Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Research Articles

Analysis of Warrant Attacks on Some Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes

In 2004, Yang et al. proposed a threshold proxy signature scheme that efficiently reduced the computational complexity of previous schemes. In 2009, Hu and Zhang presented some security leakages of Yang`s scheme and proposed an improvement to eliminate the security leakages that had been pointed out. In this paper, we will point out that both Yang and Hu`s schemes still have some security weaknesses, which cannot resist warrant attacks where an adversary can forge valid proxy signatures by changing the warrant . We also propose two secure improvements for these schemes.

Improvement of an Eliptic Curve Based Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

In 2006, Pomykala et al. proposed an elliptic curve based threshold proxy signature scheme as well as a proxy-protected version. They claimed their scheme had the properties of secrecy, unforgeability, non-repudiation and signer’s identification. In this study, we showed inter conspiracy attack on the basic scheme and gave another attack on the proxy-protected version. We pointed out that even if the central authority is engaged, the basic model is not a proxy-protected one. We also proposed an improved scheme that can resist the known attacks to achieve higher security, and gave the security analysis of the improved scheme in detail.

An Algorithm of (n, t)-Threshold Proxy Signature with an Arbitrator

The paper presents an (n, t)-threshold proxy signature scheme with an Arbitrator which enables an original signer to delegate the signature authority to sign a message on behalf of the original signer to proxy group P of n members. The original signer distributes the proxy key among the proxy group members in such a way that not less then t proxy signers and the Arbitrator can cooperatively sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Thus, for signing the document it is necessary to have agreements of not less then t members. The Arbitrator is a trusted third party. It receives the information from the t members and completes the calculation of the digital signature. A verifier can identify the original signer and the members of the proxy group P. The main feature is that n members of the proxy group can not calculate the proxy key and the original signer’s secret key.

A Secure Non-Repudiable General Proxy Signature

A threshold proxy signature scheme allows any or more proxy signers to cooperatively sign messages on behalf of an original signer, but or fewer proxy signers cannot. In this paper, in order to adapt to some practical applications, by a modification of Hu threshold proxy signature, we propose a novel secure variation of proxy signature scheme called general proxy signature scheme. This scheme has some advantages over the threshold scheme, in the sense that the subsets of proxy group that allow to sign messages on behalf of an original signer, are not necessarily defined according to their cardinality and it becomes this proposed concept more attractive and practical when the members of a proxy group do not all have the same power or influence. Also, it is more efficient. This scheme is proved to enjoy security against the existing attacks.

Analysis and Design of Protocol for Enhanced Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Based on RSA for Known Signers

Many threshold proxy signature schemes are proposed in which the t out of n threshold schemes are deployed; but they still lack the property of security. In this research paper, secret sharing proxy signature could permit the shares of designated signers, called proxy signers, renew their own proxy shares periodically without changing the secret. In particular, our scheme applies the (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme and allows any t or more then t signers to form a designated group from n proxy signers to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. In the proposed scheme, furthermore, a proxy signer can recover his/her own share from t other proxy shares without revealing any information about other proxy shares. Unless more than t other proxy signers cooperate and collude, the secret share algorithm is always secure. We compare the performance of four schemes: Hwang et al., Wen et al., Geng et al. and Fengying et al. with the performance of a scheme that has been proposed by the authors of this article earlier. In the proposed scheme, both the combiner and the secret share holder can verify the correctness of the information that they are receiving from each other. Therefore, the enhanced threshold proxy signature scheme is secure and efficient against notorious conspiracy attacks.

Cryptanalysis of an Eliptic Curve Based Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

In 2006, Pomykala et al. proposed an elliptic curve based threshold proxy signature scheme as well as a proxy-protected version. They claimed that their scheme had the properties of secrecy, unforgeability, non-repudiation and signer’s identification, and the proxy-protected version could assure the proxy-protection property. In this paper, we show attacks on the basic scheme and we also point out that even if the central authority is engaged, the basic model is not proxy-protected.

Secure Undeniable Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

the threshold proxy signature scheme allows the original signer to delegate a signature authority to the proxy group to cooperatively sign message on behalf of an original signer. In this paper, we propose a new scheme which includes the features and benefits of the RSA scheme. Also, we will evaluate the security of undeniable threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers. We find that the existing threshold proxy scheme is insecure against the original signer forgery. In this paper, we show the cryptanalysis of an existed scheme. Additional, we propose the secure, undeniable and known signers threshold proxy signature scheme which answers the drawback of an existed scheme. We also demonstrate that a threshold proxy signature suffers from a conspiracy of an original signer and a secret share dealer, that the scheme is commonly forgeable, and cannot offer undeniable. We claim that the proposed scheme offers the undeniable characteristic.

Method of Anti-Virus Protection Based on (n, t) Threshold Proxy Signature with an Arbitrator

The article suggests the method of anti-virus protection of mobile devices based on the usage of proxy digital signatures and an (n;t)-threshold proxy signature scheme with an arbitrator. The unique feature of the suggested method is in the absence of necessity to install anti-virus software in a mobile device. It will be enough only to have the software verifying digital signatures and the Internet. The method is used on the base of public keys infrastructure /PKI/, thus minimizing implementation expenses.

Security pitfalls of an efficient threshold proxy signature scheme for mobile agents

A (t,n) threshold proxy signature scheme enables an original signer to delegate his/her signing power to n proxy signers such that any t or more proxy signers can sign messages on behalf of the original signer, but t−1 or less of them cannot produce a valid proxy signature. Based on the RSA cryptosystem, Hong proposed an efficient (t,n) threshold proxy signature for mobile agents. Cai et al. found that the scheme due to Hong is proxy-unprotected, meaning that the original signer can generate a valid proxy signature by himself. However, it is unclear whether the scheme can be used in reality after fixing the security problem discovered by Cai et al. In this letter, we provide a detailed analysis on Hongʼs scheme and show that the scheme fails to achieve the properties of secrecy, proxy protected, undeniability, identifiability and even time constraint and thus adopted of this efficient construction in practice is not recommended.

A Novel Hybrid Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

In this paper, we propose a new type of threshold proxy signature scheme: hybrid threshold proxy signature (HTPS), in which a signature is cooperatively generated by the partial original signers themselves and the proxy signers on behalf of their own original signer in threshold proxy way. We formalize the notion of security for hybrid threshold proxy signature scheme and prove our schemes security, such as, distinguishability, verifiability, strong unforgeability, strong nonrepudiation, etc.

Cryptanalysis and Performance Evaluation of Enhanced Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Based on RSA for Known Signers

In these days there are plenty of signature schemes such as the <svg style="vertical-align:-2.3205pt;width:32.924999px;" id="M1" height="15.0875" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 32.924999 15.0875" width="32.924999" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.138)"><path id="x28" d="M300 -147l-18 -23q-106 71 -159 185.5t-53 254.5v1q0 139 53 252.5t159 186.5l18 -24q-74 -62 -115.5 -173.5t-41.5 -242.5q0 -130 41.5 -242.5t115.5 -174.5z" /></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,5.944,12.138)"><path id="x1D461" d="M324 430l-26 -36l-112 -4l-55 -265q-13 -66 7 -66q13 0 44.5 20t50.5 40l17 -24q-38 -40 -85.5 -73.5t-87.5 -33.5q-50 0 -21 138l55 262h-80l-2 8l25 34h66l25 99l78 63l10 -9l-37 -153h128z" /></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,11.741,12.138)"><path id="x2C" d="M95 130q31 0 61 -30t30 -78q0 -53 -38 -87.5t-93 -51.5l-11 29q77 31 77 85q0 26 -17.5 43t-44.5 24q-4 0 -8.5 6.5t-4.5 17.5q0 18 15 30t34 12z" /></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,18.438,12.138)"><path id="x1D45B" d="M495 86q-46 -47 -87 -72.5t-63 -25.5q-43 0 -16 107l49 210q7 34 8 50.5t-3 21t-13 4.5q-35 0 -109.5 -72.5t-115.5 -140.5q-21 -75 -38 -159q-50 -10 -76 -21l-6 8l84 340q8 35 -4 35q-17 0 -67 -46l-15 26q44 44 85.5 70.5t64.5 26.5q35 0 10 -103l-24 -98h2&#xA;q42 56 97 103.5t96 71.5q46 26 74 26q9 0 16 -2.5t14 -11.5t9.5 -24.5t-1 -44t-13.5 -68.5q-30 -117 -47 -200q-4 -19 -3.5 -25t6.5 -6q21 0 70 48z" /></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,26.972,12.138)"><path id="x29" d="M275 270q0 -296 -211 -440l-19 23q75 62 116.5 174t41.5 243t-42 243t-116 173l19 24q211 -144 211 -440z" /></g> </svg> threshold proxy signature scheme (Kumar and Verma 2010). The network is a shared medium so that the weakness security attacks such as eavesdropping, replay attack, and modification attack. Thus, we have to establish a common key for encrypting/decrypting our communications over an insecure network. In this scheme, a <svg style="vertical-align:-2.3205pt;width:32.924999px;" id="M2" height="15.0875" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 32.924999 15.0875" width="32.924999" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.138)"><use xlink:href="#x28"/></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,5.944,12.138)"><use xlink:href="#x1D461"/></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,11.741,12.138)"><use xlink:href="#x2C"/></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,18.438,12.138)"><use xlink:href="#x1D45B"/></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,26.972,12.138)"><use xlink:href="#x29"/></g> </svg> threshold proxy signature scheme based on RSA, any <svg style="vertical-align:-0.1638pt;width:5.9250002px;" id="M3" height="10.3875" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 5.9250002 10.3875" width="5.9250002" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,10.125)"><use xlink:href="#x1D461"/></g> </svg> or more proxy signers can cooperatively generate a proxy signature while <svg style="vertical-align:-0.1638pt;width:31.612499px;" id="M4" height="11.125" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 31.612499 11.125" width="31.612499" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,10.862)"><use xlink:href="#x1D461"/></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,9.633,10.862)"><path id="x2212" d="M535 230h-483v50h483v-50z" /></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,23.385,10.862)"><path id="x31" d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" /></g> </svg> or fewer of them cannot do it. The threshold proxy signature scheme uses the RSA cryptosystem to generate the private and the public key of the signers (Rivest et al., 1978). Comparison is done on the basis of time complexity, space complexity, and communication overhead. We compare the performance of four schemes (Hwang et al. (2003), Kuo and Chen (2005), Yong-Jun et al. (2007), and Li et al. (2007), with the performance of a scheme that has been proposed earlier by the authors of this paper. In the proposed scheme, both the combiner and the secret share holder can verify the correctness of the information that they are receiving from each other. Therefore, the enhanced threshold proxy signature scheme is secure and efficient against notorious conspiracy attacks.

Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Enhanced Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Based on RSA for Known Signers

Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Enhanced Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme Based on RSA for Known Signers

Secure proxy signature schemes from the Weil pairing

A proxy signature scheme is a method which allows an original signer to delegate his signing authority to a designated person, called a proxy signer. Up to now, most of proxy signature schemes are based on the discrete logarithm problem. In this paper, we propose a proxy signature scheme and a threshold proxy signature scheme from the Weil pairing, and also provide a security proof.

A New Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme with Fast Revocation

In a ሺ࢚, ࢔ሻ threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegate his/her signing power to ࢔ proxy signers such that any ࢚ or more out of ࢔ proxy signers can sign messages on behalf of the original signer, but ࢚െ૚ or less of the proxy signers cannot generate a proxy signature. In a proxy signature scheme, when original signer wants to revoke the delegation earlier than his/her plan, he/she cannot do anything. Moreover, the revocation of delegated rights is an essential issue of the many proxy signature schemes. In this paper, we try to solve the fast revocation issue of the threshold proxy signature schemes and propose a new threshold proxy signature scheme with fast revocation that solve the fast revocation weakness of threshold proxy signature scheme.

A Secure Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

Abstract Aiming at the security and performance problems existed in most threshold proxy signature (TPS) schemes, this paper presents a new TPS scheme based on bilinear pairings. In this work, the security level of the proposed TPS scheme has been significantly enhanced by using improved short signatures and interactive secret-sharing. Our analysis indicates that the proposed scheme achieves the six accepted security properties that are required for a strong-secure TPS scheme. It can also resist a severe attack against TPS, i.e., original signer changing attack.

Provably Secure Threshold Proxy Signature SchemeBased on Factoring

 Abstract—A proxy signature scheme is a method which allows an original signer to delegate his signing authority to a designated person, called a proxy signer. Moreover, the signing authority can be designated to a few proxy signers to scatter the signing rights. A threshold proxy signature scheme allows t out of n proxy signers to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. In this paper, we propose a new threshold proxy signature scheme based on the factoring problem in which the original signer delegates his signing authority to n authorized proxy signers in such a way that any t out of n proxy signers can generate a proxy signature collectively, while t-1 or less proxy signers cannot. Finally, we provide a proof on its security.

Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme with Known Signers

在TAMC'06上，Bao等人以双线性对为工具，首次提出了一种基于身份的已知签名人的门限代理签名方案(以下标记为BCW方案)，并得出了满足强不可伪造性以及原始签名人发送签名了的授权证书时并不需要安全信道等安全性结论。本文对BCW方案进行了安全性分析，成功地给出了一种攻击，攻击者通过公开渠道获得一个合法的原始签名人发送给代理签名人的签名了的授权证书以及代理签名人已经生成的一个有效的代理签名后，能够伪造出一个新的对相同消息的代理签名，而原始签名人变为攻击者自己。由于验证者并不能验证代理签名人到底是代表谁生成了代理签名, 这样，攻击者就获得了与合法原始签名人相同的权益。为了避免这种攻击，本文提出了改进的措施，分析表明，改进措施能有效地弥补了该方案的安全缺陷。

Breaking Pomykala-Barabasz Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme

In 2006, Pomykala and Barabasz proposed an elliptic curve based threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers. They claimed that their scheme was relatively simple in construction, had the properties of unforgeability and non-repudiation, and admitted the proactive security. Later, Li and Hu pointed out that the scheme of Pomykala and Barabasz was insecure against the conspiracy attack. And then, they proposed an improved scheme. In this paper, we not only show that the threshold proxy signature scheme of Pomykala and Barabasz is universal forgeable, but also show that the improvement of Li and Hu suffers from the rogue key attack.

Identity-Based Threshold Proxy Signature from Bilinear Pairings

Delegation of rights is a common practice in the real world. We present two identity-based threshold proxy signature schemes, which allow an original signer to delegate her signing capability to a group of n proxy signers, and it requires a consensus of t or more proxy signers in order to generate a valid signature. In addition to identity-based scheme, privacy protection for proxy singers and security assurance are two distinct features of this work. Our first scheme provides partial privacy protection to proxy signers such that all signers' identities are revealed, whereas none of those t participating signers is specified. On the other hand, all proxy signers remain anonymous in the second scheme. This provides a full privacy protection to all proxy signers; however, each valid signature contains a tag that allows one to trace all the participating proxy signers. Both our proposed schemes are secure against unforgeability under chosen message attack, and satisfy many other necessary conditions for proxy signature.

Efficient threshold proxy signature protocol for mobile agents

Mobile agents can migrate across different execution environments through the network. One important task of a mobile agent is to act as a proxy signer to sign a digital signature on behalf of the agent owner. As the agent and the remote hosts are not trustworthy, or are probably malicious, there are great challenges for the task. In this paper, we propose an efficient, secure ( t , n ) threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. The proposed scheme shares the proxy signing key with a simple Lagrange formula. However, it does not reveal any secret information. Owing to its simple algorithm and few parameter requirements, the proposed scheme requires few calculations and few transactions. The proxy signature generation stage and the proxy signature combining stage are completely non-interactive. Furthermore, the size of the partial proxy signing key and that of the partial proxy signature are constant and independent of the number of proxy signers.