Tibetan Scholars Research Articles

On the Dissemination of Buddhist Tantras in Tibet. A Historical Introduction

Abstract This study outlines the phases of dissemination and development of the Buddhist tantras in Tibet. Analysing the earliest imperial catalogues, we trace, among the Buddhist scriptures that were translated from Sanskrit and Chinese into Tibetan, the first tantric texts that spread to Tibet. We then examine the doxographies and the classifications of the various categories of tantras conceived by Tibetan scholars over time, which converged in the process of formation and compilation of the different Tibetan canons of the “New” and of the “Ancient” schools. The gter ma phenomenon is analysed, considering it the way in which tantric Buddhist doctrines have been redefined over time, to adapt to various historical changes. Finally we take into consideration the creation of the Bon tantric literature, its classification and organisation in the Bon canon that, despite its development outside the mainstream schools, played an important role in the religious history of Tibet.

Ганден Пходранг: правительство Далай-ламы в XVIII в.

Introduction. The article examines the structure and features of Ganden Phodrang (Tib. dGa’-ldan pho-brang) — Tibetan traditional Government founded by the 5th Dalai Lama Lobsang Gyatso (1617–1682) in 1642 — in the context of interaction with institutions of the Qing administration in the 18th century. Diarchy based on the principles of unity of monastic and secular government (Tib. Сhos-srid) became the basis of the political and legal system of the Tibetan state and was reflected in some specifics of relations with Buddhist countries and peoples. The influence of the Qing Empire in the region by the end of the 18th century increased, and that was traced in formal characteristics but did not affect the functioning laws of Ganden Phodrang. Goals. The paper reviews and analyzes the origins, structure and features of the Dalai Lama’s traditional government Ganden Phodrang (1642–1959); identifies the main changes in the political structure of Tibet during the period of the greatest influence of the Qing government institutions in the 18th century; clarifies the position and role of the Dalai Lama as head of state, as well as the importance of regents and Qing ambans in governing the country. Materials and Methods. In addition to Qing sources, the article uses works by German and French Tibetan scholars (in English), as well as studies by Indian and Chinese Tibetologists. In Russian historiography, special attention is paid to the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas, their relations with the Qing emperors, as well as to such administrative institutions of the Qing as ambans, legislative acts, and the Golden urn lot. Methodologically, the study employs historical and comparative approaches, and the problem-chronological principle. Conclusions. The article concludes that the Dalai Lama’s Government was uniquely independent in the 18th century, and tulku regents possessed special ‘dual’ status and significance. It is necessary to emphasize the importance of studying the topic in the context of international polemics around classification of the socioeconomic structure of Tibet in the Middle Ages, and its status in relation to China.

Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise: Distinguishing the Svātantrika/*Prāsaṅgika Difference in Early Twelfth Century Tibet

The teachings of Madhyamaka (“middle way philosophy”) have been the basis of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice since the eighth century. After the twelfth century, Tibetan scholars distinguished two branches of Madhyamaka: Autonomist (rang rgyud pa) and Consequentialist (thal ’gyur ba, *prāsaṅgika). What distinctions in Madhyamaka thought and practice did twelfth century Tibetan scholars make to differentiate these two branches? This article focuses upon a newly identified twelfth century Tibetan manuscript on Madhyamaka from the Collected Works of the Kadampas: Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise. Khu lo tsā ba, also known as Khu ston Mdo sde ’bar, was a contemporary of Jayānanda and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Nyi ma grags and instrumental for the revitalized reception of Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet. Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise outlines a multifaceted understanding of Madhyamaka (“middle way philosophy”) as the work solely focuses upon the distinctions between Autonomist and Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. The paper outlines the structure and content of the Treatise and identifies six topics that the author emphasizes to distinguish Autonomist and Consequentialist branches of Madhyamaka. Based on an overview of these topics, the paper concludes that the Autonomist/Consequentialist distinction of Madhyamaka was already well developed in twelfth century Tibet and involved a differential of systems that encompassed much more than distinct styles of logical proof.

Can We Speak of Kadam Gzhan Stong?: Tracing the Sources for Other-Emptiness in Early-Fourteenth-Century Tibet

Can We Speak of Kadam Gzhan Stong?Tracing the Sources for Other-Emptiness in Early-Fourteenth-Century Tibet Tsering Wangchuk Introduction It has become the norm for scholars familiar with the self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong)1 in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition to associate the latter doctrine with Dolpopa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361), the foremost synthesizer of the Jonang (jo nang) School of Tibetan Buddhism. He developed a systematic, distinctive view of ultimate truth (don dam bden pa; paramārthasatya) and propagated this view widely and earned much scorn for it, leading to one of the most controversial doctrinal-sectarian disputes in Tibetan Buddhist history. His explication of other-emptiness, which he equates with the ultimate truth, is deemed radical and wholly unacceptable by many of his contemporaries and later Tibetan scholars because it stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream fourteenth-century and early-fifteenth-century Tibetan interpretations of self-emptiness, the notion that all phenomena including ultimate truth do not exist inherently. The self-emptiness interpretations are based primarily on Indic sources such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna’s (c. 200) Madhyamakakārikā, and Candrakīrti’s (c. 570–640) Madhyamakāvatāra. In contrast, Dolpopa [End Page 9] generally does not claim that middle wheel treatises (‘khor lo bar pa’i gzhung) such as the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras are the fundamental sources for his presentation of an other-emptiness view. Rather, he bases his formulation of other-emptiness on tantric sources such as the Kālacakra,2 last wheel sūtras (‘khor lo tha ma’i mdo) such as Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,3 and Indic commentarial sources4 traditionally credited to figures such as Maitreya, Asaṅga (c. 300), and Vasubandhu (c. 300). As a prominent fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographer, Dolpopa, however, does not repudiate self-emptiness per se; rather, he speaks of two types of emptiness5 that have separate referent points. For him, self-emptiness refers only to conventional phenomena such as tables, chairs, and negative defilements that do not inherently exist6 or that are empty of their own entities. Dolpopa argues that since conventional phenomena cannot withstand analysis, in that their individual entities are essentially empty or deconstructed, as the existence of their nature is thoroughly investigated, they are empty of inherent existence. Therefore, he claims that self-emptiness is not ultimate truth.7 On the other hand, he passionately demonstrates that other-emptiness exists inherently and ultimately. Furthermore, it is identified with the tathāgata-essence (de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po, tathāgatagarbha or buddha-nature (sangs rgyas kyi rigs; buddhagotra) endowed with enlightened qualities that exists in all beings. Dolpopa argues that this form of emptiness is not empty of its own entity, since it ultimately and permanently exists. Also, ultimate truth is empty of all conventional phenomena that are antithetical to ultimately existent other-emptiness. So, while self-emptiness, which he refers to as “empty-emptiness” (stong pa’i stong pa), is primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras of the middle wheel teachings, it is not ultimate truth, as it is empty of its own entity and it is not free from conceptual thought. On the other hand, other-emptiness, which he dubs “non-empty-emptiness” (mi stong pa’i stong pa), while not primarily taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is delineated in last wheel teachings of the Buddha, such as Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Śrīmālādevīsūtra, and others to refer to the naturally enlightened buddha-nature that is empty of all conventional phenomena. This is Dolpopa’s position on the two types of emptiness and the hierarchy of Mahāyāna literature in a nutshell and much of the discourse that follows on other-emptiness in the history of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism has its roots in Dolpopa’s doctrinal formulation of other-emptiness vis-à-vis self-emptiness. While Dolpopa certainly gets the well-deserved credit for making other-emptiness “a place of fundamental importance in the expression of his philosophy”8 in Tibet, his controversial interpretation of Mahāy...

An Early Bka’-gdams-pa Madhyamaka Work Attributed to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna

Although Atiśa is famous for his journey to Tibet and his teaching there, his teachings of Madhyamaka are not extensively commented upon in the works of known and extant indigenous Tibetan scholars. Atiśa’s Madhyamaka thought, if even discussed, is minimally acknowledged in recent modern scholarly overviews or sourcebooks on Indian Buddhist thought. The following annotated translation provides a late eleventh century Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka teaching on the two realities (satyadvaya) attributed to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījnāna (982–1054 c.e.) entitled A General Explanation of, and Framework for Understanding, the Two Realities (bden gnyis spyi bshad dang/ bden gnyis ’jog tshul). The text furnishes an exposition of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) thought of Nāgārjuna based on an exegesis of conventional reality and ultimate reality within the framework of Mahāyāna path structures found in texts attributed to Maitreyanātha. The General Explanation fills an important gap in the historical knowledge of Madhyamaka teachings in eleventh century India and Tibet. The text presents a Madhyamaka teaching brought to Tibet by Atiśa and provides previously unknown evidence for the type of pure Madhyamaka teachings that circulated among the communities of early followers of Atiśa. These teachings were disseminated before the rise of the early Bka’-gdams-pa monastery of Gsang-phu ne’u-thog and its debating traditions that, particularly beginning in the twelfth century, placed emphasis on the merger of Madhyamaka and Epistemology (pramāṇa).

Who is that Masked Man? Candrakīrti’s Opponent in Prasannapadā I 55.11–58.13

The paper aims to determine the identity of an unnamed opponent in a passage of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā whose school affiliation eluded traditional Tibetan scholars and is disputed by modern scholars. The individual(s) in question, whose fundamental ontological views are made evident in the passage’s opening objection as presented by Candrakīrti, has/have alternatively been identified as the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka, as representatives of the Naiyāyika school and, following Stcherbatsky, as Dignāga and/or later members of his epistemological-logical tradition. Although textual evidence adduced by authors of recent publications has been viewed as supportive of the hypothesis that the interlocutor is Dignāga, the general nature of this evidence and awareness of Dignāga’s ontological presuppositions suggest that the matter requires reconsideration.

Acquiring the Notion of a Dependent Designation: A Response to Douglas L. Berger

Acquiring the Notion of a Dependent Designation:A Response to Douglas L. Berger Jay L. Garfield and Jan Westerhoff In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects. Berger's analysis, and the reading of the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome amid the profusion of such understandings. We have learned much from it. The central argument, nonetheless, is vitiated by two significant fallacies, to which we draw attention, not in order to refute Berger's reading, but to indicate that the more generally accepted reading should not be discarded on the strength of this argument. First, in arguing for his new translation of prajñaptir upādāya, Berger adduces many other occurrences of the term prajñapti in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, occurrences in which it indeed has the ordinary sense of "concept," or "idea," "notion." He argues (pp. 48–49) on this basis that we should not take it to mean any more than this in XXIV : 18. Fair enough. But in none of those occurrences does prajñapti occur in the context of the phrase at issue, namely prajñaptir upādāya, and it is this unusual occurrence that concerns us. The lexical argument is thus at least a non sequitur. Furthermore, all canonical Tibetan translations of prajñaptir upādāya render it brten nas gdags pa, which can only be glossed as a noun derived from two terms connected by an ablative particle, that is, "dependence [abl] designation," and should be translated as "dependent designation" (or as one of the many rough equivalents chosen by the many Western translators whom Berger criticizes). Of course, Berger might reply that all of these Tibetan translators, like their Western successors, were in thrall to Candrakīrti. But that would be a desperate argument for at least two reasons. First, at the time of the translation of the text into [End Page 365] Tibetan, Candrakīrti's star had not yet risen to the zenith it would occupy in Tibet, and there is little evidence of his thought having substantial impact in India during this period. Now, to be sure, Tibetan translations circa the ninth century do not by any means clinch the case, but the fact that these translations were all produced by teams of eminent Indian pandits and eminent Tibetan scholars and that they are unanimous should carry some weight. The second reason takes us to Berger's second fallacy. Berger charges that Candrakīrti is to blame (pp. 51–56). But this can't be right. It is very hard to make sense of Buddhapālita's fifth-century commentary following Berger's interpretation. Indeed Pandeya (2 : 202) reconstructs Buddhapālita's phrase brten nas gdags pa as pratītyaveditavyaḥ ("to be understood as dependent"). Bhāvaviveka also writes before Candrakīrti, and indeed Candrakīrti takes issue with much of Bhāvaviveka's reading of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. But Candrakīrti agrees with Bhāvaviveka about how to read XXIV : 18. In Prajñāpradīpa, glossing the term in question in the context of the verse in question, he writes: "Here, brten nas gdags pa(prajñaptir upādāya) means 'mundane and transcendental conventional expressions.' Thus, it means 'designation on the basis of the aggregates' (brten nas gdags pa ste/ 'jig rten pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha snyad 'dod pas nye bas len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa yin no//)" (230b). The fact that Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka disagree about so much lends force to their agreement on this point. The fact that such great Indian pandits, including both of these figures...

In Defense of His Guru: Dratsepa’s Rebuttal to the Challenges Articulated by the Proponents of the Other-Emptiness Doctrine

The buddha-nature literature has a significant place within the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and Tibetan Buddhism. While it is usually included in the so-called Last Wheel of the Buddha’s teachings, many Tibetan thinkers began to cast doubts about the textual significance of buddha-nature discourse in fourteenth-century Tibet. In this article, I will examine one particular case where there is apparent tension between multiple Tibetan masters over the importance of buddha-nature teachings. This paper primarily analyzes Dratsepa’s commentary to the Ornament (mdzes rgyan) written by his teacher, Buton. Dratsepa construes the Ornament as a work critiquing Dolpopa’s interpretation of the buddha-nature literature. He levels a barrage of criticisms against Dolpopa by referring to Indian śāstras and sūtras that are equally important to both of them, and also by tracing his own assessment of the tathāgata-essence teachings to early Tibetan scholars. In contradistinction to Dolpopa’s claims, Dratsepa offers several nuanced readings of the buddha-nature literature and complicates the notion of what it means to have tathāgata-essence, what a definitive or provisional meaning entails, and the relationship between the Middle Wheel and the Last Wheel teachings. In brief, Dratsepa’s text sheds light on one of the earliest discourses on the tension between self-emptiness and other-emptiness presentations.

Legal Autonomy of Tibet: A Tibetan Lawyer's Perspective

A Dr. Lobsang Sangay is a Research Associate at the East Asian Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School. Lobsang studied in Tibetan refugee high school in Darjeeling, B.A (Honors) and LLB (Bachelor in law) in Delhi University, India. He did his Master and Doctorate degrees at Harvard Law School and was a recipient of 2004 Yong K. Kim' 95 Prize of excellence for his Doctorate dissertation. In 2006, he was selected as one of the twenty-four young leaders of Asia by Asia Society, a global organization based in New York City. He has given numerous lectures on Sino-Tibet issues in various institutes and venues around the world. He organized major conferences on Tibet between Chinese and Tibetan scholars at Harvard University. He is consulted by international media and has published articles about Tibet in the HARVARD ASIA QUARTERLY, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, HARVARD SOUTH ASIA JOURNAl and chapters in books on Tibet and Human Rights. 2 JEAIL 2008 A Tibetan Lawyer s Persepective on Tibet 325

Newar Scholars and Tibetan Buddhists

Nepal’s role in the expansion of Mahayana Buddhism beyond the Himalaya is very significant. Nepal became the center of Mahayana Buddhism after the Muslim invasion of Nalanda Mahavihara in the 1199 A.D., which she maintained almost for 300 years. During this period, Nepal had produced a large number of profound Buddhist scholars. Most of them were the teachers of eminent Tibetan Buddhists. Some of the Nepalese Gurus also has continued lineage in Tibet until now. During that time, every Tibetan had desire to go to Nepal for higher Buddhist learning. As a matter of fact, many Tibetans made arduous journey across the Himalaya to fulfill the dream. Tibetan studied various forms of tantra, precepts, logic, doctrine, Sutra, Sadhana, Doha, Charyagiti, meditation etc. under direct supervision of Nepalese teachers. Great Tibetan scholars such as Marpa, Rwa Lo, Chag Lo, Khon phu ba, Klog Lo, Gos Lo, and others were the product of Nepal’s scholarly tradition. They have significant place in the history of Tibet. Nepalese scholars also frequently visited Tibet where they taught Buddhism in various monasteries. They also had major role in propagating tantra in Tibet. Tibetans firmly believe that it is not possible to attain enlightenment without practicing tantra. The contribution of Nepalese scholars was so profound that Tibet produced many eminent scholars who developed scholastic tradition in Tibet. But after 14th century, Nepal’s scholarly tradition ceased to continue. Then after, Tibetans started to call them ‘the dull’.

A Seminar on Tibetan Society and Culture

Previous articleNext article No AccessA Seminar on Tibetan Society and CultureRobert B. EkvallRobert B. Ekvall Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Current Anthropology Volume 4, Number 4Oct., 1963 Sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/200402 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright 1963 The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological ResearchPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The Nomadic Pattern of Living among the Tibetans as Preparation for War

M ANY factors and influences operate to make the typical pastoral nomadic community what it is: a predatory, warlike, and potentially explosive society. There are psychological influences which mold character into what has been called the nomadic personality, and at the other end of the scale there are economic causes the need or desire for enlarged pasturelands-which at times set the nomad to raiding and on the path of conquest. Between these two extremes there are many other factors which come into play and some work has been done in the examination and description of these various factors and influences. Scant attention, however, has been paid to the fact that the exigencies of the nomadic way of life, the demands placed upon the nomad, and the nature and manner of his response constitute an intensive, effective, and continuous military training program. It is the purpose of this paper to examine in some detail this phenomenon and show its relationship to the distinctive characteristics of the nomadic way of life. The data used are taken from recollection and writings of personal observation and experience during several years of residence among a number of nomadic communities in Amdo-the northeastern province of Tibet (see Fig. 1). Most recently the important aspects of this paper have been discussed with several of the Tibetan scholars who are now connected with the Tibetan Research Project of the University of Washington and have received their general endorsement. Two of these scholars1 have intimate first-hand knowledge of nomadic communities in other parts of Tibet, and the information they have given makes it clear that the nomadism of northeastern Tibet, herein described, differs but little from the nomadism of eastern Tibet or that which exists on the fringes of the Northern Plain in central Tibet. Further confirmation of a sort, in observed incident and action, is scattered throughout the writings of many who-have traveled in Tibet,2 but I know of no topical analysis of these data such as I propose. The encampment, which may number anywhere from a dozen to 100 tents or families, is the analogue of the hamlet or village among the farming communities and generally is the most tightly integrated and cohesive unit of nomadic society. Thus, attention will be focused on the normal routine and activity of the encampment to show how and in what degree such routine and activity does in fact fulfill the function of a military training program. Inescapably, the manner in which such training affects families and individuals will appear, as well as the more tangential relationship to tribal activity and policy, but primary emphasis will be on the encampment.