater mobility and probability of winning the tournament prize. Our findings highlight those tournament incentives induced by the external labor market play important roles in corporate acquisitions.

Debt Derisking

We examine how corporate bond fund managers manipulate portfolio risk in response to incentives. We find that liquidity risk concerns drive the allocation decisions of underperforming funds, whereas tournament incentives are of secondary importance. This leads laggard fund managers to trade off yield for liquidity while holding the exposure to other sources of risk constant. The documented derisking is stronger for managers with shorter tenure and is reinforced by a more concave flow to performance sensitivity and by periods of market stress. Derisking meaningfully supports ex post laggard fund returns. Flexible net asset values (swing pricing) may, however, reduce derisking incentives and create moral hazard. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03406 .

Tournament incentives and corporate digital transformation—evidence from China

ABSTRACT We examined the effect of tournament incentives on digital transformation of corporations (hereinafter referred to as ‘corporate digital transformation’) by employing 34,373 Chinese firm-year observations for the period from 2008 to 2021. We found a significantly positive association between executive compensation gap and corporate digital transformation, and this result remained robust after correcting for endogeneity. We further shed light on how the executive compensation gap promotes corporate digital transformation through corporate risk-taking. Finally, we showed that executive power and economic policy uncertainty weakened the positive relationship between the executive compensation gap and corporate digital transformation.

Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana

We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)

Tournament incentives, credit default swaps trading, and corporate policies: The interplay of managerial and creditor incentives

This paper investigates how the interaction between managerial and creditor incentives affects corporate risk and policies. Using a sample of 16,513 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2014, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) trading leads to higher stock return volatility and leverage, yet lower cash flow volatility and capital expenditure. Meanwhile, tournament incentive is associated with higher firm risk and more aggressive corporate policies. Further, we find that the interaction between tournament incentives and CDS trading alleviates the overall effect of intra-firm tournament incentives and CDS trading on firm risk and corporate policies. Altogether, our results suggest that risk-averse managers balance risk-taking incentives and creditor incentives when making corporate decisions and, hence are less sensitive to tournament incentives due to their concerns about exacting empty creditors problems in CDS-referenced firms. This study contributes to the literature by providing initial insights into the interaction effects between managerial and creditor incentives.

Executive Equity-Based Compensation and Tournament Incentives

Executive Equity-Based Compensation and Tournament Incentives

Tournament Incentives and Audit Report Lag: Further Evidence

Tournament Incentives and Audit Report Lag: Further Evidence

Does peer firms' debt default have positive externalities: The investment efficiency perspective

This paper examines the positive externalities of peer firms' debt default based on the investment efficiency perspective using data from Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2021. We robustly find that peers' debt default significantly increases the focal firm's investment efficiency. Moreover, peers' debt default generates positive externalities through investor attention and product market competition mechanisms. Additionally, our findings indicate that online platform interaction and industry tournament incentive enhance these positive externalities. Our study promotes a more nuanced understanding of debt default.

Non‐CEO executives' intraorganizational competition incentives and corporate labour investment efficiency

AbstractThis study examines the impact of non‐Chief Executive Officer (non‐CEO) executives' intraorganizational promotion‐based incentives, also known as tournament incentives, on corporate labour investment efficiency. We find that tournament incentives lead to inefficient labour investment, measured as the absolute deviation from optimal net hiring warranted by firm fundamentals. This positive relationship is weakened when non‐CEO executives are less eager to compete in the tournament. Mediating analysis demonstrates that reduced team cohesion, captured by non‐CEO executive turnover, mediates the relationship between tournament incentives and labour investment inefficiency. Our evidence is consistent with the dysfunctional view of tournament incentives and highlights the importance of non‐CEO executives' incentives in corporate labour investment.

Younger CEO and older managers: focusing on tournament incentives

Younger CEO and older managers: focusing on tournament incentives

How do industry tournament incentives affect firm debt maturity?

Our study investigates the effect of external industry tournament incentives on debt maturity structure. Prior research shows that industry tournament incentives motivate managers to employ more risky strategies. Recognizing this stronger tendency for risk-taking, creditors may shorten debt maturity and subject managers to more frequent scrutiny by debt markets. Consistent with this notion, our results show that stronger industry tournament incentives lead to significantly more short-term debt. This effect is more pronounced in firms with low credit quality, in areas with a high density of firms from the same industry, and in industries with more CEO positions.

The Impact of Executive Green Incentives and Top Management Team Characteristics on Corporate Value in China: The Mediating Role of Environment, Social and Government Performance

The pursuit of economic growth remains a consistent focal point in the development of nations. However, this heightened emphasis on economic expansion has precipitated a global environmental crisis (e.g., climate change, air pollution, etc.). Numerous countries have announced targets and commitments aimed at mitigating carbon emissions. Enterprises are the mainstay of economic development. In the context of low-carbon development, the current challenge faced by enterprises lies in transforming their business philosophy and value orientation to achieve a harmonious integration of economic growth and carbon emission reduction. Consequently, within the framework of sustainable development, the stability and developmental trajectory of enterprise value have emerged as prominent research subjects in recent years. As the concept of sustainable development gradually permeates society, there has been widespread attention from various sectors toward evaluating corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance. This study focuses on listed companies in China’s manufacturing industry as the research subject. Drawing upon the principal–agent theory, stakeholder theory, upper echelon theory and tournament incentive theory, we aim to validate the feasibility of selecting a top management team that aligns with the characteristics of sustainable development during enterprise transition. By constructing a structural equation model and conducting hypothesis testing under the premise of limited rationality among top management, we explore how green incentives provided to top management impact both enterprise transition toward sustainability and enhancement of corporate value. Additionally, we investigate how demographic characteristics of top management contribute to amplifying the role of green incentives on corporate value. The results show that executive green incentives and top management team characteristics positively impact the corporate environment, social and government (ESG) performance and that implementing environment, social and government aspects can improve corporate value. Upon further analysis, it is found that there is a moderate degree of coupling between top management team characteristics and executive green incentives in promoting better ESG performance and enhancing corporate value. This study provides empirical evidence of the favorable economic outcomes associated with environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance, which offers valuable insights for companies to consider when selecting and incentivizing executives, as well as for government departments aiming to enhance environmental, social and governance (ESG) incentive policies.

External tournament incentives and corporate social irresponsibility

AbstractWe integrate the perspectives of tournament and agency theories to examine whether, how, and when external tournament incentives influence firms' corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). Using data on Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2020, we show that external tournament incentives positively affect firms' CSI. Essentially, CEOs can use CSI to rapidly improve the firm's short‐term performance and thus increase their chances of winning external tournaments. Therefore, CEOs have an incentive to push companies to implement more CSI in response to external tournament incentives. Meanwhile, we find that good external corporate governance mechanisms (short‐selling pressure, marketization, and social trust) inhibit CEOs' opportunistic tendency to use CSI in response to external tournament incentives, thus attenuating the positive impact of external tournament incentives on CSI. This study extends the literature on external tournament incentives and CSI and provides important insights for shareholders and policymakers to effectively curb CSI.

How local tournament incentives influence ESG disclosure: CEO’s genuinely altruistic or self-serving?

PurposeThis study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.FindingsThe findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.Practical implicationsThis study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.Originality/valueThis study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.

Digital transformation and the impact of local tournament incentives: Evidence from publicly listed companies in China

In today's digital era, digital transformation has become an essential strategic priority for enterprises. This study examines how local peer compensation affects enterprise digital transformation, using CEO compensation data from Chinese listed companies between 2010 and 2019. Our research emphasizes the crucial role of local tournament incentives in advancing enterprise digitalization, primarily by enhancing digital investment and reducing financial constraints. Additionally, we find stronger positive effects in non-state-owned enterprises, high-risk-taking enterprises, enterprises with long-serving CEOs, and enterprises whose CEOs are not near retirement age. These findings suggest competition among CEOs for higher compensation in neighboring businesses drives digitalization within enterprises.